New York Law Review

Tag: grievance procedure

  • Matter of Queensborough Community College, 41 N.Y.2d 926 (1977): Statute of Limitations for Discrimination Claims

    41 N.Y.2d 926 (1977)

    The statute of limitations for filing a discrimination complaint begins to run when the alleged discriminatory decision is manifested, not when the employment term ends or when internal grievance procedures are exhausted.

    Summary

    This case concerns the timeliness of a discrimination complaint filed by a former employee of Queensborough Community College. The Court of Appeals held that the one-year statute of limitations began to run when the employee was notified that she would not be reappointed, not when her employment term concluded. The court reasoned that the notification of non-reappointment constituted the alleged unlawful discriminatory practice. The invocation of grievance procedures did not toll the statute of limitations because it was merely an alternative remedy. This decision emphasizes the importance of promptly filing discrimination claims from the date of the discriminatory act’s clear communication.

    Facts

    Ethne E. K. Marenco was employed by Queensborough Community College. She received notice that she would not be reappointed. Marenco subsequently filed a complaint alleging unlawful discrimination. The complaint was filed more than one year after receiving notice of non-reappointment but within one year of the end of her employment term and after exhausting internal grievance procedures.

    Procedural History

    The case reached the Court of Appeals of the State of New York after proceedings before the State Human Rights Appeal Board and lower courts. The specific rulings of the lower courts are not detailed in this memorandum decision, but the Court of Appeals affirmed the order, implicitly agreeing with the determination that the complaint was time-barred.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the statute of limitations for filing a discrimination complaint begins to run from the date the employee receives notice of the discriminatory decision (non-reappointment) or from a later date, such as the end of the employment term or the exhaustion of internal grievance procedures.

    Holding

    No, because the alleged discriminatory practice was the manifested decision not to reappoint the complainant, and the act of giving notice of non-reappointment immediately gave rise to a cause of action.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court based its reasoning on the plain language of Executive Law § 297(5), which requires a complaint to be filed within one year after the alleged unlawful discriminatory practice. The court determined that the discriminatory practice occurred when the college notified Marenco of its decision not to reappoint her. The court stated, “The act of giving complainant notice that she would not be reappointed gave rise immediately to a ’cause of action’, as the Appellate Division observed, and therefore started the running of the limitation period.” The court also analogized the situation to general civil practice under the CPLR, where a cause of action accrues when the plaintiff possesses a legal right to relief. Furthermore, the court held that invoking a grievance procedure, being merely an alternative remedy, does not toll the statute of limitations. The court cited the Supreme Court case of Electrical Workers v Robbins & Meyers, 429 US 229, 236-240, to support this conclusion, reinforcing the principle that alternative remedies do not extend the deadline for filing discrimination claims.

  • Rieder v. State University of New York, 39 N.Y.2d 845 (1976): Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies Before Judicial Relief

    39 N.Y.2d 845 (1976)

    A party must exhaust all available and adequate administrative remedies before seeking judicial intervention, especially when a binding collective bargaining agreement provides a grievance procedure.

    Summary

    Ronald F. Rieder and others sought judicial relief against the State University of New York, alleging improper handling of funds. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order, holding that the plaintiffs failed to exhaust their administrative remedies. The court emphasized the availability of a speedy grievance procedure in the binding collective bargaining agreement and noted no indication that the union was unwilling to pursue the grievance on the plaintiffs’ behalf. The court viewed the lawsuit as an attempt to avoid arbitration, the final stage in the grievance procedure, and rejected it.

    Facts

    The plaintiffs, Ronald F. Rieder et al., were involved in a dispute concerning the handling of certain funds at the State University of New York. The specific details of the fund mismanagement are not elaborated in the memorandum opinion but are presumed to be related to their employment. A collective bargaining agreement was in place that provided a grievance procedure for resolving disputes.

    Procedural History

    The plaintiffs initially sought judicial resolution of their dispute. The Appellate Division’s order was appealed to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision, effectively ruling against the plaintiffs and requiring them to pursue administrative remedies first.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the plaintiffs were required to exhaust the administrative remedies available to them under the collective bargaining agreement before seeking judicial relief.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the plaintiffs had access to an adequate and expeditious administrative remedy through the grievance procedure outlined in the collective bargaining agreement, and they did not demonstrate that the union was unwilling to represent them in pursuing that remedy.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court emphasized the importance of exhausting administrative remedies before resorting to judicial action. The court found that the collective bargaining agreement provided a “speedy grievance procedure,” implying that it was both adequate and expeditious for resolving the dispute. Even with the plaintiffs’ concern that the funds might lapse, the court believed there was ample time to pursue the administrative route. The court stated, “For all that appears on this record, plaintiffs’ attempt to obtain a judicial resolution of this controversy was, in practical effect, an effort to avoid arbitration, the final stage in the grievance procedure. This evasion we reject.” This highlights the court’s disapproval of bypassing established procedures for dispute resolution. The court implied that the plaintiffs’ case lacked merit because they did not demonstrate any reason why the union would not have pursued the grievance on their behalf. The court viewed the administrative process as an essential step that could not be circumvented simply by preferring a judicial forum.

