New York Law Review

Tag: governmental function

  • Tara N.P. v. Western Suffolk Board of Cooperative Educational Services, 27 N.Y.3d 711 (2016): Establishing a Special Duty is Required for Municipal Liability in Governmental Capacity

    27 N.Y.3d 711 (2016)

    A municipality is not liable for negligence committed while performing a governmental function, unless the municipality owed a special duty to the injured party.

    Summary

    Tara N.P. sued Suffolk County for negligence after she was sexually assaulted by a worker referred to a facility where she attended classes through the County’s “welfare to work” program. The New York Court of Appeals held that the County was acting in a governmental capacity when referring the worker and did not owe Tara N.P. a special duty. The Court found the County’s actions were part of a governmental function and did not meet the requirements for a special duty, specifically the lack of direct contact and justifiable reliance by the plaintiff. Therefore, the County was not liable for the assault.

    Facts

    Suffolk County operated a “welfare to work” program (SWEP). The County referred Larry Smith, a known sex offender, to a facility operated by North Amityville Community Economic Council (NACEC) for a maintenance position, despite NACEC’s policy against hiring individuals with criminal records. Smith sexually assaulted Tara N.P. at the facility. N.P. sued the County, arguing its negligence in referring Smith caused her injuries.

    Procedural History

    The trial court denied the County’s motion for summary judgment. The Appellate Division reversed, granting summary judgment to the County based on governmental immunity, holding the County acted in a governmental capacity and did not assume a special duty to the plaintiff. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the County was acting in a governmental or proprietary capacity when it referred Smith to NACEC?

    Whether, assuming the County acted in a governmental capacity, the County owed a special duty to Tara N.P. that would allow the County to be liable for Smith’s actions?

    Holding

    Yes, the County was acting in a governmental capacity because it was operating a “welfare to work” program.

    No, the County did not owe a special duty to Tara N.P., because the requirements of a special duty were not met.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court first determined whether the County was acting in a governmental or proprietary capacity. The Court found that the County’s referral of Smith was part of its operation of the SWEP program, a governmental function “undertaken for the protection and safety of the public pursuant to the general police powers.” As such, the Court held that the County was performing a governmental function. The Court distinguished this from a proprietary function where the government’s activities substitute for private enterprises. The Court found no evidence to suggest the County assumed the role of a private landlord in this case.

    Having established the County acted in a governmental capacity, the Court addressed whether the County owed Tara N.P. a “special duty.” The Court explained that to “sustain liability against a municipality, the duty breached must be more than that owed the public generally.” A special duty arises when (1) a statute protects the plaintiff’s class, (2) the government voluntarily assumed a duty beyond that owed to the public, or (3) the municipality took control of a dangerous condition. Only the second situation was at issue here. The Court cited Cuffy v. City of New York to explain the four elements of this special relationship: “(1) an assumption by the municipality, through promises or actions, of an affirmative duty to act on behalf of the party who was injured; (2) knowledge on the part of the municipality’s agents that inaction could lead to harm; (3) some form of direct contact between the municipality’s agents and the injured party; and (4) that party’s justifiable reliance on the municipality’s affirmative undertaking.” The Court found that the last two elements were not met because there was no direct contact between Tara N.P. and the County, and she did not justifiably rely on the County’s actions. The Court stated that because there was no direct contact or justifiable reliance, the County had no special duty to N.P. and thus could not be held liable for Smith’s actions.

    Practical Implications

    This case reinforces that municipalities performing governmental functions are generally immune from liability for negligence unless a special duty is established. Attorneys must carefully analyze whether a municipality’s actions constitute a governmental or proprietary function. The case underscores the strict requirements for proving a “special duty,” particularly the need for direct contact between the injured party and the municipality, and the party’s justifiable reliance on the municipality’s actions. This decision will guide the analysis of similar negligence claims against municipalities, especially those involving social services programs or other governmental activities. Lawyers need to emphasize the lack of direct contact and justifiable reliance of the injured party on the municipality’s promises or actions to defeat a negligence claim.

