New York Law Review

Tag: general release

  • Hill v. St. Clare’s Hospital, 67 N.Y.2d 72 (1986): Vicarious Liability for Clinic Physicians & Release Effect on Successive Tortfeasors

    Hill v. St. Clare’s Hospital, 67 N.Y.2d 72 (1986)

    A physician who owns a medical clinic held out to the public as offering medical services may be vicariously liable for the malpractice of a treating doctor, and a plaintiff who releases the original tortfeasor bears the burden of proving the extent to which the release reduces the claim against subsequent tortfeasors who aggravated the initial injuries.

    Summary

    Birdell Hill sustained injuries and was treated at St. Clare’s Hospital, where a fracture was missed. He then sought treatment at the Benjamin A. Gilbert Medical Clinic, owned by Dr. Bono but staffed by other physicians. Dr. Carranza misdiagnosed and improperly treated Hill’s foot injuries, resulting in further complications. Hill sued the original tortfeasors (responsible for the initial injury) and later St. Clare’s Hospital and Dr. Bono. Hill settled with the original tortfeasors and executed a general release. The Court of Appeals addressed whether Dr. Bono could be vicariously liable for Dr. Carranza’s malpractice and the impact of the release on the claims against St. Clare’s and Dr. Bono. The court held that Bono could be vicariously liable and that Hill had the burden of proving how the release should affect the damages award against the subsequent tortfeasors.

    Facts

    Birdell Hill was injured in an elevator accident on June 30, 1972. He was taken to St. Clare’s Hospital, where doctors misdiagnosed his injuries as soft tissue damage. Hill then sought treatment at the Benjamin A. Gilbert Medical Clinic, which was owned by Dr. Bono, who had taken over the practice while Dr. Gilbert was incapacitated. Dr. Carranza, practicing at the clinic, misdiagnosed Hill’s foot fractures and dislocation, applying a cast improperly. This improper treatment aggravated Hill’s injuries, leading to permanent deformity and complications.

    Procedural History

    Hill and his wife sued the original tortfeasors and settled for $57,000, executing a general release. They then sued St. Clare’s Hospital and Drs. Bono and Carranza. The defendants amended their answers to include the release as an affirmative defense. The trial court denied any offset for the prior settlement, placing the burden of proof on the defendants. The jury found in favor of Hill against both defendants. The Appellate Division affirmed, holding that the denial of offset was proper and sufficient evidence supported Dr. Bono’s liability. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether a physician who owns a medical clinic can be held vicariously liable for the malpractice of another physician practicing at the clinic, even if the owner-physician did not directly participate in or control the treatment?

    2. Whether the plaintiff, having released the original tortfeasors, bears the burden of proving the extent to which that release reduces their claim against the subsequent tortfeasors (hospital and physician) who aggravated the original injuries?

    Holding

    1. Yes, because a physician who owns a medical clinic which is held out to the public as offering medical services may be held vicariously liable for the malpractice of a treating doctor even though the owner-physician neither participates in nor controls the diagnosis made or treatment prescribed.

    2. Yes, because General Obligations Law § 15-108 (a) imposes upon the plaintiff who releases the original tort-feasor the burden of proving the extent to which his release reduces his claim against a hospital or physician who through malpractice aggravates the original injuries.

    Court’s Reasoning

    Regarding vicarious liability, the court distinguished between the liability of hospitals for their employees and the non-liability for independent physicians. However, it invoked the doctrine of apparent or ostensible agency, as established in Hannon v. Siegel-Cooper Co. (167 NY 244). The court emphasized that if a clinic holds itself out to the public as providing medical services, it can be held liable for the malpractice of the physicians practicing there, even if those physicians are technically independent contractors. The court found sufficient evidence for the jury to determine whether Dr. Bono owned the clinic and represented it as offering medical services.

    Regarding the release, the court noted the common-law rule that releasing the original tortfeasor barred actions against subsequent tortfeasors, but that General Obligations Law § 15-108 abrogated that rule. The statute states a release does not discharge other tortfeasors but reduces the claim against them. The court reasoned that while the statute provides for a reduction, it doesn’t specify who bears the burden of proving the reduction amount. Drawing from Derby v. Prewitt (12 NY2d 100, 105), the court stated that “considerations of reason and basic fairness” dictate that the plaintiff, who controlled the settlement with the original tortfeasors, bears the burden of proving what portion of the settlement was intended to cover the aggravation of injuries caused by the subsequent tortfeasors. The court emphasized that failing to place the burden on the plaintiff would create the risk of double recovery.

    The court clarified that the reduction is the *greatest* of (1) the amount stipulated by the release, (2) the consideration paid, or (3) the released tortfeasor’s equitable share of the damages. The equitable share should be based on the *damage inflicted* by each tortfeasor, not the culpability of their acts.

