New York Law Review

Tag: guilty plea

  • People v. Fuggazzatto, 9 N.Y.3d 349 (2007): Withdrawing Guilty Plea After Prior Conviction Vacated

    People v. Fuggazzatto, 9 N.Y.3d 349 (2007)

    When a defendant pleads guilty to a crime in exchange for a sentence that runs concurrently with a sentence for a prior conviction, and the prior conviction is later vacated, the defendant is entitled to withdraw the guilty plea if it was induced by the expectation of concurrent sentencing.

    Summary

    Fuggazzatto pleaded guilty to criminally negligent homicide and criminal possession of a weapon in exchange for a sentence to run concurrently with a sentence he was already serving for a prior conviction of criminal possession of stolen property. After the prior conviction was vacated, Fuggazzatto moved to withdraw his guilty plea, arguing that it had been induced by the now-defunct concurrent sentence agreement. The Court of Appeals held that he was entitled to withdraw his plea, reasoning that the plea agreement was predicated on the concurrent sentence and that vacating the prior conviction undermined the basis for the plea.

    Facts

    Defendant was on trial for murder and other related charges. After four days of trial and the testimony of sixteen witnesses, the People offered defendant a plea bargain. The offer was to plead guilty to criminally negligent homicide and criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree. This plea would result in a concurrent sentence with a term of imprisonment of 4 to 8 years. At the time of the plea, defendant was already serving a sentence for a prior conviction of criminal possession of stolen property. Subsequently, the prior conviction was vacated.

    Procedural History

    After his prior conviction was vacated, Fuggazzatto moved to withdraw his guilty plea. The County Court denied the motion. The Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order and granted Fuggazzatto’s motion to vacate the judgment of conviction and sentence.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a defendant who pleads guilty in exchange for a concurrent sentence with a prior conviction is entitled to withdraw the guilty plea when the prior conviction is vacated.

    Holding

    Yes, because the guilty plea was induced by the expectation of a concurrent sentence, and vacating the prior conviction undermines the basis for the plea.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the plea agreement was premised on the understanding that the defendant would serve a concurrent sentence. The court stated, “Here, defendant pleaded guilty to avoid the risk of a greater sentence, but he also knew that whatever sentence he received would run concurrently with the sentence he was already serving. The vacatur of the earlier conviction removed an important building block upon which the plea rested.” The court distinguished this case from situations where a defendant receives the benefit of the plea bargain (i.e., a reduced sentence) regardless of the prior conviction. The court stated that, in those cases, the defendant might not be entitled to withdraw the plea. However, in this case, the concurrent sentence was a significant factor in the defendant’s decision to plead guilty, and the vacatur of the prior conviction eliminated that benefit. The court noted the importance of fairness and ensuring that plea agreements are based on accurate information. It suggested that prosecutors could include waivers in plea agreements to address the possibility of a prior conviction being vacated. Judge Graffeo dissented, arguing that the defendant would have accepted the plea offer regardless of the prior conviction, given the serious charges he was facing and the fact that the plea avoided a potentially much longer sentence. Graffeo also expressed concern about the application of the majority’s rule in future cases, questioning how much additional time would be considered a significant factor in inducing a plea.

  • People v. Van Deusen, 6 N.Y.3d 744 (2005): Guilty Plea Requires Awareness of Post-Release Supervision

    6 N.Y.3d 744 (2005)

    A defendant pleading guilty to a determinate sentence must be aware of the post-release supervision component of that sentence in order to knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently choose among alternative courses of action.

    Summary

    Tammi Van Deusen pleaded guilty to first-degree robbery in exchange for a sentence of 5 to 15 years. Prior to sentencing, she moved to withdraw her plea, arguing the court failed to advise her she would be subject to mandatory post-release supervision (PRS). The County Court denied her motion, and the Appellate Division affirmed, noting that her actual prison term plus PRS was less than the agreed-upon maximum. The New York Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the failure to advise Van Deusen of the PRS component invalidated her guilty plea, regardless of whether the combined sentence was less than the agreed-upon maximum because a defendant must be fully aware of all direct consequences of a guilty plea.

