New York Law Review

Tag: habeas corpus

  • People ex rel. Keitt v. McMann, 18 N.Y.2d 257 (1966): Availability of Habeas Corpus for Constitutional Violations

    People ex rel. Keitt v. McMann, 18 N.Y.2d 257 (1966)

    Habeas corpus is an appropriate remedy to test a claim that a relator has been imprisoned after having been deprived of a fundamental constitutional or statutory right in a criminal prosecution.

    Summary

    Keitt petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging his imprisonment was illegal because the prosecution introduced evidence of a prior conviction before the jury, violating his due process rights and privilege against self-incrimination. The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether habeas corpus was the proper remedy. The court held that habeas corpus is available to test claims of imprisonment following deprivation of fundamental constitutional or statutory rights. However, the court affirmed the denial of the writ on the merits, finding that Keitt had not been deprived of any constitutional right due to his own conduct at trial.

    Facts

    Keitt was indicted for robbery and carrying a dangerous weapon. At trial, the prosecution introduced evidence of Keitt’s prior conviction for attempted robbery after Keitt stood mute on the matter. This was done pursuant to Section 275-b of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Keitt’s counsel objected. Keitt had previously stated he would testify in his defense, and he later did, admitting the prior conviction and other crimes. Keitt appealed his conviction, and leave to appeal to the New York Court of Appeals was denied. His petition for certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court was also denied.

    Procedural History

    Keitt petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus, which was dismissed by the Supreme Court, Clinton County. The Appellate Division affirmed the dismissal. Keitt appealed to the New York Court of Appeals by permission.

    Issue(s)

    Whether habeas corpus is an appropriate remedy to test a claim that the introduction of certain evidence violated both due process and the privilege against self-incrimination, thereby depriving the relator of a fundamental constitutional or statutory right.

    Holding

    Yes, because habeas corpus is an appropriate proceeding to test a claim that the relator has been imprisoned after having been deprived of a fundamental constitutional or statutory right in a criminal prosecution.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals acknowledged a subtle shift from its narrow view of habeas corpus relief, which traditionally required only that the convicting court have jurisdiction over the person, the crime, and the power to impose the sentence. Citing precedent such as People ex rel. Colan v. La Vallee, the court recognized that the use of “jurisdiction” and “void judgments” in prior cases was more about historical respect for habeas corpus than a true limitation on its scope.

    The court clarified that habeas corpus is available when a prisoner claims a deprivation of a substantial constitutional right on the face of the record. However, the court cautioned that habeas corpus is not the only or preferred means of vindicating such rights, and it is not a substitute for appeal to review mere trial errors. Departure from traditional appellate processes should only occur when dictated by practicality and necessity.

    Regarding the merits of Keitt’s claim, the court found that in view of Keitt’s conduct at trial, specifically his initial silence followed by his decision to testify and admit to the prior conviction, he had not been deprived of any constitutional right. The court recognized the flexibility of the writ, noting that the legislature did not intend to change the instances in which the writ was available.

    Judge Van Voorhis concurred, arguing the relator was not aggrieved without reaching the constitutional questions.

  • People ex rel. Anonymous v. Waugh, 27 N.Y.2d 751 (1970): Habeas Corpus and Mental Health Commitments

    People ex rel. Anonymous v. Waugh, 27 N.Y.2d 751 (1970)

    A writ of habeas corpus challenging the legality of a mental health commitment requires proof to warrant granting relief; the court may appoint a psychiatrist as a medical witness if the fact of mental illness is contested.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of a writ of habeas corpus sought by the petitioner challenging the legality of his mental health commitment. The court held that the petitioner failed to provide sufficient evidence to warrant the relief requested, as the record clearly established the legality of his commitment and his mental illness. The court noted that if the petitioner contested the finding of mental illness in the future, he could request the court to appoint a psychiatrist as a medical witness. Alternatively, if the petitioner conceded his mental illness, he could utilize administrative procedures to investigate the adequacy and justice of his care and treatment under the Mental Hygiene Law.

    Facts

    The petitioner, whose name is not revealed in the record, was involuntarily confined due to mental illness. He sought a writ of habeas corpus, challenging the legality of his commitment. The specific factual details leading to his commitment and the exact nature of his mental illness are not provided in the court’s memorandum.