  • Wittorf v. City of New York, 22 N.Y.3d 473 (2013): Distinguishing Governmental vs. Proprietary Functions in Municipal Liability

    Wittorf v. City of New York, 22 N.Y.3d 473 (2013)

    When a municipality’s employee is negligent while performing an act integral to a proprietary function, such as road repair, the municipality can be held liable under ordinary negligence principles, even if the specific negligent act resembles a governmental function like traffic control.

    Summary

    Rhonda Wittorf sued the City of New York for injuries sustained while bicycling through a Central Park underpass. A Department of Transportation supervisor, Bowles, had told Wittorf it was “okay to go through,” despite knowing about dangerous depressions in the roadway. The jury found Bowles negligent, apportioning 60% fault to the City. The City moved to set aside the verdict, arguing Bowles was performing a governmental function (traffic control) and thus immune from liability. The Supreme Court granted the motion, but the Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Bowles’s actions were integral to the proprietary function of road repair, subjecting the City to ordinary negligence standards.

    Facts

    On November 5, 2005, DOT supervisor Donald Bowles and his crew arrived at Central Park’s 65th Street transverse to repair roadway defects. Bowles closed the west entrance to vehicular traffic. Rhonda Wittorf and Brian Hoberman arrived on bicycles and asked if they could proceed. Bowles said it was “okay to go through.” While riding through an underpass, Wittorf encountered a depression, attempted to avoid it, hit another, and fell, sustaining injuries. The roadway was dark and the depressions were difficult to see.

    Procedural History

    Wittorf sued the City of New York. The jury found the roadway unsafe but also that the City lacked prior written notice of the condition. It also found that the City did not cause or create the condition by an affirmative act of negligence. However, the jury found Bowles negligent and apportioned fault. The Supreme Court granted the City’s motion to set aside the verdict, finding Bowles was performing a governmental function. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals granted plaintiff leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the City of New York was engaged in a proprietary function when its Department of Transportation supervisor, in preparation for roadway repairs, told a bicyclist it was “okay to go through” a closed roadway containing dangerous conditions, such that the City can be held liable for the supervisor’s negligence under ordinary negligence principles.

    Holding

    Yes, because the supervisor’s action was integral to the proprietary function of road repair, subjecting the City to ordinary negligence standards.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on the governmental/proprietary function test outlined in Applewhite v Accuhealth, Inc., noting that a municipality is subject to ordinary negligence rules when engaged in a proprietary function, defined as activities that “essentially substitute for or supplement traditionally private enterprises.” The Court distinguished governmental functions as those undertaken for public safety under general police powers. Historically, road maintenance has been performed by both private entities and local governments and is therefore typically a proprietary function. The court cited precedents establishing a municipality’s duty to maintain roads in a reasonably safe condition and to provide adequate warnings of hazards. While prior written notice laws can limit liability, the nature of the function remains proprietary when performed by highway maintenance personnel. The Court distinguished Balsam v Delma Eng’g Corp., where police traffic control at an accident scene was deemed governmental. In Balsam, there was no proprietary duty to maintain the property. Here, Bowles’s actions were directly connected to the impending road repair, a proprietary function. The court emphasized that Bowles’ act of closing the entry to vehicular travel was integral to the repair job. Therefore, the jury could assess the City’s conduct under ordinary negligence rules. The case was remitted to the Supreme Court to consider the weight of the evidence.

  • Applewhite v. Accuhealth, Inc., 20 N.Y.3d 412 (2013): Governmental Function & Special Duty in Municipal Emergency Response

    Applewhite v. Accuhealth, Inc., 20 N.Y.3d 412 (2013)

    When a municipality provides ambulance service through EMTs responding to a 911 call, it performs a governmental function and can only be liable if it owed a “special duty” to the injured party.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether a municipality is liable for negligence when its EMTs respond to a 911 call. Tiffany Applewhite suffered anaphylactic shock, and her mother called 911. EMTs arrived but were not paramedics with advanced life support (ALS) capabilities. Tiffany’s mother allegedly requested the EMTs take her to a nearby hospital, but they waited for an ALS ambulance. Tiffany suffered brain damage. The New York Court of Appeals held that providing ambulance service is a governmental function, requiring a “special duty” for liability. The Court found triable issues of fact as to whether the EMTs assumed a special duty to Tiffany, precluding summary judgment for the City.