    Facts

    Tammi Van Deusen was indicted on several charges, including felony murder, burglary, robbery, criminal use of a firearm, and conspiracy, related to a home invasion where a victim was killed. She pleaded guilty to first-degree robbery in exchange for a determinate sentence between 5 and 15 years. Prior to sentencing, Van Deusen moved to withdraw her guilty plea because the County Court did not inform her that she would be subject to mandatory post-release supervision (PRS) after her release from prison.

    Procedural History

    The County Court denied Van Deusen’s motion to withdraw her guilty plea and sentenced her to eight years’ imprisonment plus five years of PRS. The Appellate Division affirmed the County Court’s decision, concluding that Van Deusen was not deprived of the benefit of her plea bargain because the total period of punishment (imprisonment plus PRS) was less than the maximum 15 years she had agreed to. The New York Court of Appeals granted Van Deusen leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a guilty plea to a determinate sentence is knowing, voluntary, and intelligent when the defendant is not informed of the mandatory post-release supervision component of the sentence, even if the total period of punishment (imprisonment plus PRS) is less than the agreed-upon maximum period of incarceration?

    Holding

    No, because a defendant pleading guilty to a determinate sentence must be aware of the post-release supervision component to make a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent choice among alternative courses of action.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on its prior holding in People v. Catu, 4 N.Y.3d 242 (2005), which established that post-release supervision is a direct consequence of a conviction for a violent felony offense with a determinate sentence. The court emphasized that a defendant must possess all necessary information for an informed decision when choosing to plead guilty. The failure to inform Van Deusen of the mandatory PRS meant she did not have all the information necessary for an informed choice. Therefore, her decision to plead guilty could not be considered knowing, voluntary, and intelligent. The Court stated that “Because a defendant pleading guilty to a determinate sentence must be aware of the postrelease supervision component of that sentence in order to knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently choose among alternative courses of action, the failure of a court to advise of postrelease supervision requires reversal of the conviction.” The court explicitly stated that the total length of the sentence being less than the negotiated maximum was irrelevant, as the key element was the defendant’s awareness of all direct consequences at the time of the plea. The Court’s decision ensures that defendants are fully aware of the consequences of their guilty pleas, thus protecting their due process rights and ensuring the integrity of the plea bargaining process.

  • People v. Catu, 4 N.Y.3d 242 (2005): Duty to Advise on Post-Release Supervision for Guilty Pleas

    4 N.Y.3d 242 (2005)

    A trial court’s failure to advise a defendant during a guilty plea allocution that a determinate sentence includes a mandatory period of post-release supervision requires reversal of the conviction, as such supervision is a direct consequence of the plea.

    Summary

    Defendant Catu pleaded guilty to attempted robbery and operating a vehicle under the influence, receiving a determinate sentence. The sentencing court failed to inform Catu that his sentence included a mandatory five-year period of post-release supervision. The New York Court of Appeals held that this omission was a reversible error because post-release supervision is a direct consequence of a guilty plea to a determinate sentence. A defendant must be fully aware of all direct consequences to make a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent plea.

    Facts

    Catu was indicted on charges of robbery, operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, and related offenses. He pleaded guilty to attempted robbery and felony DWI in exchange for a determinate sentence of three years in prison and a $1,000 fine. As a second felony offender, Catu’s sentence included a mandatory five-year period of post-release supervision. The sentencing court did not advise Catu of this post-release supervision requirement during his plea allocution.

    Procedural History

    After sentencing, Catu appealed, arguing that the court’s failure to advise him of the post-release supervision required vacatur of his plea. The trial court and the Appellate Division refused to vacate the plea, arguing that Catu hadn’t demonstrated that he would have rejected the plea deal if he had known about the post-release supervision. The New York Court of Appeals then granted review.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a trial court’s failure to advise a defendant during a guilty plea allocution that a determinate sentence includes a mandatory period of post-release supervision requires reversal of the conviction.

