New York Law Review

Tag: grand jury

  • People v. Diaz, 29 N.Y.3d 1126 (2017): Defendant’s Right to Testify Before the Grand Jury and Waiver of Immunity

    People v. Diaz, 29 N.Y.3d 1126 (2017)

    A defendant’s statutory right to testify before a grand jury is violated when the prosecution demands an unaltered waiver of immunity that includes provisions beyond the statutory requirements of CPL 190.45.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals held that the defendant’s right to testify before a grand jury was violated when the prosecution refused to allow him to testify after he signed a waiver of immunity with certain provisions struck out. The court found that the defendant had satisfied the statutory requirements for a waiver of immunity under CPL 190.45, which only requires a waiver of the privilege against self-incrimination. The prosecution’s insistence on an unaltered waiver, including additional provisions, was deemed an infringement upon the defendant’s right to testify. The court emphasized that the defendant only needed to meet the requirements of the statute, and nothing more, to make a valid written waiver of immunity.

    Facts

    The defendant, Diaz, was indicted on charges of attempted criminal possession of a weapon and other related offenses. Diaz served notice of his intent to testify before the grand jury. The prosecution provided him with a waiver of immunity form which, in addition to the statutorily required provisions, also contained three additional paragraphs relating to his right to counsel, the scope of questioning, and the use of his testimony. Diaz struck out those three additional provisions and signed the form. The Assistant District Attorney (ADA) informed Diaz that he would not be allowed to testify unless he signed the unaltered waiver. Diaz did not sign the unaltered form and was consequently not permitted to testify.

    Procedural History

    After a jury conviction, the trial court found the defendant guilty and dismissed the indictment. The Appellate Division vacated the conviction, finding the defendant was denied his right to testify before the grand jury. The People appealed this decision to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a defendant’s statutory right to testify before a grand jury is violated when the prosecution requires an unaltered waiver of immunity containing provisions beyond those mandated by CPL 190.45?

    Holding

    Yes, because the defendant complied with the statutory requirements for a waiver of immunity, the prosecution’s insistence on additional, non-statutory terms violated his right to testify.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision. The court found that Diaz met the necessary requirements for a valid written waiver of immunity under CPL 190.45 when he signed the document, even after striking out the additional provisions. The court reasoned that CPL 190.45 is clear, straightforward, and concise in its requirements. The court referenced that a waiver of immunity requires only a written instrument waiving the privilege against self-incrimination. The additional provisions regarding the right to counsel, the scope of questioning, and the use of testimony were not required by the statute. The prosecution improperly demanded an unaltered waiver. The Court of Appeals reiterated that the defendant’s right to testify before the grand jury “must be scrupulously protected.”

    The court emphasized that the prosecutor was not authorized to impose any additional requirements. A valid waiver of immunity was established when Diaz agreed to waive his right to self-incrimination. The court stated, “When a defendant meets the waiver of immunity requirements of CPL 190.45, he or she must be permitted to testify.” The court noted that a waiver of immunity, per the statute, requires only a written instrument waiving the privilege against self-incrimination.

  • People v. Wisdom, 23 N.Y.3d 971 (2014): Correcting Unsworn Grand Jury Testimony

    People v. Wisdom, 23 N.Y.3d 971 (2014)

    An isolated procedural error in a grand jury proceeding, such as the failure to administer an oath during a witness’s initial testimony, does not automatically warrant dismissal of the indictment if the error is promptly corrected and does not prejudice the defendant.

    Summary

    Sidney Wisdom was indicted for burglary and attempted murder after a grand jury viewed a videotaped interview of a victim, Jane, who identified him as her assailant. Jane was not initially sworn in before the recording. The prosecution, realizing the error, obtained a second recording where Jane swore to the truth of her prior statements. The New York Court of Appeals held that the initial failure to administer an oath, although a procedural error, did not compromise the integrity of the grand jury proceeding because the error was rectified, and the defendant did not demonstrate prejudice.

