New York Law Review

Tag: grandparent visitation rights

  • E.S. v. P.D., 8 N.Y.3d 150 (2007): Grandparent Visitation Rights and Parental Authority After Troxel

    E.S. v. P.D., 8 N.Y.3d 150 (2007)

    New York’s grandparent visitation statute (Domestic Relations Law § 72(1)) is constitutional, both facially and as applied, because it allows judicial intervention only when equitable circumstances exist, requires consideration of the child’s best interests, and presumes that a fit parent’s decisions are in the child’s best interests.

    Summary

    After a mother’s death, the maternal grandmother provided substantial care for her grandson for several years. When the relationship between the grandmother and the child’s father soured, the father limited the grandmother’s access to the child. The grandmother petitioned for visitation rights under Domestic Relations Law § 72(1). The New York Court of Appeals held that the statute was constitutional and that the visitation order was appropriate, emphasizing that the statute provides a procedural mechanism for grandparents to acquire standing, while still according special weight to the parent’s decisions regarding the child’s best interests, in accordance with the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Troxel v. Granville.

    Facts

    A mother (A.D.) died of cancer, and her mother (E.S., the grandmother) moved into the marital home to care for A.D. and her son (C.D.). After A.D.’s death, the grandmother continued to live with the father (P.D.) and C.D. for 3.5 years, providing significant care for C.D. The relationship between the father and grandmother deteriorated, leading the father to demand that the grandmother move out and restricting her contact with C.D.

    Procedural History

    The grandmother commenced a proceeding in Supreme Court seeking visitation rights. The Supreme Court granted visitation to the grandmother. The Appellate Division affirmed, modifying the visitation schedule in deference to the father’s wishes. The father appealed to the New York Court of Appeals, arguing that Domestic Relations Law § 72(1) was unconstitutional in light of Troxel v. Granville.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether Domestic Relations Law § 72(1) is facially unconstitutional under the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Troxel v. Granville?

    2. Whether Domestic Relations Law § 72(1) was unconstitutionally applied in this case?

    Holding

    1. No, because Domestic Relations Law § 72(1) is narrowly drafted, affording a grandparent standing only when a parent is deceased or where equitable circumstances exist, and requires a determination of the child’s best interest, giving the parent’s decision presumptive weight.

    2. No, because the trial court was mindful of the father’s parental rights and employed the presumption that the parent’s wishes represent the child’s best interests, but the grandmother overcame this presumption by demonstrating the extraordinarily close relationship she had with the child and the child’s deep love for her.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that Domestic Relations Law § 72(1) is facially constitutional because it is narrower than the Washington statute in Troxel, which allowed “any person” to petition for visitation “at any time.” New York’s statute requires either the death of a parent or a showing of circumstances where equity would intervene. The court emphasized that the statute provides a procedural mechanism for grandparents to acquire standing to seek visitation, but the court must still determine if visitation is in the best interest of the grandchild, giving special weight to the parent’s determination. The court noted the Troxel decision requires that courts accord “at least some special weight to the parent’s own determination.”

    The court distinguished this case from Troxel, noting that the trial court was “mindful” of the father’s parental prerogatives and employed the presumption that the parent’s wishes represent the child’s best interests. The grandmother successfully demonstrated an extraordinarily close relationship with the child during the nearly five years she lived with him, essentially acting as his surrogate mother. The court found the father’s complaints about the grandmother’s caregiving skills were contrived. The court properly considered all the circumstances and the law guardian’s assessment before granting visitation.

    The Court of Appeals cited Matter of Emanuel S. v Joseph E., 78 NY2d 178, 181 (1991), emphasizing that visits with a grandparent are “often a precious part of a child’s experience” and provide benefits the child cannot derive from other relationships.

