New York Law Review

Tag: General Obligations Law § 9-103

  • Sena v. Town of Greenfield, 91 N.Y.2d 611 (1998): Municipality Liability in Supervised Public Parks

    Sena v. Town of Greenfield, 91 N.Y.2d 611 (1998)

    General Obligations Law § 9-103 does not shield a municipality from liability for ordinary negligence in operating and maintaining a supervised public park and recreational facility.

    Summary

    Patrick Sena sued the Town of Greenfield for injuries sustained while sledding on a hill in a town park. The Town claimed immunity under General Obligations Law § 9-103, which protects landowners who allow recreational use of their property. The Court of Appeals held that the statutory immunity does not apply to supervised public parks. Because the town had designated the area as a park, improved the hill for sledding, and supervised its use, it could not claim immunity under § 9-103. The case was remitted to the Appellate Division to consider other issues raised but not addressed.

    Facts

    Patrick Sena was injured while sledding with his son on a hill owned by the Town of Greenfield. The hill was located in an area that the Town Board had designated as a Town park by resolution. The Highway Department had previously used the area as a gravel pit. In 1988, the Town Board directed the Highway Superintendent to grade the gravel pit to make it suitable for sledding. After the grading, the hill was used for sledding. The Highway Superintendent routinely inspected the hill and became concerned about safety, urging the Town Supervisor to close the hill. The Town Supervisor initially complied but was overruled by the Town Board, which instructed him to reopen the hill. Sena was injured on January 22, 1989, when his sled hit a mound, throwing him and his son off.

    Procedural History

    Sena sued the Town of Greenfield. The Supreme Court denied the Town’s motion for summary judgment based on General Obligations Law § 9-103. A jury found the Town 100% liable. The Appellate Division reversed and dismissed the complaint, holding that § 9-103 applied because the Town had opened the land for sledding free of charge. Two justices dissented, arguing that the area was a supervised public park. Sena appealed to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether General Obligations Law § 9-103 immunizes a municipality from liability for injuries sustained in a supervised public park and recreational facility.

    Holding

    No, because General Obligations Law § 9-103 does not apply to immunize a municipality from liability for its failure to fulfill its duty of reasonable care in the operation and maintenance of a supervised public park and recreational facility.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that General Obligations Law § 9-103 grants immunity to landowners who permit recreational activities on their property to encourage them to do so. However, this quid pro quo does not apply when a municipality already operates a supervised public park. In such cases, the municipality has already assumed a duty to maintain the facility in a reasonably safe condition. Applying § 9-103 in this context would create an anomaly where liability depends on whether the recreational activity is specifically listed in the statute. The court emphasized that “the statute does not apply… to immunize, a municipality from liability for its failure to fulfill its duty of reasonable care in the operation and maintenance of a supervised public park and recreational facility.” The court found that the hill was part of a supervised Town park because the Town Board had declared it a park, the Highway Department had graded the hill for sledding, and the Highway Superintendent routinely inspected it. The court quoted the dissent from the Appellate Division: “Defendant had declared the area to be a Town park by Town Board resolution…The area was graded by the [Highway] Superintendent to be used for sledding and the Town Board officially sanctioned such use with the proviso that a sign be posted indicating that participation was at one’s own risk.” This level of involvement and supervision meant that the Town could not claim immunity under § 9-103. The case was remitted to the Appellate Division to consider other issues.

  • Albright v. Metz, 88 N.Y.2d 656 (1996): Landowner Immunity and Recreational Use Statute

    Albright v. Metz, 88 N.Y.2d 656 (1996)

    New York’s General Obligations Law § 9-103 grants immunity to landowners from ordinary negligence claims when individuals are injured while engaging in recreational activities on their property, provided the land is suitable for such activities, and this suitability is determined by factors including past recreational use and the land’s general characteristics.

    Summary

    Albright sued Metz for injuries her son sustained while motorbiking on Metz’s property, a former gravel mine and landfill. Metz claimed immunity under General Obligations Law § 9-103, which protects landowners from liability for ordinary negligence when their land is used for recreational activities. The court held that the property was suitable for motorbiking, considering its past use for that purpose and its general characteristics, despite its status as a regulated landfill. The ruling affirmed landowner immunity, emphasizing the legislative intent to encourage recreational land use. The court emphasized that the relevant inquiry is the general suitability of the property, not temporary conditions. Metz’s contracting company also qualified for immunity as an “occupant” of the land.