  • Matter of Coffed, 46 N.Y.2d 514 (1979): Revocation of Reciprocal Wills and Effect of General Release

    Matter of Coffed, 46 N.Y.2d 514 (1979)

    A general release discharging a contractual obligation to execute a reciprocal will does not, by itself, revoke the will; moreover, an instrument not compliant with EPTL 3-4.1 cannot revoke a bequest by implication.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether a reciprocal will is revoked by a general release discharging the testator’s obligation to maintain such a will. Earl Coffed and Bessie Waley executed reciprocal wills as part of a contract. After their divorce, they signed a general release of all claims against each other. Earl died without changing his will. The court held that the general release did not revoke the will, as the contract to make a will is distinct from the will itself, and revocation requires compliance with EPTL 3-4.1. The court further clarified that a release of contractual duty does not automatically invalidate a pre-existing will. The order to probate the will was affirmed.

    Facts

    Earl Coffed and Bessie Waley married in 1971 and agreed to execute reciprocal wills leaving their assets to each other and then equally to their four children from prior marriages.
    They contracted not to revoke or modify these wills.
    The couple divorced in 1973, executing a mutual release of all claims.
    Earl died in 1976 without altering his will.

    Procedural History

    Earl’s will was offered for probate by Edwin Waley, Jr. (Bessie’s son).
    David Coffed, Earl’s son, objected to the probate.
    The Surrogate’s Court ruled against probating the will, presuming Earl’s intent.
    The Appellate Division reversed the Surrogate’s decree.
    The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a general release, discharging a contractual obligation to execute a reciprocal will, effectively revokes that will.
    Whether a testamentary disposition can be impliedly revoked by a document failing to meet the formalities of EPTL 3-4.1.

    Holding

    No, because a contract to make a will is distinct from the will itself, and the release of the contractual obligation does not automatically revoke the will.
    No, because EPTL 3-4.1 provides the exclusive mechanism for will revocation, requiring specific formalities that the general release did not satisfy.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that a contract to make a testamentary provision is separate from the will itself. Releasing the contractual duty does not impact the existing will. To hold otherwise would undermine the statutory provisions of EPTL 3-4.1, which requires that revocatory instruments be executed with the same formalities as a valid will, preventing fraud and perjury.

    The court stated, “Conceptually, the contract to make a testamentary provision is separate and distinct from the will itself. While the contract might be enforceable in equity, from a technical standpoint it has no effect upon the will’s status as a legal instrument.”

    Moreover, the court distinguished this case from Matter of Hollister, where a separation agreement “wholly inconsistent” with a testamentary disposition worked a revocation, because in this case, EPTL 5-1.4 automatically revoked the bequest to the divorced spouse. The Court suggests that the Hollister decision may be in doubt due to legislative action in the area. However, the Court does not reach that issue, finding Hollister distinguishable.

    The Court concluded that because the general release did not satisfy the requirements of EPTL 3-4.1, it did not revoke the will. The policy underlying EPTL 3-4.1 is to prevent fraud and ensure the testator’s intent is clear when revoking a will. The Court affirmed the Appellate Division’s order to probate the will.

  • Mayer v. Cronkite, 40 N.Y.2d 857 (1976): Effect of General Release on Joint Tortfeasors After Subsequent Change in Law

    Mayer v. Cronkite, 40 N.Y.2d 857 (1976)

    A general release, without reservation of rights, given to some joint tortfeasors discharges all other joint tortfeasors from liability, and a subsequent change in the law does not revive liability extinguished by the release, especially where the initial settlement was judicially approved and operated as a final judgment.

    Summary

    In this case, the New York Court of Appeals addressed whether a general release given to some joint tortfeasors barred a subsequent action against other joint tortfeasors after a change in law that arguably created new liability. The infant respondent received a general release without reservation of rights in 1968. Later, the court’s decision in Gelbman v. Gelbman removed the bar on intrafamilial tort actions. The Court of Appeals held that the general release discharged all tortfeasors, including the parents, and that Gelbman did not create new liability that would override the effect of the release, which operated as a final judgment under CPLR 1207 because it was judicially approved.

    Facts

    In 1968, an infant respondent, Mayer, received a general release without any reservation of rights related to a tort claim. The release was given to other joint tortfeasors. The order of compromise authorizing the general release was judicially approved.

    Procedural History

    The defendant parents moved to amend their answer to assert a defense of general release. The trial court denied the motion. The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court’s decision. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and certified a question.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a general release, given to some joint tortfeasors without reservation of rights, discharges other joint tortfeasors from liability, even after a subsequent change in law that removes a bar to the specific type of tort action.

    Holding

    Yes, because the general release, without a reservation of rights, discharged all other joint tortfeasors from liability and the subsequent change in law did not create new liability that would override the effect of the release, especially given that the initial settlement was judicially approved and operated as a final judgment.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on established precedent that a general release without a reservation of rights discharges all joint tortfeasors. The court cited Oliver v. Washburn, Berlow v. New York State Thruway Auth., and Milks v. Mclver. The Court distinguished the case from situations where rescission of the release might be warranted due to mutual mistake or other grounds. The court stated, “There was no reservation of rights in the unlimited general release given on May 16, 1968 to the other joint tort-feasors, and, hence, the infant respondent’s parents, against whom this new action has been brought, were discharged from any alleged tort liability on their part.”

