New York Law Review

Tag: Grand Larceny

  • People v. Brown, 20 N.Y.2d 238 (1967): Admissibility of Identification Evidence

    People v. Brown, 20 N.Y.2d 238 (1967)

    Evidence of a prior identification is admissible, and a claim of unfairness in the identification process will only warrant reversal if prejudice to the defendant is shown.

    Summary

    The defendant, Brown, was convicted of grand larceny. He appealed, arguing that evidence of false representations was improperly admitted and that the identification procedure was unfair. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that the complaining witness was not induced to part with her money through false pretenses, and the identification procedure, while not ideal, did not prejudice the defendant. The court reasoned that the false pretenses occurred after the theft, and the identification by the complaining witness was reliable enough to uphold the conviction.

    Facts

    Jennie Finch withdrew $200 from a bank to purchase a money order for taxes. Outside the bank, she met Brown, who asked her for directions. Meyers then joined them, and they all looked for an address in a telephone book. Finch entered their car, and after driving around, returned to the bank and withdrew an additional $800 for her granddaughter’s hospital bill. Upon exiting the bank a second time, she was pushed back into the car. Brown and Meyers then stole $950 from her bag. Afterward, Brown made false statements about the money being food stamps, not a bank book. Finch later identified Brown at the police station.

    Procedural History

    Brown was convicted of grand larceny in the first degree. He appealed the conviction, arguing that evidence of false representations or pretenses was illegally introduced, violating Penal Law § 1290-a, and that the identification procedure was unfair. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s judgment, upholding Brown’s conviction.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether evidence of false representations or pretenses was improperly admitted against Brown in violation of Penal Law § 1290-a, where the representations occurred after the theft.

    2. Whether the identification procedure used by the police was so unfair as to warrant reversal of Brown’s conviction.

    Holding

    1. No, because the false representations occurred after the larceny had already been committed, and thus, did not induce the victim to part with her money.

    2. No, because under the specific circumstances of this case, the identification procedure did not result in prejudice to the defendant.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that Penal Law § 1290-a prohibits the admission of evidence of false representations or pretenses only if they were used to accomplish, aid, or facilitate a theft. Here, the false statements made by Brown occurred after Finch had already been pushed into the car and her money had been taken. Therefore, they could not have induced her to part with her money. The court emphasized that Finch’s testimony indicated the theft occurred through force, not deception.

    Regarding the identification, the court acknowledged the United States Supreme Court cases of United States v. Wade, Stovall v. Denno, and Gilbert v. California, which addressed the right to counsel at police lineups. However, the court noted that these cases were not retroactive and, therefore, did not directly apply to Brown’s appeal. Furthermore, the court addressed the defense’s argument that the lineup consisting of only two black defendants and one white detective was inherently unfair. It held that despite this fact pattern, the defendant had not shown actual prejudice. The court implicitly found that Finch’s initial encounter with Brown provided an independent basis for her identification, mitigating any potential unfairness in the lineup procedure. “Under the circumstances of this case there was no prejudice in the identification of appellant by the complainant.”

  • People v. Yonkers Contracting Co., 17 N.Y.2d 322 (1966): Establishing Larceny Through Overbilling Requires Proof of Intent

    People v. Yonkers Contracting Co., 17 N.Y.2d 322 (1966)

    To establish larceny based on overbilling, the prosecution must prove that the defendant knowingly made false claims with the intent to steal; mere negligence or opportunity to overbill is insufficient.

    Summary

    This case concerns indictments for grand larceny and bribery against Yonkers Contracting Co. and its officers, as well as members of the engineering firm, Briggs, Blitman, and Posner. The indictments stemmed from alleged overpayments for “unsuitable material” removed during a Thruway construction project. The Court of Appeals held that while there was sufficient evidence to sustain charges against the corporation, Yonkers, the evidence was insufficient to establish that individual defendants or the engineering firm knowingly participated in a scheme to defraud the State. The Court emphasized that proof of intent to steal is a necessary element of larceny.

    Facts

    Yonkers Contracting Co. was awarded a contract to construct a portion of the New York State Thruway. The State contracted with Briggs, Blitman, and Posner to supervise Yonkers’ work, including certifying the quantities of excavated material, which were paid at a unit price. The dispute arose over item 2BX, “Unclassified Excavation,” specifically concerning “unsuitable material.” The State alleged Yonkers was overpaid for excess unsuitable material removed. The engineering firm’s supervision was neglected, and they often relied on figures provided by Yonkers without independent verification.

    Procedural History

    The Grand Jury indicted Yonkers and its officers, as well as members of the Briggs, Blitman, and Posner firm, for grand larceny. Yonkers and two of its officers were also indicted for bribery. The Appellate Division held that the Grand Jury minutes disclosed sufficient evidence to sustain the charges. However, they also found that the individual defendants had acquired immunity, except for certain defendants on the grand larceny charge and the bribery charges against Yonkers. The defendants appealed, arguing insufficient evidence. The People appealed the dismissal of indictments against the individual defendants.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the evidence before the Grand Jury was sufficient to establish that Yonkers knowingly overstated the quantity of unsuitable material excavated, thus committing grand larceny.

    2. Whether the evidence was sufficient to establish that the engineers, Posner and Snook, knowingly participated in the alleged larceny by certifying false quantities and receiving additional fees.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because there was prima facie evidence that the quantity of unsuitable material for which Yonkers was paid was knowingly overstated.

    2. No, because the evidence did not establish that the engineers knowingly participated in the scheme or were aware that the contractor had inflated the quantities of excavated material.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that to establish grand larceny, the prosecution must prove that Yonkers knowingly claimed and received payment for more excavation work than was actually done, with the intent to steal. The Court found that evidence suggested Yonkers overstated the quantity of unsuitable material. However, the Court held that evidence of opportunity to steal does not equate to evidence of actual theft. Concerning the engineers, the Court emphasized that neglect of duty or laxity is not equivalent to larceny. To be guilty of larceny, the engineers had to have knowledge that the contractor had inflated the quantities of excavated material. The Court noted, “In certifying to the correctness of the contractor’s, figures and receiving the additional engineering fees, the engineers, in order to be guilty of larceny, had to have notice that the contractor had inflated the quantities of excavated material. Insofar as the engineers are concerned, neglect of duty is not equivalent to theft nor is laxity equivalent to larceny.”

    The Court acknowledged that Posner should have informed the State about his firm’s failure to independently verify the quantity of excavated material. However, the central question was whether there was prima facie evidence that he was guilty of grand larceny. The Court emphasized that the engineers were not charged with receiving money from the contractor in a nefarious joint enterprise. Though the engineers may have been derelict in their duties, they were not guilty of grand larceny unless they knew that the quantity of unsuitable material had been inflated. The court found no evidence that the engineers knew the quantities were exaggerated. The court quoted the County Court’s finding that there was no testimony that whoever changed the lines in the engineer’s diagrams “intended to defraud the State or harbored any such criminal purpose or criminal consciousness.”

    The Court also noted that the State had withheld payment from the Briggs firm more than the amount the indictment charged the firm with stealing, which undermined the claim that the engineers had received ill-gotten gains. The court emphasized that “Receipt of money may be larcenous where no services have been rendered or for goods sold that have never been delivered, where the whole transaction is fictitious.” This was not such a case.