Grossman v. Baumgartner, 17 N.Y.2d 345 (1966)

A municipality’s health code prohibiting tattooing is a valid exercise of its police power when supported by evidence demonstrating a rational basis, such as the prevention of the spread of infectious diseases like hepatitis, even if it impacts existing businesses.

Summary

Grossman and Funk, professional tattoo artists, challenged a New York City Health Code provision that prohibited tattooing by anyone except licensed medical professionals for medical purposes. The plaintiffs sought a declaration that the provision was unconstitutional and an injunction against its enforcement, arguing it infringed upon their right to conduct their business. The New York Court of Appeals upheld the prohibition, finding a rational basis for the regulation in the compelling medical necessity to prevent the spread of hepatitis, as supported by substantial evidence. The Court deferred to the judgment of public health officials, emphasizing the broad scope of police power in matters of public health and safety.

Facts

Plaintiffs Grossman and Funk operated tattooing businesses in Coney Island for several years, complying with existing Board of Health regulations. In 1961, New York City’s Health Code was amended to prohibit tattooing by non-medical professionals. Evidence presented by the city’s Health Department indicated a direct link between tattooing and the transmission of serum hepatitis, with statistical analysis suggesting that tattooed individuals were at a significantly higher risk of contracting the disease. Health officials determined that effective regulation and supervision of tattoo parlors to ensure proper sterilization were practically impossible.

Procedural History

The plaintiffs initiated a lawsuit challenging the constitutionality of the Health Code provision in the trial court. The trial court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, declaring the provision unconstitutional. The Appellate Division reversed, upholding the prohibition. The plaintiffs then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

Issue(s)

Whether the Health Code provision prohibiting tattooing, except for medical purposes by licensed medical professionals, constitutes an unconstitutional exercise of power by the Board of Health, violating Article III, Section 1 of the New York State Constitution.

Holding

No, because the Board of Health is explicitly authorized by the City Charter to add, alter, amend, or repeal any part of the health code, and the prohibition is a reasonable exercise of its power to protect public health, supported by evidence of a link between tattooing and the spread of hepatitis.

Court’s Reasoning

The Court of Appeals held that the Health Code provision was a valid exercise of the city’s police power. It reasoned that a statute or administrative regulation is valid if it has a rational basis, meaning it is not unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious. The court found compelling medical necessity for the prohibition, noting the evidence presented by the defendants’ witnesses that showed a connection between tattooing and hepatitis and the ineffectiveness of rigorous regulation. The court emphasized that “[t]he police power is exceedingly broad, and the courts will not substitute their judgment of a public health problem for that of eminently qualified physicians in the field of public health.” Citing precedent, the court stated, “The judicial function is exhausted with the discovery that the relation between means and end is not wholly vain and fanciful, an illusory pretense.”

The court also rejected the argument that the Board of Health unconstitutionally exercised legislative power, citing the City Charter, which explicitly authorizes the board to regulate the health code. The court further dismissed the plaintiffs’ preemption argument, finding that the state laws prohibiting tattooing of minors or in hazing rituals did not demonstrate a legislative intent to occupy the entire field of tattooing regulation, particularly concerning public health measures to prevent the spread of infectious diseases. The court declined to address the constitutionality of the provision’s limitation on physicians, finding the plaintiffs lacked standing to raise those specific claims since they were not doctors or prospective patients.