New York Law Review

Tag: grand jury

  • People v. Corrigan, 80 N.Y.2d 326 (1992): Scope of Immunity and Prosecutorial Misconduct Before Grand Jury

    People v. Corrigan, 80 N.Y.2d 326 (1992)

    A prosecutor’s mere possession and review of a defendant’s immunized statement during the defendant’s grand jury testimony does not automatically constitute an unconstitutional “use” of the statement requiring dismissal of the charges, absent a showing of actual prejudice or impairment of the grand jury proceeding’s integrity.

    Summary

    The case addresses whether a prosecutor’s possession and review of a police officer’s immunized statement during his grand jury testimony constituted a prohibited “use” of the statement, warranting dismissal of assault charges. The Court of Appeals held that while the practice was disfavored, it did not warrant dismissal because there was no indication that the prosecutor used the statement to elicit testimony, control the witness, or impair the integrity of the grand jury proceeding, and sufficient independent evidence existed to sustain the charges. This ruling emphasizes the necessity of demonstrating actual prejudice to justify dismissing charges based on potential prosecutorial misconduct before a grand jury.

    Facts

    Defendant, an off-duty police officer, was working security at a restaurant. He confronted a group of young men drinking alcohol, leading to an argument with one, Bihn Nguyen. After police arrived, the defendant allegedly grabbed Nguyen by the throat, bent him over a car trunk, and struck him with a flashlight. The Police Department conducted an internal investigation, obtaining a compelled statement from the defendant under threat of dismissal. Subsequently, the matter was presented to a Grand Jury.

    Procedural History

    The District Attorney filed an information charging the defendant with assault. The Town Court dismissed the information, concluding the prosecutor improperly used the defendant’s involuntary statement. The County Court affirmed, finding dismissal warranted despite the existence of other admissible proof. The Court of Appeals reversed the County Court’s order, reinstating the information and remitting the case for further proceedings.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the prosecutor’s possession and review of the defendant’s immunized statement during his Grand Jury testimony constituted a prohibited “use” of the statement under the Fifth Amendment and the New York Constitution.

    2. Whether, assuming such conduct constituted a prohibited “use,” dismissal of the information was the appropriate remedy.

    Holding

    1. No, because there was no showing that the prosecutor used the statement as a source of information, to control the witness, or that the defendant was aware of the prosecutor’s possession of the statement.

    2. No, because the defendant was not inhibited from exercising his right to testify, the integrity of the Grand Jury proceedings was not impaired, and ample independent evidence existed to sustain the charges.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court acknowledged that a statement made under threat of dismissal is automatically immunized. While the People bear the burden of proving that any evidence used was derived independently of the statement, the court found no evidence that the prosecutor used the statement as a source of information or to control the witness. The prosecutor’s questions were generally non-specific, and the defendant was given wide latitude in his testimony. CPL 210.35(5) allows dismissal only when the Grand Jury proceeding fails to conform to CPL 190 requirements, impairing its integrity and potentially prejudicing the defendant. Here, there was no indication that the defendant was aware of the prosecutor’s possession of the statement, and his testimony was not inhibited. The court cautioned against the practice of possessing immunized statements during Grand Jury presentations but held that dismissal was not warranted in this specific instance because sufficient independent evidence existed to sustain the charges. The court emphasized that “[a] defendant’s guarantee of immunity as well as his or her rights to testify before the Grand Jury must be scrupulously protected.”

  • People v. Medina, 76 N.Y.2d 331 (1990): Sufficiency of Affidavit for Establishing Value Before a Grand Jury

    People v. Medina, 76 N.Y.2d 331 (1990)

    An affidavit submitted to a Grand Jury stating the worth of stolen property or damage to it must indicate the basis for that valuation to sustain an indictment where value is an element of the offense.

    Summary

    The case concerns the sufficiency of an affidavit used to establish the value of stolen property before a Grand Jury. Defendant Medina was indicted for grand larceny, criminal possession of stolen property, and criminal mischief after being arrested in a stolen car. The indictment relied on an affidavit from the car’s owner stating its value exceeded $2,500 and the damage exceeded $250, without providing any basis for these valuations. The New York Court of Appeals held that such a conclusory affidavit, lacking a foundation for the stated value, is insufficient to sustain an indictment where value is a necessary element of the crime charged.