    Holding

    Yes, because a defendant pleading guilty to a determinate sentence must be aware of the postrelease supervision component of that sentence in order to knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently choose among alternative courses of action; therefore, the failure of a court to advise of postrelease supervision requires reversal of the conviction.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals distinguished between direct and collateral consequences of a guilty plea. It stated that while a court need not advise a defendant of collateral consequences, it must advise of direct consequences. Citing People v. Ford, 86 N.Y.2d 397 (1995), the court defined a direct consequence as one with a “definite, immediate and largely automatic effect on defendant’s punishment.” The court reasoned that post-release supervision, mandated by “Jenna’s Law,” is an integral part of a determinate sentence and therefore a direct consequence. The court emphasized that post-release supervision is significant, imposing conditions and potential re-incarceration for violations. Because a defendant must understand the plea’s consequences to make a voluntary and intelligent choice, the court held the failure to advise Catu of post-release supervision warranted reversal. The court explicitly rejected the lower courts’ requirement that Catu prove he would have rejected the plea had he known of the supervision, noting that “harmless error rules were designed to review trial verdicts and are difficult to apply to guilty pleas”. As the Court stated, “A trial court has the constitutional duty to ensure that a defendant, before pleading guilty, has a full understanding of what the plea connotes and its consequences”.

  • People v. Konieczny, 2 N.Y.3d 569 (2004): Guilty Plea Forfeits Challenge to Order of Protection Validity

    People v. Konieczny, 2 N.Y.3d 569 (2004)

    A defendant’s guilty plea to criminal contempt generally forfeits the right to challenge the underlying order of protection’s validity on appeal, unless the challenge implicates the court’s jurisdiction or a constitutional right.

    Summary

    Konieczny pleaded guilty to attempted criminal contempt for violating an order of protection. On appeal, he argued the order was invalid because the protected party wasn’t a victim or witness in the underlying bad check case, thus the order was improperly issued under CPL 530.13(4). The New York Court of Appeals held that his guilty plea forfeited this non-jurisdictional challenge. The Court emphasized that guilty pleas mark the end of litigation, and only jurisdictional defects or fundamental constitutional rights survive such a plea. While cautioning against misuse of protective orders, the Court affirmed the conviction, finding the accusatory instrument sufficient on its face.

    Facts

    Defendant pleaded guilty to disorderly conduct related to a bad check charge. Subsequently, an order of protection was issued directing him to stay away from Gary M. Although compliance with the order was a condition of his discharge, the order didn’t specify Gary M.’s connection to the bad check charge. One month later, police found Defendant at Gary M.’s residence, violating the order. He was charged with criminal contempt in the second degree. Defendant then pleaded guilty to attempted criminal contempt. Only on appeal did Defendant argue Gary M. wasn’t a victim or witness in the bad check case, rendering the protective order invalid.

    Procedural History

    Defendant pleaded guilty in City Court to attempted criminal contempt. On appeal to County Court, he argued the invalidity of the order of protection, which was rejected because the guilty plea forfeited the claim. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal to determine if the challenge to the order survived the guilty plea.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a defendant’s guilty plea to attempted criminal contempt forfeits the right to challenge the validity of the underlying order of protection on the grounds that the protected party was not a victim or witness in the underlying criminal action, when that challenge is raised for the first time on appeal.

    Holding

    No, because the defendant’s claim that the order of protection was invalid under CPL 530.13(4) is a statutory violation, not a jurisdictional defect or violation of a fundamental constitutional right, and therefore it did not survive his guilty plea. The information and supporting documents adequately pleaded that the defendant violated a court order.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that a guilty plea generally ends a criminal case, precluding further litigation on non-jurisdictional defects. Exceptions exist for jurisdictional matters or fundamental constitutional rights. The Court acknowledged concerns about misusing CPL 530.13 to issue protective orders for parties unrelated to the underlying prosecution. However, the Court determined that the defendant’s challenge to the order’s validity didn’t implicate the court’s jurisdiction. The misdemeanor information adequately alleged a violation of a court order, as the order of protection was facially valid and attached to the information. The Court cited People v. Casey, 95 N.Y.2d 354 (2000), stating that an accusatory instrument should be given a reasonable reading and external factors cannot be used to create jurisdictional defects not evident from the face of the document. The Court distinguished People v. Alejandro, 70 N.Y.2d 133 (1987), where the information failed to address an element of the offense. The Court noted that orders of protection are filed in a statewide registry and are enforced by a myriad of law enforcement agencies and courts throughout the state. For these reasons the court held, “Having pleaded guilty to attempted criminal contempt on a jurisdictionally valid accusatory instrument, defendant conceded every element of the offense, including the lawfulness of the order of protection, and forfeited his claim that the order violated CPL 530.13 (4).”

