New York Law Review

Tag: group home

  • Group House of Port Washington, Inc. v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 45 N.Y.2d 266 (1978): Defining ‘Family’ in Zoning for Group Homes

    Group House of Port Washington, Inc. v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 45 N.Y.2d 266 (1978)

    A municipality cannot apply zoning ordinances defining ‘family’ so stringently as to exclude a small group home for foster children that functions as the functional equivalent of a natural family.

    Summary

    Group House sought a building permit to operate a foster home for children in an area zoned for single-family residences. The town denied the permit, arguing it wasn’t a ‘family’ under the ordinance. The New York Court of Appeals held that the group home, operating as a functional family unit, could not be excluded. The court converted the Article 78 proceeding to a declaratory judgment action. The court reasoned that excluding a group home that functions as a natural family serves no valid public purpose, but emphasized that the ruling was limited to homes functioning as family units. The dissent argued the group home was not a stable family unit and extending the definition of ‘family’ was an overreach.

    Facts

    Group House, a non-profit, bought a house in Port Washington, NY, in an area zoned for one-family residences. The town’s zoning ordinance defined ‘family’ as related persons living as a single housekeeping unit, with limited boarders. Group House planned to use the house as a state-authorized group home for foster children. The Building Commissioner denied their building permit application, stating the group home was not a permitted use.

    Procedural History

    The Board of Zoning Appeals upheld the Building Commissioner’s denial. Group House then initiated an Article 78 proceeding to overturn the Board’s decision. The Supreme Court ruled in favor of Group House. The Appellate Division affirmed the judgment, but on different grounds, asserting a municipality could not use zoning to exclude a state-approved group home. The Court of Appeals affirmed, but on the narrow grounds that the group home was indistinguishable from a natural family.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the Town of North Hempstead may apply its zoning ordinance definition of ‘family’ to exclude a small group home for foster children that functions as a functional equivalent of a natural family?

    Holding

    Yes, because the group home in this case operated as the functional equivalent of a natural family and to exclude it would serve no valid public purpose.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals focused on the factual similarities between the proposed group home and a traditional family. It noted that the group home would consist of two surrogate parents and seven children, creating a stable home environment. The children would be drawn from the local community, attend local schools, and not impose an additional burden on the community.

    The court distinguished this situation from boarding houses or transient residences, emphasizing the intent to create a permanent family structure. It stated that excluding such a group home would not further the family and youth values that single-family zoning is intended to protect.

    The court stated that while the power to zone is broad, it is not unlimited, and may not be used for arbitrary exclusionary efforts. Citing Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, the court acknowledged the legitimacy of zoning for single-family residences. However, it emphasized that arbitrary restrictions under the guise of protecting family values are impermissible. The court reasoned that because the group home was the functional equivalent of a natural family, excluding it would serve no valid purpose. The court also warned that the holding was limited to homes functioning as family units, and might not apply to facilities for delinquents or the mentally disturbed.

    Chief Judge Breitel dissented, arguing that the group home did not meet the standard for ‘family’ established in City of White Plains v. Ferraioli because it was not a stable, single-family unit. He also argued that the alternating houseparents and the transient nature of the children undermined the purpose of single-family zoning. The dissent emphasized the importance of analyzing subtle distinctions on a case-by-case basis to determine if a group home truly emulates a family.

  • City of White Plains v. Ferraioli, 34 N.Y.2d 300 (1974): Defining ‘Family’ in Zoning Ordinances to Include Group Homes

    City of White Plains v. Ferraioli, 34 N.Y.2d 300 (1974)

    A group home consisting of a married couple, their children, and a number of foster children, functioning as a single housekeeping unit, qualifies as a “family” for the purposes of a zoning ordinance, even if the relationships are not based on blood or adoption.

    Summary

    The City of White Plains sought to enforce its zoning ordinance to prevent the operation of a group home for foster children in a single-family residential zone. Abbott House, a licensed child care agency, leased a house for a married couple, their two children, and ten foster children. The city argued that this arrangement was not a single-family use but either a philanthropic institution or a boarding house, both prohibited in the zone. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the lower court’s summary judgment for the city, holding that the group home, operating as a single housekeeping unit and resembling a traditional family, fell within the zoning ordinance’s definition of “family.”

    Facts

    Abbott House, a state-licensed child care agency, established a group home in White Plains, New York. The group home consisted of a married couple (the Seards), their two children, and ten foster children (seven siblings and three unrelated children). Abbott House leased a house owned by the Ferraiolis in an R-2 single-family zone. The Seards were paid a salary, and all household expenses were covered by Abbott House. The children lived together as siblings, and the household functioned as a single housekeeping unit with shared kitchen facilities.

    Procedural History

    The City of White Plains sued Abbott House and the Ferraiolis to enforce its zoning ordinance. The trial court granted summary judgment to the City. The Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order and granted summary judgment to the defendants, Abbott House and the Ferraiolis, dismissing the complaint.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a group home, consisting of a married couple, their children, and ten foster children living together as a single housekeeping unit, constitutes a “family” within the meaning of a zoning ordinance restricting land use to single-family dwellings.

    Holding

    Yes, because the group home is structured as a single housekeeping unit and functions as a relatively normal, stable, and permanent family unit, thus meeting the zoning ordinance’s intent to promote a family environment.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the zoning ordinance’s purpose was to promote a stable, uncongested, single-family environment. The group home, designed to emulate a traditional family and function as a single housekeeping unit, was consistent with this purpose. The court distinguished the group home from temporary living arrangements like college students sharing a house or a commune, emphasizing the permanency and community ties fostered by the group home. The court stated, “So long as the group home bears the generic character of a family unit as a relatively permanent household, and is not a framework for transients or transient living, it conforms to the purpose of the ordinance.”

    The Court acknowledged that while a city could properly limit a zone to single-family units, it could not define “family” in a way that requires relationships based on blood or adoption. The court referenced several cases, including Kirsch Holding Co. v. Borough of Manasquan, to support the idea that zoning should control housing types, not internal family relationships. The Court noted that, “Zoning is intended to control types of housing and living and not the genetic or intimate internal family relations of human beings.”

    The Court also mentioned the defendants’ argument that prohibiting group homes would contravene the state’s Social Services Law, which authorizes licensed agencies to establish group homes. However, because the Court found that the group home was a family, it did not need to address this argument. The Court concluded that, as a matter of law, the group home was a family and granted summary judgment to the defendants.