    Facts

    Sidney Wisdom was accused of attempting to kill a four-year-old girl and her grandmother, Jane, during a burglary. Due to the severity of Jane’s injuries, the People videotaped her testimony for grand jury presentation. In the initial recording, Jane identified Wisdom as the assailant, stating she knew him. However, she was not administered an oath. The prosecutor, realizing the error, obtained a second recording where Jane swore to the truth and accuracy of her prior statements. The grand jury viewed both videos before indicting Wisdom.

    Procedural History

    Wisdom moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing the unsworn testimony compromised the grand jury’s integrity. The Supreme Court denied the motion, and a jury convicted Wisdom. The Appellate Division reversed, finding the grand jury proceeding defective. The People appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the failure to administer an oath to a witness before their initial grand jury testimony, later corrected by a sworn affirmation of the prior statements, constitutes a defect impairing the integrity of the grand jury proceedings, warranting dismissal of the indictment.

    Holding

    No, because the lack of an oath was an oversight that was corrected, and the defendant failed to demonstrate prejudice, the grand jury proceeding was not fundamentally impaired.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals acknowledged that an oath should have been administered during the first recording. However, the court emphasized that not every procedural error warrants dismissal of an indictment. The court applied the statutory standard requiring a “very precise and very high” showing of impairment to the grand jury proceedings (People v. Darby, 75 N.Y.2d 449, 455 [1990]). The court noted the absence of any nefarious intent to unfairly prejudice the defendant. Instead, the prosecution proactively sought to correct the error by obtaining a second, sworn statement from Jane, which the grand jury reviewed along with instructions regarding the initial omission. The Court determined that the defendant failed to establish a possibility of prejudice that would justify dismissing the indictment. The court emphasized that corrective measures were taken, and there was no evidence that the initial lack of oath substantially influenced the grand jury’s decision to indict. The court cited precedent, including People v. Adessa, 89 N.Y.2d 677, 686 (1997), underscoring that dismissal is an exceptional remedy reserved for cases where the integrity of the grand jury process is genuinely compromised. The Court reasoned that the purpose of the oath is to ensure truthfulness, and Jane’s subsequent sworn affirmation of her initial statements served this purpose, mitigating any potential prejudice to the defendant.

  • People v. Thompson, 22 N.Y.3d 687 (2014): Limits on Prosecutorial Influence on Grand Jury Discretion

    People v. Thompson, 22 N.Y.3d 687 (2014)

    While prosecutors advise grand juries, they cannot use their influence to undermine the grand jury’s independent discretion to hear witnesses requested by the defendant, although not every misstep warrants dismissal of an indictment.

    Summary

    Thompson was convicted of second-degree murder. He appealed, arguing that the prosecutor committed misconduct before the grand jury by discouraging them from hearing a witness he requested. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that while the prosecutor’s actions were not ideal, they did not rise to the level of impairing the integrity of the grand jury proceedings because the grand jury ultimately exercised its discretion in the matter. The Court emphasized that the grand jury is an independent body and the prosecutor’s role as legal advisor does not give them the power to control the grand jury’s decisions, but requires a showing of pervasive misconduct to warrant dismissal of an indictment.

    Facts

    Thompson was arrested for the murder of Rasheem Williams. In a prior grand jury proceeding on weapons charges, a witness, Jane Doe, gave a description of the shooter somewhat consistent with Thompson, but stated she did not see the shooter’s face due to fear from anonymous threats. Subsequently, another witness, James Doe, came forward, identifying Thompson as the shooter. The People presented murder charges to a second grand jury. Thompson testified and requested the grand jury call Jane Doe as a witness, claiming she would exonerate him. The prosecutor questioned the relevance of Jane Doe’s testimony.

    Procedural History

    The grand jury indicted Thompson on murder and weapons charges. Thompson moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing prosecutorial misconduct. The Supreme Court denied the motion. Thompson was convicted at trial. He appealed, and the Appellate Division affirmed. The case then went to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the prosecutor’s comments regarding the defendant’s requested witness impaired the integrity of the grand jury proceedings.