  • People v. Pichardo, 1 N.Y.3d 126 (2003): Vacating Guilty Pleas After Original Concurrent Sentence is Overturned

    1 N.Y.3d 126 (2003)

    When a guilty plea is induced by the court’s explicit promise of a lesser sentence to run concurrently with a sentence in another case, and that original conviction is overturned, the defendant may withdraw their plea.

    Summary

    Juan Carlos Pichardo pleaded guilty to a drug charge in Bronx County in exchange for a 1-to-3-year sentence to run concurrently with a 20-years-to-life murder sentence in New York County. Subsequently, his murder conviction was vacated due to ineffective assistance of counsel, and he was acquitted on retrial. Pichardo then moved to vacate the drug conviction, arguing the plea was induced by the concurrent sentence promise, which could no longer be fulfilled. The Supreme Court granted his motion, but the Appellate Division reversed. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division, holding that Pichardo was entitled to withdraw his plea because the fundamental basis for it—the concurrent sentence—had disappeared.

    Facts

    Pichardo was convicted of murder in New York County and sentenced to 20 years to life. One week later, he pleaded guilty in Bronx County to criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree, in exchange for a 1-to-3-year sentence to run concurrently with the murder sentence. The guilty plea was based on selling one bag of cocaine for $20 to an undercover officer. Years later, Pichardo’s murder conviction was vacated due to ineffective assistance of counsel. He was retried and acquitted of murder. Pichardo had already served his 1-to-3-year drug sentence by this time.

    Procedural History

    After being acquitted of murder, Pichardo moved in Bronx County Supreme Court to vacate his drug conviction under CPL 440.10, arguing his plea was induced by the now-vacated murder sentence. The Supreme Court granted the motion. The Appellate Division reversed, reinstating the drug conviction. Pichardo appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a defendant is entitled to withdraw a guilty plea entered in exchange for a sentence to run concurrently with another sentence when the initial conviction is overturned.

    Holding

    Yes, because the condition that induced the admission of guilt—the concurrent sentence promise—fundamentally changed when the murder conviction was vacated. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division and reinstated the Supreme Court’s order vacating the plea.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on its prior holdings, including People v. Taylor, People v. Boston, People v. Fuggazzatto, People v. Rogers, and People v. Clark, stating that it had consistently concluded that when a guilty plea is induced by the court’s explicit promise that the defendant will receive a lesser sentence to run concurrently with a sentence in another case, and that conviction is overturned, the defendant may withdraw his plea since the promise cannot be kept. The Court distinguished People v. Lowrance, where there was no clear promise of a concurrent sentence. The Court dismissed the argument that Pichardo had already received the benefit of his bargain because he served the drug sentence concurrently with the murder sentence, noting that the timing was not determinative. “What changed essentially here were the facts that induced defendant’s plea. In effect, when the murder conviction was vacated, defendant’s ‘concurrent’ time became a nullity—in the eyes of the law, it is as if he served no time at all on the murder, and his sentence on the drug charge stood alone, based on an unfulfilled and unfulfillable promise.” The Court concluded that Pichardo would not have pleaded guilty to the drug charge—based on selling a $20 bag of cocaine—had it not been for the murder conviction, of which he now stands acquitted. The court suggested that a better practice might be for the parties to spell out the consequences that will follow upon vacatur of the conviction. The dissent argued that vacatur was unwarranted because the lesser sentence was completed while the defendant was serving a concurrent sentence and it is not manifestly unjust to hold defendant to his negotiated plea since the drug and murder charges did not share any common defenses.