    Facts

    Pedro Medina’s 1985 Pontiac was stolen. When recovered, the car had a broken window, trunk lock, luggage rack, and steering column. An affidavit from Medina stated he owned the vehicle, the defendant lacked permission to use it, the damage exceeded $250, and the vehicle’s value was over $2,500. The affidavit did not provide any basis for these valuations. Based on this affidavit, the defendant was indicted for grand larceny, criminal possession of stolen property, and criminal mischief, all felonies with value as a necessary element.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court dismissed the indictment to the extent of reducing the felony counts to misdemeanors, finding the affidavit insufficient proof of value. The Appellate Division affirmed this decision. The People appealed to the New York Court of Appeals, which granted permission to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether an affidavit submitted to a Grand Jury pursuant to CPL 190.30(3), stating in conclusory terms the value of stolen property and damage to it, without indicating the basis for that valuation, is legally sufficient evidence to sustain an indictment where value is an element of the offense charged.

    Holding

    No, because CPL 190.30(3) does not eliminate the need for the victim’s statement of value to have a basis of knowledge before it can be accepted as legally sufficient evidence.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that while CPL 190.30(3) allows an owner’s statement to establish value, it doesn’t eliminate the requirement that the statement have a basis in knowledge. The court noted the Appellate Divisions in all four Departments have uniformly held that a victim must provide a basis of knowledge for their statement of value. The purpose of the statute is to eliminate the need for complainants to personally appear before the Grand Jury, not to lower the standard of evidence required to prove value. The court pointed to the legislative history, noting that a sponsor’s memorandum recognized that “in most instances an owner cannot actually testify to the value of this property.” The court stated that requiring a basis of knowledge in the affidavit ensures the Grand Jury can reasonably infer the property or damage has the requisite value, rather than merely speculate. The court clarified that its decision does not require the victim to be physically present at Grand Jury proceedings, but simply that the affidavit submitted contains a basis of knowledge for the witness’ statement as to value. Without such a basis, the affidavit is insufficient to support an indictment for crimes where value is an element.

  • People v. Carter, 77 N.Y.2d 95 (1991): Validity of Indictment When Prosecutor Was Not Admitted to the Bar

    People v. Carter, 77 N.Y.2d 95 (1991)

    An indictment is not invalid simply because the assistant district attorney presenting the case to the grand jury was not admitted to the bar, so long as that person was appointed by an authority with subject matter jurisdiction.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals held that an indictment was valid even though the Assistant District Attorney (ADA) who presented the case to the grand jury was not a licensed attorney. The court reasoned that as long as the ADA was appointed by a prosecutor with subject matter jurisdiction and had taken the oath of office, the indictment was valid. The court emphasized that neither the constitution nor statute mandates an ADA be a lawyer. The dissent argued that allowing a non-lawyer to present a case to a grand jury undermines the integrity of the legal process.

    Facts

    Daniel Penofsky, posing as an Assistant District Attorney, presented evidence to a grand jury that led to the indictment of the defendant, Carter. Penofsky was never admitted to the bar and had fraudulently represented himself as an attorney for 16 years. After his deception was discovered, the defendant challenged the validity of the indictment.

    Procedural History

    The trial court upheld the indictment. The defendant appealed, arguing that the indictment was invalid because the prosecutor was not a licensed attorney. The appellate division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and affirmed the appellate division’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    Whether an indictment is invalid because the Assistant District Attorney presenting the case to the grand jury was not a licensed attorney.

