New York Law Review

Tag: Going and Coming Rule

  • Neacosia v. New York Power Authority, 85 N.Y.2d 471 (1995): Defining ‘Special Errand’ Exception to the Going and Coming Rule

    Neacosia v. New York Power Authority, 85 N.Y.2d 471 (1995)

    An employee injured while traveling between work and home, after completing a work-related errand, sustains injuries arising out of employment if the employer encouraged the errand and benefitted from it.

    Summary

    Michael Neacosia, a security officer, was injured in a car accident after dropping off his uniform at a dry cleaner recommended by his employer, the New York State Power Authority. He filed for worker’s compensation. The Workers’ Compensation Board affirmed an award of benefits, finding the trip a work-related errand. The Appellate Division reversed, requiring an express directive by the employer for the errand to qualify. The New York Court of Appeals reversed, holding that express requirement isn’t necessary; employer encouragement and benefit are sufficient for the ‘special errand’ exception to the ‘going and coming’ rule.

    Facts

    Neacosia was a security officer required to wear a clean uniform. The Power Authority recommended specific dry cleaners and paid for the service, though employees could use other cleaners and seek reimbursement. Neacosia dropped off his uniform at a recommended cleaner after his shift, following his usual route home. He was then involved in an accident and sustained severe injuries.

    Procedural History

    The Law Judge initially awarded worker’s compensation benefits. The Workers’ Compensation Board affirmed this award. The Appellate Division reversed, requiring an express directive from the employer to constitute a ‘special errand’. The Court of Appeals granted an appeal as of right.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the ‘special errand’ exception to the ‘going and coming’ rule requires an express employer directive, or if employer encouragement and benefit are sufficient.

    2. Whether Neacosia’s employment had terminated prior to the accident, thus precluding application of the ‘special errand’ exception.

    Holding

    1. No, because employer encouragement and benefit are sufficient to establish a ‘special errand’.

    2. No, because once an employee engages in a ‘special errand,’ the travel between the workplace and home remains within the scope of employment.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court rejected a bright-line rule requiring an express employer directive, finding it inconsistent with precedent and the Workers’ Compensation Law’s liberal construction. It stated, “The test for determining whether specific activities are within the scope of employment or purely personal is whether the activities are both reasonable and sufficiently work related under the circumstances” (citing Matter of Richardson v Fiedler Roofing, 67 N.Y.2d 246, 249). The Court emphasized a two-part test: employer encouragement and benefit. The Power Authority encouraged dry cleaning by recommending specific cleaners and paying for the service. The employer benefitted from a neat and presentable security force and consolidated accounting. Because Neacosia was still traveling home from the special errand, the court determined that his employment had not ended and the special errand exception applied. The Court reasoned, “Once an employee engages in the performance of a special errand, he or she is considered to be acting within the scope of employment during travel between the place of employment and home”.

  • Lemon v. New York City Transit Authority, 72 N.Y.2d 324 (1988): Employee Commuting and Workers’ Compensation

    72 N.Y.2d 324 (1988)

    Injuries sustained while commuting to or from work are generally not compensable under workers’ compensation, unless the employer assumes responsibility for transportation through contract or custom, or a specific nexus exists between the employment and the injury.

    Summary

    Mattiel Lemon, a subway conductor, was injured while commuting home from work on the subway after her shift ended. She fell on the stairs at her destination subway station. Although she had a free transportation pass provided by her employer, the New York City Transit Authority, the court held that her injuries were not compensable under workers’ compensation. The court reasoned that her commute was not part of her employment because her shift had ended, and the Transit Authority did not have a contractual or customary obligation to transport her. The mere provision of a free pass did not establish such a duty, nor did it create a sufficient nexus between her employment and the injury.

    Facts

    Mattiel Lemon worked as a subway conductor for the New York City Transit Authority (NYCTA).
    She was assigned to a line operating between the Bronx and Brooklyn.
    Lemon received a free transportation pass as a benefit of her employment, allowing her to ride the subway without charge.
    After finishing her shift at 4:00 AM, Lemon boarded a subway train to travel home to Brooklyn.
    Upon arriving at her station in Brooklyn, she exited the train and fell on the stairs leading to the street, sustaining injuries.