  • People v. McDonald, 1 N.Y.3d 109 (2003): Ineffective Assistance of Counsel and Misadvice on Deportation Consequences

    People v. McDonald, 1 N.Y.3d 109 (2003)

    An attorney’s affirmative misstatement regarding the deportation consequences of a guilty plea can constitute ineffective assistance of counsel, but the defendant must demonstrate prejudice by showing a reasonable probability that they would have gone to trial had they been correctly advised.

    Summary

    Bruce McDonald, a lawful permanent resident, pleaded guilty to drug charges based on his attorney’s incorrect advice that his long-term residency and U.S. citizen children would prevent deportation. After being served with deportation papers, McDonald moved to vacate his conviction, arguing ineffective assistance of counsel. The New York Court of Appeals held that while an attorney’s affirmative misstatement about deportation can be ineffective assistance, McDonald failed to demonstrate prejudice because he didn’t allege he would have gone to trial but for the incorrect advice. The court affirmed the denial of his motion.

    Facts

    Bruce McDonald, a Jamaican immigrant and lawful permanent resident for over 20 years, was arrested for selling marihuana to an undercover officer. A subsequent search of his apartment revealed cocaine, marihuana, and drug paraphernalia. McDonald had three U.S. citizen children and a U.S. citizen wife. His attorney incorrectly advised him that his guilty plea would not result in deportation due to his lengthy U.S. residence and his children’s citizenship. McDonald then pleaded guilty to criminal sale of marihuana and criminal possession of a controlled substance.

    Procedural History

    After pleading guilty and being sentenced, the INS served McDonald with a notice of deportation. McDonald moved to vacate the judgment of conviction, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel. The County Court denied the motion without a hearing. The Appellate Division affirmed, stating McDonald failed to demonstrate prejudice. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether an attorney’s incorrect advice regarding the deportation consequences of a guilty plea constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment.
    2. Whether a defendant must demonstrate prejudice (i.e., that they would have proceeded to trial) to succeed on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel based on misadvice about deportation consequences.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because an attorney’s affirmative misstatement regarding deportation can fall below an objective standard of reasonableness and thus constitute deficient performance.
    2. Yes, because to establish ineffective assistance, the defendant must show a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s error, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals applied the two-pronged Strickland v. Washington test for ineffective assistance of counsel. Under Strickland, a defendant must show that counsel’s performance was deficient and that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. The court found that the attorney’s misadvice regarding deportation consequences satisfied the first prong, as it fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. The court distinguished the case from situations where counsel merely fails to advise about deportation, which does not automatically constitute ineffective assistance. The court emphasized that here, counsel gave affirmatively incorrect advice. However, the court held that McDonald failed to satisfy the second prong because his motion to vacate the conviction lacked a factual allegation that he would have gone to trial had he been correctly advised. The court noted that “defendant was required to allege necessary facts to support his motion to vacate the judgment of conviction” and he failed to do so. The Court clarified that this case did not require a prediction analysis regarding the likely outcome of a trial. The key issue was whether McDonald showed he would have chosen to go to trial had he known the truth about the deportation consequences. The court affirmed the denial of McDonald’s motion because he failed to make this crucial showing of prejudice. The decision underscores the importance of defendants making specific factual allegations in support of ineffective assistance claims.

  • People v. Keizer, 100 N.Y.2d 114 (2003): Forfeiture of Claims After Guilty Plea

    People v. Keizer, 100 N.Y.2d 114 (2003)

    A defendant’s valid guilty plea generally forfeits the right to challenge non-jurisdictional defects in the accusatory instrument or the plea proceedings, absent specific statutory authorization to the contrary.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether a defendant can challenge a conviction after pleading guilty, based on defects in the initial charges or plea bargain. In People v. Keizer, the defendant pleaded guilty to disorderly conduct after being charged with larceny. In People v. Pittman, the defendant pleaded guilty to disorderly conduct after being charged with drug possession based on an accusatory instrument that the defendant claimed was based on hearsay. The New York Court of Appeals held that in both cases, the guilty pleas forfeited the defendants’ rights to challenge their convictions based on non-jurisdictional defects. A valid guilty plea generally marks the end of a criminal case, and challenges related to factual guilt or statutory authorization are forfeited.

