New York Law Review

Tag: grand jury indictment

  • People v. Jensen, 86 N.Y.2d 248 (1995): Sufficiency of Evidence for Grand Jury Indictment

    86 N.Y.2d 248 (1995)

    A grand jury indictment requires legally sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case for each element of the charged offense, but the reviewing court is limited to ascertaining the “legal sufficiency” of the evidence, without weighing the proof or examining its adequacy.

    Summary

    Michael Jensen was indicted on charges including petit larceny, criminal possession of stolen property, resisting arrest, and second-degree assault after an incident involving the theft of a dorm chair. He was stopped by campus police while carrying a lounge chair, admitted to taking it as a prank, and then resisted arrest, injuring an officer. The County Court dismissed the indictment, but the Appellate Division reversed. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division, holding the Grand Jury evidence was sufficient to indict on all counts. The court reasoned that larcenous intent could be inferred, the arrest was based on probable cause, and the assault occurred while preventing a lawful duty.

    Facts

    At 3:13 A.M. on November 6, 1992, Cornell University Public Safety Officers observed Michael Jensen carrying a dormitory lounge chair on his head. Jensen admitted to taking the chair from a residence hall as a prank. He refused to identify himself or confirm if he was a student. After repeated requests for identification, Jensen eventually reached for his pocket, but an officer attempted to retrieve the ID instead. Jensen slapped the officer’s hand away and fled. During the pursuit, Officer Zoner was injured when Jensen dragged her down a gorge slope as he attempted to escape.

    Procedural History

    Jensen was indicted on charges of petit larceny, criminal possession of stolen property, resisting arrest, and second-degree assault. The County Court granted Jensen’s motion to dismiss the indictment. The Appellate Division reversed, reinstating all charges. A Justice of the Appellate Division granted leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the evidence presented to the Grand Jury was legally sufficient to support the indictment on charges of petit larceny, criminal possession of stolen property, resisting arrest, and second-degree assault.

    Holding

    Yes, because the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the People, was legally sufficient for the Grand Jury to infer larcenous intent, probable cause for arrest, and intent to prevent a lawful duty, causing physical injury.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals applied the standard that a Grand Jury indictment requires legally sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case, including all elements of the crime and reasonable cause to believe the accused committed the offense. The court stated, “[L]egally sufficient means prima facie, not proof beyond a reasonable doubt.” The court emphasized its review is limited to ascertaining legal sufficiency, without weighing the proof. The court found that the Grand Jury could rationally infer larcenous intent from Jensen’s actions of carrying the chair at 3:13 A.M., his admission that the chair did not belong to him, and his evasive behavior. The court reasoned that there was probable cause to arrest Jensen for larceny, thus justifying the charge of resisting arrest. Finally, there was legally sufficient evidence that Jensen intended to prevent Officer Zoner from performing a lawful duty, causing her physical injury, thus supporting the charge of second-degree assault. The dissent argued that the evidence was insufficient to establish the elements of larceny or the lawfulness of the arrest, and the officer’s injury stemmed from the officer’s own misconduct. The dissent noted, “[T]here must still be a showing that the underlying police conduct was lawful.”

  • People v. Sinistaj, 81 N.Y.2d 232 (1993): Criminal Court Jurisdiction and Grand Jury Indictments

    People v. Sinistaj, 81 N.Y.2d 232 (1993)

    A local criminal court is divested of jurisdiction over a misdemeanor charge when the charge is presented to a grand jury within a designated adjournment period, and either an indictment or dismissal results, which occurs when the indictment is filed with a superior court.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed the issue of when a criminal court is divested of jurisdiction under CPL 170.20(2)(a) when a case is presented to a grand jury. The defendant was arrested and charged with misdemeanors. The Assistant District Attorney (ADA) sought an adjournment to present the case to the Grand Jury, which voted to indict the defendant on felony charges before the adjourned date. On the adjourned date, the defendant pleaded guilty to the misdemeanor. The indictment was filed after the plea. The Court held that Criminal Court was divested of jurisdiction when the indictment resulted (filing), prior to the guilty plea.

    Facts

    Defendant was arrested on December 1, 1989, and charged with misdemeanor criminal trespass and criminal mischief.

