New York Law Review

Tag: Governmental Estoppel

  • Pless v. Town of Royalton, 81 N.Y.2d 1047 (1993): Governmental Estoppel and Highway Abandonment

    Pless v. Town of Royalton, 81 N.Y.2d 1047 (1993)

    Estoppel is generally not available against a governmental agency in the exercise of its governmental functions unless an unusual factual situation exists, and a municipality is not estopped from certifying a road as abandoned due to nonuse simply because it previously certified the road as a highway for state funding purposes.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether a town was estopped from certifying a road as abandoned due to six years of nonuse, despite including the road in its calculation for state highway funding during that period. Abutting property owners argued estoppel should apply. The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s decision, holding that estoppel typically does not apply against governmental agencies performing governmental functions, absent exceptional circumstances, which were not present here. The court reasoned that applying estoppel would require municipalities to speculate about future road abandonment, an obligation not imposed by statute.

    Facts

    From 1982 to 1987, the Town of Royalton included a particular road in its calculation of town highway miles for the purpose of receiving state highway maintenance funding. On October 20, 1987, the Town issued a certificate of abandonment for the road, asserting it had not been traveled or used as a highway for the preceding six years. Property owners abutting the road challenged the abandonment, arguing that the Town should be estopped from issuing the certificate given its prior representations for funding purposes.

    Procedural History

    The plaintiffs, abutting property owners, challenged the Town’s certificate of abandonment in court. The Appellate Division modified the trial court’s judgment, ultimately declaring that the road had been abandoned pursuant to Highway Law § 205(1). The property owners appealed this decision to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a municipality is estopped from certifying a road as abandoned due to nonuse for six years (Highway Law § 205 [1]) because, during the relevant period, it certified that the road was a highway for purposes of obtaining State highway funds.

    Holding

    No, because estoppel is generally not available against a governmental agency in the exercise of its governmental functions unless an “unusual factual situation” exists, which was not present here.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the property owners failed to demonstrate that the abandonment certification contradicted the prior certifications for state aid. Critically, they failed to allege reliance on the Town’s actions or provide a reason to invoke estoppel against the Town. The court cited the general rule that “estoppel is not available against a governmental agency in the exercise of its governmental functions” (Matter of Daleview Nursing Home v Axelrod, 62 NY2d 30, 33). The court emphasized that an exception to this rule requires an “‘unusual factual situation’” (id., quoting Matter of Hamptons Hosp. & Med. Ctr. v Moore, 52 NY2d 88, 93, 1), which was absent in this case. The court found that applying estoppel would effectively require municipalities to speculate about which highways might be abandoned in the future, a requirement not imposed by Highway Law § 205 (1). The court thus declined to apply estoppel and upheld the abandonment certification.

  • Parkview Associates v. City of New York, 71 N.Y.2d 274 (1988): Governmental Estoppel in Zoning Disputes

    Parkview Associates v. City of New York, 71 N.Y.2d 274 (1988)

    Estoppel generally cannot be invoked against a governmental entity to prevent it from discharging its statutory duties, especially regarding zoning laws, and the erroneous issuance of a building permit does not estop a municipality from correcting its errors.

    Summary

    Parkview Associates sought to build a structure exceeding height restrictions within a Special Park Improvement District (P.I.D.) in Manhattan. The Department of Buildings initially approved a permit based on a misinterpretation of a zoning map. After substantial construction, the City issued a stop-work order, partially revoking the permit to comply with height restrictions. Parkview challenged the revocation, arguing estoppel and a taking without just compensation. The court held that estoppel does not apply against the City in enforcing its zoning laws and that the taking claim was premature due to a pending variance application.

    Facts

    Parkview purchased property in 1982, part of which fell within a Special Park Improvement District (P.I.D.) with height restrictions. A 1983 resolution amended the P.I.D. boundary, reducing it from 150 to 100 feet east of Park Avenue between East 88th and mid-95th/96th Streets. North of that midblock line, the boundary remained at 150 feet. Zoning Map 6b, accompanying the resolution, initially depicted the amended boundary with a dotted line and a numerical designation of “100,” but lacked a numerical designation along the northern part of the boundary. Parkview’s initial building application was rejected for violating P.I.D. height limitations. A revised application, limiting height within 100 feet of Park Avenue, was approved based on a misinterpretation of Map 6b. Construction commenced, but the City later issued a stop-work order due to height violations within the 150-foot P.I.D.

    Procedural History

    The Commissioner of Buildings partially revoked the building permit. Parkview appealed to the Board of Standards and Appeals (BSA), which upheld the Commissioner’s decision. Parkview then filed an Article 78 proceeding in court, seeking to reinstate the original permit. The IAS Judge dismissed the petition, holding that the BSA determination was reasonable and estoppel was unavailable. The Appellate Division affirmed, and Parkview appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the principle of equitable estoppel precludes the partial revocation of a building permit that was erroneously issued but relied upon by the builder.

    2. Whether the City’s partial revocation of the building permit constitutes a taking in violation of due process of law and without just compensation.

    Holding

    1. No, because estoppel is generally not available against a municipality to prevent it from discharging its statutory duties, especially concerning zoning laws, and the mistaken issuance of a permit does not estop the municipality from correcting its errors.

    2. The Court did not address this issue because Parkview had not yet applied for a variance, a necessary prerequisite to a takings claim.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that the Department of Buildings has no discretion to issue a permit that violates applicable law, and the Commissioner may revoke an erroneously issued permit. Discrepancies between a zoning map and the enabling resolution are controlled by the resolution. Thus, the original permit was invalid as it violated height restrictions within the 150-foot P.I.D.

    Regarding estoppel, the Court reaffirmed the general rule that estoppel is unavailable against a municipal agency discharging its statutory duties, particularly in zoning matters. Citing City of Yonkers v. Rentways, Inc., 304 NY 499, 505, the Court noted that a municipality is not estopped from enforcing its zoning laws by the issuance of a building permit or by laches. The Court emphasized that “[e]stoppel is not available against a local government unit for the purpose of ratifying an administrative error” (Morley v Arricale, 66 NY2d 665, 667).

    The Court further noted that even if there was municipal error, reasonable diligence would have uncovered the 150-foot limitation in the original resolution. This highlights a critical exception: the rare instances where estoppel might apply are negated when the true facts could have been discovered through reasonable inquiry. The court stressed the strong policy reasons for generally precluding estoppel against governmental entities.

    Finally, the Court declined to address the takings claim because Parkview had not applied for a variance, making the claim premature. Citing Church of St. Paul & St. Andrew v. Barwick, 67 NY2d 510, 519, the Court emphasized that seeking a variance is a prerequisite to a takings claim.