    Facts

    People v. Keizer: Morgan Keizer was charged with petit larceny and criminal possession of stolen property after allegedly attempting to steal books from a bookstore. He pleaded guilty to disorderly conduct.

    People v. Pittman: Johnnie Pittman was charged with criminal possession of a controlled substance. The accusatory instrument stated it was based on the officer’s “own knowledge and on information and belief.” Pittman moved to dismiss, arguing it was impossible to determine which allegations were based on personal knowledge.

    Procedural History

    People v. Keizer: The Criminal Court accepted Keizer’s plea. Appellate Term affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    People v. Pittman: City Court denied Pittman’s motion to dismiss. Pittman pleaded guilty to disorderly conduct. Appellate Term reversed, dismissing the accusatory instrument as jurisdictionally defective. The New York Court of Appeals granted the People leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. In Keizer: Whether Criminal Court lacked jurisdiction to convict the defendant based on a plea of disorderly conduct when that offense was not charged in the complaint nor a lesser included offense.

    2. In Pittman: Whether a purported hearsay defect in an accusatory instrument is non-jurisdictional and thus forfeited by a guilty plea.

    3. In Pittman: Whether the defendant’s claim that his guilty plea to disorderly conduct was jurisdictionally defective because it was not a valid lesser included offense is forfeited.

    Holding

    1. In Keizer: No, because the court had jurisdiction over the defendant via the valid complaint, and the acceptance of the guilty plea did not abrogate that jurisdiction.

    2. In Pittman: Yes, because hearsay defects in accusatory instruments are non-jurisdictional and waivable if not raised at trial.

    3. In Pittman: Yes, because any claim that the disposition was not statutorily authorized is forfeited by his guilty plea.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that a guilty plea generally marks the end of a criminal case. In Keizer, the court had jurisdiction to commence the criminal action via the misdemeanor complaint. The specific constitutional limitations restricting the plea process for felony charges are absent in misdemeanor cases. Any claim of error that the disposition was not statutorily authorized is forfeited by the guilty plea.

    In Pittman, the Court relied on People v. Casey, holding that hearsay defects are nonjurisdictional and waivable if not raised at the trial level. The Court reasoned that a plea usually removes the issue of factual guilt, so whether a claim is forfeited depends on whether it relates to the factual elements of the crime or some other fundamental matter. By pleading guilty, the defendant cannot revisit the alleged hearsay defect as the claim is forfeited. The court emphasized that there is no mechanical rule that fixes when a claim is forfeited by a guilty plea, referencing People v Taylor, 65 NY2d at 5.

    The Court also referenced People v Hansen, (95 NY2d 227 [2000]), where the court held that the defendant forfeited his right to raise a claim of improperly admitted evidence before the grand jury due to his guilty plea, characterizing that argument as “essentially relat[ing] to the quantum of proof required to satisfy the factual elements of the crimes considered by the Grand Jury”

  • People v. Campbell, 4 N.Y.3d 532 (2005): Enforceability of Appeal Waivers in Sentencing Delay Cases

    People v. Campbell, 4 N.Y.3d 532 (2005)

    A general waiver of the right to appeal, entered as part of a guilty plea, does not automatically foreclose appellate review of a claim of impermissible delay in sentencing, particularly where the delay was unforeseeable and not attributable to the defendant.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether a defendant’s general waiver of the right to appeal, made during a guilty plea, bars a challenge to the sentence based on an allegedly unreasonable delay. The Court held that such a waiver does not automatically preclude appellate review of sentencing delay claims, especially when the delay is unforeseeable and not caused by the defendant. The Court emphasized that while waivers are generally enforceable, they cannot operate to deprive a defendant of the right to challenge fundamental errors in the proceedings. The case was remitted to the Appellate Division to consider the merits of the defendant’s claim.

    Facts

    The defendant pleaded guilty to a crime and, as part of the plea agreement, waived his right to appeal. Substantial time passed between the plea and sentencing. On appeal, the defendant argued that the delay in sentencing was unreasonable and violated his rights. The prosecution argued that the defendant’s general waiver of appeal precluded him from raising this issue.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court accepted the defendant’s guilty plea. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, holding that the defendant’s general waiver of the right to appeal barred his claim of unreasonable delay in sentencing, citing People v. Espinal and People v. Jones. The case then went to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a defendant’s general waiver of the right to appeal, made as part of a guilty plea, forecloses appellate review of a claim that the sentence was impermissibly delayed.