    Facts

    In 1998, Tiffany Applewhite experienced anaphylactic shock after a nurse administered medication. Her mother called 911 when Tiffany’s breathing worsened. Two EMTs from the New York City Fire Department arrived in a basic life support ambulance because no ALS ambulance was available. One EMT performed CPR while the other called for an ALS ambulance. Tiffany’s mother allegedly asked the EMTs to transport Tiffany to a nearby hospital. Paramedics from a private hospital arrived in an ALS ambulance, administered epinephrine, intubated her, gave her oxygen, and transported her to Montefiore Hospital. Tiffany survived but suffered serious brain damage.

    Procedural History

    Tiffany and her mother sued the nurse, her employer (Accuhealth), and the City of New York. The claims against Accuhealth and the nurse were resolved. The City moved for summary judgment, arguing governmental immunity and lack of proximate cause. Supreme Court granted the City’s motion. The Appellate Division reversed, finding triable issues on special duty and proximate cause. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the City was exercising a governmental or proprietary function when the EMTs initiated emergency care.

    Whether the City voluntarily assumed a “special relationship” with the plaintiffs beyond the duty owed to the general public.

    Holding

    Yes, the City was exercising a governmental function because providing ambulance service by EMTs responding to a 911 call is a core governmental responsibility.

    Yes, because the allegations raised a question of fact as to whether the EMTs assumed an affirmative duty and whether the mother justifiably relied on their actions, precluding summary judgment.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that police and fire protection are quintessential governmental functions. Emergency medical services are a critical government duty. The court distinguished this case from medical services provided in hospital settings, which are akin to private, proprietary conduct. The Court stated that emergency medical services are “undertaken for the protection and safety of the public pursuant to the general police powers.” The court stated that “publicly-employed, front-line EMTs and other first responders, who routinely place their own safety and lives in peril in order to rescue others, surely fulfill a government function…because they exist ‘for the protection and safety of the public’ and not as a ‘substitute for…private enterprises’.”

    To establish a special duty, the plaintiff must prove: ” ‘(1) an assumption by the municipality, through promises or actions, of an affirmative duty to act on behalf of the party who was injured; (2) knowledge on the part of the municipality’s agents that inaction could lead to harm; (3) some form of direct contact between the municipality’s agents and the injured party; and (4) that party’s justifiable reliance on the municipality’s affirmative undertaking.’ ”

    The Court found a question of fact as to whether the EMTs assumed an affirmative duty by deciding to await ALS paramedics rather than transport Tiffany to the nearby hospital, after being asked to take her to the hospital by her mother. The court also found a question of fact concerning justifiable reliance. The Court stated, “Plaintiffs are therefore entitled to show how the EMTs’ statements or “conduct deprived [plaintiffs] of assistance that reasonably could have been expected from another source”.

    The court also cited public policy concerns. The cost of tort recoveries would be excessive for taxpayers, and liability could dissuade municipalities from maintaining emergency services.

  • Perez v. City University, 6 N.Y.3d 522 (2006): Determining When University Committees are Subject to Open Government Laws

    Perez v. City University, 6 N.Y.3d 522 (2006)

    A committee within a public university system performs a governmental function, and is therefore subject to the Open Meetings Law and the Freedom of Information Law, when it exercises responsibilities delegated by the legislature and functions as a proxy for authorized faculty councils.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether the Hostos Community College Senate and its Executive Committee are subject to New York’s Open Meetings Law (OML) and Freedom of Information Law (FOIL). The Court of Appeals held that these entities do perform a governmental function because they have been charged with responsibilities delegated by the legislature to the CUNY Board, and they function as a proxy for the faculty councils authorized by the CUNY bylaws. The court further clarified that while the OML does not prohibit secret ballots, FOIL requires a record of each member’s final vote, thus precluding secret ballots.