    Holding

    1. No, because the prosecutor’s comments, while not ideal, did not prevent the grand jury from exercising its independent discretion in deciding whether to hear from the witness, and the grand jury was not misled into thinking that they had no choice but to agree with the prosecutor.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals recognized the importance of the grand jury as an independent body. It stated that under CPL 190.50, the grand jury has the power to subpoena witnesses, even those not called by the People. While the prosecutor is the legal advisor to the grand jury, due process requires fair dealing and candor. However, the Court emphasized that a grand jury proceeding is not a mini-trial, but an investigation to determine if sufficient evidence exists to accuse someone of a crime. Here, the prosecutors allowed Thompson to submit his request to call the witness directly to the grand jurors, and told the grand jurors they could vote to hear from the witness. The Court acknowledged the lead prosecutor forcefully contended that the witness’s testimony would be irrelevant. However, the lead prosecutor clarified that, despite her objections, the grand jurors had the right to call the witness based on their own belief regarding the relevance of the potential witness’s testimony. The Court pointed to the grand jurors’ assertive conduct as evidence that the prosecutors did not undermine the grand jurors’ independence. A grand juror repeatedly expressed skepticism regarding the prosecutor’s assertions and the grand jurors voted to hear from witnesses proffered by another defendant. The court held that the remedy of dismissing an indictment due to prosecutorial misconduct is an exceptional remedy, available only in rare cases, requiring a showing of pervasive bias and misconduct. Here, the Court found that the prosecutors did not commit pervasive misconduct, nor were they motivated by bias or a desire to deceive the grand jury. The Court distinguished this case from People v. Hill, 5 N.Y.3d 772 (2005), because the prosecutors did not hide the full extent of Thompson’s offer of proof, and the prosecutors’ conduct was justified by a concern for the safety of a prior witness. Thus, the Court affirmed the order of the Appellate Division.

  • People v. Davis, 19 N.Y.3d 265 (2012): Limits on De Facto Grand Jury Dismissals

    People v. Davis, 19 N.Y.3d 265 (2012)

    A prosecutor’s withdrawal of a case from a grand jury due to witness unavailability is not a de facto dismissal requiring court authorization for re-presentation unless the grand jury has fully considered the evidence and charges.

    Summary

    Defendants Davis and McIntosh were indicted for assault after an incident at a nightclub. The prosecution initially presented evidence to a grand jury against McIntosh only, as Davis had not yet been apprehended, but withdrew the case due to witness unavailability. Later, both Davis and McIntosh were indicted by a second grand jury. The Court of Appeals held that the withdrawal from the first grand jury was not the functional equivalent of a dismissal requiring court authorization before re-presentation, because the first grand jury had not fully considered the evidence and charges against both defendants.

    Facts

    Lynn Walker was severely injured in an altercation at a nightclub, allegedly instigated by Davis and joined by McIntosh. McIntosh was arrested shortly after the incident, while Davis was apprehended later. The People began presenting evidence to a grand jury against McIntosh before Davis was arrested, advising the jury that it was a “continued case.” Walker testified that both Davis and McIntosh assaulted her. The People withdrew the case due to witness unavailability and the grand jury’s term expiring. Later, the People presented evidence to another grand jury against both Davis and McIntosh, who were subsequently indicted.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court denied the defendants’ motions to dismiss the indictment. Davis was convicted of assault, while McIntosh was acquitted of first-degree assault but convicted of second-degree assault. The Appellate Division reversed the judgments, holding that the withdrawal from the first grand jury was the functional equivalent of a dismissal under People v. Wilkins, requiring court permission before re-presentment. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and reversed the Appellate Division’s orders.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the People’s withdrawal of their case from the first grand jury presentation, due to witness unavailability, constituted the functional equivalent of a dismissal pursuant to CPL 190.75, requiring court authorization before re-presentment to a second grand jury.