  • E.S. v. A.D., 861 N.E.2d 466 (N.Y. 2006): Grandparent Visitation Rights and Parental Authority

    E.S. v. A.D., 8 N.Y.3d 151, 861 N.E.2d 466, 831 N.Y.S.2d 360 (2006)

    New York’s Domestic Relations Law § 72(1), allowing grandparent visitation, is constitutional both facially and as applied, provided courts give special weight to a fit parent’s decisions regarding their child’s best interests.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether a grandmother was properly granted visitation rights with her grandson under New York Domestic Relations Law § 72(1), and whether the statute is constitutional under Troxel v. Granville. The Court of Appeals held that § 72(1) is constitutional, both facially and as applied. The Court emphasized that while grandparents can seek visitation, courts must give special weight to the decisions of fit parents. The Court found the grandmother established a close relationship with the child, making visitation in the child’s best interest, and the trial court properly considered the father’s parental rights.

    Facts

    A.D. (mother) married E.D. (father) and had a son, C.D., in 1993. In 1997, A.D. was diagnosed with cancer. A.D.’s mother, E.S. (grandmother), moved in to care for A.D. and C.D. After A.D.’s death in 1998, the grandmother continued living with the father and son for 3.5 years, providing significant care for the child. In 2001, the relationship between the father and grandmother deteriorated. In 2002, the father asked the grandmother to move out and initially forbade contact between her and C.D. Later, he allowed limited, supervised visits. In 2003, the grandmother sought court-ordered visitation.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court granted visitation to the grandmother. The Appellate Division affirmed the Supreme Court’s judgment, modifying the visitation schedule to accommodate the father’s wishes. The Appellate Division also rejected the father’s constitutional challenge to the statute. The father then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Was the grandparent properly granted visitation with her grandson pursuant to Domestic Relations Law § 72(1)?

    2. Is Domestic Relations Law § 72(1) facially unconstitutional in light of Troxel v. Granville?

    3. Was Domestic Relations Law § 72(1) unconstitutionally applied in this case?

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the record supported the determination that visitation was in the child’s best interest.

    2. No, because the statute can be interpreted to accord deference to a parent’s decision.

    3. No, because the trial court properly considered the father’s parental prerogatives and applied the presumption that the parent’s wishes represent the child’s best interests.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that § 72(1) provides a procedural mechanism for grandparents to seek visitation, but it does not create an absolute right. The statute requires a two-part inquiry: first, the court must find standing based on death or equitable circumstances; second, the court must determine if visitation is in the best interest of the grandchild. The court emphasized that the presumption that a fit parent’s decisions are in the child’s best interests is a strong one. The Court distinguished Troxel, where the trial court failed to give special weight to the parent’s decision and effectively placed the burden on the parent to disprove that visitation was in the child’s best interest. Here, the trial court was mindful of the father’s right to raise his child, but the grandmother had established an extraordinarily close relationship with the child. The Court noted that, “so long as a parent adequately cares for his or her children (i.e., is fit), there will normally be no reason for the State to inject itself into the private realm of the family to further question the ability of that parent to make the best decisions concerning the rearing of that parent’s children”. Because the trial court gave proper weight to the father’s parental rights and then considered the child’s best interest, § 72(1) was constitutionally applied. The Court stated, “Troxel does not prohibit judicial intervention when a fit parent refuses visitation, but only requires that a court accord ‘some special weight to the parent’s own determination’ when applying a nonparental visitation statute”.

  • E.S. v. P.D., 8 N.Y.3d 150 (2007): Grandparent Visitation Rights and Parental Authority

    E.S. v. P.D., 8 N.Y.3d 150, 863 N.E.2d 100, 831 N.Y.S.2d 96 (2007)

    Domestic Relations Law § 72(1) grants grandparents standing to seek visitation under specific circumstances, but courts must give special weight to a fit parent’s decisions regarding their child’s best interests.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether a grandparent was properly granted visitation rights under New York’s Domestic Relations Law § 72(1) and whether that statute is constitutional under Troxel v. Granville. After the child’s mother died, the grandmother lived with the father and child for 3.5 years, becoming a primary caregiver. When the father ended the arrangement and limited visitation, the grandmother sought court-ordered visitation. The Court of Appeals held that the statute was properly applied and is constitutional, both facially and as applied, emphasizing that while the statute allows for grandparent visitation, it requires significant deference to the decisions of a fit parent.