    Procedural History

    The petitioner sought a writ of habeas corpus. The lower court denied the writ. The Court of Appeals reviewed the denial and affirmed the lower court’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the petitioner presented sufficient proof to warrant the granting of a writ of habeas corpus challenging the legality of his mental health commitment.

    Holding

    No, because the petitioner failed to adduce any proof which would warrant the granting of the relief sought, and the evidence in the record clearly established the legality of his commitment and the fact of his mental illness.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals based its decision on the lack of evidence presented by the petitioner to challenge the legality of his commitment. The court stated, “Petitioner-appellant has failed to adduce any proof which would warrant our granting the relief sought. The evidence in the record clearly establishes the legality of his commitment and the fact of his mental illness.”

    The court further outlined options available to the petitioner. If the petitioner were to challenge the finding of mental illness in the future, he could request the court to appoint a psychiatrist as a medical witness on his behalf during a habeas corpus proceeding. The court referenced Opinion of the State Comptroller, Feb. 5, 1965, No. 65-6, regarding this process.

    Alternatively, if the petitioner conceded the fact of mental illness, he could utilize administrative procedures provided by the Legislature under the Mental Hygiene Law, specifically sections 86 and 88, to investigate the care and treatment received and address any inadequacies or injustices.

    Section 86 of the Mental Hygiene Law empowers the Commissioner of Mental Hygiene to conduct investigations, subpoena witnesses, and issue orders, which require court approval to be binding.

    Section 88 established the Mental Health Information Service to supervise and protect the rights of the mentally ill, particularly concerning the retention, care, and treatment of involuntary patients.

    The court emphasized the importance of these statutory mechanisms for ensuring the appropriate care and treatment of individuals involuntarily committed for mental illness.

  • People ex rel. Harris v. Lindsay, 15 N.Y.2d 751 (1965): Habeas Corpus Relief Requires Sufficient Factual Foundation

    15 N.Y.2d 751 (1965)

    A writ of habeas corpus will be denied if the petition lacks sufficient factual support to warrant relief, especially when challenging a conviction without a direct appeal.

    Summary

    Lilly Harris sought a writ of habeas corpus, arguing that her conviction for failing to operate the heating system in her multiple dwelling violated due process. Harris claimed she was financially unable to maintain the heating system due to reduced rents of $1 per apartment. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of her writ, holding that her petition was too factually sparse to justify relief. The court emphasized that Harris did not appeal her initial conviction, and habeas corpus was not the appropriate remedy given the lack of detailed factual allegations. The affirmance was without prejudice, allowing Harris to pursue other legal avenues if warranted by more substantial facts.

    Facts

    Lilly Harris owned or managed a multiple dwelling and was convicted for failing to operate its heating system, a violation of New York law. She asserted that she couldn’t afford to operate the heating system because the rents in her building had been reduced to $1 per apartment. She did not appeal her conviction directly.

    Procedural History

    Harris sought to challenge her conviction via a writ of habeas corpus, claiming a violation of due process. The lower court dismissed the writ. Harris appealed this dismissal to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a petition for a writ of habeas corpus can be granted when the petition lacks sufficient factual detail to support the claim that the underlying conviction violated due process.

    Holding

    No, because the petition was too sparse in its statements of fact to serve as the foundation for any relief.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals found that Harris’s petition for habeas corpus lacked the necessary factual foundation to warrant relief. The court noted that Harris was essentially arguing that she was convicted for failing to do the impossible, which she claimed was a denial of due process. However, the court emphasized that she did not appeal her original conviction. The court implied that habeas corpus is not a substitute for a direct appeal, especially when the factual basis for the constitutional claim is weakly presented. The court’s decision highlights the importance of providing detailed and specific factual allegations in a habeas corpus petition, particularly when challenging a conviction on constitutional grounds. The court did not foreclose the possibility of future legal action, stating that the affirmance was “without prejudice to her position in any new action or proceeding if the facts warrant such relief.”