    The court addressed the argument that Gelbman v. Gelbman, which removed the bar on intrafamilial tort actions, created new liability. The court held that Gelbman did not create new liability encompassed by the general release but only removed a judicially created impediment. It also noted that Gelbman was only retrospectively applicable to matters which had not gone to final judgment, and the order of compromise authorizing the execution of the general release operated as a final judgment pursuant to CPLR 1207.

    The court emphasized that the release was given in 1968, before the enactment of section 15-108 of the General Obligations Law (effective Sept. 1, 1972), and thus the statute did not apply. The court addressed a procedural issue related to the denial of the defendant’s motion to amend their answer, acknowledging that such decisions are typically discretionary and not reviewable. However, it reasoned that the lower courts likely would have permitted the amendment had they believed the defense was available as a matter of law. The court concluded that the order of the Appellate Division should be reversed, and the appellants granted leave to serve an amended answer asserting the defense of general release.

  • Mangini v. McClurg, 24 N.Y.2d 556 (1969): Setting Aside a General Release for Unknown Injuries

    Mangini v. McClurg, 24 N.Y.2d 556 (1969)

    A general release may be set aside on grounds of mutual mistake if it can be shown that the parties did not intend to release liability for unknown injuries, even if the release contains broad, standardized language.

    Summary

    In this case, the New York Court of Appeals addressed the circumstances under which a general release for personal injuries could be set aside due to the subsequent discovery of previously unknown injuries. Deborah Mangini, a passenger injured in a car accident, executed a general release for all claims after being treated for back and knee pain. Later, she was diagnosed with a hip condition that medical experts agreed was undetectable at the time of the release. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s grant of summary judgment for the defendants, holding that factual issues existed regarding the parties’ intent to release liability for unknown injuries and whether the hip injury was a distinct, unknown injury rather than an unanticipated consequence of known injuries. The court emphasized that standardized release language is not always determinative, and the releasor bears the burden of proving a mutual mistake.

    Facts

    Deborah Mangini was injured in a car accident on February 26, 1963. She complained of knee and lower back pain after hitting her face on the dashboard. She was examined by multiple doctors who diagnosed a lumbo-sacral strain. Deborah also mentioned a “hitch” or “catch” in her left hip. On May 20, 1963, an insurance physician noted her complaint of a clicking hip and diagnosed a resolving hematoma. A settlement was negotiated, and a general release was executed on July 1, 1963, releasing the defendants from all claims related to the accident. In December 1963, Deborah was diagnosed with osteochondritis dissecans in her left hip, a condition that doctors agreed could not have been detected earlier.

    Procedural History

    The plaintiffs (Deborah and her father) filed an action to set aside the general release and recover damages for the hip injury. Special Term denied the defendants’ motion for summary judgment. The Appellate Division reversed, granting summary judgment to the defendants and dismissing the complaint. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order, remanding the case for trial.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether knowledge of some symptoms, mistakenly attributed to a known injury in another part of the body, constitutes knowledge of the injuries such that a later claim of mutual mistake is precluded.
    2. Whether the general release should be set aside due to a mutual mistake of fact regarding the extent of the injuries, specifically the unknown hip injury.

    Holding

    1. No, because the sensation of pain in the hip area cannot be considered constructive notice of the distinct and unknown injury to the femur.
    2. Yes, if the plaintiffs can demonstrate that the parties did not intend to release claims for unknown injuries and that a true mutual mistake existed.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that while general releases are governed by contract law, their interpretation is subject to special rules acknowledging their standardized language and the circumstances in which they are executed. The court emphasized that a release should not be lightly overturned but that traditional grounds for setting aside written agreements, such as mutual mistake, must be considered. The burden of persuasion lies with the releasor to demonstrate that the general language of the release should be limited due to a mutual mistake. The court distinguished between injuries unknown to the parties and mistakes about the consequences of known injuries. The court cited Farrington v. Harlem Sav. Bank, 280 N.Y. 1, stating, “a release could be made covering both known and unknown injuries, ‘provided the agreement was fairly and knowingly made.’ ” The court found that the Appellate Division erred in granting summary judgment because factual issues remained regarding whether the parties intended to release liability for the unknown hip injury, which was a distinct and separate injury from the known back injury. The court also noted that although the plaintiff’s lawyer drafted the release, the plaintiffs were still entitled to prove that there was no intention to release claims for unknown injuries. The court pointed out that the claims representative’s affidavit did not definitively state whether the possibility of an actual hip injury was considered or if the hip symptoms were considered a consequence of the back injury. Judge Breitel concluded that the affidavits and pretrial testimony did not conclusively demonstrate that no issue of fact remained as to the parties’ intent; thus, the order was reversed and remanded for trial.