New York Law Review

Tag: Geographical Jurisdiction

  • People v. Taub, 99 N.Y.2d 53 (2002): Establishing ‘Particular Effect’ Jurisdiction for Tax Crimes

    People v. Taub, 99 N.Y.2d 53 (2002)

    For a county to assert jurisdiction over a crime based on its ‘particular effect,’ the conduct must cause a concrete and identifiable injury to the county’s governmental processes or community welfare, not merely affect a city-wide agency located within the county.

    Summary

    Sherman Taub and International Mortgage Servicing Company (IMSC) were indicted in New York County for stealing millions through inflated mortgages. Five counts related to allegedly false tax returns filed by the defendants failing to report interest income from these mortgages. The Court of Appeals addressed whether New York County had jurisdiction over the tax-related counts, arguing a “particular effect” due to the processing of New York City taxes within the county. The Court reversed the lower court’s decision, holding that the location of city agencies and bank accounts within the county was insufficient to establish a particular effect on the county itself, requiring a more direct and identifiable injury.

    Facts

    Defendants Taub and IMSC were indicted on multiple counts, including offering a false instrument for filing, based on an alleged scheme to steal millions. The specific counts at issue involved filing allegedly false New York State and City tax returns. These returns did not reflect interest income derived from mortgages held by IMSC on Ocean House, a Queens County adult home. The People argued that New York County had jurisdiction because New York City tax revenues are processed within the county.

    Procedural History

    Supreme Court denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss the five tax-related counts for lack of jurisdiction. The defendants then initiated a CPLR article 78 proceeding seeking a writ of prohibition to prevent prosecution of those counts. The Appellate Division denied the petition, asserting that the false New York City tax returns had a particular effect on New York County. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the location of New York City agencies and bank accounts within New York County, which are involved in processing city income tax revenue, is sufficient to establish a ‘particular effect’ on the county, thus granting it jurisdiction over a prosecution for underreporting income on those tax returns.

    Holding

    No, because the location of city agencies and bank accounts within the county is, alone, insufficient to establish a particular effect on that county when the prosecution’s core is the deprivation of revenue from New York City. The impact must represent a concrete and identifiable injury to the county’s governmental processes or community welfare.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court emphasized that the ‘particular effect’ must be on New York County specifically, requiring a concrete and identifiable injury to its governmental processes or community welfare. This impact must be more than minor or incidental, harming the community as a whole, and demonstrable before a Grand Jury. The Court distinguished the case from situations where the injury to the prosecuting county is more readily identifiable, such as interference with the county’s courts, exposure of many residents to harm, physical intrusion, or theft of county funds. The court reasoned that allowing New York County to assert jurisdiction solely based on the processing of tax revenues would improperly grant the District Attorney city-wide jurisdiction over tax offenses. The Court stated, “Plainly, CPL 20.40 (2) (c) requires a harm to the prosecuting county, not a harm felt by a city-wide governmental agency that happens to have an office in the county.” The Court found that the People failed to show that the harm suffered by the City was peculiar to New York County. It noted that CPL 20.40(2)(c) requires proof the defendant intended or knew their actions would impact New York County, and that this wasn’t established. As such, the court held that New York County could not assert jurisdiction over all crimes affecting New York City merely because city agencies transact business in Manhattan. The court also addressed and rejected the defendant’s claim that the indictment was facially insufficient.

  • People v. Cullen, 50 N.Y.2d 168 (1980): Establishing Geographical Jurisdiction for Possessory Crimes

    People v. Cullen, 50 N.Y.2d 168 (1980)

    For the crime of criminal possession of a controlled substance, jurisdiction requires that knowledge and possession occur simultaneously; the element of knowledge cannot occur before possession for the purpose of establishing jurisdiction.

    Summary

    Paul Cullen was convicted of criminal possession of a controlled substance. The Appellate Division reversed, holding that Nassau County lacked jurisdiction because the drug sale occurred in New York County. The Court of Appeals reversed and remitted, holding that evidence existed for the jury to find jurisdiction based on possession in a vehicle traveling through multiple counties. The court clarified that while a jury could find jurisdiction if the location of the crime was unknown and the crime occurred in a vehicle traveling through multiple counties, as per CPL 20.40(4)(g), the jury instructions were deficient, and also clarified that intent to possess formed in one county cannot confer jurisdiction if possession occurred in another. The court also noted that the defendant’s admission of guilt should have been suppressed because he was not provided counsel, because the defendant was arrested pursuant to an arrest warrant.

    Facts

    A confidential informant contacted Paul Cullen to purchase peyote. The informant and an undercover officer drove to Cullen’s Nassau County home, picked him up, and proceeded to New York County for the sale. In New York County, the officer paid Cullen for the drugs, and Cullen obtained the drugs. The three men then returned to Nassau County.