  • People v. Wilson, 13 N.Y.2d 277 (1963): No New York Forum for Challenging Out-of-State Convictions

    People v. Wilson, 13 N.Y.2d 277 (1963)

    New York courts will not provide a forum (through coram nobis or habeas corpus) to challenge the validity of a prior out-of-state conviction used to enhance sentencing in New York, unless the rendering court lacked jurisdiction.

    Summary

    Wilson, convicted in New York as a second felony offender based on a prior Florida conviction, sought coram nobis relief in New York, arguing his Florida conviction was unconstitutional because he lacked counsel. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of relief, reiterating that New York courts will not entertain collateral attacks on out-of-state convictions used for sentencing enhancement unless the rendering court lacked jurisdiction. The court reasoned that while the defendant may have a federal remedy, New York is not obligated to provide a forum to challenge the foreign judgment’s validity.

    Facts

    In 1948, Alfred Wilson was convicted of attempted murder in New York and sentenced as a second felony offender. The predicate felony was a 1931 Florida murder conviction. At sentencing, Wilson admitted the truth of the information regarding his prior felony. In 1962, Wilson filed a coram nobis petition in New York, arguing his Florida conviction was invalid because he was not represented by counsel or advised of his right to counsel in Florida. He submitted affidavits from Florida court officials and an attorney supporting his claim.

    Procedural History

    Wilson sought a writ of error coram nobis in the New York court where he was sentenced as a second felony offender, challenging the validity of the Florida conviction underlying his enhanced sentence. The lower court denied the petition. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s decision, upholding the denial of coram nobis relief.

    Issue(s)

    Whether New York State must provide a forum (through coram nobis or habeas corpus) for a defendant to challenge the constitutional validity of an out-of-state conviction used as a predicate for enhanced sentencing in New York.

    Holding

    No, because New York State is under no duty to provide a forum for attacking a foreign judgment, and New York can rely on the face value of the Florida conviction for sentencing purposes.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on its prior holding in People v. McCullough, which established that New York courts will not grant a hearing on the validity of an out-of-state conviction used for multiple offender sentencing unless the rendering court lacked jurisdiction. The court reasoned that coram nobis must be brought in the court that entered the judgment under attack, and habeas corpus is only available when the sentencing court lacked jurisdiction. The court acknowledged the Second Circuit’s decision in United States ex rel. La Near v. La Vallee, which held that a defendant in this situation may seek federal habeas corpus relief without exhausting out-of-state remedies, but stated this did not require New York to revise its own rules regarding collateral attacks on foreign judgments. The court expressed concern about the practical difficulties and burdens that would arise if New York courts were required to examine the validity of criminal judgments from other jurisdictions. The court noted that subsequent offender statutes are constitutional and do not require inquiry into the circumstances of the prior adjudication. As stated in the ruling, “the courts of this State have no alternative but to treat the conviction as an effective predicate for multiple offender punishment under section 1941 or section 1942 of the Penal Law.”

  • People ex rel. Lupo v. Fay, 13 N.Y.2d 253 (1963): Defendant’s Presence at Trial; When Absence Does Not Violate Rights

    People ex rel. Lupo v. Fay, 13 N.Y.2d 253 (1963)

    A defendant’s right to be present at their felony trial extends only to situations where their presence has a reasonably substantial relation to the fullness of their opportunity to defend against the charges; absence during arguments on motions unrelated to direct evidence or jury instruction does not automatically void a conviction.

    Summary

    The case addresses whether a defendant is entitled to habeas corpus relief because he was absent from the courtroom during his counsel’s motion for a mistrial. The motion, based on the argument that further jury deliberation would be coercive, was denied, and the defendant was convicted. The New York Court of Appeals held that the defendant’s absence during this particular stage of the trial did not violate his rights. The court reasoned that due process requires the defendant’s presence only when it’s necessary for a fair and just hearing, specifically when it impacts his opportunity to defend against the charges. The court affirmed the dismissal of the writ of habeas corpus.

    Facts

    After the jury in Lupo’s grand larceny trial deliberated for hours, they indicated difficulty reaching a verdict around midnight. The trial judge instructed them to continue deliberations and arranged for hotel accommodations. Following the jury’s departure, Lupo’s counsel moved for a mistrial, arguing that continued deliberation would be coercive. Lupo was not present in the courtroom during this motion. The motion was denied. The jury resumed deliberations the next morning, requested further instructions around noon, and ultimately returned a guilty verdict late in the afternoon.