    On December 4, 1989, the ADA obtained an adjournment to December 8, 1989, to seek a felony indictment from the Grand Jury.

    On December 7, 1989, the Grand Jury voted to indict defendant for second-degree burglary.

    On December 8, 1989, defendant pleaded guilty to the misdemeanor trespass charge in Criminal Court, with the People’s consent.

    On December 13, 1989, the burglary indictment was filed in Supreme Court.

    Procedural History

    Defendant was convicted of attempted burglary in the second degree in Supreme Court, Kings County, after his motion to dismiss the indictment on double jeopardy grounds was denied.

    The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction.

    Issue(s)

    Whether Criminal Court was divested of jurisdiction pursuant to CPL 170.20 when the ADA requested an adjournment to present the case to the Grand Jury, and an indictment resulted prior to the defendant’s guilty plea in Criminal Court.

    Holding

    Yes, because Criminal Court was divested of jurisdiction pursuant to CPL 170.20 when the indictment was filed, which occurred before the guilty plea. The Court interpreted the statute to mean that divestiture occurs when an indictment “results,” which is upon filing with the superior court.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court focused on interpreting CPL 170.20 (2) (a), which states that a local criminal court is divested of jurisdiction when a charge is presented to a grand jury within the designated period and either an indictment or dismissal of such charge results. The Court emphasized that the word “results” accommodates either an indictment or a dismissal. An indictment, as defined in the CPL 200.10, is “a written accusation by a grand jury, filed with a superior court.” The Court reasoned that an indictment “results” when it is filed, not merely when the grand jury votes to indict. The majority held that because the indictment was filed with the Supreme Court prior to the acceptance of the guilty plea in criminal court, that the criminal court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to accept the plea. Chief Judge Kaye dissented, arguing that Criminal Court jurisdiction is divested only when an indictment is filed, and the majority’s interpretation condones sloppy practice and enlarges the statutory definition of an indictment. She cited People v. Cade, 74 N.Y.2d 410, 416, noting that the case held there is no strict time limit for filing the indictment, but does not hold that an indictment is valid without being filed.

  • Magee v. County Court, 54 N.Y.2d 104 (1981): Prohibition Against Compelling a Preliminary Hearing Post-Indictment

    Magee v. County Court, 54 N.Y.2d 104 (1981)

    Once a grand jury indicts a defendant, a lower court is divested of jurisdiction, and a defendant is not entitled to a preliminary hearing for discovery purposes after indictment.

    Summary

    Magee was indicted for burglary, attempted rape, sexual abuse, and assault. After indictment, he moved for a preliminary hearing, alleging the District Attorney improperly presented the charges to the Grand Jury after a hearing was scheduled in Town Court but not held. The County Court granted the motion, directing the Town Court to conduct the hearing. The Court of Appeals held that the County Court exceeded its jurisdiction by ordering a preliminary hearing after the indictment, as the Town Court lacked jurisdiction once the Grand Jury acted. A preliminary hearing after an indictment serves no legal purpose other than potential discovery, which is not a right guaranteed to the defendant.

    Facts

    Kevin Magee was indicted on charges of first-degree burglary, first-degree attempted rape, first-degree sexual abuse, and third-degree assault.

    A preliminary hearing had been scheduled in Town Court before the indictment.

    Magee waived his appearance at the preliminary hearing, and the Town Court confirmed his right to do so.

    The District Attorney then presented the charges to a Grand Jury, which indicted Magee, before the preliminary hearing occurred.

    Procedural History

    After indictment, Magee moved in County Court for an order compelling the District Attorney to conduct the preliminary hearing.

    The County Court granted Magee’s motion and stayed all further proceedings until the Town Court conducted the preliminary hearing.

    The Appellate Division reversed the County Court’s order.

    The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division, holding that the preliminary hearing was required.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a County Court can compel a Town Court to conduct a preliminary hearing after the defendant has been indicted by a Grand Jury.