    Holding

    Yes for McIntosh; No for Davis. The order is reversed because the People had instructed the first grand jury that only McIntosh was the target of the proceedings. As to McIntosh, no, because the proceedings before the first grand jury had not progressed to the point where it had fully considered the evidence and the charges against McIntosh.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals distinguished this case from People v. Wilkins, which held that a pre-vote withdrawal of charges after the presentation was complete was the functional equivalent of a dismissal. The Court emphasized that Wilkins applies only in limited circumstances where the withdrawal is “fundamentally inconsistent with the objectives underlying CPL 190.75,” such as curtailing prosecutorial excess and maintaining grand jury independence (People v. Gelman, 93 N.Y.2d 314, 319 (1999)). For Davis, since the People never sought an indictment from the first grand jury against Davis, Wilkins is irrelevant since there were no charges against Davis to be withdrawn (see People v Santmyer, 255 AD2d 871, 871 [4th Dept 1998]). The Court found that the first grand jury had not fully considered the evidence and charges against McIntosh because the People intended to present additional witnesses and had informed the grand jury that it was a continuing case. The Court emphasized that there was no evidence that the People withdrew their case to find a more compliant grand jury. The court reasoned that the focus should be on “the extent to which the Grand Jury considered the evidence and the charge” (Wilkins, 68 NY2d at 274). Because the People withdrew the charges before fully presenting their case, it did not constitute a de facto dismissal requiring court authorization.

  • Cantwell v. Ryan, 2 N.Y.3d 620 (2004): Limits on Court Authority to Order Resubmission of Charges to a Grand Jury

    Cantwell v. Ryan, 2 N.Y.3d 620 (2004)

    A court lacks the authority to order a prosecutor to submit charges to a grand jury that are different from those previously considered and dismissed by a prior grand jury.

    Summary

    This case addresses the scope of a court’s authority to order the resubmission of charges to a grand jury after the initial grand jury declined to indict on certain charges. Following a grand jury’s refusal to indict on murder charges, a County Court Judge, concerned that lesser charges were not considered, ordered the prosecutor to present the case to a second grand jury and instruct it to consider manslaughter and criminally negligent homicide charges. The Appellate Division prohibited the enforcement of the judge’s orders, and the Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the judge exceeded his authority under CPL 190.75(3), which only permits the court to authorize resubmission of the *same* charge previously dismissed, not different or lesser charges.

    Facts

    After a grand jury returned a “no true bill” on intentional and depraved indifference murder charges against Lawrence Crouthers, a grand juror expressed concern that lesser charges should be considered.

    The County Court Judge arranged for the juror to appear in court, directing the prosecutor to be present with the grand jury’s foreperson and ordering the prosecutor to produce the grand jury minutes.

    The prosecutor stated he had no intention of re-presenting the matter.

    The court concluded that the evidence supported manslaughter in the second degree and criminally negligent homicide charges.

    The court ordered the prosecutor to present the case to another grand jury and to instruct it to consider those lesser charges.

    Procedural History

    The County Court Judge issued an order directing the prosecutor to present lesser charges to a second grand jury.

    After the prosecutor sought to reargue, the court issued a second order clarifying that the prosecutor could choose which lesser crimes to submit.

    The Appellate Division granted the District Attorney’s petition prohibiting the County Judge from enforcing its orders.

    The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a County Court Judge has the authority under CPL 190.75(3) to order a prosecutor to submit charges to a grand jury that are different from those previously considered and dismissed by a prior grand jury?

    Holding

    No, because CPL 190.75(3) only allows a court to authorize resubmission of the *same* charge that the grand jury had previously considered and dismissed, not other or additional (i.e., lesser) charges.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals focused on the plain language of CPL 190.75(3), which states that a charge dismissed by a grand jury “may be resubmitted to a grand jury only if the court ‘in its discretion authorizes or directs the people to resubmit *such charge* to the same or another grand jury’ (emphasis supplied).”

    The court reasoned that the County Court Judge’s order to submit *different* charges (specifically, lesser included offenses) exceeded the scope of authority granted by the statute. Since the judge did not direct the District Attorney to resubmit the *same* charge that the grand jury had previously considered and dismissed, the order was invalid.