    Procedural History

    Lupo was convicted of grand larceny. He appealed, and the Appellate Division affirmed the conviction (13 A.D.2d 684). Leave to appeal to the New York Court of Appeals was denied. Lupo then sought habeas corpus relief, arguing his absence during the motion for a mistrial warranted the writ. The Supreme Court, Dutchess County, dismissed the writ. Lupo appealed this dismissal to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the defendant is entitled to habeas corpus relief because he was absent from the courtroom while his counsel argued a motion for a mistrial based on potentially coercive jury deliberation.

    Holding

    No, because the defendant’s absence from the courtroom during his counsel’s argument for a mistrial did not affect any substantial right of his and did not invalidate the subsequent judgment of conviction.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court relied on Section 356 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which mandates the defendant’s personal presence during a felony trial to prevent secret trials and guarantee the right to be present at all important stages. However, the court clarified that this right is not absolute and must be balanced with reason. Citing Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, the court emphasized that due process requires the defendant’s presence only to the extent that it’s necessary for a fair and just hearing. Justice Cardozo’s inquiry in Snyder was adopted: whether the defendant’s presence at the particular trial stage had “a relation, reasonably substantial to the fulness of his opportunity to defend against the charge”. The court found that Lupo’s absence during the mistrial motion, which concerned the potential coercion of the jury, did not impact his ability to defend against the charges. The court emphasized that this ruling does not change the established rule that a defendant’s presence is indispensable during testimony, summations, jury instructions, the rendering of the verdict, and sentencing. The court explicitly declined to address the issue of waiver, finding no evidence that Lupo voluntarily surrendered his right to be present.

  • People ex rel. Shapiro v. Keeper of City Prison, 296 N.Y. 463 (1947): Excessive Bail and Constitutional Rights

    People ex rel. Shapiro v. Keeper of City Prison, 296 N.Y. 463 (1947)

    A writ of habeas corpus is available to protect against excessive bail, but relief is granted only to prevent invasion of constitutional rights, not merely due to a difference of opinion regarding the amount of bail.

    Summary

    This case addresses the issue of excessive bail and the use of a writ of habeas corpus to challenge it. The relators sought relief from what they considered excessive bail fixed at $250,000. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s decision, finding that considering the seriousness of the crime (murder), the relators’ backgrounds, their relationship to potential witnesses, and the risk of flight, the bail amount was not excessive as a matter of law. The court emphasized that the reasonableness of bail depends on the specific facts of each case.

    Facts

    The relators were being held in connection with a murder investigation. The judge of the Court of General Sessions fixed bail for each relator at $250,000. The prosecution presented evidence regarding the seriousness of the crime, the relators’ criminal records, their relationships to other individuals involved, and the possibility they might flee to avoid testifying.

    Procedural History

    The relators sought a writ of habeas corpus, arguing that the bail amount was excessive. The lower court denied the writ. The relators appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether, given the facts presented, the bail amount of $250,000 fixed by the Court of General Sessions was excessive as a matter of law, thereby warranting relief through a writ of habeas corpus.

    Holding

    No, because considering the seriousness of the crime under investigation, the character, reputation, background, and extensive criminal records of the relators, their relationship to others against whom they may be called to testify, the possibility of flight to avoid giving testimony, and the difficulty of procuring their return if they leave the State, the bail amount was not excessive as a matter of law.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals stated that a writ of habeas corpus is the proper mechanism to challenge excessive bail as a violation of constitutional rights. However, the court emphasized that the decision to grant relief depends on whether the bail is excessive as a “matter of law,” not merely a difference of opinion. The court considered several factors to determine the reasonableness of the bail: the seriousness of the crime (murder), the relators’ criminal histories, their relationships to potential witnesses, and the risk of flight. The court found sufficient evidence before the lower court to justify the high bail amount, given these factors. The court distinguished this case from People ex rel. Lobell v. McDonnell, noting that the evidence presented in this case regarding the relevant factors was not present in Lobell. The court stated, “the reasonableness of bail in any case depends upon examination of the particular record. Evidence such as was here adduced was not there furnished.” The court affirmed the order without prejudice to any future proceedings where the relators might raise the issue of undue or prolonged detention.