    Holding

    No, because once the Grand Jury acts and issues an indictment, the Town Court is divested of jurisdiction.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that the purpose of a preliminary hearing is to determine if there is reasonable cause to hold the defendant for the action of the Grand Jury. Once the Grand Jury has acted and issued an indictment, the Town Court loses jurisdiction over the matter. The Court emphasized that there is no constitutional or statutory right to a preliminary hearing, and it is not a jurisdictional predicate to indictment. The District Attorney has the right to submit charges to a Grand Jury, superseding the Town Court’s jurisdiction, and the Grand Jury is not bound by anything occurring before the magistrate. The Court noted that the defendant’s argument rested on the idea that he was entitled to a hearing for discovery purposes, but New York law does not recognize a general right to discover the identity of prosecution witnesses or the substance of their testimony pretrial. The Court stated, “Once the Grand Jury acts the Town Court is divested of jurisdiction (CPL 180.80, subd 2). The District Attorney has a clear legal right to submit the charges to a Grand Jury and he may do so without filing a felony complaint or before or after a preliminary hearing if a felony complaint is filed.”

  • Lee v. City of Mount Vernon, 49 N.Y.2d 1041 (1980): Overcoming the Presumption of Probable Cause in Malicious Prosecution

    Lee v. City of Mount Vernon, 49 N.Y.2d 1041 (1980)

    A Grand Jury indictment in New York creates a presumption of probable cause in a malicious prosecution action, which can only be overcome by evidence of police misconduct, such as fraud, perjury, suppression of evidence, or bad faith.

    Summary

    Lee sued the City of Mount Vernon for malicious prosecution after murder charges against him were dismissed due to lack of direct evidence. The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether the Grand Jury indictment created a presumption of probable cause, and if so, whether Lee presented sufficient evidence to overcome it. The Court held that the indictment did create a presumption of probable cause, and Lee failed to demonstrate that the police acted in bad faith or suppressed evidence. The dismissal of the indictment by the District Attorney was deemed simply an acknowledgment of insufficient evidence for trial, not an admission of a lack of probable cause for the initial arrest. The malicious prosecution claim was dismissed.

    Facts

    On March 3, 1974, police investigated a knifing and found Emelio Hernandez fatally stabbed and Lee lying nearby. Witnesses reported seeing Lee arguing and fighting with another man, with Lee wielding a knife. Lee claimed he was hit on the head and remembered nothing further. The police investigation led to Lee’s indictment for second-degree murder. However, 22 months later, the District Attorney moved to dismiss the indictment because there was no direct evidence linking Lee to Hernandez’s death, only evidence that Lee had been in a fight in the area where Hernandez was found.

    Procedural History

    Lee sued the City for malicious prosecution and false imprisonment. The City defaulted, but stipulated that Lee would need to establish a prima facie case of malicious prosecution. The trial court ruled in favor of Lee, awarding $250,000. The Appellate Division reduced damages to $125,000. The City appealed to the New York Court of Appeals, contesting only the malicious prosecution claim.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a Grand Jury indictment creates a presumption of probable cause in a subsequent malicious prosecution action against the police?

    Whether the plaintiff presented sufficient evidence to overcome the presumption of probable cause arising from the Grand Jury indictment?

    Holding

    Yes, because the Grand Jury acts judicially, and it is presumed to have acted regularly.

    No, because the plaintiff failed to demonstrate that the police acted in bad faith, misrepresented or suppressed evidence, or otherwise engaged in misconduct to secure the indictment.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized that a Grand Jury indictment creates a presumption of probable cause. To overcome this presumption, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the police “have not made a complete and full statement of facts either to the Grand Jury or to the District Attorney, that they have misrepresented or falsified evidence, that they have withheld evidence or otherwise acted in bad faith.” The Court distinguished New York law from other jurisdictions where the presumption can be overcome by any evidence showing the absence of probable cause. The Court found that the plaintiff’s arguments, including the lack of direct evidence and discrepancies in witness descriptions, did not establish fraud, perjury, suppression of evidence, or bad faith on the part of the police. The court stated that “[t]he rule is founded upon the premise that the Grand Jury acts judicially and it may be presumed that it has acted regularly.” The dismissal of the indictment was merely a concession that the prosecution lacked sufficient evidence to convict, not an admission of a lack of probable cause for the initial arrest. Therefore, the Court modified the Appellate Division’s order, dismissing the malicious prosecution claim.