    The Court of Appeals adopted the reasoning of the Appellate Division, emphasizing a strict interpretation of the statutory language.

    The decision highlights the limits on judicial intervention in the prosecutorial process, emphasizing that the authority to direct grand jury proceedings is primarily vested in the District Attorney, subject only to the specific exceptions outlined in the Criminal Procedure Law.

  • People v. Aarons, 2 N.Y.3d 547 (2004): Requires 12 Grand Jurors to Vote for Dismissal

    2 N.Y.3d 547 (2004)

    A grand jury’s dismissal of criminal charges requires a formal vote with the concurrence of at least 12 grand jurors; a failure to indict does not automatically constitute a dismissal.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether a formal vote of 12 grand jurors is necessary to dismiss a charge. After hearing testimony, a grand jury deliberated on charges against Aarons but couldn’t reach a decision. The prosecutor then presented more evidence. Aarons moved to dismiss, arguing the initial failure to indict constituted a dismissal, requiring court approval to re-present the case. The Court of Appeals held that a formal vote with at least 12 concurring jurors is required for a dismissal, affirming the Appellate Division’s reinstatement of the indictment. The court reasoned that inferring a dismissal undermines the grand jury’s explicit power to dismiss charges.

    Facts

    Lenworth Aarons was accused of burglary and related crimes. On March 19, 1999, a Bronx County grand jury heard testimony from witnesses, including Aarons. The grand jury deliberated but informed the prosecutor they were having difficulty reaching a decision regarding the proposed charges. The prosecutor then asked the grand jury to cease deliberations to present additional evidence. The prosecutor reconvened the grand jury the following week, presented another witness, and asked the jurors to vote. The grand jury then indicted Aarons.

    Procedural History

    Aarons moved to dismiss the indictment. Supreme Court granted the motion and dismissed the indictment. The Appellate Division reversed, reinstating the indictment, holding that a dismissal requires a concurrence of 12 grand jurors. A Justice of the Appellate Division granted Aarons leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a formal vote of 12 grand jurors is necessary to effectuate a dismissal of charges by a grand jury, or whether a failure to indict can be interpreted as a de facto dismissal.

    Holding

    Yes, because a dismissal of a charge constitutes an affirmative official action or decision of the grand jury, requiring the concurrence of at least 12 members as stipulated in CPL 190.25(1).

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that CPL 190.25(1) requires a concurrence of at least 12 grand jurors for any affirmative official action or decision. The court determined that dismissing charges is an affirmative action. The court examined the legislative history of grand jury procedure, noting that even under the former Code of Criminal Procedure, a dismissal required an express communication to the court, not a mere inference. The Court cited CPL 190.60 and 190.75, which outline the grand jury’s power to dismiss charges, file an information, remove the case to Family Court, or submit a report, arguing that failure to indict doesn’t automatically equate to dismissal. The court distinguished the case from People v. Montanez, where 12 grand jurors voted to dismiss before the prosecutor improperly influenced a reconsideration. The court emphasized that allowing prosecutors to resubmit charges after a failure to indict, without judicial oversight, would undermine the grand jury’s independence. The dissent argued that dismissal is not an “affirmative official action” requiring 12 votes, as it ends proceedings rather than advancing them. The dissent contended that a failure to indict should automatically trigger a dismissal, subject to the requirement that the finding of dismissal is filed with the court. The Court stated that inferring a dismissal from a failure to indict would subvert the power conferred upon the grand jury and disregard the statute’s intent. As the Court stated, “For the court to infer a dismissal of a charge from the grand jury’s inability to make a decision as to what action it should take undermines this clear legislative intent and effectively eliminates one of the enumerated powers of the grand jury.”

  • People v. Anderson, 93 N.Y.2d 269 (1999): Defining ‘Reasonable Time’ for Grand Jury Witness Notification

    People v. Anderson, 93 N.Y.2d 269 (1999)

    The determination of what constitutes a ‘reasonable time’ for notifying a defendant of their right to appear as a witness before a Grand Jury, as required by CPL 190.50(5)(a), is a flexible standard based on the specific facts known at the time, and lower court determinations on this issue, if supported by the record, are beyond further review by the Court of Appeals.