    Facts

    A.D. (mother) died of cancer, and her mother, E.S. (grandmother), moved in with A.D.’s husband, P.D. (father), and their son, C.D., to help care for them. After the mother’s death, the grandmother continued to live with the father and child for 3.5 years, providing significant care and support for the child. The relationship between the father and grandmother deteriorated, leading the father to demand the grandmother move out and severely restrict her access to the child. The grandmother then sought court-ordered visitation.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court granted the grandmother visitation rights. The Appellate Division affirmed, modifying the visitation schedule in deference to the father’s wishes. The father appealed to the Court of Appeals, arguing the statute was unconstitutional in light of Troxel v. Granville and that the visitation order was an abuse of discretion.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the grandparent was properly granted visitation rights with her grandson pursuant to Domestic Relations Law § 72(1)?

    2. Whether Domestic Relations Law § 72(1) is facially unconstitutional under the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Troxel v. Granville?

    3. Whether Domestic Relations Law § 72(1) was unconstitutionally applied in this case?

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the grandmother established an extraordinarily close relationship with the child for several years, and the trial court properly considered the child’s best interests.

    2. No, because Domestic Relations Law § 72(1) is narrowly drafted and can be interpreted to accord deference to a parent’s decision, aligning with the principles established in Troxel v. Granville.

    3. No, because the trial court properly employed the presumption that a fit parent acts in the best interest of his child and then thoroughly considered all relevant circumstances before granting visitation.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that Domestic Relations Law § 72(1) provides a procedural mechanism for grandparents to seek visitation, but it does not create an absolute right. The court emphasized the importance of the two-part inquiry: first, determining standing based on death or equitable circumstances, and second, determining whether visitation is in the child’s best interest. The court stressed that the presumption that a fit parent’s decisions are in the child’s best interests is strong, and courts should not lightly intrude on the family relationship against a fit parent’s wishes.

    The court distinguished this case from Troxel v. Granville, where the Washington statute was deemed overly broad. The Court quoted Justice Altman, stating that section 72(1) “can be, and has been, interpreted to accord deference to a parent’s decision, although the statute itself does not specifically require such deference. Further, [section 72(1)] is drafted much more narrowly than the Washington statute [considered in Troxel].” The court noted that the trial court in this case was “mindful” of the father’s parental prerogatives and employed the strong presumption that the parent’s wishes represent the child’s best interests.

    The Court of Appeals concluded that, unlike in Troxel, the trial court did not presuppose that grandparent visitation was warranted. Instead, the court properly considered all circumstances, including the child’s wishes, the grandmother’s caregiving skills, and the father’s objections, before granting visitation. The Court reiterated that affirmed findings of fact from the lower courts are binding and that there was no abuse of discretion in applying the statute.

  • McGlinchey v. Wilson, 6 N.Y.3d 372 (2006): Terminating Grandparent Visitation Based on Changed Circumstances

    McGlinchey v. Wilson, 6 N.Y.3d 372 (2006)

    A court may modify or terminate a grandparent visitation order upon a showing of a subsequent change of circumstances where the continuation of visitation is no longer in the child’s best interest, even if the initial order was based on a stipulation.

    Summary

    This case concerns a dispute over grandparent visitation rights. After an initial order stipulating visitation between grandparents and their grandchild, the parents sought to terminate visitation, citing a change in circumstances due to increased animosity and stress adversely affecting the child and her mother. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision to terminate visitation, holding that the parents demonstrated a sufficient change in circumstances to warrant modification, and that continuing visitation was no longer in the child’s best interest because of the high level of family dysfunction.

    Facts

    The Wilsons (parents) and McGlincheys (grandparents) were estranged. The grandparents filed a petition for visitation with their four-month-old granddaughter. A court order was entered based on a stipulation allowing the grandparents eight hours of visitation per month, with the expectation of therapeutic family counseling, which never occurred. Months later, the Wilsons petitioned to terminate visitation, alleging that the visits were a disaster, the grandparents were bullying them, and discontinuing visitation would be in the child’s best interest. The grandparents opposed the petition and sought visitation with the Wilsons’ younger daughter as well.

