New York Law Review

Tag: guilty plea

  • People v. Serrano, 15 N.Y.2d 304 (1965): Duty to Inquire When Defendant’s Plea Contradicts Guilt

    People v. Serrano, 15 N.Y.2d 304 (1965)

    When a defendant pleads guilty but provides a factual account inconsistent with the crime to which they are pleading, the trial court has a duty to inquire further to ensure the defendant is aware of the implications of the plea.

    Summary

    The defendant, initially charged with first-degree murder, pleaded guilty to second-degree murder. During the plea colloquy, his account of the killing suggested a lack of intent, potentially indicating manslaughter instead. The trial judge, disbelieving the defendant’s version, accepted the guilty plea. The New York Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the trial court should have inquired further into the inconsistencies between the defendant’s statements and the elements of the crime before accepting the guilty plea, to ensure the defendant understood the implications of the plea.

    Facts

    The defendant was indicted for first-degree murder for shooting and killing Gilberto Bonilla. Initially, he pleaded not guilty. After jury selection began, the defendant, with the consent of his attorneys and the district attorney, requested to withdraw his initial plea and plead guilty to second-degree murder. During questioning by the court prior to accepting the plea, the defendant admitted to the shooting but described the circumstances as arising from an argument and a threat of bodily harm from the deceased, with whom he had a strained relationship.

    Procedural History

    The defendant pleaded guilty to second-degree murder and was sentenced to 30 years to life. He appealed the conviction, arguing the trial court erred in accepting his guilty plea. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. He also sought coram nobis relief, which was denied, and that denial was also affirmed by the Appellate Division. The New York Court of Appeals then reviewed the case.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a judgment of conviction based on a guilty plea may stand when the trial court, before accepting the plea, elicited information from the defendant that cast doubt on his guilt of the crime to which he pleaded.

    Holding

    No, because when a defendant’s factual recitation contradicts the elements of the crime to which they are pleading guilty, the court must inquire further to ensure the defendant understands the implications of the plea. The court’s failure to do so invalidates the guilty plea.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that when a trial court inquires into the circumstances of the crime before accepting a guilty plea, the plea cannot be considered valid if the defendant’s own recital does not clearly establish all the elements of the crime. In this case, the defendant’s description of the events surrounding the shooting suggested a lack of intent to kill, a necessary element of second-degree murder. The court noted that the defendant’s version was “more consonant with the lesser charge of manslaughter in the first degree, that is, a killing in the heat of passion.” The trial court should have either refused the plea, continued the trial, or advised the defendant that his admissions did not necessarily establish guilt of second-degree murder and questioned him further. The court emphasized, quoting People v. Griffin, that ordinarily “’After a plea to a lesser crime has been accepted, the factual basis of the crime confessed can ordinarily be found only in the language of the plea’”. The court distinguished this situation, however, noting that “where, as is the usual case today, the trial court, before accepting the plea of guilty, properly inquires of the defendant as to the circumstances and details of the crime to which he is admitting his guilt, the mere mouthing of the word ‘guilty’ may not be relied upon to establish all the elements of that crime.” The Court concluded that “before accepting a plea of guilt where the defendant’s story does not square with the crime to which he is pleading, the court should take all precautions to assure that the defendant is aware of what he is doing.”

  • People v. Lang, 11 N.Y.2d 371 (1962): Validity of Guilty Plea for a 13-Year-Old Defendant

    People v. Lang, 11 N.Y.2d 371 (1962)

    A guilty plea to a lesser charge can be validly accepted, even when the defendant was a minor at the time of the crime, if the defendant was capable of understanding the proceedings and the plea was entered on the advice of counsel and with the court’s reasoned assessment of the circumstances.

    Summary

    This case concerns the validity of a guilty plea entered by a 13-year-old defendant, Lang, to second-degree murder. Lang sought to vacate the conviction via coram nobis, arguing that his age and possible insanity at the time of the crime rendered his plea invalid. The Court of Appeals held that the trial court did not err in accepting the plea. Despite conflicting psychiatric opinions regarding Lang’s sanity, the judge’s decision to accept the plea, based on the totality of circumstances, including the advice of Lang’s counsel and the potential for a first-degree murder conviction, was within the bounds of responsible judicial action. The court found no suppression of evidence and affirmed the dismissal of Lang’s petition.

    Facts

    In 1943, Lang, a 13-year-old, was indicted for first-degree murder. During pre-trial proceedings, defense counsel requested the court accept a guilty plea to second-degree murder. One psychiatrist indicated Lang was psychotic at the time of the crime, but three other psychiatrists, including one retained by the defense, believed Lang was sane. The District Attorney possessed an electroencephalogram (EEG) of Lang. The judge accepted the guilty plea to second-degree murder.

