Tag: Haymon v. Pettit

  • Haymon v. Pettit, 9 N.Y.3d 324 (2007): No Duty to Protect Non-Patrons Chasing Foul Balls Outside Stadium

    Haymon v. Pettit, 9 N.Y.3d 324 (2007)

    A baseball park operator generally owes no duty to warn or protect non-patron spectators who are injured while chasing foul balls outside the stadium, even if the operator offers an incentive for retrieving such balls.

    Summary

    A 14-year-old, L.H., was injured when struck by a drunk driver after chasing a foul ball into a public street near Falcon Park. The baseball association operating the park offered free tickets for returned foul balls. L.H.’s mother sued the association, arguing its promotion created a duty to protect or warn participants. The New York Court of Appeals held that the association owed no such duty. The inherent dangers of crossing a street, coupled with the association’s lack of control over the street and third parties, negated any duty of care.

    Facts

    L.H., a 14-year-old, regularly retrieved foul balls outside Falcon Park, a baseball stadium operated by the Auburn Community Non-Profit Baseball Association, Inc. (Ball Club). The Ball Club offered free tickets for returning foul balls. L.H. was struck by a vehicle driven by Donald Pettit, who was intoxicated, after L.H. chased a foul ball into a public street adjacent to the stadium while wearing headphones and failing to look for traffic. The parking lot across the street was owned by the City of Auburn and used by baseball fans.

    Procedural History

    L.H.’s mother sued the Ball Club, Pettit, and the City of Auburn. The Supreme Court denied the Ball Club’s motion for summary judgment, finding it had a duty. The Appellate Division reversed, dismissing the complaint against the Ball Club, holding that no legal duty existed. Two justices dissented. The New York Court of Appeals then reviewed the Appellate Division’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a baseball park operator owes a duty to warn or protect non-patron spectators who are injured while chasing foul balls that are hit out of the stadium when the operator offers an incentive for retrieving those balls.

    Holding

    No, because an owner or occupier of land generally owes no duty to warn or protect others from a dangerous condition on adjacent property unless the owner created or contributed to such a condition and, here, the dangers of crossing the street exist independent of the Ball Club’s promotion.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that landowners generally don’t owe a duty to protect others from dangers on adjacent property unless they created or contributed to the condition. Citing Galindo v Town of Clarkstown, 2 NY3d 633, 636 (2004), the court stated, “The reason for such a rule is obvious—a person who lacks ownership or control of property cannot fairly be held accountable for injuries resulting from a hazard on neighboring property.” Foreseeability alone doesn’t create a duty. The Court distinguished the case from situations where a landowner created a dangerous condition on adjacent property. It drew an analogy to Darby v Compagnie Natl. Air France, 96 NY2d 343 (2001), where a hotel wasn’t liable for a guest’s drowning at a public beach despite encouraging its use. Here, the Ball Club’s promotion, like the hotel’s services, didn’t create a duty to ensure safety in an area they didn’t control. The court observed: “The dangers of crossing the street—and individuals electing to cross it in pursuit of foul balls—exist independent of the Ball Club’s promotion.” Even if the promotion contributed to the risk, the court considered the “practical realities” that “foul balls can land on virtually any square foot of property surrounding a stadium, and imposition of a duty to warn or protect under such circumstances is neither fair nor practical”. Imposing a duty would lead to limitless liability, requiring the stadium to control the conduct of third persons outside its premises, which is unrealistic. The court stated: “[I]t is difficult to imagine what steps the stadium operator could have taken that would have sufficed to meet a duty.”