    Holding

    No, because the Assistant District Attorney was appointed by an authority with subject matter jurisdiction, had the permission of the Special Narcotics Prosecutor and had taken the oath of office; therefore, the indictment was valid.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that neither the Constitution nor any statute requires a District Attorney or an Assistant District Attorney to be an admitted lawyer. The critical factor is whether the person presenting the case had the authority to do so. Here, Penofsky was appointed by the Special Narcotics Prosecutor, who had subject matter jurisdiction over the case. The court distinguished this situation from cases where the prosecutor lacked subject matter jurisdiction. The court found that Penofsky’s lack of a law license did not negate the Special Narcotics Prosecutor’s grant of authority. The court emphasized that Penofsky “duly executed the oath of office” and was “regularly assigned as an Assistant District Attorney.” The court also noted that concerns about Penofsky’s competence were mitigated by the fact that he worked within an office with supervisory structures. The dissent argued that allowing an unadmitted layperson to practice law and to present a criminal case to a grand jury compromises the integrity of the Grand Jury system and violates Judiciary Law provisions concerning the practice of law.

  • People v. Calbud, Inc., 49 N.Y.2d 389 (1980): Grand Jury’s Role in Assessing Legal Sufficiency of Evidence

    49 N.Y.2d 389 (1980)

    A prosecutor’s instruction to a grand jury that the legal sufficiency of evidence is solely the prosecutor’s determination impairs the grand jury’s function, as the grand jury must itself determine whether the evidence establishes each element of the crime.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether a prosecutor can instruct a grand jury that the legal sufficiency of evidence is solely the prosecutor’s concern, not the grand jury’s. The Court of Appeals held that such instructions are erroneous and impair the integrity of the grand jury proceeding, requiring dismissal of the indictment. The court reasoned that the grand jury has a fundamental responsibility to assess whether the evidence presented establishes each element of the crime charged, and the prosecutor cannot preempt this function by declaring the evidence legally sufficient.

    Facts

    An Assistant District Attorney (ADA) presented evidence to a grand jury regarding a charge of second-degree grand larceny against the defendant. During deliberations, grand jurors asked about the standard for voting on an indictment and the elements of the crime. The ADA responded by instructing the grand jurors that determining the legal sufficiency of the evidence was a matter of law for the ADA to decide, and that the ADA had already determined the evidence to be legally sufficient.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was indicted for second-degree grand larceny. The trial court dismissed the indictment, finding that the ADA’s instructions to the grand jury concerning the sufficiency of the evidence were erroneous and tainted the integrity of the proceeding. The Appellate Division affirmed the dismissal. The People appealed to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a prosecutor’s instruction to a grand jury, stating that the legal sufficiency of the evidence is solely the prosecutor’s determination, impairs the integrity of the grand jury proceeding and requires dismissal of the indictment.

    Holding

    Yes, because the grand jury has a fundamental responsibility to assess whether the evidence presented establishes each element of the crime charged, and the prosecutor cannot preempt this function.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals held that the instructions given by the ADA were erroneous and required dismissal of the indictment. While CPL 190.65(1) authorizes a grand jury to indict only when the evidence is legally sufficient and provides reasonable cause, it does not specify who determines whether each standard has been met. The Court acknowledged that legal sufficiency (defined in CPL 70.10 as competent evidence that, if accepted as true, would establish every element of an offense) is analytically distinct from reasonable cause. However, the Court rejected the People’s argument that sufficiency is a purely legal question for the prosecutor. The Court stated, “It is simply not permissible for a District Attorney to inform grand jurors, who by statute and Constitution, have the unique responsibility to decide whether to vote an indictment, that as a matter of law the prosecutor has already determined that there is enough evidence to warrant that action.” Such instructions carry an unacceptably high risk that grand jurors might undervalue their own role in reviewing the evidence. The Court emphasized that the question of whether there is sufficient evidence of each element of a crime lies at the very heart of the decision to vote an indictment. Allowing the prosecutor to unilaterally decide legal sufficiency would infringe upon a defendant’s right not to be held to answer for a felony charge except upon a Grand Jury’s indictment. The Court noted that it is, of course, proper for the District Attorney to evaluate a matter for legal sufficiency before commencing, or continuing, a prosecution.

  • People v. Cade, 74 N.Y.2d 410 (1989): Resubmission of Charges to Grand Jury After True Bill

    People v. Cade, 74 N.Y.2d 410 (1989)

    A prosecutor may resubmit charges to the same Grand Jury after a true bill has been voted, to introduce additional evidence, without obtaining court authorization, as long as the action does not impair the integrity of the Grand Jury proceedings or risk prejudice to the defendant.

