New York Law Review

Tag: Hardship

  • Douglaston Civic Assn. v. Klein, 51 N.Y.2d 963 (1980): Establishes Standard for ‘Uniqueness’ in Zoning Variances

    51 N.Y.2d 963 (1980)

    For a zoning variance based on hardship, ‘uniqueness’ does not require the subject parcel to be the only one affected by the hardship condition, but rather that the condition not be so widespread that granting variances to all similarly situated properties would fundamentally alter the zoning district.

    Summary

    Douglaston Civic Association, Inc. v. Klein addresses the ‘uniqueness’ requirement for zoning variances in New York. The Court of Appeals affirmed the grant of a variance for enclosed tennis courts on swampy land zoned for residential use. The court held that uniqueness doesn’t mean the property is the only one affected by the condition, but that the condition isn’t so widespread that granting variances to all similarly situated properties would alter the zoning district. The key factors supporting the variance were the land’s inability to yield a reasonable return as zoned, the minimal impact of the tennis courts on the neighborhood, and the swampy nature of the property, coupled with the limited 15-year duration of the variance.

    Facts

    An owner sought a variance to use swampy land, zoned for residential use, as enclosed tennis courts for 15 years. The Board of Standards and Appeals granted the variance. The land could not yield a reasonable return as zoned because construction costs for residences were three times the potential sales price. The proposed tennis courts would not negatively impact the neighborhood’s character, traffic, or pollution. The owner’s difficulty arose from the swampy nature of the property.

    Procedural History

    The Board of Standards and Appeals of the City of New York granted a variance. The Appellate Division affirmed the board’s decision. The Douglaston Civic Association appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the ‘uniqueness’ requirement for a zoning variance requires that only the specific parcel of land, and no other, be affected by the condition creating the hardship, or whether it is sufficient that the hardship condition is not so generally applicable as to materially change the zoning of the district if variances were granted to all similarly situated properties.

    Holding

    No, because uniqueness does not require that only the parcel of land in question be affected by the condition which creates the hardship. What is required is that the hardship condition is not so generally applicable throughout the district as to require the conclusion that if all parcels similarly situated are granted variances the zoning of the district would be materially changed.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that a strict interpretation of ‘uniqueness’ would be impractical. It cited Beatrice Block Club Assn. v Facen, 40 Mich App 372, 380-382, noting that uniqueness does not demand that only the specific parcel be affected. Instead, the court emphasized a comparative approach, requiring an assessment of the prevalence of the hardship within the zoning district. The critical inquiry is whether granting variances to all similarly situated parcels would fundamentally alter the district’s zoning scheme. The court acknowledged that other swampy parcels existed in the area. However, it deferred to the Board’s finding of uniqueness, stating that it could not conclude, as a matter of law, that the Board’s determination was arbitrary or capricious. The court also highlighted the confiscatory nature of the current zoning in relation to the subject parcel and the time limit imposed on the variance, further justifying its decision. The court stated, “What is required is that the hardship condition be not so generally applicable throughout the district as to require the conclusion that if all parcels similarly situated are granted variances the zoning of the district would be materially changed.”

  • Barry Iselin & Assoc. v. Village of Old Brookville, 41 N.Y.2d 103 (1976): Establishing Hardship for Zoning Use Changes

    Barry Iselin & Assoc. v. Village of Old Brookville, 41 N.Y.2d 103 (1976)

    To rezone property, a landowner must demonstrate that the land cannot yield a reasonable return as currently zoned, that their hardship is unique, and that the proposed use won’t alter the locality’s essential character.

    Summary

    Barry Iselin & Associates sought to rezone a 4.271-acre parcel from residential to business use, arguing the area had become commercial and the residential zoning was unconstitutional. The trial court dismissed the claim, but the Appellate Division reversed, finding the denial arbitrary. The New York Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the plaintiff failed to prove the property could not yield a reasonable return under the existing residential zoning. The court emphasized the higher standard of proof required for use variances versus area variances and underscored the presumption of constitutionality afforded to zoning ordinances.

    Facts

    Barry Iselin & Associates owned approximately 17 acres of land, a portion of which (4.271 acres) was the subject of the rezoning request. The property had been zoned for residential use since 1930. The plaintiff argued that the area had become predominantly commercial, rendering the property unsuitable for residential development. The plaintiff had previously sold portions of their land for commercial purposes, including a shopping center and a gas station near the subject property.

    Procedural History

    The plaintiff initially sought a zoning change from the town, which was denied. The plaintiff then filed suit in the Supreme Court, which dismissed the complaint after trial. The Appellate Division reversed the Supreme Court’s decision, declaring the existing zoning unconstitutional as applied to the plaintiff’s property. The case was then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the plaintiff met the burden of proving that the residential zoning of the subject property was unconstitutional because the property could not yield a reasonable return under the existing zoning, the plight was due to unique circumstances, and the rezoning would not alter the essential character of the locality.

    Holding

    No, because the plaintiff failed to demonstrate that the property could not yield a reasonable return if used for residential purposes, as required to overcome the presumption of constitutionality afforded to zoning ordinances.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals distinguished between area variances and use variances, noting that a higher standard of proof is required for the latter. For a use variance or rezoning, the owner must show: (1) the land cannot yield a reasonable return if used only for a purpose allowed in that zone; (2) the plight of the owner is due to unique circumstances and not to general neighborhood conditions; and (3) the use authorized by the variance will not alter the essential character of the locality, citing Matter of Otto v. Steinhilber, 282 N.Y. 71, 76. The court found that the plaintiff’s evidence failed to demonstrate that the property could not yield a reasonable return if developed residentially. The court emphasized that a slight or even significant difference in profit from commercial use does not automatically establish confiscation. The court also addressed the argument of spot zoning, stating that the zoning was part of a comprehensive plan. It reiterated the presumption of constitutionality afforded to zoning ordinances, stating, “Upon parties who attack an ordinance * * * rests the burden of showing that the regulation assailed is not justified under the police power of the state by any reasonable interpretation of the facts.” The court found that the plaintiff had not met this burden.