    Summary

    Defendant was convicted of murder, weapon possession, and assault. He appealed, arguing he didn’t receive reasonable notice to appear before the Grand Jury, violating CPL 190.50(5)(a). The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that ‘reasonable time’ for notification is flexible and fact-dependent. The Court found the defendant had sufficient opportunity to consult with counsel and prepare, given he had representation, received oral and written notice, conferred with his attorney multiple times, and his attorney reviewed key evidence. The defendant’s reasons for delay (tiredness and lack of discovery) were insufficient to render the notice unreasonable.

    Facts

    The defendant was arrested and charged with murder, criminal possession of a weapon, and assault. The District Attorney provided oral and written notice to the defendant, who was represented by counsel, of the date when the case would be presented to the Grand Jury. The notice was given one and a half days before the presentment date. The defendant requested a delay, citing tiredness and the lack of certain discovery materials.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted in the trial court. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The case then went to the Court of Appeals by permission from a Justice of the Appellate Division. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the District Attorney afforded the defendant a ‘reasonable time’ to exercise his right to appear as a witness before the Grand Jury, as required by CPL 190.50(5)(a), when the defendant was given one and a half days’ notice of the presentment date.

    Holding

    No, because, under the specific facts of the case, the defendant was afforded a meaningful opportunity to consult with counsel and to prepare for his possible testimony before the Grand Jury.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that CPL 190.50(5)(a) does not define a specific time period for notice but requires a ‘reasonable time’ for the defendant to consult with counsel and decide whether to testify. The Court emphasized that reasonableness is flexible and depends on the particular facts known at the time. The Court cited People v. Harrison, 57 NY2d 470, 477-478, stating that because the inquiry involves a mixed question of law and fact, where the determinations by courts with fact-finding authority are supported by the record they are beyond the further review of this Court. The Court noted that the defendant was represented by counsel, received both oral and written notice, and conferred with counsel on at least three occasions before the presentment date. Defense counsel had access to the felony complaint and an eyewitness statement, and viewed the crime scene. The Court found the defendant’s excuses for a delay, being tired and lacking discovery materials he wasn’t yet entitled to, insufficient to demonstrate that the notice was unreasonable. The court emphasized the lower court findings supported the conclusion defendant had a sufficient opportunity to consult and prepare. Thus, based on the record, the Court of Appeals determined that the notice provided was not unreasonable as a matter of law.

  • People v. Hansen, 95 N.Y.2d 227 (2000): Effect of Guilty Plea on Challenging Grand Jury Proceedings

    People v. Hansen, 95 N.Y.2d 227 (2000)

    A guilty plea generally forfeits the right to appellate review of claims relating to rights deprivations occurring before the plea, except for jurisdictional defects or constitutional rights impacting the process’s integrity.

    Summary

    Hansen pleaded guilty to attempted burglary. He then sought to challenge his indictment, arguing that the Grand Jury proceedings were impaired by the prosecutor’s introduction of inadmissible hearsay (a news report). The trial court rejected this argument, and the Appellate Division affirmed, holding that the guilty plea waived the right to challenge the Grand Jury proceeding. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the guilty plea forfeited the right to challenge the Grand Jury proceeding because the defect was evidentiary, not jurisdictional or constitutional.

    Facts

    Harold Stickney testified before the Grand Jury that he awoke to noises outside his home, saw Hansen on his porch with a shovel trying to break in, and confronted him with a gun. Deputy Stark testified that he apprehended Hansen, who claimed he was there to shovel snow. Hansen testified that he was under the influence of medication and hallucinating. The prosecutor then played a portion of a news report where a reporter stated that Hansen was charged with attempted burglary. The prosecutor told the grand jurors to only consider Hansen’s statement on the tape. Hansen was indicted for burglary and related charges.