    Facts

    Petitioners Chong Kim and Aneudis Perez were denied access to meetings of the Hostos Community College Senate and its Executive Committee, respectively. Kim was turned away from a meeting where curriculum changes were approved via secret ballot. Perez was barred from an Executive Committee meeting where he sought to deliver a petition. The College Senate, established by the Governance Charter, is responsible for recommending policy on all college matters and formulating academic policy. The Executive Committee organizes the Senate’s work. The CUNY Board of Trustees delegated some of its authority to faculty councils; the College Senate acts in place of this council at Hostos Community College.

    Procedural History

    The petitioners filed a CPLR article 78 proceeding, arguing the College Senate and Executive Committee were subject to OML and FOIL. Supreme Court granted the petition. The Appellate Division reversed, concluding the Senate was merely advisory and thus not subject to these laws. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division, reinstating the Supreme Court’s judgment.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the Hostos Community College Senate and its Executive Committee perform a “governmental function” such that they are subject to the Open Meetings Law and the Freedom of Information Law.
    2. Whether the Open Meetings Law or the Freedom of Information Law prohibits secret ballots by the College Senate.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the College Senate and its Executive Committee have been charged with responsibilities delegated by the Legislature to the CUNY Board and function as a proxy for the faculty councils authorized by CUNY bylaws.
    2. No, the Open Meetings Law does not prohibit secret ballots, but the Freedom of Information Law does because it requires a record of each member’s final vote.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized that both the Open Meetings Law and the Freedom of Information Law aim to ensure transparency in governmental decision-making. The Court stated, “[I]n enacting the Open Meetings Law, the Legislature sought to ensure that ‘public business be performed in an open and public manner and that the citizens of this state be fully aware of and able to observe the performance of public officials and attend and listen to the deliberations and decisions that go into the making of public policy’ (Public Officers Law § 100).” They reiterated that these laws should be construed liberally. To determine whether an entity performs a governmental function, the court considers the entity’s authority, power distribution, role, and relationship to affected parties. The Court distinguished this case from purely advisory bodies, emphasizing the Senate’s significant role in policy-making. The court highlighted that the College Senate is the sole legislative body on campus authorized to send proposals to the CUNY Board of Trustees. The court quoted from the lower court decision, stating, “[T]he college senate and the executive committee thereof constitute integral components of the governance structure of Hostos Community College. The senate and its executive committee perform functions of both advisory and determinative natures which are essential to the operation and administration of the college.” (195 Misc 2d 16, 33 [Sup Ct, Bronx County 2002]). Regarding secret ballots, the Court noted that while the OML only requires a record of motions, proposals, resolutions, and other matters formally voted upon, the FOIL mandates a record of each member’s final vote, thus precluding secret ballots. The Court concluded that “under the Freedom of Information Law, voting by the College Senate and the Executive Committee may not be conducted by secret ballot.”

  • Smith v. City University of New York, 92 N.Y.2d 707 (1999): Defining “Public Body” Under Open Meetings Law

    Smith v. City University of New York, 92 N.Y.2d 707 (1999)

    An organization comprised of administrators, faculty members, and students authorized to review proposed budgets, allocate student activity fees, and authorize disbursements is deemed a “public body” performing a governmental function and is therefore subject to New York’s Open Meetings Law.

    Summary

    Smith v. City University of New York (CUNY) concerns whether the Fiorello H. LaGuardia Community College Association, Inc. is subject to New York’s Open Meetings Law. The Association, Inc. reviews budgets, allocates student activity fees, and authorizes disbursements. After the Association, Inc. held a closed meeting, Smith, a student, sued, claiming a violation of the Open Meetings Law. The Court of Appeals held that the Association, Inc. is a public body because it exercises a governmental function by managing student activity fees, and is therefore subject to the Open Meetings Law. The court emphasized the Association’s decision-making authority and control over student funds.

    Facts

    LaGuardia Community College, part of CUNY, collects student activity fees as a condition of enrollment. The Fiorello H. LaGuardia Community College Association, Inc., composed of administrators, faculty, and students, manages these fees. The Association, Inc. voted to suspend the student newspaper, The Bridge, after an article containing offensive statements about Jews was published. A subcommittee investigated the newspaper, and the Dean of Student Affairs disapproved a purchase order for the next issue, effectively suspending publication. At a closed meeting on March 30, 1994, the Association, Inc. lifted the suspension but imposed restrictions on The Bridge, including prepublication review. Two individuals, Smith and Maitland, were prevented from attending the meeting.

