People v. Cabrera, 78 N.Y.2d 705 (1991)

To be convicted of criminally negligent homicide, a defendant’s conduct must constitute a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would observe in the situation, demonstrating a failure to perceive a substantial and unjustifiable risk.

Summary

The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the defendant’s conviction for criminally negligent homicide and vehicular manslaughter. The court held that driving while intoxicated, off a public highway, into an unfamiliar field at high speed, without headlights, and crashing through a hedgerow constituted a gross deviation from reasonable care, sufficient to establish criminal negligence. The court further clarified that the vehicular manslaughter statute applies to driving under the influence regardless of location, even if the conduct wouldn’t violate the Vehicle and Traffic Law.

Facts

The defendant, Cabrera, while legally intoxicated, drove his motor vehicle at night off a public highway and into a farmer’s field he was unfamiliar with. He accelerated to approximately 50 miles per hour, intermittently operated the vehicle without headlights, and then forcefully drove through a hedgerow of small trees and shrubs. A passenger in the vehicle died as a result of the incident.

Procedural History

Cabrera was convicted of criminally negligent homicide and vehicular manslaughter in the second degree. He appealed, arguing that his conduct did not constitute criminal negligence and that the vehicular manslaughter statute did not apply to his actions because he was not driving on a public highway. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, and Cabrera appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

Issue(s)

1. Whether the defendant’s actions constituted a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would observe, thus establishing criminal negligence for the purposes of criminally negligent homicide.

2. Whether the vehicular manslaughter statute applies to driving under the influence of alcohol regardless of whether the driving occurred on a public highway or other areas defined in the Vehicle and Traffic Law.

Holding

1. Yes, because driving while intoxicated, off a public highway, into an unfamiliar field at high speed, without headlights, and crashing through a hedgerow constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care a reasonable person would have observed.

2. Yes, because the Penal Law does not incorporate the Vehicle and Traffic Law’s limitation to public roads and areas when defining vehicular manslaughter, thus applying the statute to driving under the influence regardless of location.

Court’s Reasoning

The court reasoned that criminal negligence requires a failure to perceive a substantial and unjustifiable risk, constituting a gross deviation from reasonable care. The court found that Cabrera’s actions met this standard, stating, “A rational juror could certainly have found that this conduct grossly deviated from the standard of care a reasonable person would have observed in a similar situation. Accordingly, the conduct was sufficiently blameworthy to sustain defendant’s conviction for criminally negligent homicide.”

Regarding vehicular manslaughter, the court acknowledged that Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192 prohibits driving under the influence on public highways. However, Penal Law § 125.12, defining vehicular manslaughter, only references subdivisions (2), (3), and (4) of § 1192, which prohibit driving while intoxicated or under the influence of drugs, but does not incorporate subdivision (5) (now subd [7]), which limits the prohibition to public roads. The court reasoned that the Penal Law and Vehicle and Traffic Law serve different purposes, and the vehicular manslaughter statute applies to anyone causing a death by driving under the influence, regardless of location. The court emphasized, “With the understanding that penal laws have different purposes than vehicle and traffic laws, we conclude the vehicular manslaughter statute applies to any person causing a death by driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs, regardless of location, even though there could be no separate punishment for such driving under Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192 where the driving did not occur on public roads or other areas defined in that section.”