  • Board of Education v. Poughkeepsie Public School Teachers’ Association, 35 N.Y.2d 599 (1974): Concurrent Pursuit of Contract Grievance and Statutory Remedies

    Board of Education v. Poughkeepsie Public School Teachers’ Association, 35 N.Y.2d 599 (1974)

    Parallel procedures challenging a school district’s refusal to appoint a teacher, one an appeal to the Commissioner of Education and the other a contract grievance including arbitration, may proceed concurrently when the collective bargaining agreement does not explicitly prohibit it and the grounds for relief are discrete.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether a teacher and the teachers’ union can pursue both a statutory appeal to the Commissioner of Education and a contractual grievance procedure, including arbitration, simultaneously. The New York Court of Appeals held that, in the specific circumstances, both procedures could continue concurrently because the collective bargaining agreement did not explicitly preclude it, both remedies were pursued diligently, and the grounds for relief under each were distinct. This case clarifies the circumstances where parallel remedies are permissible in disputes involving collective bargaining agreements and statutory rights in the education context.

    Facts

    Raylene Shayo, a tenured teacher, applied for a first-grade teaching position after her prior role was eliminated. The school board did not act favorably on her application. The teacher, and the Poughkeepsie Public School Teachers Association (the union), believed this was unjust. On April 5, 1972, the teacher filed an appeal with the State Commissioner of Education under Section 310 of the Education Law. Simultaneously, the union initiated a grievance procedure per their collective bargaining agreement, alleging a violation of the agreement’s promotional policy. The grievance procedure included internal stages and final, binding arbitration.

    Procedural History

    The teacher filed a section 310 appeal and the union started grievance procedures on the same day. The superintendent’s designee dismissed the grievance due to the pending appeal. The Board of Education answered the section 310 proceeding. The union requested a Stage 3 grievance hearing, but the board declined, citing the pending appeal. The union then demanded arbitration. The Board of Education sought a stay of arbitration, which Special Term granted. The Appellate Division reversed, dismissing the petition for a stay and remitting to arbitration. The Court of Appeals then reviewed the Appellate Division’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the pursuit of an appeal to the Commissioner of Education under Section 310 of the Education Law waives or abandons the right to pursue grievance procedures, including arbitration, under a collective bargaining agreement for the same underlying dispute.

    2. Whether a contractual time limitation for demanding arbitration is a threshold question for the court or an issue of procedural arbitrability for the arbitrator.

    Holding

    1. No, because both remedies were pursued concurrently and diligently, the collective bargaining agreement did not explicitly exclude the specific type of claim, and the grounds for relief under each procedure were discrete.

    2. The issue is one of procedural arbitrability for the arbitrator, because the time limitation arises from the agreement itself and is necessary for interpreting and applying the agreement to resolve the grievance.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the collective bargaining agreement did not explicitly exclude the teacher’s claim from the grievance procedure. Section 2.1 of Article XXIV excluded disciplinary proceedings and matters of compensation appealable to the Commissioner, but the teacher’s claim for appointment did not fall within these exclusions. The court emphasized that both the Section 310 appeal and the grievance procedures were initiated and pursued concurrently and diligently. Therefore, neither remedy was waived or abandoned. The court stated, “While the school board indicated a clear preference for the section 310 track, the conduct of the teacher and the union discloses only a calculated intention to pursue both remedies concurrently and vigorously.”

    The Court also distinguished the grounds for relief. The Commissioner of Education addressed the claim under Section 2510 of the Education Law, while the arbitration was based on Sections 1.1 and 1.2 of Article XI of the collective bargaining agreement. These were distinct issues.

    Regarding the time limitation for demanding arbitration, the court cited Long Is. Lbr. Co. [Martin], 15 N.Y.2d 380, holding that because the 10-day limitation arose from the parties’ agreement, its application was a procedural matter for the arbitrator to decide. The court clarified that since the arbitration clause contemplated arbitration as to the interpretation and application of the agreement, the arbitrator should determine whether the union met the contractual deadline. The court noted, “Since the 10-day limitation of time is found in a provision of the agreement, it would seem that a decision as to its application would be procedurally necessary to a determination of the grievance here.”