    Procedural History

    Lang initially sought coram nobis relief, which was remitted to the County Court by the Court of Appeals in 1961 (10 N.Y.2d 361) for a trial on the issues raised in the petition. After the trial, the County Court dismissed the petition on the merits. The Appellate Division affirmed the County Court’s dismissal. Lang then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court erred, or deprived the defendant of due process, by accepting a guilty plea to second-degree murder from a 13-year-old defendant, given conflicting psychiatric opinions regarding his sanity at the time of the offense and the District Attorney’s possession of an electroencephalogram?

    Holding

    No, because the judge’s decision to accept the plea was within a fair range of responsible judicial action, considering the potential for a first-degree murder conviction, the advice of the defendant’s counsel, and the conflicting psychiatric opinions. The court also found no suppression of evidence regarding the electroencephalogram (EEG) as the defense eventually had a more favorable EEG.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the indictment for first-degree murder was valid under the law at the time. The evidence presented by the People was sufficient to send the case to a jury on the first-degree murder charge. Therefore, the judge could not have dismissed or reduced the charge at that stage. The court emphasized the defendant’s counsel requested that the court accept the plea to the lesser charge of second-degree murder. The court acknowledged the conflicting psychiatric opinions but noted that three psychiatrists believed Lang was sane, including one retained by the defense. The court stated the judge should not have compelled the defendant to risk a first-degree murder conviction against the advice of his own counsel. The court concluded: “With the record now fully developed of what occurred at the conference in 1943, the Judge’s decision to accept the plea was within a fair range of responsible judicial action.” The court also addressed the issue of the electroencephalogram (EEG) possessed by the District Attorney, stating that it was less favorable to the defendant than a later one in the possession of defendant’s own lawyer. This negated any argument for suppression of evidence.

  • People v. O’Connor, 14 N.Y.2d 62 (1964): The Necessity of Stating Reasons for Accepting a Plea to a Lesser Offense

    14 N.Y.2d 62 (1964)

    When a statute requires the prosecution to state reasons on the record for recommending a plea to a lesser offense, failure to do so does not automatically invalidate the conviction if the prosecutor acquiesced to the plea, especially when the defendant seeks to withdraw the plea.

    Summary

    O’Connor was charged with multiple offenses but pleaded guilty to disorderly conduct. After sentencing, he sought to withdraw his plea, arguing the Assistant District Attorney failed to state reasons for accepting the plea as required by the New York City Criminal Courts Act. The Appellate Division reversed, but the Court of Appeals reversed again, holding that the failure to state reasons did not invalidate the conviction because the prosecutor acquiesced to the plea, and the defendant himself sought the lesser plea. The court distinguished this from situations where the prosecutor objects to the lesser plea.

    Facts

    O’Connor was initially charged with unlawfully entering a building, petit larceny, and injury to property.
    To resolve the charges, O’Connor pleaded guilty to the lesser offense of disorderly conduct.
    After being sentenced for disorderly conduct, O’Connor attempted to withdraw his guilty plea.

    Procedural History

    The trial court denied O’Connor’s request to withdraw his guilty plea.
    The Appellate Division reversed the trial court’s decision, finding a failure to comply with the New York City Criminal Courts Act.
    The People appealed the Appellate Division’s reversal to the New York Court of Appeals.
    O’Connor cross-appealed, seeking dismissal of the original charges.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the failure of the Assistant District Attorney to state reasons on the record for recommending acceptance of a guilty plea to a lesser offense, as required by the New York City Criminal Courts Act, invalidates the conviction and requires dismissal of the original charges.

    Holding

    No, because the Assistant District Attorney acquiesced to the plea, and the defendant sought the lesser plea; therefore, the failure to state reasons on the record does not invalidate the conviction.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals distinguished this case from Matter of McDonald v. Sobel, where the District Attorney objected to the acceptance of a plea to a lesser charge. Here, the Assistant District Attorney consented to the acceptance of the lesser plea. The court relied on People v. D’Aula, which held that the omission by the District Attorney to take further proceedings is equivalent to acquiescence.

    The court acknowledged the language of the New York City Criminal Courts Act, stating the court “shall have the power” to accept a plea to a lesser offense “when the reasons for the recommendation are stated in open court and upon the record.” However, it found this language not sufficiently different from section 342-a of the Code of Criminal Procedure (which describes the making of such a statement as the duty of the prosecutor) to warrant a different rule.

    The court emphasized that O’Connor himself was appealing, seeking to be relieved from his own plea of guilty to the lesser offense. Therefore, he should not be allowed to do so.

    Judge Bergan dissented, arguing that the statute’s language was jurisdictional and that the failure to state reasons on the record and show “facts before the court” was a significant omission. He also pointed out that the statute requires that the reason for the recommendation be made available for public inspection, which differs from mere consent from the district attorney.