  • Broughton v. State of New York, 37 N.Y.2d 451 (1975): Establishing Probable Cause and Malicious Prosecution Claims

    Broughton v. State of New York, 37 N.Y.2d 451 (1975)

    A plaintiff alleging malicious prosecution must demonstrate the absence of probable cause for the criminal proceeding, and the victim’s identification and Grand Jury indictment generally establish probable cause unless the identification resulted from conspiracy and the indictment from fraud, perjury, or suppression of evidence.

    Summary

    Broughton sued the State of New York, alleging malicious prosecution after he was arrested and indicted for robbery. The Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of his claim, holding that the victim’s identification of Broughton as the robber and the Grand Jury’s indictment established probable cause for his prosecution. To overcome these elements, Broughton needed to prove the identification was the result of a conspiracy and the indictment was due to fraud, perjury, or suppression of evidence. The court found that Broughton failed to provide sufficient evidence to meet this burden, particularly since the decision to present the case to the Grand Jury was made by the District Attorney, for whose actions the city is not responsible.

    Facts

    Plaintiff Broughton was arrested for robbery. The complaining witness identified Broughton as the robber soon after the crime. The witness identified some of the money found on Broughton as marked money from the robbery. Broughton matched the complaining witness’ description of the robber in height, weight, age and clothing. A Grand Jury indicted Broughton for the robbery. A gun was retrieved near the scene of the robbery.

    Procedural History

    Broughton sued the State of New York, alleging malicious prosecution. The lower court dismissed the claim. The Appellate Division affirmed the dismissal. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the victim’s identification of the plaintiff and the Grand Jury’s indictment established probable cause for the plaintiff’s prosecution, thereby precluding a claim for malicious prosecution, absent evidence of conspiracy, fraud, perjury, or suppression of evidence.

    Holding

    Yes, because the victim’s identification of the plaintiff as the robber and the Grand Jury’s indictment established probable cause for his prosecution, and the plaintiff failed to present sufficient evidence to demonstrate that the identification was the result of a conspiracy or that the indictment was the result of fraud, perjury, or suppression of evidence.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that the victim’s identification and the Grand Jury’s indictment are strong indicators of probable cause. The court stated, “the victim’s identification of plaintiff as the robber and the Grand Jury’s indictment established probable cause for his prosecution.” To overcome these indicators, the plaintiff must prove that the identification resulted from a conspiracy between officials and the victim, and that the indictment was the result of fraud, perjury, or suppression of evidence. The court emphasized that the decision to present the matter to the Grand Jury was made by the District Attorney, for whose acts the city is not responsible. Detective Barbagallo’s role was also considered, and the court noted that he did not testify before the Grand Jury, nor was it shown that he withheld information. The court analyzed that Barbagallo’s investigation was not egregiously flawed as to indicate intentional or reckless action. Even if not all possible procedures were followed, the positive identifications and exact description of the plaintiff justified the actions taken. The court compared the situation to the Restatement (Second) of Torts, referencing sections related to malicious prosecution. The court noted: “While the evidence suggests that not all procedures that could have been followed were followed in fact, it does not establish that the omissions were improper, much less egregious, given the positive identifications and exact description referred to above”. In essence, the Court required a showing that the police deviated egregiously from proper activity to prove intentional or reckless action, which was not demonstrated in this case.

  • Matter of Vega v. Bell, 47 N.Y.2d 543 (1979): Grand Jury Indictment of Juvenile Offenders Without Prior Removal Hearing

    Matter of Vega v. Bell, 47 N.Y.2d 543 (1979)

    A Grand Jury can indict a juvenile offender without a prior hearing in local criminal court to determine if the case should be transferred to Family Court.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether a juvenile offender must be afforded a hearing in local criminal court to determine if the interests of justice require the case to be moved to Family Court before being indicted by a Grand Jury. The Court of Appeals held that such a hearing is not a jurisdictional prerequisite to a Grand Jury indictment. The court reasoned that the purpose of the local criminal court hearing is to determine reasonable cause pending Grand Jury action, which becomes unnecessary once the Grand Jury indicts. The Court emphasized that the power to indict lies with the Grand Jury, and that the Legislature’s provisions for removal to Family Court are meant to quickly remove appropriate cases, not to mandate a hearing for every juvenile offender.

