New York Law Review

Tag: Habit Evidence

  • Rivera v. Anilesh, 8 N.Y.3d 627 (2007): Admissibility of Habit Evidence in Medical Malpractice Cases

    Rivera v. Anilesh, 8 N.Y.3d 627 (2007)

    Evidence of a routine practice is admissible to infer conduct on a specific occasion if the practice is deliberate, repetitive, and the person is in complete control of the circumstances.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether a dentist’s routine procedure for administering anesthetic injections is admissible as habit evidence to support an inference that the same procedure was used on a specific patient. The plaintiff alleged malpractice related to an injection. The dentist, while not specifically recalling the procedure, described her standard injection protocol. The Court of Appeals held that the dentist’s testimony regarding her routine injection procedure was admissible as habit evidence because the procedure was a deliberate and repetitive practice, performed frequently and consistently, thus creating a triable issue of fact as to whether malpractice occurred.

    Facts

    Plaintiff Margarita Rivera was a patient of Defendant Dr. Indu Anilesh. On May 4, 2000, Rivera visited Dr. Anilesh for a tooth extraction. Dr. Anilesh administered a local anesthetic via injection. Rivera claimed she felt pain during a second injection, like an electric shock. Rivera later developed an infection. Rivera sued, alleging negligent injection and extraction. Dr. Anilesh couldn’t specifically recall the procedure but described her routine injection technique, performed on multiple patients daily since 1982. She stated that second injections were needed in 15-20% of her cases.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court granted Dr. Anilesh’s motion for summary judgment. The Appellate Division reversed, holding that Dr. Anilesh’s testimony about her customary practice was inadmissible. The Appellate Division granted leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a dentist’s routine procedure for administering an anesthetic injection is admissible as habit evidence to support an inference that the same procedure was used when treating a patient, even if the dentist doesn’t specifically recall the procedure.

    Holding

    Yes, because the dentist demonstrated a deliberate and repetitive practice in complete control of the circumstances, making the habit evidence admissible to infer conduct on a specific occasion.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court relied on Halloran v Virginia Chems., stating, “evidence of habit has, since the days of the common-law reports, generally been admissible to prove conformity on specified occasions” because “one who has demonstrated a consistent response under given circumstances is more likely to repeat that response when the circumstances arise again.” The Court emphasized that the doctrine applies when proof demonstrates “a deliberate and repetitive practice” by a person “in complete control of the circumstances.” The court distinguished this from conduct that varies depending on circumstances. Dr. Anilesh’s testimony indicated a routine injection procedure performed thousands of times. The court found no evidence suggesting the procedure varied based on patient circumstances. The court concluded that Dr. Anilesh’s habit evidence shifted the burden to Rivera to create an issue of fact as to whether Dr. Anilesh committed malpractice. Rivera met this burden through her testimony of experiencing extreme pain during the second injection, coupled with her expert’s opinion that such pain indicated improper administration. This raised a factual issue for trial regarding negligence and causation of the infection. The court noted, “the key criteria are ‘adequacy of sampling and uniformity of response.’”

  • Halloran v. Virginia Chemicals, Inc., 41 N.Y.2d 386 (1977): Admissibility of Habit Evidence to Prove Negligence

    Halloran v. Virginia Chemicals, Inc., 41 N.Y.2d 386 (1977)

    Evidence of a person’s habit or regular usage, particularly a deliberate and repetitive practice under complete control, is admissible to infer conduct on a specific occasion, even in negligence cases, provided a sufficient number of instances of the conduct are established.

    Summary

    Frank Halloran, a mechanic, was injured when a can of refrigerant exploded. He sued Virginia Chemicals, the packager. The central issue was whether Halloran’s prior practice of using an immersion coil to heat refrigerant cans was admissible to prove negligence on the day of the accident. The Court of Appeals held that evidence of habit or regular usage is admissible to infer conduct on a particular occasion, even in negligence cases, if a sufficient number of instances are proven. The court reversed the lower court’s decision, finding that the evidence was not collateral and should have been admitted to help determine if Halloran acted negligently by overheating the can.

    Facts

    Halloran, a mechanic, was injured when a can of Freon refrigerant exploded while he was charging an air conditioning unit. He typically used warm tap water to heat the Freon cans to accelerate the flow, checking the temperature with a thermometer. On the day of the accident, the can exploded before he could remove it from the water. Halloran claimed he used warm water and a thermometer, but neither was produced at trial. Virginia Chemicals sought to introduce evidence that Halloran habitually used an immersion coil to heat the water, despite warnings on the can, which Halloran denied.

    Procedural History

    Halloran sued Virginia Chemicals. The trial court excluded evidence of Halloran’s prior use of an immersion coil. The jury found Virginia Chemicals liable. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and certified a question of law for review.

    Issue(s)

    Whether evidence of a plaintiff’s habit or regular usage of a particular method, specifically using an immersion coil to heat refrigerant cans, is admissible to prove negligence on a specific occasion, even if the plaintiff denies such practice.

    Holding

    Yes, because evidence of a deliberate and repetitive practice by one in complete control of the circumstances is highly probative and admissible to allow the inference of its persistence, and hence negligence, on a particular occasion, provided a sufficient number of instances of the conduct are established.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that while evidence of general carelessness is typically inadmissible to prove negligence on a specific occasion, evidence of habit or regular usage is different. Habit involves a “repetitive pattern of conduct and therefore predictable and predictive conduct.” The court distinguished this from occasional carelessness. The court noted, “Because one who has demonstrated a consistent response under given circumstances is more likely to repeat that response when the circumstances arise again, evidence of habit has, since the days of the common-law reports, generally been admissible to prove conformity on specified occasions.” The court emphasized that for habit evidence to be admissible, the party must show a sufficient number of instances of the conduct in question. The court noted that Halloran testified to a specific, routine practice. By doing so, he opened the door to refutation of that testimony. The court further clarified that the defendant should be able to “fix, at least generally, the times and places of such occurrences” to establish habit. The Court quoted *Matter of Kellum, 52 NY 517, 519-520* to illustrate how “a lawyer, to prove due execution of a will, may testify that he always has wills executed according to statutory requirements”. The court held that the exclusion of the evidence was prejudicial to Virginia Chemicals because it prevented them from presenting a plausible explanation for the explosion.