    Procedural History

    Smith and Maitland sued, alleging the closed meeting violated the Open Meetings Law. The Supreme Court declared the Association, Inc. a “public body,” ordered future compliance with the Open Meetings Law, and annulled actions taken at the closed meeting. The Appellate Division reversed, holding the Association, Inc. was not a public body because it performed merely an advisory function and the funds it managed were segregated from the University’s general revenues. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division, holding the Association, Inc. is a public body subject to the Open Meetings Law.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the Fiorello H. LaGuardia Community College Association, Inc., is a “public body” performing a governmental function, thus subject to New York State’s Open Meetings Law when it allocates student activity fees and regulates student publications.

    Holding

    Yes, because the Association, Inc. exercises real and effective decision-making power by managing student activity fees delegated by CUNY and by regulating student publications, it performs a governmental function, making it a “public body” subject to the Open Meetings Law.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the Open Meetings Law, designed to ensure public business is conducted openly, applies to any entity performing a governmental function. The court emphasized that the Association, Inc.’s powers and functions, derived from State law through CUNY’s by-laws, extend beyond a mere advisory role. CUNY delegated its statutory power to administer student activity fees to the Association, Inc., giving it control over the student activity fee budget. The court also noted the Association, Inc.’s power to suspend, regulate, and reinstate student publications, demonstrating its substantial autonomy. While the funds were segregated from CUNY’s general revenues, the court held that mandatory student activity fees, collected by the State to support student activities at a public university, are public funds. Claims regarding the closed meeting itself were deemed time-barred by the four-month statute of limitations, but claims contesting the allocation of funds were timely. The court cited Matter of Panarella v Birenbaum, 32 NY2d 108 and Rosenberger v Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 US 819, noting mandatory student fees are public funds. In defining “public body”, the court considered various criteria including the authority under which the entity was created, the power distribution, the nature of its role, and its relationship to affected parties, holding that the Association, Inc. possesses “real and effective decision-making power.” According to the court, “This Association, Inc., therefore, is manifestly not just a club or extracurricular activity.”

  • Weiner v. Metropolitan Transp. Auth., 84 N.Y.2d 324 (1994): Governmental vs. Proprietary Functions and Proximate Cause in Negligence

    Weiner v. Metropolitan Transp. Auth., 84 N.Y.2d 324 (1994)

    A governmental entity is immune from liability for negligence claims when its actions are overwhelmingly governmental in nature, and a plaintiff must establish proximate cause between the alleged negligence and the injury.

    Summary

    The plaintiff was attacked in a subway tunnel undergoing renovations. She sued the Metropolitan Transportation Authority (MTA), alleging negligence in storing construction materials (a metal plate) that allowed her assailant to hide and in failing to close the tunnel despite a history of crime. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division, granting summary judgment to the MTA. The court held that the MTA’s actions were overwhelmingly governmental, thus shielding it from liability. Furthermore, the plaintiff failed to establish that the metal plate, rather than the general lack of security, was the proximate cause of her injuries. This case highlights the distinction between governmental and proprietary functions and the importance of establishing proximate cause in negligence claims against governmental entities.

    Facts

    On March 20, 1991, the plaintiff was attacked while walking through a subway tunnel undergoing renovations. The assailant dragged her behind a large metal plate that was temporarily placed against the tunnel wall. The tunnel had a history of violent felonies, including two prior rapes. Eight months before the attack, the local community board had recommended closing the tunnel to the MTA.

    Procedural History

    The plaintiff sued the Metropolitan Transportation Authority (MTA), alleging negligence. The lower courts allowed the case to proceed. The Court of Appeals reversed the lower court’s decision, granted the MTA’s motion for summary judgment, and dismissed the complaint.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the MTA’s actions in maintaining the subway tunnel constituted a governmental function, thereby shielding it from liability for negligence.
    2. Whether the plaintiff established that the placement of the metal plate was the proximate cause of her injuries.

