New York Law Review

Tag: Good Faith Exception

  • People v. Bigelow, 66 N.Y.2d 417 (1985): Establishes Stricter Probable Cause Standard Under the New York Constitution

    People v. Bigelow, 66 N.Y.2d 417 (1985)

    Under the New York State Constitution, the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule does not apply; evidence seized pursuant to a warrant issued without probable cause must be suppressed, even if police acted in good faith reliance on the warrant.

    Summary

    Bigelow was arrested and his car seized without a warrant based on information from an informant and a police investigation. A subsequent search warrant was issued, and a search revealed contraband. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s suppression of the evidence. The Court held that neither the arrest nor the search warrant were supported by probable cause under either the Aguilar-Spinelli test or the totality of the circumstances test of Illinois v. Gates. Further, the court declined to adopt the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule under the New York State Constitution, finding that allowing the evidence would frustrate the exclusionary rule’s purpose of deterring unlawful police conduct. Therefore, the evidence was suppressed.

    Facts

    Police suspected Bigelow of drug trafficking based on the following facts: he telegraphed almost $25,000 to a Florida resident over four months; the address was near an area known for drug activity; he rented post office boxes in two New York towns; he received two packages from Florida at one post office box in August and September 1981 and another at another post office box in December 1981; and he frequented the apartment of a known drug user and dealer.

    On December 24, 1981, police observed Bigelow attempt to pick up a package from Florida, but the post office was closed. On December 26, they saw him pick up a package and drive to the drug user’s apartment. Police interviewed an informant who stated that Bigelow was a “drugger” dealing cocaine shipped from Florida and had conducted drug transactions as recently as “Christmas week of 1981.” However, the informant had not seen Bigelow sell or possess drugs at any time.

    Bigelow was later stopped, frisked, and taken to the police station. A search warrant was obtained, and a search of his person and vehicle revealed amphetamines, hypodermic needles, and over $4,500 in cash, but no cocaine.

    Procedural History

    Bigelow was charged with and convicted of criminal possession of a controlled substance and hypodermic needles. He moved to suppress the evidence, which was denied by the suppression court, which found probable cause for the arrest and search. The Appellate Division reversed, granted the motion to suppress, and remitted the matter, finding a lack of probable cause. The People appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the arrest of Bigelow was supported by probable cause.

    2. Whether the search warrant was supported by probable cause under either the Aguilar-Spinelli test or the totality of the circumstances test.

    3. Whether the evidence seized pursuant to the warrant should be admissible under the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule.

    Holding

    1. No, because the police lacked sufficient information to support a reasonable belief that Bigelow had committed or was committing a crime.

    2. No, because the informant’s basis of knowledge was not established, and the police investigation did not sufficiently corroborate the hearsay information to establish probable cause under either test.

    3. No, because the New York State Constitution does not recognize a good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule in this context.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that probable cause requires information sufficient to support a reasonable belief that an offense has been or is being committed, or that evidence of a crime may be found in a certain place. The Court reiterated New York’s adherence to the Aguilar-Spinelli rule for evaluating hearsay information, requiring the establishment of both the informant’s basis of knowledge and reliability.

    The Court found that the informant’s statement lacked any indication of personal observation and did not describe Bigelow’s activities with sufficient particularity to infer personal knowledge. The informant’s conclusory assertion that Bigelow was a “drugger” was insufficient. The police investigation, while corroborating some details, was susceptible to innocent interpretation and did not establish probable cause. The Court then considered the totality of circumstances test articulated in Illinois v. Gates but determined that even under that more relaxed standard, probable cause was lacking, because the informant’s basis of knowledge was not established, nor was the informant’s reliability demonstrated given the prior acquittal of charges resulting from his tips.

    Finally, the Court declined to adopt the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule, reasoning that allowing the seized evidence would frustrate the exclusionary rule’s purpose of deterring unlawful police conduct. The Court emphasized that permitting the use of illegally seized evidence would place a premium on illegal police action and provide a positive incentive for similar lawless acts in the future, which is unacceptable under the New York State Constitution.

    The court stated, “[I]f the People are permitted to use the seized evidence, the exclusionary rule’s purpose is completely frustrated, a premium is placed on the illegal police action and a positive incentive is provided to others to engage in similar lawless acts in the future.”

  • People v. Martinez, 37 N.Y.2d 662 (1975): Admissibility of Statements After an Illegal Stop

    People v. Martinez, 37 N.Y.2d 662 (1975)

    The admissibility of custodial statements obtained after an illegal stop depends on whether the police acted in good faith with a reasonable belief that probable cause existed for the arrest, considering the purpose and flagrancy of the misconduct.

    Summary

    Martinez was convicted of felony murder. The key issue was whether an illegal initial stop of the car he was in tainted his subsequent arrest for illegal gun possession and the station house interrogation regarding the homicide. The Court of Appeals held that while the initial stop was illegal, the subsequent statements made by Martinez were admissible because the police acted in good faith and had a reasonable basis for believing probable cause existed after discovering the gun in the car. The court emphasized that the interrogation was not a result of the illegal stop but rather stemmed from independent evidence linking Martinez to the homicide.