    Procedural History

    Hansen moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing the Grand Jury proceeding was defective due to the hearsay in the news report. The motion court denied the motion. Hansen pleaded guilty to attempted first-degree burglary. The Appellate Division affirmed, holding the plea waived the challenge to the Grand Jury proceeding. Hansen appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a defendant who pleads guilty forfeits the right to argue on appeal that the Grand Jury proceedings were impaired by the prosecutor’s introduction of inadmissible hearsay evidence.

    Holding

    No, because the defect was not jurisdictional or a constitutional violation that impacted the integrity of the process. The Court of Appeals held that the defendant’s guilty plea forfeited his right to challenge the Grand Jury proceeding on the basis of the inadmissible hearsay.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that a guilty plea generally marks the end of a criminal case. A guilty plea encompasses a waiver of specific trial rights and forfeits the right to revive certain pre-plea claims. However, issues relating to jurisdictional matters or constitutional rights that go to the heart of the process survive a guilty plea. The court distinguished between defects implicating the integrity of the process, which may survive a guilty plea, and less fundamental flaws, such as evidentiary or technical matters, which do not. Here, the Court found that the introduction of the videotaped remarks was an evidentiary error, not a jurisdictional or constitutional one. “Flaws of an evidentiary or technical nature are thus forfeited by a guilty plea.” The court noted that a valid and sufficient accusatory instrument existed, enabling the court to acquire jurisdiction. The court distinguished this case from People v. Pelchat, where the prosecutor knew there was no evidence to support the indictment. Here, there was sufficient evidence, even without the videotape. The court emphasized that after a guilty plea, the sufficiency of the evidence before the Grand Jury cannot be challenged.

  • People v. Cade, 74 N.Y.2d 410 (1989): Limits on Grand Jury Re-Presentation After Withdrawal

    74 N.Y.2d 410 (1989)

    When the People withdraw a case from a grand jury before the grand jury has had an opportunity to fully consider the evidence and the charges, judicial approval is not required to resubmit the charges to a subsequent grand jury.

    Summary

    Cade was convicted of arson. Prior to trial, he argued that the indictment should be dismissed because the charges had been improperly submitted to the second grand jury without court approval, violating CPL 190.75 and People v. Wilkins. The first grand jury heard testimony from a firefighter and a fire inspector, but neither witness linked Cade to the crime. The prosecution withdrew the case because a key witness was unavailable and the grand jury refused to extend its term. The New York Court of Appeals held that because the first grand jury did not fully consider the evidence or charges against the defendant, the withdrawal was not equivalent to a dismissal, and judicial approval wasn’t needed to resubmit to a second grand jury.

    Facts

    Cade was convicted of first-degree arson for allegedly hiring four men to set fire to an apartment building he owned. The building was subject to rent control, and Cade sought to convert it into condominiums.

    Procedural History

    The trial court denied Cade’s motion to dismiss the indictment. The Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the prosecutor’s withdrawal of a case from a grand jury, after presenting minimal evidence that does not link the defendant to the crime, constitutes a dismissal requiring judicial approval before resubmitting the case to another grand jury under CPL 190.75.

    Holding

    No, because the key factor in determining whether an unauthorized withdrawal of the case must be treated as a dismissal is the extent to which the grand jury considered the evidence and the charge. Here, the grand jury did not have the opportunity to fully evaluate the evidence or charges against an identified defendant.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court emphasized that CPL 190.75 aims to prevent repeated resubmissions of charges to successive grand juries after a dismissal. The court distinguished People v. Wilkins, where the prosecution’s presentation to the first grand jury was complete, and all witnesses had testified. In that case, withdrawal was deemed equivalent to a dismissal. Here, the court reasoned that because the first grand jury heard limited evidence that did not link Cade to the crime, and the case was withdrawn due to witness unavailability, the grand jury did not have an adequate opportunity to consider the evidence and charges. The court stated, “[T]he key factor in determining whether an unauthorized withdrawal of the case must be treated as a dismissal is the extent to which the Grand Jury considered the evidence and the charge.” The court concluded that allowing resubmission without judicial approval in this context did not undermine the integrity of the grand jury proceedings or the purpose of CPL 190.75. The court also found that a remark by the judge’s law clerk did not render Cade’s waiver of his right to a jury trial involuntary, because there was no promise of favorable treatment.

