New York Law Review

Tag: “Grievance Procedures”

  • Matter of City of New York v. New York State Nurses Association, 29 N.Y.3d 486 (2017): Information Rights in Collective Bargaining and Grievance Procedures

    29 N.Y.3d 486 (2017)

    A public employer must provide a union with data normally maintained in the regular course of business, reasonably available and necessary for the administration of the parties’ agreements, including the processing of grievances, which encompasses disciplinary actions when the collective bargaining agreement (CBA) defines grievances to include disciplinary actions.

    Summary

    The New York State Nurses Association (NYSNA) sought information from the City of New York’s Human Resources Administration (HRA) to represent two nurses in disciplinary proceedings. The City refused, leading NYSNA to file an improper practice petition. The Board of Collective Bargaining (Board) found the City’s refusal improper, citing NYCCBL § 12-306(c)(4). The City challenged this decision, but the Appellate Division affirmed, finding the Board’s decision rational. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division, holding that because the CBA defined “grievance” to include disciplinary actions, the City was obligated to provide the requested information, which included data normally maintained in the regular course of business. The dissent argued that the statute, focused on good faith bargaining, did not extend to information requests for disciplinary proceedings and that the information requests were not necessary for the collective bargaining process.

    Facts

    Two nurses, members of NYSNA, employed by the City’s Human Resources Administration (HRA), faced disciplinary charges for falsifying time records. HRA sent notices outlining the disciplinary process, including a Step 1 conference and a Step 2 Grievance Hearing. NYSNA requested information from HRA, including policies, records, and witness statements, to represent the nurses. The City refused. NYSNA filed an improper practice petition with the Board of Collective Bargaining, alleging a violation of NYCCBL § 12-306(a)(1) and (4). The Board ruled in favor of NYSNA, which the City then challenged in court.

    Procedural History

    The Board of Collective Bargaining found that the City’s refusal to provide information was an improper practice. The City initiated a CPLR Article 78 proceeding in Supreme Court, which granted the City’s petition and annulled the Board’s determination. The Appellate Division reversed the Supreme Court, holding that the Board’s decision was rational and granting the City leave to appeal on a certified question. The Court of Appeals then affirmed the Appellate Division.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether NYCCBL § 12-306(c)(4) requires the City to provide information to NYSNA for disciplinary proceedings against its members.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the CBA defined grievance to include disciplinary action, and the information requested was data normally maintained in the regular course of business, necessary for grievance processing.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court considered the language of NYCCBL § 12-306, which requires employers to provide data reasonably necessary for full and proper discussion, understanding, and negotiation. The court noted that the CBA defined “grievance” to include disciplinary actions, incorporating the information requirements applicable to grievances. The court distinguished this case from Matter of Pfau v. Public Employment Relations Board, which did not have the same contractual framework. The court held that the City’s arguments regarding the expedited timeline of disciplinary proceedings were unpersuasive, especially since other agencies followed the same process.

    Practical Implications

    This ruling clarifies that the duty to provide information in collective bargaining extends to disciplinary proceedings when the CBA defines disciplinary actions as grievances. Legal practitioners representing unions should review CBAs to identify the scope of “grievance” definitions. This decision reinforces the importance of clear contract language in defining the scope of information rights. Public employers must be prepared to provide relevant information during disciplinary proceedings. This case underscores that access to information is a crucial aspect of union representation and contract administration. Subsequent cases involving information requests related to disciplinary actions will likely cite this case as precedent.

  • Matter of Abramovich v. Board of Educ., 46 N.Y.2d 450 (1978): Limits on Agency Authority in Grievance Procedures

    Matter of Abramovich v. Board of Educ., 46 N.Y.2d 450 (1978)

    An administrative board’s decision is only binding regarding the specific controversy brought before it; the board lacks authority to issue directives on matters outside that scope.

    Summary

    This case addresses the scope of authority of the Unified Court System Employment Relations Review Board. The Court of Appeals held that the Board’s decision was only binding on the specific grievance presented – cancellation of holiday recess in 1972 and did not extend to a separate grievance regarding the charging of leave time during a subsequent holiday recess in 1973. The Court emphasized that the Board’s jurisdiction is limited to the controversies actually submitted for resolution. The Court refused to compel the Office of Court Administration to implement a portion of the Review Board’s decision that addressed a matter not properly before it.

    Facts

    For over 20 years, courts in the Appellate Division, First Department, recessed over the Christmas-New Year holidays, with nonjudicial employees receiving time off without it being charged to their annual leave. In 1972, the Appellate Division canceled the recess and directed that no compensating nonchargeable time off would be allowed. Employees initiated grievance proceedings. Later, the customary holiday recess was reinstated for 1973, but the Appellate Division ordered that time off enjoyed by employees would be charged to annual leave, contrary to past practice.

    Procedural History

    Employees initiated grievance proceedings regarding the 1972 cancellation, which was denied at the second step. The employees appealed to the Employment Relations Review Board, which sustained the rejection of the 1972 grievance but also issued a directive regarding future holiday recesses. Special Term upheld the Review Board and ordered that respondents treat time off during the 1973 recess as nonchargeable leave. The Appellate Division reversed and dismissed the proceeding, which the Court of Appeals affirmed.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the Employment Relations Review Board exceeded its authority by issuing a directive regarding nonchargeable leave for future holiday recesses, when the grievance before it concerned only the cancellation of a holiday recess in 1972?

    Holding

    No, because the Board’s jurisdiction is limited to the specific controversy submitted to it; any directive regarding matters outside that controversy is beyond the Board’s authority and unenforceable.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that under Section 23.5 of the Rules of the Administrative Board, the Review Board’s determination is final only with respect to controversies submitted to it. The grievance arose out of the 1972 cancellation, and the dispute concerned employees’ rights when courts were in session. No controversy existed then regarding future nonchargeable time off when courts might be in recess, especially because the decision was rendered before the announcement of the 1973 recess. The Court noted deficiencies in the rules for defining the scope of the grievance. The Court emphasized that the 1973 issue only came to the board’s attention because hearings were postponed. The Court found no evidence that the 1973 controversy was properly introduced to the board; in fact, evidence showed the parties recognized it as a separate, future grievance. Therefore, the board’s directive was “gratuitous, not called for in the circumstances, and therefore outside the jurisdiction of the board.” The Court also rejected the argument that the grievance procedures should be treated as arbitration, with limited judicial review. The court stated: “The review board shall review the record of the prior proceedings and shall determine such appeal * * * based on the record and such additional oral or written arguments as may be presented at hearings before it.”