    Holding

    No, because a general waiver of appeal does not automatically preclude appellate review of a sentencing delay claim, particularly where the delay was unforeseeable and not attributable to the defendant.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that while waivers of the right to appeal are generally valid and enforceable, they are not absolute. Certain fundamental rights and errors in the proceedings cannot be waived. The Court stated that “a waiver of appeal does not operate to deprive a defendant of the right to challenge an illegal sentence.” The Court distinguished between waiving specific known rights and waiving the right to challenge future, unforeseen errors. It held that a delay in sentencing, if unreasonable and not caused by the defendant, could constitute such an error. The court noted that the Appellate Division should determine if the delay was excusable under the circumstances. Judge Rosenblatt concurred, emphasizing that the defendant’s own evasiveness and use of aliases contributed to the delay, and clarified that the holding shouldn’t impede the Appellate Division from affirming the Supreme Court’s factual determinations. The concurrence highlights that the ruling protects defendants from unforeseen delays not of their own making, not those who contribute to the delay. The court remitted the case to the Appellate Division to determine whether the delay was, in fact, unreasonable under the circumstances and whether the defendant’s conduct contributed to the delay. The court stated, “This decision should not be construed as impeding the Appellate Division in this case from affirming Supreme Court’s factual determinations.”

  • People v. Alfaro, 99 N.Y.2d 469 (2003): Factual Basis Required for Guilty Plea Despite Alford Plea

    People v. Alfaro, 99 N.Y.2d 469 (2003)

    Even with an Alford plea, where a defendant does not admit to the acts constituting the crime, there must be some factual basis presented to the court, either by the defendant or the prosecution, to support the acceptance of the guilty plea.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether a guilty plea, specifically an Alford plea, could be accepted without any factual basis presented on the record. The defendant entered an Alford plea to criminal contempt but did not admit to the underlying facts. The prosecution also failed to proffer any evidence demonstrating the defendant’s guilt. The Court of Appeals held that it was improper for the trial court to accept the plea without some factual basis articulated on the record, even when it is an Alford plea where the defendant maintains their innocence but acknowledges the evidence against them is substantial.

    Facts

    The defendant was indicted on multiple counts related to alleged criminal conduct against his former girlfriend. These charges included assault and aggravated criminal contempt for violating an order of protection. He pleaded guilty to criminal contempt in the first degree, specifically violating Penal Law § 215.51(b) by subjecting his girlfriend to physical contact with intent to harass, annoy, threaten, or alarm her. Critically, the defendant entered an Alford plea, meaning he pleaded guilty but did not admit to the factual basis of the crime. The prosecutor also did not provide any factual basis for the plea.

    Procedural History

    Following the guilty plea, the defendant obtained new counsel who moved to vacate the plea, arguing the defendant was not taking his medication for a mental illness at the time of the plea. The trial court ordered a psychiatric examination, which indicated the defendant was competent at sentencing but did not address his competency at the time of the plea. The defendant appealed, arguing his plea was not knowing or voluntary and violated due process. The Court of Appeals affirmed the order, with a dissenting opinion arguing that the trial court erred by not ensuring a factual basis for the plea was established.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether a trial court can accept an Alford plea to a criminal charge when neither the defendant nor the prosecution proffers a factual basis for the plea on the record.

