New York Law Review

Tag: gun control

  • People v. Hughes, 21 N.Y.3d 39 (2013): Second Amendment and Severity of Punishment for Gun Possession

    People v. Hughes, 21 N.Y.3d 39 (2013)

    The Second Amendment does not categorically limit the severity of punishment for unlawful gun possession, although in some extreme cases, it might; intermediate scrutiny applies when evaluating Second Amendment claims related to gun control regulations.

    Summary

    Hughes was convicted of a class C felony for possessing a loaded, unlicensed weapon in his home due to a prior misdemeanor conviction, which, under New York law, removed the “home exception” to the felony charge. Hughes argued that enhancing the charge to a felony based on a misdemeanor violated his Second Amendment rights. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed his conviction, holding that the law, which allows most misdemeanants to obtain gun licenses, substantially relates to the important government objective of preventing gun violence and keeping guns out of the hands of those who have demonstrated an inability to follow the law. The court applied intermediate scrutiny, assuming without deciding that Second Amendment scrutiny applied to the severity of punishment.

    Facts

    Hughes, who had a prior misdemeanor conviction for resisting arrest, possessed a loaded handgun in his ex-girlfriend’s apartment (deemed by the trial court to be his home as well). He did not have a permit for the handgun. Following an argument outside the apartment, Hughes shot and killed a man. He was acquitted of murder and related charges based on a justification defense but convicted of second-degree (felony) and third-degree (felony) criminal possession of a weapon because of his prior conviction and lack of a permit.

    Procedural History

    The trial court convicted Hughes of second and third-degree criminal possession of a weapon. Hughes moved to set aside the second-degree conviction, arguing a Second Amendment violation. The trial court denied the motion. The Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether enhancing a weapon possession charge to a class C felony based on a prior misdemeanor conviction impermissibly burdens the right to keep and bear arms under the Second Amendment.

    Holding

    No, because the statute bears a substantial relationship to the achievement of an important governmental objective.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court assumed, without deciding, that the Second Amendment could limit the severity of punishment for unlawful gun possession. It then applied intermediate scrutiny, a standard adopted by several federal circuit courts following District of Columbia v. Heller and McDonald v. City of Chicago. The court reasoned that New York’s law, which elevates the charge to a felony only when the possessor has a prior conviction and lacks a license, is substantially related to the important government objective of preventing gun violence. The law allows most misdemeanants to obtain gun licenses, mitigating the burden on Second Amendment rights. The court emphasized that “preventing the criminal use of firearms is an important government objective; and keeping guns away from people who have shown they cannot be trusted to obey the law is a means substantially related to that end.” The court explicitly chose not to explore what a truly draconian sentence might have meant for the outcome of the case. Thus, the court found that the 3 1/2 year sentence Hughes received did not violate the Second Amendment.

  • Hamilton v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 96 N.Y.2d 222 (2001): No Duty for Gun Manufacturers to Prevent Illegal Gun Sales

    Hamilton v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 96 N.Y.2d 222 (2001)

    Gun manufacturers do not have a general duty to exercise reasonable care in the marketing and distribution of handguns to prevent them from falling into the hands of criminals, nor can liability be apportioned on a market share basis in cases involving negligently marketed legal products.

    Summary

    Plaintiffs, relatives of victims of handgun violence, sued gun manufacturers alleging negligent marketing. The case centered on whether manufacturers owed a duty to exercise reasonable care in the marketing and distribution of handguns and whether liability could be apportioned on a market share basis. The New York Court of Appeals held that gun manufacturers do not have a duty to prevent the illegal acquisition and misuse of their handguns by third parties and rejected the application of market share liability due to the non-fungible nature of guns and the varied marketing practices of manufacturers. The court emphasized that imposing such a duty would create indeterminate liability and that the connection between manufacturers and victims was too remote.

    Facts

    Relatives of victims of handgun violence sued 49 handgun manufacturers alleging negligent marketing, design defect, ultra-hazardous activity, and fraud. Stephen Fox, one of the plaintiffs, was permanently disabled after being shot by a friend with a gun obtained from an illegal sale. Plaintiffs argued that the manufacturers’ negligent distribution created an illegal, underground market for handguns, providing weapons to minors and criminals. Only one gun was recovered, and plaintiffs sought to proceed on a market share theory of liability.

    Procedural History

    The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York dismissed the product liability and fraud claims but retained the negligent marketing claim. After a jury trial, damages were awarded against three defendants based on their share of the national handgun market. The defendants unsuccessfully moved for judgment as a matter of law. The Second Circuit certified the questions of duty and market share liability to the New York Court of Appeals, which accepted certification.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the defendant-manufacturers owed plaintiffs a duty to exercise reasonable care in the marketing and distribution of the handguns they manufacture?
    2. Whether liability in this case may be apportioned on a market share basis, and if so, how?

    Holding

    1. No, because gun manufacturers do not have a duty to prevent the illegal acquisition and misuse of their handguns by third parties given the remote connection between the manufacturers, the criminal wrongdoers, and the plaintiffs. Imposing such a duty would create indeterminate liability.
    2. No, because the guns are not identical fungible products, the manufacturers’ marketing techniques were not uniform, and therefore market share is not an accurate reflection of the risk posed.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court emphasized that foreseeability alone does not define duty; a specific duty to the injured party must exist. It stated, “[W]ithout a duty running directly to the injured person there can be no liability in damages, however careless the conduct or foreseeable the harm” (Lauer v. City of New York, 95 N.Y.2d 95, 100). The court highlighted the absence of a relationship between the manufacturers and the victims that would justify imposing a duty to control the conduct of third parties. The court distinguished this case from products liability cases involving defective products or failure to warn, noting that the handguns themselves were not defective. Addressing the market share liability claim, the court noted guns are not fungible like DES in Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly & Co. (73 N.Y.2d 487), and the manufacturers’ marketing techniques were not uniform. Thus, market share was not an accurate measure of risk. The court concluded that imposing such a duty would create an indeterminate class of plaintiffs and defendants with little connection to the benefits of controlling illegal guns. The court noted the existence of federal statutory and regulatory schemes governing gun sales and expressed caution in imposing novel tort theories in an area of ongoing national policy debate.