    Summary

    The Grand Jury initially voted a true bill charging the defendant with murder and weapons possession, but then vacated the vote at the prosecutor’s request to hear additional evidence. After hearing the additional evidence, the Grand Jury voted a second true bill, and the defendant was indicted. The trial court dismissed the indictment, arguing that the second submission required court authorization. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that court authorization is not required for resubmission to the same Grand Jury after a true bill has been voted, as long as the proceedings’ integrity is maintained and the defendant is not prejudiced. The purpose of requiring court authorization is to prevent prosecutorial abuse when a Grand Jury has rejected the evidence.

    Facts

    On April 1 and 3, 1987, a Grand Jury heard evidence regarding the murder of Darrell Richardson and the defendant’s alleged involvement.
    On April 3, the Grand Jury voted a true bill, charging the defendant with second-degree murder and second-degree criminal possession of a weapon.
    However, the indictment was not immediately filed.
    On April 9, 1987, at the prosecutor’s request, the Grand Jury vacated its earlier vote to consider new testimony.
    The new testimony concerned the shotgun used in the murder, establishing that the defendant had exclusive possession of it on the day of the murder.
    After hearing this additional evidence, the Grand Jury voted a second true bill containing the same two counts.

    Procedural History

    The trial court dismissed the indictment, with leave to the District Attorney to resubmit the charges to another Grand Jury.
    The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court’s decision.
    The People were granted leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a prosecutor needs court authorization to resubmit charges to the same Grand Jury after the Grand Jury has already voted a true bill, but before the indictment is filed, in order to present additional evidence.

    Holding

    No, because court authorization is not required for resubmission to the same Grand Jury after a true bill has been voted, as long as the action does not impair the integrity of the Grand Jury proceedings or risk prejudice to the defendant.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that CPL 190.75 (1) and (3) apply only to prior “dismissals” and require judicial permission to resubmit charges when the first Grand Jury hearing the evidence has rejected it as insufficient. The court emphasized that nothing in the Criminal Procedure Law was intended to change the existing rule that a superseding indictment may be obtained without court authorization. The court noted, “If the Grand Jury has voted favorably on the charges, the District Attorney is at liberty to resubmit the matter to the same Grand Jury…without court approval and obtain a superseding indictment.” The court emphasized that the key is whether the action impairs the integrity of the Grand Jury proceedings or risks prejudice to the defendant under CPL 210.35 (5). In this case, neither was at risk, so the indictment against the defendant could stand.

    The court distinguished its prior holding in People v. Wilkins, where it held that when the prosecutor unilaterally withdrew a case from the grand jurors before they had an opportunity to vote, he could not resubmit the matter without court authorization. In this case, the Grand Jury *did* vote to indict; thus, the District Attorney had no need to “forum shop” for a more compliant Grand Jury.

    The court rejected the argument that the failure to file the April 3 indictment immediately was a jurisdictional defect, stating that the provision is only directory, and its requirements were met when the indictment voted April 9 encompassing all the proceedings on the charges was filed with the court.

    The court also noted the impracticality of requiring a superseding indictment in this circumstance. The court stated, “Unless the proceedings have been flawed or the District Attorney’s actions have risked some prejudice on defendant within the meaning of CPL 210.35 (5), and we see none, he was free to act as he did.”

  • People v. Williams, 73 N.Y.2d 84 (1988): Limits on Extended Grand Jury Authority

    People v. Williams, 73 N.Y.2d 84 (1988)

    A Grand Jury whose term has been extended under CPL 190.15(1) due to uncompleted business may not consider entirely new matters during its extended term, and an indictment resulting from such a violation must be dismissed.

    Summary

    This case addresses the permissible scope of a Grand Jury’s power when its term has been extended. The Court of Appeals held that a Grand Jury extended to complete unfinished business could not consider new matters. The case stemmed from allegations of witness tampering in a rape case, which were investigated by a Grand Jury whose term was extended. The Court found that because the extended Grand Jury considered new matters unrelated to its original business, the resulting indictment was invalid and must be dismissed without requiring a showing of prejudice to the defendants. The decision emphasizes adherence to statutory limitations on Grand Jury power.