  • People v. Adessa, 89 N.Y.2d 910 (1996): Limits on Resubmitting Charges to Grand Juries After Dismissal

    People v. Adessa, 89 N.Y.2d 910 (1996)

    When a court dismisses an indictment due to insufficient evidence, the prosecution is not limited in the number of times it can resubmit the charges to a grand jury, unlike when a grand jury itself dismisses the charges.

    Summary

    The defendant was initially indicted on robbery charges, but the court dismissed the indictment due to insufficient evidence. After a second grand jury declined to indict, the prosecution obtained permission to present the case to a third grand jury, which then indicted the defendant. The defendant argued that this third presentation violated CPL 190.75(3), which limits resubmissions after a grand jury dismissal. The New York Court of Appeals held that CPL 190.75(3) applies only to grand jury dismissals, not to court-ordered dismissals based on insufficient evidence under CPL 210.20. Therefore, the prosecution was permitted to resubmit the charges.

    Facts

    The defendant was initially charged with two counts of robbery in the second degree.

    The Supreme Court dismissed the initial indictment because the evidence presented to the Grand Jury was legally insufficient.

    The court granted leave to resubmit the charges to another Grand Jury.

    A second Grand Jury considered the charges, including two additional charges for attempted robbery, but voted “no true bill” (declined to indict).

    The People moved for leave to resubmit to a third Grand Jury, stating that the defendant’s friend, who had already pleaded guilty in connection with the crimes, would be willing to testify.

    The court granted leave, and the third Grand Jury indicted the defendant on all charges.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court initially dismissed the indictment due to insufficient evidence.

    After the third grand jury indicted the defendant, the defendant moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that the presentation to a third grand jury violated CPL 190.75(3).

    The Supreme Court rejected this argument.

    The Appellate Division affirmed the Supreme Court’s decision.

    The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether CPL 190.75(3), which limits resubmissions to a grand jury after a grand jury dismissal, applies when a court dismisses an indictment due to insufficient evidence under CPL 210.20.

    Holding

    No, because CPL 190.75(3) applies only to Grand Jury dismissals, not court-ordered dismissals based on insufficiency of evidence under CPL 210.20.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that at common law, a prosecutor could repeatedly resubmit charges to Grand Juries until an indictment was obtained. The Legislature enacted provisions in the Criminal Procedure Law to prevent prosecutorial abuse, including CPL 190.75, which governs Grand Jury dismissals, limiting the number of times the People can resubmit after a Grand Jury has dismissed charges. Specifically, CPL 190.75(3) states that if a Grand Jury dismisses a charge, the People can resubmit only after obtaining permission from the court, and if the charge “is again dismissed, it may not again be submitted to a grand jury.”

    By contrast, CPL 210.20, governing judicial dismissals, provides without qualification that where a court dismisses an indictment based on insufficiency of the evidence, it “may, upon application of the people, in its discretion authorize the people to submit the charge or charges to the same or another grand jury” (CPL 210.20[4]).

    The court emphasized that “discretionary judicial dismissals do not present the same potential for prosecutorial abuse, and are subject to their own check of appellate review,” thus the provision for judicial dismissals does not limit the number of resubmissions.

    The court concluded that CPL 190.75(3) and 210.20 are separate statutory provisions addressing separate legislative concerns. The dismissal of the first indictment was court-ordered pursuant to CPL 210.20, not a Grand Jury dismissal that implicates the limitations imposed on resubmission pursuant to CPL 190.75(3). Thus, the People’s single resubmission after the Grand Jury dismissed the charges was consistent with the law.

    The court also addressed the defendant’s reliance on language in People v. Cade, clarifying that CPL 190.75(3) applies solely to Grand Jury dismissals, not court-ordered dismissals.