New York Law Review

Tag: Grossly Unqualified

  • People v. Lewis, 80 N.Y.2d 1007 (1992): Discharging Juror After Partial Verdict

    People v. Lewis, 80 N.Y.2d 1007 (1992)

    A juror may be discharged even after deliberations have begun if the court finds the juror is grossly unqualified based on facts unknown during jury selection, but this determination must be based on concrete evidence, not speculation.

    Summary

    Lewis was convicted of robbery and attempted robbery. On the second day of deliberations, a juror expressed fear for her family’s safety after recognizing someone in the courtroom. The court questioned the juror and, learning the jury had reached a verdict on some counts the previous day, took a partial verdict on those counts and discharged the jury. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that the juror’s disqualification arose only after the first day of deliberations, making the partial verdict valid. The court emphasized that a juror’s disqualification must be based on concrete evidence, not speculation.

    Facts

    Defendant Lewis was tried with two codefendants and convicted of robbery in the first degree and three counts of attempted robbery in the first degree.
    During the second day of jury deliberations, the court learned that at least one juror was experiencing a personal problem. A juror then sent a note expressing concern for her family’s safety because she recognized someone in the courtroom. The juror feared reprisal if the verdict was unfavorable to the defendants. The juror stated that her fear arose after the first day of deliberations ended. The defendant moved for a mistrial.

    Procedural History

    The trial court, after determining that the jury had reached a verdict on some counts at the end of the first day, took a partial verdict finding Lewis guilty of one count of robbery in the first degree and three counts of attempted robbery in the first degree. The jury did not reach a verdict on the remaining count of robbery in the first degree. The trial court then discharged the jury and denied the defendant’s motion for a mistrial. The Appellate Division affirmed the convictions, and the defendant appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court erred in taking a partial verdict and discharging the jury after a juror expressed fear for her family’s safety, claiming she recognized someone in the courtroom, and stating her fear arose after the first day of deliberations.

    Holding

    No, because the juror’s disqualification arose only after the first day of deliberations, making the partial verdict valid, and the trial court properly terminated deliberations after determining the jury could not reach a verdict on all counts.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order. The court cited CPL 270.35, which allows a juror to be discharged even after deliberations have begun if the court finds the juror is grossly unqualified based on facts unknown during jury selection. However, the court emphasized that under People v. Buford, 69 NY2d 290, 299, “In concluding that a juror is grossly unqualified, the court may not speculate as to possible partiality of the juror based on her equivocal responses. Instead, it must be convinced that the juror’s knowledge will prevent her from rendering an impartial verdict”. The court reasoned that because the juror stated she did not feel unable to continue deliberating until after the jury had been discharged on the first day, she was not grossly unqualified to participate in the first day’s deliberations. Therefore, the partial verdict was reached by a qualified and competent jury. Further, the court noted that having determined that the jury would be unable to reach a verdict on all counts, the trial court properly terminated the deliberations and ordered the jury to render a partial verdict under CPL 310.70 [1] [a].

  • People v. Buford, 69 N.Y.2d 290 (1987): Standard for Dismissing a Sworn Juror During Trial

    People v. Buford, 69 N.Y.2d 290 (1987)

    A sworn juror in a criminal trial may only be dismissed over the defendant’s objection if the court finds the juror is “grossly unqualified” to serve, meaning the juror possesses a state of mind that would prevent the rendering of an impartial verdict.

    Summary

    This case addresses the standard for dismissing a sworn juror during a criminal trial under New York Criminal Procedure Law (CPL) 270.35. The Court of Appeals held that a juror can only be dismissed if “grossly unqualified,” meaning the juror’s state of mind prevents an impartial verdict. The Court reversed the convictions in two separate cases, finding that the trial courts applied an improper, less stringent standard in excusing jurors. The key factor is whether the juror’s impartiality is clearly compromised, not merely questionable. Speculation about possible bias is insufficient for dismissal.

    Facts

    People v. Buford: During Buford’s murder trial, a forewoman saw two prosecution witnesses leaving the courthouse together and expressed concern about a possible conspiracy. The court questioned her, and she stated she could still be fair. The court excused her over the defendant’s objection.
    People v. Smitherman: During Smitherman’s weapon possession trial, a juror revealed she had personal knowledge of the shooting of the defendant’s friend, which the defendant claimed was the reason he wore a bulletproof vest. Initially, she indicated this knowledge might affect her judgment, but later stated she could still be fair and impartial. The court excused her over the defendant’s objection.

    Procedural History

    Both Buford and Smitherman were convicted in their respective trials. In both cases, the Appellate Divisions affirmed the convictions. The New York Court of Appeals consolidated the appeals and reversed the orders of the Appellate Divisions, ordering new trials for both defendants.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the trial court in People v. Buford applied the correct standard in excusing the forewoman from the jury over the defendant’s objection.
    2. Whether the trial court in People v. Smitherman applied the correct standard in excusing the juror with personal knowledge of the defendant’s friend’s shooting over the defendant’s objection.

    Holding

    1. No, because the trial court did not apply the “grossly unqualified” standard established in CPL 270.35, instead relying on speculation about possible partiality.
    2. No, because the trial court did not apply the “grossly unqualified” standard established in CPL 270.35, instead relying on the juror’s particular knowledge, even though the juror stated she could be fair.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized that dismissing a sworn juror after the trial has begun requires a showing that the juror is “grossly unqualified” under CPL 270.35. This standard is higher than the standard for challenging a juror for cause during jury selection. The Court reasoned that a defendant has a constitutional right to a trial by a particular jury chosen according to law. The Court stated, “This statutory test places a greater burden upon the moving party than if the juror was challenged for cause”.

    In Buford, the forewoman’s initial concern about a conspiracy was alleviated after being informed that the witnesses’ conduct was proper. Her subsequent statements indicated she could remain fair and impartial. Therefore, it was not “obvious” that she possessed a state of mind that would prevent an impartial verdict.

    In Smitherman, the juror’s knowledge of the shooting of defendant’s friend pertained to a collateral matter, not to material facts in issue. Although the juror initially stated her knowledge would affect her deliberations, she later indicated she could convict if the prosecution proved its case beyond a reasonable doubt. The court emphasized that the trial court must be convinced that the juror’s knowledge will prevent her from rendering an impartial verdict, and the court may not speculate. “In concluding that a juror is grossly unqualified, the court may not speculate as to possible partiality of the juror based on her equivocal responses. Instead, it must be convinced that the juror’s knowledge will prevent her from rendering an impartial verdict.” The Court found that the trial court applied a standard other than “grossly unqualified” by focusing on the juror’s “particular knowledge” rather than her actual ability to be impartial. The Court reiterated that each case must be evaluated on its unique facts and stated that the trial court’s reasons for its ruling should be placed on the record.