    Facts

    Petitioner, a 15-year-old, was arrested and arraigned on a felony complaint charging him with sodomy in the first degree. He requested a felony hearing and removal of the case to Family Court. The prosecutor informed the court that a Grand Jury had already voted to indict the petitioner on four counts of sodomy. The Criminal Court denied petitioner’s applications, reasoning it lacked power after the Grand Jury’s action, and transferred the action to the Supreme Court.

    Procedural History

    Petitioner moved in the Supreme Court to transfer the action back to the Criminal Court for resolution of his removal motion, which was denied. Petitioner then commenced an Article 78 proceeding seeking to prohibit his prosecution, arguing the Grand Jury lacked power to indict him without a prior removal hearing. The Appellate Division granted the petition. The respondents then appealed to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a juvenile offender may be indicted by a Grand Jury and brought to trial without first being afforded a hearing in a local criminal court on the issue of whether the interests of justice require removal of the action to Family Court.

    Holding

    No, because a local criminal court hearing is not a jurisdictional prerequisite to indictment by a Grand Jury. The power of the Grand Jury to indict is independent of whether a preliminary hearing has occurred.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court stated, “[T]he extraordinary remedy of prohibition lies only where there is a clear legal right and only when the body or officer ‘acts or threatens to act without jurisdiction in a matter over which it has no power over the subject matter or where it exceeds its authorized powers in a proceeding over which it has jurisdiction’”. The court reasoned that CPL 180.75 is intended to provide a prompt felony hearing, similar to that granted to adults, to determine whether there exists reasonable cause to hold a defendant pending Grand Jury action. Once the Grand Jury acts, the need for a felony hearing is obviated. The court cited People ex rel. Hirschberg v. Close, 1 N.Y.2d 258, 261, stating that “the Grand Jury [has] power to investigate and indict regardless of what [has] occurred before the magistrate.”

    The court distinguished Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, noting that New York’s statutory scheme now automatically prosecutes certain juveniles in the adult system unless special circumstances warrant transfer to Family Court, unlike the Kent scenario where juvenile court jurisdiction was initially exclusive. The court also clarified that superior criminal courts possess the power to remove cases to Family Court in the interests of justice, impliedly founded in their authority to dismiss an indictment under CPL 210.40. The court interpreted the Legislature’s explicit provision for removal with the District Attorney’s consent as an indication that removal over the District Attorney’s objections should only occur in exceptional cases. The Court emphasized that a hearing is not always necessary and should be left to the court’s discretion.

  • People v. Mayo, 36 N.Y.2d 1002 (1975): Sufficiency of Evidence for Grand Jury Indictment

    People v. Mayo, 36 N.Y.2d 1002 (1975)

    An indictment must be supported by legally sufficient evidence establishing every element of the offense charged and the defendant’s commission thereof; mere suspicion or speculation is insufficient.

    Summary

    This case concerns the sufficiency of evidence presented to a grand jury to indict a toll collector for grand larceny. The Court of Appeals held that the evidence presented, which primarily consisted of a shortage of commutation tickets and the defendant’s attempt to dispose of tickets upon arrest, was insufficient to establish the necessary intent and deprivation of property required for a larceny conviction. The court emphasized that the evidence did not prove that the Thruway Authority was deprived of any money or that the detached commuter stubs had any monetary value.

    Facts

    Ann Mayo worked as a toll collector for the New York State Thruway Authority at the Tappan Zee Bridge for eight years. Tolls were collected via cash, credit, or commutation tickets. An audit revealed a shortage of 2,153 commutation tickets for Mayo over a four-week period. When a State Trooper approached Mayo for arrest, she attempted to flush 122 commutation tickets down the drain. She also had a small amount of cash. There was no evidence presented that she pocketed cash tolls and her cash and credit transactions were in order.

    Procedural History

    The County Court dismissed the grand jury indictment for grand larceny in the second degree. The Appellate Division reversed and reinstated the indictment. The New York Court of Appeals reviewed the Appellate Division’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the evidence presented to the grand jury was legally sufficient to establish that Ann Mayo committed the offense of grand larceny, specifically whether there was sufficient evidence of intent to deprive the Thruway Authority of property and actual deprivation of property.