    Facts

    On April 1, 1971, Martinez was a passenger in a parked car in a high-crime area. Police officers approached the car, suspecting something related to a nearby liquor store based on the time of day and the occupants’ appearance. After the driver made a quick motion towards the glove compartment, an officer opened the car door and saw a gun on the floor in the back. All occupants were arrested. Detectives investigating a previous homicide interrogated Martinez after informing him of his Miranda rights. Martinez admitted being near the crime scene with others but denied involvement. A woman, Geraldine Neal, told police Martinez confessed to stabbing a man near a Lafayette Radio Store. Police found the victim’s coat with a switchblade knife in the pocket at an apartment where Martinez often stayed.

    Procedural History

    The trial court admitted the gun, Martinez’s statements, and the knife and coat as evidence, finding the stop and arrest justified and Martinez’s statements voluntary after a knowing and intelligent waiver of his rights. The Appellate Division affirmed Martinez’s conviction. This appeal followed.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the illegality of the initial stop tainted the subsequent arrest for illegal possession of a firearm and, therefore, the subsequent station house interrogation of the defendant concerning the homicide, requiring suppression of the statements and evidence obtained as a result.

    Holding

    No, because the police acted in good faith and had a reasonable basis to believe probable cause existed for the arrest after discovering the gun, and the interrogation was based on independent evidence linking Martinez to the homicide, thus attenuating any taint from the illegal stop.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court addressed the “fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine under Wong Sun v. United States, requiring that evidence be excluded if obtained through exploitation of illegal police conduct. Citing Brown v. Illinois, the court stated that Miranda warnings alone are not always sufficient to break the causal connection between an illegal arrest and a confession. Relevant factors include temporal proximity, intervening circumstances, and the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct. The court adopted a good-faith standard, asking whether law enforcement acted in good faith with a fair basis for belief that probable cause existed for the arrest. This standard is similar to the ALI’s Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure. The court found the initial stop was improper under People v. Ingle. However, a reasonable basis for arrest existed once the gun was discovered. The officers, unaware of Martinez’s potential involvement in the homicide, acted in good faith. The detectives investigating the homicide had independent evidence linking Martinez to the Manague stabbing, which broke the causal chain between the illegal stop and the interrogation. The court emphasized that the exclusionary rule’s purpose is to deter unlawful police activity. Here, the police misconduct was not exploitative and did not require suppression of the evidence. The court stated: “[T]he controlling consideration for determining the admissibility of ‘verbal’ evidence obtained pursuant to claimed illegal police conduct is whether law enforcement officers acted in good faith and with a fair basis for belief that probable cause existed for an arrest.”

  • People v. Kaiser, 21 N.Y.2d 86 (1967): Exclusionary Rule and Good Faith Exception

    People v. Kaiser, 21 N.Y.2d 86 (1967)

    Evidence obtained through electronic eavesdropping, even when conducted under a statute later deemed unconstitutional, is inadmissible under the exclusionary rule, including any evidence derived from it, regardless of the good faith of law enforcement officers acting under the then-valid statute.

    Summary

    This case addresses the admissibility of evidence obtained through electronic eavesdropping conducted under a New York statute that was later declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in Berger v. New York. Kaiser and others were indicted for conspiracy to commit murder and for possession of revolvers. The conversations that led to the indictment were obtained via electronic devices installed under a court order pursuant to the eavesdropping statute. The New York Court of Appeals held that, despite the police acting in good faith under a seemingly valid statute, the evidence and its fruits (the revolvers) were inadmissible, mandating suppression and dismissal of the indictment.

    Facts

    Defendants were indicted for conspiracy to commit murder and for possession of revolvers.
    The indictment was based on recorded conversations obtained through electronic devices installed by the police as part of a larceny investigation.
    The conversations revealed a plot to murder witnesses in the larceny investigation, involving the acquisition of deadly weapons.
    The electronic devices were installed pursuant to a court order under a New York statute that had been considered valid for many years.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court granted the defendants’ motions to suppress the evidence (recorded conversations and revolvers) and dismissed the indictment.
    The Appellate Division reversed the Supreme Court’s order, reinstating the indictment.
    The defendants appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether evidence obtained through electronic eavesdropping, conducted under a statute later declared unconstitutional, is admissible in court, considering the law enforcement officers’ good faith reliance on the statute at the time of the eavesdropping.

    Holding

    No, because the subsequent invalidation of the statute renders the eavesdropping illegal from its inception, and the exclusionary rule applies to illegally obtained evidence regardless of the officers’ good faith.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court acknowledged that the police acted in good faith under a statute they reasonably believed to be valid.
    However, the Supreme Court’s decision in Berger v. New York rendered the eavesdropping statute unconstitutional, effectively nullifying the legal basis for the police action.
    The court relied on Mapp v. Ohio, which extended the exclusionary rule to state court proceedings. The exclusionary rule prohibits the use of illegally obtained evidence in criminal trials.
    The court stated that “it is as if there had never been any valid authority for the police to act as they did.”
    The purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter police misconduct by removing the incentive to violate constitutional rights.
    Despite recognizing that the deterrence rationale is less applicable when police act in good faith, the court felt constrained to apply the exclusionary rule broadly.
    Consequently, the court reversed the Appellate Division’s order, granted the motion to suppress the evidence, and dismissed the indictment.