    Facts

    Shelly McClure accused her stepfather, Martin Williams, of rape. Donna Williams, McClure’s mother, urged her to withdraw the charges. McClure recanted her accusation in exchange for $3,000, signing a recantation statement prepared by attorney Michael Barrett. Jeffrey Snyder, McClure’s boyfriend, was also involved. Subsequently, attorney Robert Becher pressured McClure to reaffirm her recantation. These events led to an investigation into bribery, conspiracy, and witness tampering.

    Procedural History

    A Rensselaer County Grand Jury, nearing the end of its term, had its term extended to investigate the witness tampering allegations. The Grand Jury indicted the defendants. The trial court dismissed the indictment, finding the extended Grand Jury exceeded its jurisdiction. The Appellate Division reversed, reinstating the indictment. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division, reinstating the trial court’s dismissal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether a Grand Jury whose term has been extended under CPL 190.15(1) may consider entirely new matters during its extended term.

    2. Whether an indictment resulting from a Grand Jury considering new matters during its extended term must be dismissed.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because CPL 190.15(1) limits Grand Jury extensions to completing unfinished business; considering new matters exceeds this statutory authority.

    2. Yes, because a Grand Jury acting outside its authorized scope is considered “illegally constituted” under CPL 210.35(1), mandating dismissal regardless of prejudice.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that CPL 190.15(1) explicitly limits Grand Jury extensions to completing unfinished business, curtailing a holdover Grand Jury’s jurisdiction. The Court distinguished its prior holding in People v. Stern, noting that the Criminal Procedure Law now contains specific provisions governing Grand Jury extensions that did not exist previously. The court emphasized that the plain language of the statute limits extensions to those necessary to complete unfinished business. Because the Grand Jury did not begin investigating the McClure matter until after its original term expired, the court found that the extension was improper. The Court also stated, “[T]he statute’s plain language limits Grand Jury extensions to those that are necessary to permit the completion of unfinished business. The statute thus has the substantive effect of curtailing a holdover Grand Jury’s jurisdiction. The apparent purpose was to eliminate the danger of ‘vestpocket’ Grand Juries”. Further, the court reasoned that CPL 210.35 mandates dismissal when the Grand Jury is “illegally constituted.” Because the Grand Jury exceeded its statutory authority, the indictment was invalid, and dismissal was required regardless of whether the defendants suffered prejudice. The Court emphasized that certain improprieties, such as those delineated in CPL 210.35(1)-(3), require automatic dismissal, whereas other, less serious infractions of Article 190 rules require a showing of prejudice to the accused.

  • People v. Williams, 73 N.Y.2d 250 (1989): Validity of Indictment When Fewer Than 16 Jurors Hear All Evidence

    People v. Williams, 73 N.Y.2d 250 (1989)

    An indictment is valid if at least 12 grand jurors who voted to indict heard all the essential and critical evidence, even if fewer than the full 16-juror quorum were present for all of the evidence.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether an indictment was valid when some grand jurors did not hear all the critical evidence presented. The defendant argued that CPL 210.35(2) requires that a minimum of 16 grand jurors must be present and hear all critical evidence to participate in deliberations and vote for an indictment. The Court of Appeals held that as long as at least 12 grand jurors who voted to indict heard all the essential and critical evidence, the indictment is valid, even if fewer than 16 jurors heard all the evidence. The court emphasized the historical separation of quorum and voting requirements.

    Facts

    Defendant was arrested for allegedly robbing a Kansas Fried Chicken store with accomplices. Evidence was presented to the Grand Jury over four days. The grand jurors were instructed that they could not vote unless they heard all the evidence. After a poll, it was revealed only 12 jurors heard all the evidence. A juror expressed reservations about deliberating with fewer than 16 jurors present who heard all evidence. Ultimately, the jurors decided to deliberate and voted to indict the defendant.