    Holding

    1. No, because the MTA’s actions were overwhelmingly governmental in nature, placing the source of asserted liability well toward the “governmental function” end of the Miller continuum.
    2. No, because the plaintiff’s claim was speculative, and she failed to establish that the location of the metal plate, rather than the general lack of security, was the proximate cause of her injuries.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court determined that the MTA’s actions fell under a governmental function, providing immunity from liability. The court applied the governmental/proprietary function test established in Weiner v Metropolitan Transp. Auth., 55 NY2d 175. Citing Miller v. State of New York, 62 NY2d 506, 511-512, the court noted the “continuum of responsibility” from proprietary acts to governmental functions, like “the maintenance of general police and fire protection.” The court found the MTA’s actions to be overwhelmingly governmental because the failure to close the tunnel or properly police it were governmental decisions. Furthermore, the court stated that the plaintiff failed to establish proximate cause. The court highlighted prior instances of violent felonies in the tunnel even without the presence of negligently placed construction materials. Therefore, the court concluded that the plaintiff’s claim was speculative on the issue of causation, requiring dismissal as a matter of law. The court referenced Matter of Crichlow v New York City Tr. Auth., 184 AD2d 395 and Khodai v New York City Tr. Auth., 176 AD2d 524 to support this conclusion. The court emphasized that “plaintiffs claim is so speculative on the issue of causation as to mandate dismissal as a matter of law”. There were no dissenting or concurring opinions noted.

  • duties owed to teachers

    [73 N.Y.2d 931, 537 N.E.2d 617, 539 N.Y.S.2d 291 (1989)]

    A school’s provision of security against attacks by third parties is a governmental function, and liability for negligence in performing that function requires a special duty of protection to the plaintiff.

    Summary

    A teacher injured by an intruder in a schoolyard sued the Board of Education, alleging negligence in security. The New York Court of Appeals reversed a judgment for the teacher, holding that providing security is a governmental function, not a proprietary one. Because the teacher failed to demonstrate a special duty owed to him by the Board of Education, the Board was not liable for negligence. The court emphasized that the teacher’s role in securing the gate was part of the school’s overall security system.

    Facts

    A New York City public school teacher, along with other teachers, was assigned to supervise a school playground. The playground, enclosed by a chain-link fence, had two gates. The teacher locked one gate but had to stand guard at the other because it was broken. He then broke up a fight and forcibly escorted one of the non-student participants out of the playground. The student returned with a baseball bat and injured the teacher.

    Procedural History

    The teacher sued the Board of Education, alleging negligence in security. A jury returned a verdict for the teacher, finding him 50% responsible, and awarded damages. The Appellate Division affirmed the judgment for the teacher. The Board of Education appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the Board of Education’s alleged negligence in providing security at the school playground constituted a proprietary function, for which the Board could be held liable, or a governmental function, which would require a showing of a special duty owed to the teacher.

    Holding

    No, because providing security against physical attacks by third parties is a governmental function involving policymaking, and no liability arises absent a special duty of protection. The teacher failed to establish that the Board of Education had assumed a special duty to him.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that the teacher’s claim was based on the inadequacy of the school’s security system, which is a governmental function. The court cited prior cases establishing that providing security against third-party attacks is a governmental function involving policymaking, and liability requires a special duty of protection. The court distinguished this case from situations involving proprietary functions, such as failure to repair steps. The court stated that the teacher’s station at the gate was part of the security system: “plaintiff’s own testimony established that his station at the schoolyard’s north gate was in accordance with prior instruction, for the security of the school children, when the gate could not be locked.” The court likened the situation to a failure to maintain a key control system, which would also be considered a governmental function related to overall security. The court emphasized it was deciding the case solely on the terms presented regarding governmental and proprietary functions.

  • Daleview Nursing Home v. Axelrod, 62 N.Y.2d 30 (1984): Recoupment of Medicaid Overpayments Due to State Error

    Daleview Nursing Home v. Axelrod, 62 N.Y.2d 30 (1984)

    The State can recover Medicaid overpayments to a facility resulting from the State’s own computer error, even if the facility could not have discovered the error and was not promptly notified.