    Holding

    1. No, because a guilty plea, even an Alford plea, requires some indication on the record that there is a factual basis for the conviction; otherwise, it undermines fundamental principles of criminal procedure.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals, in the dissenting opinion, emphasized that fundamental principles of law mandate a factual basis for a guilty plea. The dissent cited precedent establishing that certain procedural errors are so fundamental that they invalidate the entire proceeding, even without a contemporaneous objection. The dissent argued that accepting an Alford plea without any factual basis presented by either the defendant or the prosecution violates this principle. Specifically, because Penal Law § 215.51(b)(v) requires actual physical contact or the threat of physical contact, the absence of any evidence supporting that element rendered the plea invalid. The dissent argued that the court had an obligation to ensure the defendant’s competency at the time of the plea and that the Alford plea needed some factual support from the prosecution. The dissent cited Matter of Silmon v Travis, noting that, at the time of the Alford plea in that case, there was record evidence that the defendant had committed the crime. The lack of any such evidence in Alfaro was the critical distinction. The dissent quoted from prior cases, such as Cancemi v People, to highlight the principle that some legal errors are so fundamental that they cannot be waived, even with the defendant’s consent. The dissent stated, “a conviction in this case violates the principle of law that a person should not be convicted, even on an Alford plea, without some indication on the record that there is a factual basis for the conviction.”

  • People v. Miller, 91 N.Y.2d 372 (1998): Cross-Examination on Prior Guilty Pleas Before Sentencing

    People v. Miller, 91 N.Y.2d 372 (1998)

    A defendant who pleads guilty to a crime waives their Fifth Amendment rights regarding the facts admitted during the plea allocution, and may be cross-examined on those admissions in a subsequent trial, even if sentencing on the prior plea is pending, absent a credible claim that the plea is subject to vacatur.

    Summary

    Miller was convicted of robbery. Prior to trial, the court ruled that if Miller testified, the prosecution could cross-examine him regarding a prior robbery to which he had pleaded guilty but had not yet been sentenced. The cross-examination was limited to the facts Miller admitted during his guilty plea allocution. Miller appealed, arguing that because sentencing was pending on the prior robbery, cross-examination violated his right against self-incrimination. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that Miller waived his Fifth Amendment rights regarding the admitted facts when he pleaded guilty, and had not demonstrated a risk of incriminating himself beyond those admitted facts.

    Facts

    Miller robbed three children at a McDonald’s restaurant on August 11, 1996. He pleaded guilty to attempted robbery on November 20, 1996, admitting under oath to taking $70 from a child. Before sentencing, Miller was arrested for another robbery. At the trial for the second robbery, the People sought to cross-examine Miller about the McDonald’s robbery, for which he was still awaiting sentencing. The trial court permitted the cross-examination, limited to Miller’s admissions during his guilty plea allocution for the McDonald’s robbery. Miller did not testify and was convicted.

    Procedural History

    After being convicted of robbery, Miller appealed. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. A Judge of the Court of Appeals granted Miller leave to appeal to that court.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a trial court errs in permitting the prosecution to cross-examine a defendant about a prior crime to which the defendant pleaded guilty, but for which the defendant has not yet been sentenced, when the cross-examination is limited to the defendant’s admissions during the guilty plea allocution?

    Holding

    No, because the defendant waived his Fifth Amendment rights regarding the facts admitted during the plea allocution and did not demonstrate a credible risk of incriminating himself beyond those admitted facts.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals distinguished this case from People v. Betts, 70 N.Y.2d 289 (1987), where the Court held that a defendant who testifies does not waive their self-incrimination rights with respect to “pending” unrelated criminal charges. Here, Miller had already pleaded guilty to the prior crime, waiving his Fifth Amendment rights in connection with the facts he admitted during the plea allocution. The Court emphasized that Miller never suggested that his guilty plea was vulnerable or that there was any ground upon which it could be vacated. The Court also distinguished Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 314 (1999), where the Supreme Court held that a defendant’s guilty plea did not waive her right to remain silent during sentencing proceedings where further testimony was expected. In this case, there was no basis for Miller to fear or expect a sentencing hearing at which proof would be taken or that he would be called upon to incriminate himself beyond what he admitted at the plea allocution. The Court stated, “By meticulously limiting the inquiry as it did, the trial court foreclosed any incriminating inquiry as to the McDonald’s crime, save what defendant himself said when he relinquished his Fifth Amendment rights during the plea colloquy.” The court concluded that Miller’s arguments regarding self-incrimination were theoretical and unavailing because the trial court only allowed questioning related to what Miller already admitted to under oath. The Court noted that it was not deciding whether People v. Spitaleri, 9 N.Y.2d 168 (1961), which barred the use of withdrawn guilty pleas, should be extended to admissions made in another trial.