    Facts

    Metz owned a property that was previously used as a gravel mine and later as a landfill under a DEC permit. Active mining ceased in 1989 or 1990. In April 1991, Albright’s son rode his dirt bike onto the property, as he had done before, and fell approximately 35 feet into the landfill bed after his bike went over an earthen berm. Many people had ridden motorbikes on the property for years prior to the incident.

    Procedural History

    Albright sued Metz and his contracting company. The defendants moved for summary judgment based on General Obligations Law § 9-103. The Supreme Court granted the motion, finding the property suitable for motorbiking and thus providing immunity. The Appellate Division affirmed, citing evidence of past recreational use. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether General Obligations Law § 9-103 extends immunity to landowners for injuries sustained on their property during recreational activities, specifically motorbiking, when the property is a regulated landfill but has been used for such activities in the past?

    Holding

    Yes, because the property was suitable for motorbiking, evidenced by its past recreational use, and the DEC regulations governing the landfill did not preclude recreational use of the berm where the injury occurred. The relevant inquiry is the general suitability of the property, not temporary conditions.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court applied the two-prong test from Bragg v Genesee County Agric. Socy. and Iannotti v Consolidated Rail Corp.: (1) the plaintiff must be engaged in an activity identified in section 9-103, and (2) the plaintiff must be recreating on land suitable for that activity. Motorbiking is a protected activity. To determine suitability, the Court considered whether the property is physically conducive to the activity and appropriate for public recreational use. Past recreational use is a substantial indicator of physical suitability. The court found that the DEC regulations were targeted at preventing unauthorized dumping, not banning recreational use of areas distinct from the landfill itself. The court quoted Bragg stating: “The statute removes any obligation on the landowner ‘to keep the premises safe * * * [and] to give warning of any hazardous condition * * * to persons entering for [recreational] purposes’ (General Obligations Law § 9-103 [1] [a]). If this language is to have any force, suitability must be judged by viewing the property as it generally exists, not portions of it at some given time.” The court reasoned that imposing a duty to inspect and correct temporary conditions would vitiate the statute. The court further stated: “The premise underlying section 9-103 is simple enough: outdoor recreation is good; New Yorkers need suitable places to engage in outdoor recreation; more places will be made available if property owners do not have to worry about liability when recreationists come onto their land.” The court also held that Metz Contracting qualified for immunity as an “occupant” because it managed the property in accordance with DEC regulations as Metz’s agent.

  • Bragg v. Genesee County Agricultural Society, 84 N.Y.2d 544 (1994): Landowner Immunity and Suitability for Recreational Use

    Bragg v. Genesee County Agricultural Society, 84 N.Y.2d 544 (1994)

    General Obligations Law § 9-103 grants landowners immunity from ordinary negligence claims by recreationists using their land for enumerated activities if the land is suitable for such activities, and suitability is judged by the property’s general characteristics, not temporary conditions.

    Summary

    Bragg sued Genesee County Agricultural Society for injuries sustained while motorbiking on its property, an abandoned railway bed. The Society claimed immunity under General Obligations Law § 9-103, which protects landowners from negligence liability when recreationists use their land. Bragg argued the land was unsuitable for motorbiking due to excavation. The Court of Appeals held that the statute applies if the land is generally suitable for the activity, regardless of temporary hazards. The Court clarified that suitability should be assessed based on the overall nature of the property, not specific, transient conditions. This decision reinforces the legislative intent to encourage landowners to open their property for recreation by limiting their liability.

    Facts

    Genesee County Agricultural Society owned an abandoned railway bed. In 1988, the Society’s president allowed a trucking company to excavate gravel from the railbed. The president knew off-road vehicles used the property but did not instruct the contractor to post warnings. By September 1990, the excavation created a 10-foot deep hole. Plaintiff Bragg was injured when he drove his motorbike into the excavation.