    Procedural History

    The defendant moved to dismiss the indictment for insufficient evidence and unspecified defects. The trial court dismissed the indictment, concluding that CPL 210.35(2) requires 16 jurors who heard all critical evidence be available for deliberations. The Appellate Division reversed and reinstated the indictment, relying on prior precedent that at least 12 jurors who voted to indict heard all essential and critical evidence. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a Grand Jury proceeding is defective under CPL 210.35(2) when fewer than 16 jurors who heard all the critical evidence are available to participate in deliberations and vote on an indictment.

    Holding

    No, because CPL 190.25(1) requires that at least 16 members be present during grand jury proceedings, but only 12 members need to concur to find an indictment; the statute does not require all 16 members to have heard all the critical and essential evidence.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court relied on the precedent set by People v. Brinkman and People v. Saperstein, which held that an indictment is valid as long as at least 12 grand jurors who voted to indict heard all the essential and critical evidence. The court reasoned that the Criminal Procedure Law (CPL) did not materially alter the requirements from the predecessor statute, the Code of Criminal Procedure, which contained separate quorum and voting requirements. The court stated: “The language is hardly — and, we conclude, not materially — different. Indeed, had the Legislature intended to change such a basic provision of the Criminal Procedure Law after nearly a century, surely it would have said so.” CPL 190.25(1) combines the quorum and voting requirements into a single subdivision but does not explicitly require all 16 jurors to have heard all essential evidence. The court dismissed the argument that the quorum requirement becomes meaningless if some jurors are idle observers. It suggested those jurors still contribute by providing protection against malicious prosecution. The court concluded the defendant’s protection through grand jury indictment was not diminished because at least 12 jurors who heard the evidence were required to be convinced for a true bill.

  • People v. Lancaster, 69 N.Y.2d 20 (1986): Duty to Present Evidence of Mental Disease or Defect to Grand Jury

    People v. Lancaster, 69 N.Y.2d 20 (1986)

    The prosecution has no obligation to present evidence of a defendant’s psychiatric history to the grand jury to support a potential defense of mental disease or defect, nor is it required to instruct the grand jury on such a defense.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals held that prosecutors are not required to present evidence of a defendant’s psychiatric history to a grand jury, even if it could support a defense of mental disease or defect. Peter Lancaster, a psychiatric patient, was indicted for attempted murder and assault after attacking another patient. Lancaster argued the prosecution should have presented his psychiatric history to the grand jury, especially since he was incompetent to testify himself. The Court of Appeals disagreed, reasoning that the defense of mental disease or defect is a matter for the petit jury, not the grand jury, and that mandating such disclosure would improperly allow the grand jury to circumvent statutory commitment procedures for those found not responsible due to mental illness.

    Facts

    Peter Lancaster, a patient at Hutchings Psychiatric Center under a CPL article 330 commitment, allegedly attacked another patient. He was initially charged with misdemeanor assault. The People notified Lancaster that they would present the case to the Grand Jury. Lancaster’s counsel informed the prosecutor that Lancaster was incoherent and assaultive and unable to intelligently exercise his right to appear before the Grand Jury. The People presented testimony from the victim and facility employees and patients to the Grand Jury but did not present any evidence of Lancaster’s psychiatric history or mental condition at the time of the offense. The People instructed the Grand Jury on the presumption of sanity and the defense of mental disease or defect. Lancaster was indicted for attempted murder, second-degree assault, and third-degree assault.

    Procedural History

    The trial court, based on psychiatric reports, found Lancaster incompetent to stand trial and committed him to a psychiatric facility. After being deemed competent, Lancaster moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing the People wrongfully withheld his psychiatric history from the grand jury, preventing him from presenting an insanity defense or negating the intent element of the charged crimes. The trial court dismissed the attempted murder and second-degree assault counts for insufficient evidence. The Appellate Division reinstated those counts, holding the evidence sufficient and ruling the People were justified in relying on the presumption of sanity. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the People have a duty to present evidence of a defendant’s psychiatric history to the grand jury when considering a potential defense of mental disease or defect.
    2. Whether an indictment should be dismissed because the defendant was legally incompetent during the grand jury proceedings, precluding him from exercising his right to testify.