    Holding

    No, because the evidence presented did not establish every element of the offense charged, particularly the intent to deprive and actual deprivation of property. The shortage of commutation tickets and the attempt to dispose of them, without more, was insufficient to warrant an indictment for grand larceny.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that to constitute larceny, there must be an intent coupled with a taking or withholding of property from its owner. The evidence failed to demonstrate that the Thruway Authority was deprived of any money, as the detached commuter stubs had no monetary value in that state and cash/credit accounts were clear. The court cited CPL 190.65, stating that a grand jury may indict only where the evidence is legally sufficient to establish the commission of the offense. The court held that the test for dismissing an indictment is whether there has been a “‘clear showing’ that the evidence before the Grand Jury if unexplained and uncontradicted would not warrant conviction by a trial jury.” The court distinguished between carelessness, stupidity, or inefficiency and the crime of grand larceny, explaining that the former does not constitute the latter. The court stated that “Surmise, suspicion or speculation is no substitute for evidence.” While the defendant’s attempt to destroy evidence might suggest consciousness of guilt, such evidence “may be used to strengthen ‘other and more tangible evidence’ of guilt, it is not alone sufficient to sustain a conviction.” The court emphasized the presumption of innocence and held that the evidence presented was insufficient to overcome this presumption and warrant an indictment for grand larceny.

  • Matter of Smith v. Foley, 27 N.Y.2d 4 (1970): Waiver of Grand Jury Indictment for Felony Prosecution

    Matter of Smith v. Foley, 27 N.Y.2d 4 (1970)

    Under the New York State Constitution, a defendant charged with a felony cannot waive indictment by a grand jury and consent to be prosecuted on an information filed by the District Attorney.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether a defendant charged with a felony in New York can waive their right to a grand jury indictment and be prosecuted based on an information filed by the District Attorney. The Court of Appeals held that such a waiver is not permissible under the New York State Constitution. The court reaffirmed its prior holding in People ex rel. Battista v. Christian, emphasizing that the constitutional requirement of a grand jury indictment for felony prosecutions is a fundamental right that cannot be waived. The court reasoned that the state has a vested interest in ensuring that a grand jury, rather than solely a prosecutor, determines whether sufficient evidence exists to warrant a felony trial.

    Facts

    Clarence Smith was charged with both a misdemeanor (narcotic drug possession) and a felony (possession of a loaded weapon) in Nassau County. The District Attorney filed an information in the County Court charging Smith with both crimes, intending to test the validity of waiving grand jury indictment for felonies. Smith, represented by counsel and informed of his right to a grand jury presentation, waived that right and consented to prosecution on the felony information.

    Procedural History

    The foreman of the Nassau County Court Grand Jury initiated an Article 78 proceeding in the Appellate Division seeking to prohibit the District Attorney from prosecuting Smith on the felony information and to prevent the County Court Judges from trying him without a grand jury indictment. The Appellate Division agreed with the petitioner, holding that the County Court lacked jurisdiction due to the constitutional prohibition against felony prosecutions without a grand jury indictment. The District Attorney appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a defendant charged with a felony can waive indictment by a grand jury and consent to be prosecuted on an information filed by the District Attorney, consistent with Article I, Section 6 of the New York State Constitution.

    Holding

    No, because the New York State Constitution explicitly prohibits prosecuting a defendant for a felony without a grand jury indictment; this right is not waivable.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals upheld the Appellate Division’s decision, reaffirming the principle established in People ex rel. Battista v. Christian that the right to a grand jury indictment for felony prosecutions is a fundamental right that cannot be waived. The court emphasized that Article I, Section 6 of the New York State Constitution states that “No person shall be held to answer for a capital or otherwise infamous crime * * * unless on indictment of a grand jury.” The court rejected the argument that the doctrine of stare decisis should be abandoned in this instance, asserting that the principles established in Battista remain valid and relevant. The court quoted Battista: “Unqualifiedly, it prohibits the trial of any one charged with infamous crime except on * * * indictment by a grand jury. Until the grand jury shall act, no court can acquire jurisdiction to try.”