    Procedural History

    Bragg sued, and the Society asserted General Obligations Law § 9-103 as a defense. The Supreme Court denied Bragg’s motion to dismiss the defense and granted summary judgment for the Society, finding the statute applicable and no evidence of willful or malicious conduct. The Appellate Division affirmed. Bragg appealed to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether General Obligations Law § 9-103’s immunity applies if the property was generally suitable for the recreational activity, even with a temporary hazardous condition.
    2. Whether the suitability of the property for recreational use should be determined solely by the condition of the land at the time of the accident.

    Holding

    1. Yes, General Obligations Law § 9-103’s immunity applies because suitability is judged by the property’s general characteristics, not temporary conditions.
    2. No, suitability should not be determined solely by the condition of the land at the time of the accident because the statute removes the obligation on the landowner to keep the premises safe or warn of hazardous conditions.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized that General Obligations Law § 9-103 aims to encourage landowners to make their land available for recreation by limiting their liability for ordinary negligence. The Court reaffirmed the “suitability” test established in Iannotti v. Consolidated Rail Corp., requiring the land to be the “type of property which is not only physically conducive to the particular activity or sport but is also a type which would be appropriate for public use in pursuing the activity as recreation” (Iannotti, 74 N.Y.2d at 45). However, the Court clarified that suitability should be judged by viewing the property as it generally exists, not based on temporary conditions or isolated hazards. Requiring landowners to inspect and correct transient hazards would effectively reinstate the common-law duty of care, undermining the statute’s purpose. The Court stated, “If this language is to have any force, suitability must be judged by viewing the property as it generally exists, not portions of it at some given time. Any other test, which requires the owner to inspect the land, to correct temporary conditions or locate and warn of isolated hazards as they exist on a specific day, would vitiate the statute by reimposing on the owner the common-law duty of care to inspect and correct hazards on the land.” The court found no evidence of willful or malicious intent on the part of the defendants to negate the immunity.

  • Ferres v. City of New Rochelle, 68 N.Y.2d 446 (1986): Applicability of General Obligations Law § 9-103 to Supervised Municipal Parks

    Ferres v. City of New Rochelle, 68 N.Y.2d 446 (1986)

    General Obligations Law § 9-103, which limits landowner liability for recreational use of property, does not apply to claims against a municipality for negligence in the operation and maintenance of a supervised public park and recreational facility.

    Summary

    Plaintiff Dean Ferres was injured while riding his bicycle into a chain strung across Hudson Park Road at the entrance of a municipal park in New Rochelle. He sued the city, alleging negligence. The city argued that General Obligations Law § 9-103 shielded it from liability. The Court of Appeals held that § 9-103 does not apply to a municipality’s duty to maintain a supervised public park, because the statute’s purpose is to encourage landowners to open their property for recreational use, an incentive that is not needed for public parks already open to the public. Applying the statute to a supervised municipal park would drastically reduce the municipality’s responsibility without serving any discernible public interest.

    Facts

    Dean Ferres rode his bicycle into a chain strung across Hudson Park Road at the entrance of a municipal park operated by the City of New Rochelle. The park was a suburban, regulated facility with a Recreation Supervisor and staff, including a parking area, guard house, beach, and other recreational amenities. Ferres sustained injuries as a result of the incident.

    Procedural History

    Ferres sued the City of New Rochelle for negligence. The trial court refused to dismiss the complaint based on General Obligations Law § 9-103, and the jury found in favor of Ferres. The Appellate Division affirmed. The City of New Rochelle appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether General Obligations Law § 9-103 applies to a claim based on a breach of duty by a municipality in the operation of a supervised public park and recreational facility.

    Holding

    No, because the statute’s purpose is to encourage private landowners to open their property for recreational use, and this purpose is not served by applying it to supervised municipal parks already open to the public.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that the sole purpose of General Obligations Law § 9-103 is to induce property owners to permit persons to come on their property for specified recreational activities, by granting them immunity from liability. The statute offers two inducements: (1) immunity from the duty to keep the premises safe and to warn of hazards, and (2) assurance that by giving permission, the owner does not assume a duty of care to invitees. The court stated, “It would be contrary to reason to assume that the Legislature could have intended that the statute apply in circumstances where neither the basic purpose of the statute, nor, indeed, any purpose could be served — as in the case of the supervised park here where the municipality has already held its recreational facility open to the public and needs no encouragement to do so from the prospective immunity offered by the statute.”