    Procedural History

    The Family Court dismissed the Wilsons’ petition to terminate visitation with the older child and denied the grandparents’ cross-petition for visitation with the younger child. The Appellate Division modified the Family Court’s order, granting the Wilsons’ petition and vacating the visitation order, finding that the child, her mother, and grandmother suffered emotional distress due to increasing tension between the parties. The grandparents appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the Appellate Division erred in modifying the Family Court’s order and terminating the grandparent’s visitation rights based on a change of circumstances.

    Holding

    Yes, because the Appellate Division’s finding that the exacerbated levels of animosity and stress, along with their negative impact on the child and her mother, represented a change necessitating termination of visitation more closely comported with the weight of the evidence.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals recognized the fundamental right of parents to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of their children, citing Troxel v. Granville. While New York law acknowledges the value of grandparent relationships, it does not create an absolute right to visitation. Modification of a visitation order requires a showing of a subsequent change of circumstances and that the modification is required. While extraordinary circumstances are not required, the ultimate standard remains the best interests of the child. Relevant considerations include the fitness of the parties, the nature and quality of the relationships, and the existence of a prior agreement. The court emphasized that, “the standard ultimately to be applied remains the best interests of the child when all of the applicable factors are considered.”

    The Court found the evidence showed a deterioration of the relationship between the parents and grandparents after the initial visitation order. Specifically, the court noted the testimony of Carol Wilson’s therapist, who stated that Carol suffered from post-traumatic stress as a result of the visitation and that her tension and anxiety affected her ability to parent. The Law Guardian also opined that the stress experienced by Carol carried over to the child, negatively impacting her. Although “visits with a grandparent are often a precious part of a child’s experience,” this interest must yield where the family circumstances render the continuation of visitation not in the child’s best interest. The Court concluded that shielding the child from the animosity and dysfunction was in the child’s best interest.

  • Mimkon v. Grieco, 68 N.Y.2d 779 (1986): Grandparents’ Visitation Rights After Adoption

    Mimkon v. Grieco, 68 N.Y.2d 779 (1986)

    Grandparents of an adopted child retain visitation rights, provided it is in the child’s best interest and does not hinder the adoptive relationship, even if the natural parent consented to the adoption.

    Summary

    This case addresses the visitation rights of grandparents after their grandchild has been adopted by a stepparent. The New York Court of Appeals held that the grandparents retained visitation rights, emphasizing that the Domestic Relations Law intends to continue familial relationships between grandparents and grandchildren even after adoption, as long as it’s in the child’s best interest and doesn’t disrupt the adoptive family. The court found no evidence that visitation would harm the child and that the grandparents were willing to respect the adoptive family’s boundaries.

    Facts

    The natural father of a child consented to the child’s adoption by the stepfather. The child’s paternal grandparents sought visitation rights after the adoption. The mother and adoptive father opposed the visitation, primarily because they did not want the child to know that they have three sets of grandparents, which could highlight their adoptive status.

    Procedural History

    The Family Court initially denied the grandparents’ visitation petition, suggesting that the natural father’s consent to adoption terminated the grandparents’ rights and finding that visitation was not in the child’s best interest. The Appellate Division reversed, holding that the Family Court erred on both the law and the facts. The case then went to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the natural father’s consent to the adoption of his child by the stepfather terminated the visitation rights of the child’s paternal grandparents.

    Holding

    No, because section 72 of the Domestic Relations Law intends to continue the familial relationship between grandparents of an adopted child and the child, provided that doing so is not contrary to the best interests of the child.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that Section 72 of the Domestic Relations Law demonstrates a legislative intent to maintain familial bonds between grandparents and their grandchildren, even after adoption, as long as doing so is in the child’s best interest. The court emphasized that the Family Court Judge erred in suggesting that the natural father’s consent to the adoption automatically terminated the grandparents’ rights. Furthermore, the court deferred to the Appellate Division’s finding that the Family Court also erred in its assessment of the child’s best interests. The court noted the grandparents’ willingness to avoid involving the natural father in their visits and to respect the adoptive family’s wishes regarding disclosure of the adoption to the child. The court acknowledged the adoptive parents’ concern about the child being aware of having three sets of grandparents but stated that this concern is inherent in the legislative policy and doesn’t justify denying visitation absent evidence that the grandparents are exacerbating the situation. The court ultimately concluded that the Appellate Division’s decision, that contact with the grandparents would not harm the child’s emotional or physical well-being, was more aligned with the weight of the evidence. The court stated that absent evidence of harm to the child, visitation should not be denied. The court quoted People ex rel. Sibley v Sheppard, 54 NY2d 320, 329 stating that this issue involves “as a primary consideration the avoidance of hindering the adoptive relationship”.