    The court reasoned that the purpose of the grand jury requirement is not merely to protect the individual defendant, but also to ensure that the People as a whole have the right to demand that facts indicating the commission of a felony are presented to a grand jury for evaluation. The court acknowledged criticisms of the grand jury system but emphasized that the constitutional provision explicitly requires indictment by a grand jury for felony prosecutions. The Court also highlighted that multiple attempts to amend the constitution to allow for waiver have failed. Until the Constitution is amended, the court reasoned, the right to indictment is not waivable. The court noted the parallel to the right to a jury trial, which was also unwaivable until the constitution was amended to explicitly allow waiver. The court emphasized the state’s interest in protecting the rights of the accused, ensuring a responsible and objective body (the grand jury) decides if evidence warrants a trial. The court stated, “[T]he People of the State of New York, by constitutional provision, and the courts, by decisional law, have solemnly and deliberately determined that it is preferable to have a responsible and objective group such as the grand jury, rather than a prosecutor alone, decide whether the evidence at hand is such ‘as * * * would * * * warrant a conviction by the trial jury’ before subjecting the defendant to the jeopardy of prosecution and conviction.”

  • People v. Jackson, 18 N.Y.2d 516 (1966): Sufficiency of Evidence for Grand Jury Indictment

    People v. Jackson, 18 N.Y.2d 516 (1966)

    An indictment must be dismissed if it is based upon evidence that is clearly insufficient to sustain a conviction if uncontroverted, even if a subsequent trial produces sufficient evidence for conviction.

    Summary

    Jackson was convicted of felony murder. Prior to trial, he unsuccessfully moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing insufficient evidence before the grand jury. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the indictment was based on insufficient evidence. The prosecution’s key evidence before the grand jury was an inadmissible hearsay statement from an accomplice, and the eyewitness testimony presented was insufficient to establish the premeditation required for a murder charge. The court emphasized that an indictment must stand on its own evidentiary footing, irrespective of the strength of evidence presented at trial. Even though the trial evidence was sufficient to convict Jackson, the flawed indictment invalidated the subsequent proceedings.

    Facts

    Warwick Perry was found unconscious at the bottom of steps and died from a skull fracture. The prosecution alleged that Jackson, with an accomplice, pushed Perry down the steps during a robbery. At trial, an accomplice, Harris, testified against Jackson. However, before the Grand Jury, Harris’s statement, later repudiated as coerced, was used. An eyewitness, Ruth Williams, testified before the Grand Jury stating that she saw Jackson push, kick, and jump on the victim.

    Procedural History

    Jackson was indicted for murder. He unsuccessfully moved to inspect the grand jury minutes and dismiss the indictment for insufficient evidence. He was convicted of felony murder at trial. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. Jackson appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the indictment against Jackson was based on sufficient evidence to sustain a conviction for murder, specifically premeditated murder, given the evidence presented to the grand jury.

    Holding

    No, because the evidence presented to the Grand Jury was insufficient to sustain a conviction for murder. The indictment was based on an inadmissible hearsay statement and eyewitness testimony that, even if true, did not establish premeditation.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that the grand jury indictment was flawed because it relied on an inadmissible hearsay statement from Harris and insufficient eyewitness testimony from Williams. The court noted that Harris’s statement, implicating Jackson in a robbery, was inadmissible hearsay. The court determined that Williams’s testimony, describing Jackson pushing, kicking, and jumping on the victim, might indicate criminal conduct but did not demonstrate the “deliberate and premeditated design to effect the death” required for premeditated murder. The court stated, “While intent to kill may often be reasonably inferred from the conduct of the accused in inflicting a fatal wound upon the victim… it is not certain whether even mere intent to kill could be inferred from the defendant’s acts in the present case.” The court rejected the argument that an indictment for a higher crime (first-degree murder) is sufficient if the evidence could sustain a conviction for a lesser included offense (assault). The court emphasized the importance of a valid indictment as the foundation for subsequent proceedings, stating that “the indictment is invalid, and consequently any subsequent proceedings resting thereon are similarly invalid.” The court acknowledged the unfortunate situation where a conviction obtained with sufficient trial evidence must be reversed due to a flawed indictment but affirmed the necessity of upholding established principles of criminal justice. The court indicated that re-indictment was possible since there was sufficient evidence at trial.