    Summary

    Daleview Nursing Home was overpaid Medicaid reimbursements due to a state computer error. The State discovered the error in November 1980 but did not notify Daleview until June 1981, after Daleview had entered into a new union contract increasing employee salaries. Daleview argued the State should be estopped from recouping the overpayment. The Court of Appeals held that the State could recover the overpayment despite its delay in notifying Daleview, reaffirming the principle that estoppel is generally not available against governmental agencies acting in their governmental capacity to protect the public fisc. The court distinguished between errors in calculation and judgmental determinations, finding the former recoverable.

    Facts

    Daleview Nursing Home operated a nursing and health care facility, participating in the Medicaid program. Reimbursement rates were fixed approximately 60 days before each year. The State’s Office of Health Systems Management advised Daleview on June 22, 1981, that its 1980 and 1981 reimbursement rates were incorrectly computed due to electronic data processing problems, resulting in overpayments of $150,961. The State discovered this error in November 1980 but did not notify Daleview until June 1981. Daleview entered a new union contract on April 1, 1981, increasing employee salaries.

    Procedural History

    Daleview commenced an Article 78 proceeding to review and enjoin the retroactive reduction and reimbursement. Special Term dismissed the petition. The Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the State can recoup Medicaid overpayments to a residential health care facility when the overpayment resulted from the State’s own computer error, the facility could not have discovered the error, and the State delayed notifying the facility of the error.

    Holding

    Yes, because estoppel is not available against a governmental agency in the exercise of its governmental functions, and the State’s common-law right to recover overpayment of governmental moneys is well-established. The delay in notification does not transform the error in calculation into a discretionary judgment barring recoupment.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court relied on the established principle that estoppel is generally not available against a governmental agency exercising its governmental functions. The Court noted that an exception exists in very limited circumstances with unusual facts, which this case did not meet. The court emphasized the importance of protecting the public fisc. Addressing Daleview’s argument that the seven-month delay constituted a judgmental error, the Court distinguished between errors in calculation and judgmental considerations involving expertise. It stated that recoupment is barred when payments are based on judgmental considerations, but the delay in informing Daleview of the computer error did not transform the initial error in calculation into such a judgmental determination. The court quoted Board of Supervisors v Ellis stating that “the recipient ‘should now and then suffer by such mistakes, than to introduce a rule against the abuse of which * * * it would be very difficult for the public to protect itself’”. The Court deferred to the Legislature to make any changes to the long-accepted rule against estopping the government in these circumstances.

  • Kircher v. City of Jamestown, 74 N.Y.2d 251 (1989): Public Duty Doctrine and Special Relationship Exception

    Kircher v. City of Jamestown, 74 N.Y.2d 251 (1989)

    A municipality is not liable for negligence in the performance of a governmental function unless a special relationship exists between the municipality and the injured party, creating a specific duty to protect that individual.

    Summary

    Plaintiff sought to recover damages for injuries sustained when the car she was in struck a loose horse. She claimed the police negligently performed their duties by failing to locate the horse or take adequate precautions to protect motorists after receiving a report of the animal’s presence near a major road. The New York Court of Appeals held that the plaintiff’s action failed because she could not establish the existence and breach of a “special duty” owed to her by the police. The court reasoned that the police had to make a discretionary decision on how to allocate limited resources and that their actions did not create a special relationship with the plaintiff.

    Facts

    Police received a report of a loose horse near a major road.

    The police decided to search for the horse but were unable to find it with the limited personnel available.

    Plaintiff was injured when the car in which she was a passenger struck the loose horse while traveling at high speed.

    Plaintiff sued, alleging the police were negligent in carrying out their duties.

    Procedural History

    The trial court initially entered a verdict in favor of the plaintiff.

    The trial court then vacated the verdict and dismissed plaintiff’s action.

    The Appellate Division reversed the trial court’s decision.

    The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order and reinstated the trial court’s dismissal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the plaintiff can recover against the municipality for negligent performance of a governmental function when no special relationship existed between the plaintiff and the municipality.