    Holding

    1. No, because the defense of mental disease or defect is a matter for the petit jury, and the People are justified in relying on the presumption of sanity.
    2. No, because CPL 730.40(3) authorizes presentation of a case to the grand jury while a defendant is under a temporary order of observation and provides that the Grand Jury need not hear the defendant as it ordinarily must pursuant to CPL 190.50.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that while the grand jury serves to protect individuals from needless prosecutions, the People have wide discretion in presenting their case and are not obligated to search for or present all evidence favorable to the accused. Citing People v. Valles, the court clarified that the prosecutor needs to instruct the Grand Jury only as to those complete defenses that have the potential for eliminating a needless or unfounded prosecution. The defense of mental disease or defect, although potentially a complete defense, does not have the potential for eliminating a needless or unfounded prosecution because a finding of guilt must be made before the defense can be considered. The court emphasized that a successful assertion of the defense triggers mandatory commitment procedures under CPL 330.10(2) and 330.20, reflecting society’s interest in assessing the defendant’s ongoing threat to himself or others. Allowing the grand jury to dismiss charges based on a potential mental disease or defect defense would circumvent these procedures. The court also stated, “[I]nasmuch as it is the proper purpose of an indictment to bring a defendant to trial on a prima facie case, which, if unexplained, would warrant a conviction, the People are justified in relying on the presumption of sanity.” The court found no merit in the argument that the evidence should have been presented to negate intent, as the prosecutor is under no duty to instruct the grand jury as to mitigating defenses. Finally, the Court upheld the Appellate Division’s ruling that CPL 730.40(3) allows for presentation of a case to the grand jury even when a defendant is committed under a temporary order of observation.

  • People v. Wilkins, 68 N.Y.2d 269 (1986): Grand Jury Withdrawal Equals Dismissal Requiring Court Approval

    People v. Wilkins, 68 N.Y.2d 269 (1986)

    When a prosecutor withdraws a case from a grand jury after the presentation of evidence, such withdrawal is considered the equivalent of a dismissal, requiring court approval before resubmitting the case to a second grand jury.

    Summary

    Wilkins was charged with second-degree murder. The prosecution presented the case to a grand jury but withdrew it before a vote on indictment. A second grand jury indicted Wilkins, and his trial ended in a mistrial. Wilkins learned of the withdrawal/resubmission and moved for a hearing, arguing impropriety. The court found the prosecutor acted in good faith but the Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the unauthorized withdrawal was the equivalent of a dismissal. Resubmission without court approval violated the statutory scheme protecting the grand jury’s integrity. The indictment was dismissed, with leave to the District Attorney to apply for resubmission.

    Facts

    Wilkins was charged with second-degree murder for fatally shooting a victim. The prosecution initially presented the case to a grand jury. Before the grand jury could vote on whether to issue an indictment, the prosecutor withdrew the case. The case was then presented to a second grand jury, which indicted Wilkins for second-degree murder. A trial on this charge resulted in a mistrial because the jury couldn’t reach a verdict. It was during this trial that the defense learned of the withdrawal and resubmission.

    Procedural History

    Following the mistrial, Wilkins moved for an evidentiary hearing regarding the circumstances of the resubmission to the second grand jury. The trial court granted the motion and concluded that the prosecutor acted in good faith. Wilkins was then retried and convicted of first-degree manslaughter. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. Wilkins appealed to the New York Court of Appeals, arguing that the withdrawal and resubmission of charges at the grand jury level was improper.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a prosecutor may withdraw a case from a grand jury after presenting evidence and resubmit it to a second grand jury without the consent of the first grand jury or the court that impaneled it.