    Procedural History

    Cullen was indicted in Nassau County for criminal sale and possession of a controlled substance. His motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction was denied. The jury found him guilty of second-degree criminal possession but not guilty of the other charges. The Appellate Division reversed the conviction, finding that Nassau County lacked jurisdiction because the sale occurred in New York County. The People appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether sufficient evidence existed for the jury to find that Nassau County had geographical jurisdiction over the offense of criminal possession of a controlled substance.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because there was evidence presented at trial that the defendant possessed the drugs in a private vehicle during a trip extending through both New York County and Nassau County.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals held that the Appellate Division erred in finding no evidence to support Nassau County’s jurisdiction. The informant testified that the drugs were passed around in the car during the return trip to Nassau County, and the defendant had possession of them at one point. Therefore, the jury could have found that the offense of possession occurred in a vehicle traveling through multiple counties, satisfying CPL 20.40(4)(g). The court clarified the standard for CPL 20.40(4)(g), noting that its use is only appropriate when the location of the crime is unknown, in accordance with People v. Moore. The court emphasized that the trial court’s charge on jurisdiction, although potentially erroneous, became the law of the case because the defendant did not object. Regarding the element of intent, the court stated that for possession crimes, “knowledge” and “possession” must occur simultaneously. The court found the defendant’s admission of guilt inadmissible, stating that “a defendant cannot waive his rights in the absence of counsel after being arrested pursuant to an arrest warrant,” citing People v. Samuels. The case was remitted to the Appellate Division to determine whether the jury’s finding of jurisdiction was against the weight of the evidence. The court concluded that if jurisdiction is sustained, the defendant is entitled to a new trial due to the inadmissible confession.

  • Steingut v. Gold, 42 N.Y.2d 311 (1977): Establishing Jurisdiction Based on Impact of Criminal Conduct

    Steingut v. Gold, 42 N.Y.2d 311 (1977)

    For a county to assert criminal jurisdiction based on the “injured forum” provision, the criminal activity must have a materially harmful impact on the governmental processes or community welfare of that county, and the activity must have been performed with the intent or knowledge that such an impact was likely to occur there.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether Kings County had jurisdiction to indict the Steinguts for corrupt use of position, based on actions in New York County. The alleged crime involved a promise to assist someone in obtaining an appointment in exchange for campaign contributions to Robert Steingut, who was running for office in Kings County. The Court held that the “injured forum” provision of the Criminal Procedure Law (CPL 20.40, subd. 2) did not confer jurisdiction on Kings County because the alleged criminal activity did not have a sufficiently material and demonstrable harmful impact on the governmental processes or community welfare of Kings County. The court affirmed the Appellate Division’s grant of a writ of prohibition preventing Kings County from prosecuting the Steinguts.

    Facts

    Robert Steingut, seeking election as Councilman-at-Large in Kings County, and his father, Stanley Steingut, allegedly met with Hans Rubenfeld in New York County. During the meeting, they purportedly promised to help Rubenfeld obtain an appointment to the Civilian Complaint Review Board in exchange for Rubenfeld arranging a fundraising dinner and contributing to Robert Steingut’s campaign. Rubenfeld contributed $2,500, but the dinner never occurred.

    Procedural History

    A Kings County Grand Jury indicted the Steinguts for corrupt use of position. The Steinguts moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing Kings County lacked jurisdiction. The motion was denied. The Steinguts then initiated an Article 78 proceeding in the Appellate Division seeking a writ of prohibition to prevent the prosecution. The Appellate Division granted the petition. The Kings County District Attorney appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the “injured forum” provision of the Criminal Procedure Law (CPL 20.40, subd. 2) conferred geographical jurisdiction on Kings County to indict and prosecute the Steinguts for alleged offenses that occurred entirely in New York County.

    Holding

    No, because the alleged criminal activity did not have a materially harmful impact on the governmental processes or community welfare of Kings County, nor was it performed with the intent or knowledge that such an impact was likely to occur there.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals held that while prohibition is a proper remedy to challenge geographical jurisdiction, Kings County lacked such jurisdiction in this case. The court emphasized that under common law, criminal offenses are prosecuted where they are committed. CPL 20.40(2) provides an exception, allowing jurisdiction in a county where conduct outside the county has a “particular effect.” CPL 20.10(4) defines “particular effect” as a “materially harmful impact upon the governmental processes or community welfare.” The court found that the mere fact that the election was to take place in Kings County was insufficient to establish the required “particular effect.” The court reasoned that a contrary interpretation would allow any county in the state to assert jurisdiction over a statewide election tainted by criminal activity localized in a single county, which was not the intent of the statute. The court noted, “The type of injury or offense contemplated by the statute must be perceptible and of the character and type which can be demonstrated by proof before a Grand Jury.” Furthermore, the indictment itself failed to specify the effect the purported crime would have on Kings County, stating only in a conclusory fashion that the defendants’ conduct had and was likely to have a particular effect on Kings County. The court found that there was no evidence presented to the Grand Jury that the alleged criminal activity was performed with the intent or knowledge that a materially harmful impact would occur in Kings County. Therefore, Kings County lacked the power to indict and prosecute the Steinguts.