    Furthermore, the court analyzed the legislative history of the statute, noting that it originated in the Conservation Law to encourage landowners to allow hunting, trapping, and fishing. Subsequent amendments expanded the scope, but the underlying purpose remained the same: to encourage landowners to open their properties for recreational use. The court emphasized that applying the statute to a supervised city park would result in a drastic reduction in the municipality’s responsibility without a corresponding public benefit, which is inconsistent with the statute’s aim of encouraging landowners to permit recreational activities.

    The court distinguished this situation from cases where § 9-103 appropriately applies, such as hunting or fishing on private land where the landowner’s permission is given in return for statutory immunity. In contrast, a city park is already open to the public, and the municipality has already assumed a duty of reasonable care. “If the statute is applied in such case, the result is an immediate reduction of this higher duty to one which requires the municipality to do no more than refrain from a malicious act or omission. The municipality would give up nothing but gain immunity.” The court also found that the statute’s application would be arbitrary based on the activity in which the injured person was engaged. The court concluded that the broad reading urged by the defendant, which produces such an unreasonable result, should be avoided.

  • Sega v. State, 60 N.Y.2d 183 (1983): State Immunity for Recreational Use of Land

    Sega v. State, 60 N.Y.2d 183 (1983)

    New York General Obligations Law § 9-103 protects the State from liability for injuries sustained by individuals using state-owned land for recreational activities, absent willful or malicious failure to guard or warn against a dangerous condition.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether New York General Obligations Law § 9-103, which limits landowners’ liability for recreational use of their property, applies to the State of New York. The Court of Appeals held that the statute does apply to the State, shielding it from liability for injuries sustained on state-owned land used for recreation, unless the State acted willfully or maliciously. The court rejected the argument that the statute codified common law classifications of trespasser, licensee, or invitee, instead finding it imposed a single standard of care.

    Facts

    In Sega, the claimant was injured while hiking in the Catskill Forest Preserve when a pipe railing she was sitting on gave way. The railing had been previously damaged, but state employees determined no repairs were necessary after visually inspecting it. In Cutway, the claimant was injured while riding an all-terrain vehicle on state-owned land when he struck a steel cable gate that was difficult to see. The State had posted a sign barring public vehicles but did not warn specifically of the cable.

    Procedural History

    In Sega, the Court of Claims found the State not negligent. The Appellate Division considered General Obligations Law § 9-103 and found no willful or intentional act by the State. In Cutway, the Court of Claims found the State 80% liable based on negligence, despite the application of § 9-103. The Appellate Division affirmed.

    Issue(s)

    Whether General Obligations Law § 9-103 applies to the State of New York, thereby limiting its liability for injuries sustained on state-owned land used for recreational purposes.

    Holding

    Yes, because the plain language of § 9-103 includes “any owner, lessee or occupant of premises,” without limiting it to private landowners, and refers to Environmental Conservation Law provisions concerning state-owned lands.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court emphasized the unambiguous language of § 9-103, stating that it applies to “any owner, lessee or occupant of premises.” The court found no reason to limit the statute’s scope to private landowners, especially considering its reference to ECL provisions related to state-owned fishing and hunting preserves. The court rejected the argument that the statute codified common-law principles of premises liability. Instead, it established a single standard of care, requiring a plaintiff to prove a willful or malicious failure to guard or warn against a dangerous condition. The court noted that the policy of New York is to determine a landowner’s duty of care based on foreseeability, not on rigid classifications like trespasser, licensee, and invitee, citing Basso v. Miller, 40 N.Y.2d 233. The Court stated: “On its face, section 9-103 imposes a single standard. We see no reason to reintroduce confusion and conflict by interpreting’ the statute as a retention of the common-law classifications.” In Cutway, the State may have been negligent, but there was no evidence of willful or malicious conduct. In Sega, even presuming all evidence was presented, there was no proof of willful or malicious failure to warn. The court reasoned that the standard under § 9-103 “requires a graver act than mere negligence before liability may be imposed”.