  • People ex rel. Shapiro v. Keeper of City Prison, 290 N.Y. 393 (1943): Limits on Habeas Corpus Review of Bail Determinations

    People ex rel. Shapiro v. Keeper of City Prison, 290 N.Y. 393 (1943)

    While habeas corpus is available to challenge the legality of a bail denial, it does not allow a court of coordinate jurisdiction to conduct a de novo review of the discretionary decision to deny bail made by the original court.

    Summary

    Jacob Shapiro was indicted on multiple counts of extortion. The Court of General Sessions denied him bail based on his extensive criminal record and a prior instance of absconding while on bail. Shapiro’s brother then sought a writ of habeas corpus in the Supreme Court, arguing Shapiro needed to be free to prepare his defense. The Supreme Court set bail at $100,000. The Appellate Division reversed, holding that while the Supreme Court had jurisdiction to inquire into the denial of bail, the Court of General Sessions had not abused its discretion. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed, holding habeas corpus is available to test the legality of a bail denial, but it does not permit a second court to substitute its discretion for that of the original court.

    Facts

    Jacob Shapiro was charged with multiple counts of extortion in indictments issued in 1937 and 1940. He was not arraigned until 1942. At arraignment in the Court of General Sessions, he requested bail. The District Attorney opposed, citing Shapiro’s seven prior criminal convictions and his absconding while on bail in 1937, resulting in bail forfeiture. The General Sessions judge denied bail, citing Shapiro’s criminal history and the potential for a life sentence as a fourth felony offender.

    Procedural History

    1. Court of General Sessions: Denied bail.
    2. Supreme Court (Special Term): Granted a writ of habeas corpus and set bail at $100,000.
    3. Appellate Division: Reversed the Supreme Court’s order, dismissed the writ, and remanded the prisoner.
    4. Court of Appeals: Affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the denial of bail in a non-capital felony case is a constitutional violation.
    2. Whether the Supreme Court, in a habeas corpus proceeding, has the power to review a prior denial of bail by the Court of General Sessions and to exercise independent discretion in setting bail.

    Holding

    1. No, because the constitutional prohibition against “excessive bail” does not create a right to bail in all cases; the legislature may determine when bail is allowed as a matter of right or discretion.

    2. No, because while the Supreme Court has jurisdiction to inquire into the legality of the denial of bail via habeas corpus, it cannot substitute its discretion for that of the original court unless the original denial was without reason or for reasons insufficient in law.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals first addressed the constitutional question, reaffirming its holding in People ex rel. Fraser v. Britt that the prohibition against excessive bail does not mandate release on bail in all cases. The Court noted that New York statutes make bail a matter of right in misdemeanor cases but discretionary in felony cases. The Court stated, “[A] statute which makes it discretionary with a court to allow or refuse bail does not in itself offend against the Constitutional ban against the requiring of excessive bail.”

    Turning to the habeas corpus issue, the Court acknowledged the importance of the writ in safeguarding liberty. The Court emphasized that habeas corpus is available to test the legality of the detention, meaning whether the denying court abused its discretion by denying bail without reason or for insufficient reasons. However, the Court explicitly rejected the notion that habeas corpus allows a second court to exercise independent discretion or conduct a de novo review. The Court reasoned that the legislature, by forbidding appeals from bail denials, did not intend to permit the equivalent of an appeal through habeas corpus.

    The Court emphasized the limits on habeas review: “The traditional status and purpose of a writ of habeas corpus can be maintained in cases like this without making it a device for obtaining a new trial of a discretionary matter.” Since Shapiro’s petition sought a new trial on the bail issue, it was properly denied. The court also noted that successive applications for bail to different judges offend orderly procedure.

    The Court clarified that the Supreme Court retains original jurisdiction to grant or refuse bail. However, this is distinct from the power to review a prior exercise of jurisdiction by another court. The court found “ample reason” for the denial of bail by the Court of General Sessions.