    Procedural History

    Lemon filed for workers’ compensation benefits, which the NYCTA contested.
    The Workers’ Compensation Board awarded benefits, finding the accident occurred within the precincts of her employment.
    The Appellate Division affirmed the Board’s decision.
    The NYCTA appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether Lemon’s injuries arose out of and in the course of her employment with the NYCTA, making them compensable under workers’ compensation law, when she was injured during her commute home after her shift had ended and she was using a free transportation pass provided by the NYCTA.

    Holding

    No, because Lemon’s journey home was not considered part of her employment, as her shift had ended, and the NYCTA did not have a contractual or customary obligation to transport her, thus breaking the nexus between her job and the injury.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reiterated the general rule that injuries sustained while commuting to and from work are not compensable under workers’ compensation because the risks inherent in commuting relate to the employment only marginally.
    The court acknowledged exceptions to this rule, such as when the employer has a contractual or customary duty to transport the employee or when there is a reasonable nexus between the risk and the employment.
    The court distinguished this case from Holcomb v. Daily News, where the employer had an established custom of providing transportation and derived a benefit from it. In Lemon’s case, the court found no evidence that the NYCTA assumed an obligation to transport her or that it derived any benefit from her use of the transportation pass for commuting.
    The court noted that the pass was a fringe benefit, equivalent to added compensation, and the NYCTA was indifferent to how employees used it.
    The court emphasized that Lemon’s employment had terminated when she signed out of work in the Bronx, and the accident occurred much later in Brooklyn, making the connection between her employment and the injury too remote.
    The dissent argued that the Board’s determination was rational and consistent with precedent, given that Lemon was injured on the employer’s premises, was wearing her uniform, and was using the free pass provided by the NYCTA.

  • Greene v. City of New York Dep’t of Social Services, 44 N.Y.2d 322 (1978): “Outside Worker” Exception to the Going and Coming Rule

    44 N.Y.2d 322 (1978)

    An outside employee whose job requires travel between work locations remains within the scope of employment for worker’s compensation purposes, even when violating an employer’s implicit rule regarding the method of transportation, if the travel itself is an integral part of their job duties.

    Summary

    Sue Greene, a homemaker for the NYC Department of Social Services, was injured in a car accident while driving between client appointments. She did not have permission to use her personal vehicle. The Workmen’s Compensation Board denied her claim, arguing that using her car without permission placed her outside the scope of her employment. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that as an “outside worker,” traveling between client sites was a core part of Greene’s job, and violating the transportation rule did not remove her from the course of employment. The court emphasized the remedial nature of worker’s compensation law.

    Facts

    Sue Greene worked as a homemaker for the City of New York Department of Social Services. Her job required her to travel to multiple clients’ homes daily to provide domestic services. Employees were generally not allowed to use their personal vehicles for work-related travel without permission. Greene did not seek or receive permission to use her car, but on December 10, 1974, she chose to drive to her assignments for personal convenience. While driving to her second appointment of the day, she was involved in a car accident and sustained injuries.

    Procedural History

    Greene filed for workmen’s compensation benefits. The referee disallowed the claim, and the Workmen’s Compensation Board affirmed, finding that Greene’s unauthorized use of her car meant her accident did not arise out of her employment. The Appellate Division affirmed the Board’s decision. The New York Court of Appeals granted Greene leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether an “outside worker” is considered outside the scope of their employment, for purposes of workmen’s compensation, when they are injured while traveling between work assignments in their own vehicle without explicit authorization, violating an implicit employer prohibition.

    Holding

    Yes, because Greene was an “outside worker” whose job inherently required travel, and her unauthorized mode of transport did not fundamentally alter the fact that she was engaged in the duties she was employed to perform.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the general rule denying compensation for injuries sustained while commuting does not apply to “outside workers.” These employees are required to travel as part of their job. The court acknowledged that Greene violated an implied prohibition by using her car without permission. However, it emphasized that the travel between clients’ homes was an integral part of her work duties. The court stated: “At the time of the accident, claimant, in traveling to an assigned client during regular working hours, was doing exactly what she had been employed to do.” The court distinguished between prohibitions related to the *manner* of performing work and prohibitions of the work itself. Violating a rule about *how* to travel, as opposed to *whether* to travel, does not remove an employee from the scope of employment. The court emphasized the remedial nature of the Workmen’s Compensation Law, stating that it “is to be construed liberally to accomplish the economic and humanitarian objects of the act”. The dissenting judge argued that the Workmen’s Compensation Board’s determination should be upheld if supported by substantial evidence, and that the board was within its purview to determine that Greene’s actions fell outside the scope of employment.