  • Sibley v. Sheppard, 405 N.Y.S.2d 322 (1978): Grandparent Visitation Rights After Adoption

    405 N.Y.S.2d 322 (1978)

    A natural grandparent has the right to visitation with their grandchild, even after the child’s adoption, when authorized by court decree and in the best interest of the child.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether a grandparent has visitation rights after their grandchild is adopted, despite the adoptive parents’ objections. The New York Court of Appeals held that Domestic Relations Law § 72 allows a grandparent to seek visitation rights, even post-adoption, if it’s in the child’s best interest. The court found that adoption does not automatically extinguish grandparental rights and that the state has a legitimate interest in ensuring a child maintains beneficial family ties, especially after the death of the child’s parents. The court emphasized that visitation must not hinder the adoptive relationship and that the statute’s application doesn’t unconstitutionally infringe on the adoptive family’s privacy.

    Facts

    Agatha Sibley, the petitioner, sought visitation rights with her grandson, Willie Sheppard. Willie’s parents were deceased. Willie lived with Sibley until he was about two years old. Following his mother’s death, Willie was placed in foster care and eventually adopted by his paternal grandparents, Mamie and Willie Sheppard, the respondents. After the adoption, the respondents interfered with Sibley’s attempts to visit Willie.

    Procedural History

    Sibley initiated a habeas corpus action under Domestic Relations Law § 72 to obtain visitation rights. The Supreme Court ruled that the adoption didn’t extinguish Sibley’s rights and awarded her visitation. The Appellate Division affirmed this decision. The New York Court of Appeals then reviewed the case.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether Domestic Relations Law § 72 permits a grandparent to seek visitation rights with a grandchild after the child has been adopted.
    2. Whether granting visitation rights to a grandparent over the objection of adoptive parents constitutes an unconstitutional infringement on the adoptive family’s right to privacy.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because Domestic Relations Law § 72 allows a grandparent to seek visitation rights with a grandchild, even after adoption, if it is in the child’s best interest and does not unduly hinder the adoptive relationship.
    2. No, because the State has a legitimate interest in protecting the best interests of the child, and granting visitation rights under limited circumstances is reasonably related to that goal and does not unconstitutionally impinge upon the integrity of the adoptive family.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that Domestic Relations Law § 72 permits a proceeding against any person who has custody of the child, including adoptive parents. Nothing in the statute excludes custody obtained through adoption. The Court highlighted that § 117, which describes the effects of adoption, doesn’t expressly terminate all contacts between the child and their natural relatives. The court stated, “The purpose of the section, as manifested by its own terms, is to facilitate maintenance of family ties between grandparents and grandchildren where one or both of the natural parents have died.” The court noted that the Legislature was presumed to know about both statutes (§ 117 and § 72) and intended each to have full effect.

    Regarding the constitutionality challenge, the Court acknowledged parents’ rights to raise their families but noted that such rights are not absolute. The Court applied a less rigorous standard of review, asking whether the law had a “reasonable relation to any end within the competency of the State.” The Court found that allowing grandparent visitation, subject to the child’s best interests, was a valid exercise of the State’s power to protect children. The Court emphasized that visitation rights may not be awarded if they hinder the adoptive relationship. The court stated: “Section 72 expressly provides that the court’s decision is to be rendered ‘as the best interest of the child may require’. Consequently, visitation rights may not be awarded when doing so will hinder the adoptive relationship.”
    The court emphasized that the power to interfere is severely limited and does not extend to dictating other aspects of the child’s upbringing. The court acknowledged that protecting the best interest of a child is unquestionably a proper exercise of the police power.