    Holding

    No, because such withdrawal is the equivalent of a dismissal by the first grand jury, and the prosecution may only resubmit the charges with the consent of the court.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals recognized that at common law, a prosecutor could resubmit charges to successive grand juries without limitation until an indictment was voted. However, the Legislature enacted statutes to insulate the grand jury process from prosecutorial excesses. CPL 190.75(3) dictates that when a charge has been dismissed, it may not be resubmitted to a grand jury unless the court authorizes or directs the resubmission. The court emphasized that the statutory scheme doesn’t contemplate terminating deliberations without grand jury action. The court noted that once a grand jury hears evidence, the key factor is the extent to which it considered the evidence. In this case, the first presentation was essentially complete. The court reasoned that allowing the prosecutor to unilaterally withdraw the case so late in the process would undermine CPL 190.75(3). “An explicit recognition of such power by this court would furnish the prosecutor the means of defeating CPL 190.75 (3) in almost every case by withdrawing all but ‘open and shut’ cases and resubmitting them after further preparation or a more compliant Grand Jury is impaneled.” The court also noted that the prosecutor could have sought an extension of the grand jury’s term. The resubmission without court leave violated Article 190, impairing the integrity of the process. The court rejected the harmless error argument based on the subsequent conviction, emphasizing that New York law allows for dismissal based on the mere possibility of prejudice.

  • People v. Brewster, 63 N.Y.2d 419 (1984): Admissibility of Identification Testimony Before Grand Jury

    People v. Brewster, 63 N.Y.2d 419 (1984)

    An indictment is not dismissable solely because a complaining witness identified the defendant before the Grand Jury without disclosing that the initial identification was based on photographs.

    Summary

    Defendants Brewster and Alfonso were indicted for robbery, burglary, and firearm offenses. A complaining witness testified before the Grand Jury that she identified the defendant without mentioning that the identification was made from photographs. The defense moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that the Grand Jury proceeding was defective. The Court of Appeals held that the indictment was valid because the identification testimony presented to the Grand Jury, absent any information about the photographic identification, established a prima facie case. The court emphasized that the Grand Jury proceeding is not an adversary proceeding and the identification testimony was not hearsay because the Grand Jury was not informed of the photographic identification.

    Facts

    Two defendants, Brewster and Alfonso, were indicted along with others for robbery, burglary, and related firearm charges. Before the Grand Jury, a complaining witness testified that she identified Brewster, and another witness testified she identified Alfonso. Neither witness revealed that their identifications were made from photographs. The People served notice of intent to present testimony at trial from witnesses who had previously identified the defendants from photographs. During a Wade hearing, it was revealed that the Grand Jury testimony was based on photographic identifications, and each witness made a corporeal identification of the defendant during the hearing.

    Procedural History

    The defendants moved to dismiss the indictment based on insufficient evidence and defects in the Grand Jury proceedings, and a Wade hearing was ordered. During the Wade hearing, the defendants filed a supplementary motion to dismiss the indictment pursuant to CPL 210.35 (subd 5). The hearing judge granted the motion, finding the indictment based on incompetent evidence but allowed in-court identification based on an independent source. The Appellate Division reversed and reinstated the indictment, deeming CPL 60.30 inapplicable to Grand Jury proceedings. The Court of Appeals affirmed, albeit with different reasoning.

    Issue(s)

    Whether an indictment should be dismissed under CPL 210.35 (subd 5) when a complaining witness testifies before the Grand Jury that she identified the defendant, without disclosing that the identification was initially made from photographs.

    Holding

    No, because the identification testimony before the Grand Jury established a prima facie case that, if unexplained, would warrant a conviction.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that a Grand Jury proceeding is not an adversary proceeding, except for the limited rights granted to a defendant to testify and request witnesses. The purpose of an indictment is to bring a defendant to trial upon a prima facie case that, if unexplained, would warrant a conviction. The identification testimony before the Grand Jury served that purpose. The court emphasized that the identification testimony was not hearsay because the Grand Jury was not presented with information about how or when the identification was made. The Grand Jury was only informed that the witness identified a defendant as her assailant, which constituted a present statement of the fact that she recalled the defendant as the person who assaulted her. The court noted that withholding the information about the photographic identification avoided unfairness to the defendant by preventing the Grand Jury from inferring a prior arrest record. The court stated, “The identification testimony before the Grand Jury satisfied that purpose.” (quoting People v. Oakley, 28 NY2d 309, 312). The court found no infringement of CPL 60.30, which concerns the admissibility of prior identification evidence at trial, because the Grand Jury was not presented with any evidence concerning the photographic identification. The court distinguished the case from situations where a witness identifies a photograph of the perpetrator and a custodian testifies to the name of the person in the photograph, which is permissible.