    Holding

    No, because the plaintiff failed to establish the existence and breach of a “special duty” owed to her by the police.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals applied the public duty doctrine, which shields municipalities from liability for negligence in the performance of governmental functions unless a special relationship exists between the municipality and the injured party. A special relationship requires: (1) an assumption by the municipality, through promises or actions, of an affirmative duty to act on behalf of the party who was injured; (2) knowledge on the part of the municipality’s agents that inaction could lead to harm; (3) direct contact between the municipality’s agents and the injured party; and (4) that party’s justifiable reliance on the municipality’s undertaking.

    The court found that the plaintiff’s claim was essentially that the police should have allocated their limited resources differently. The court stated, “Faced with a report of a loose horse near a major thoroughfare, the police either had to locate the horse, stop traffic on the road, or take other precautions to protect motorists. With only a few officers immediately available, there was insufficient personnel to pursue more than one course of action.”

    The court distinguished this case from cases like De Long v. County of Erie, 60 N.Y.2d 296, where a special relationship was found due to the plaintiff’s direct reliance on specific assurances from the police.

  • Matter of Consolidated Edison Co. v. Lindsay, 24 N.Y.2d 309 (1969): Utility’s Duty to Relocate Facilities at Own Expense

    Matter of Consolidated Edison Co. v. Lindsay, 24 N.Y.2d 309 (1969)

    A utility company must relocate its facilities at its own expense when a municipality condemns land for a governmental function, such as urban renewal or building a public school, unless the legislature expressly directs otherwise.

    Summary

    Consolidated Edison (Con Ed) sought compensation from New York City for the costs of relocating its pipes and mains after the city condemned land for an urban renewal project and a public school. The Court of Appeals held that Con Ed was not entitled to compensation. The court reasoned that the common-law rule requires utility companies to relocate their facilities at their own expense when necessitated by governmental functions. The court distinguished this case from situations where the city acts in a proprietary capacity, reaffirming that slum clearance and school construction are governmental functions.

    Facts

    New York City condemned land in lower Manhattan for the Brooklyn Bridge Southwest Urban Renewal Plan and another parcel in the Bronx to build Public School 161. These condemnations required Con Ed to remove and relocate its subsurface infrastructure (pipes, mains, conduits) from the affected streets. The city did not offer compensation to Con Ed for these relocation expenses, citing the common-law rule that utilities bear the cost of relocating facilities in public rights-of-way when required for public projects.

    Procedural History

    In the urban renewal case (Matter of Consolidated Edison Co. v. Lindsay), Con Ed initiated an Article 78 proceeding to compel the city to compensate it for relocation costs; Special Term granted Con Ed’s petition, which the Appellate Division affirmed. In the school construction case (Matter of City of New York [Public School 161]), the city sought an order compelling Con Ed to relocate its facilities at its own expense, which Special Term granted; the Appellate Division reversed. Both cases were appealed to the New York Court of Appeals and were consolidated for review.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether a utility company is entitled to compensation from a municipality when the municipality condemns land for a governmental function, thereby requiring the utility to relocate its facilities.

    Holding

    1. No, because the common-law rule dictates that utility companies must bear the cost of relocating their facilities when required by governmental functions, such as urban renewal and school construction, unless the legislature expressly directs otherwise.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reaffirmed the common-law rule, stating, “utility companies, which have been granted the ‘privilege’ of laying their pipes and mains in the public streets…must relocate them at their own expense ‘whenever the public health, safety or convenience requires the change to be made.’” The Court emphasized that departures from this rule are recognized “only ‘when the change is required in behalf of other public service corporations or in behalf of municipalities exercising a proprietary instead of a governmental function.’” The court determined that urban renewal and the construction of public schools constitute governmental functions. Distinguishing Matter of City of New York (Gillen Place), 304 N.Y. 215, the court clarified that Gillen Place applied only when the city acted in a proprietary capacity. The court noted that the city was not attempting to appropriate Con Ed’s pipes for its own use, but simply compelling relocation. The court stated that statutory definitions of “real property” do not override the common-law rule. “The burden and expense traditionally imposed on the public utility to remove and relocate its property may not be transferred to the taxpayer absent ‘express direction of the Legislature.’”