New York Law Review

Tag: General Municipal Law § 50-e

  • Rosenbaum v. City of New York, 8 N.Y.3d 1 (2006): Sufficiency of Notice of Claim for Tort Actions Against Municipalities

    Rosenbaum v. City of New York, 8 N.Y.3d 1 (2006)

    A letter from an attorney to a city agency suggesting unmet demands might lead to litigation does not satisfy the requirements of General Municipal Law § 50-e for a valid notice of claim, particularly when special damages are an element of the cause of action and are not adequately described.

    Summary

    Rosenbaum sued the City of New York for slander of title, alleging that improperly filed liens caused him to lose a sale of his property. The City moved to dismiss, arguing Rosenbaum failed to comply with General Municipal Law § 50-e’s notice-of-claim requirements. Rosenbaum argued a letter from his attorney to HPD served as adequate notice. The Court of Appeals held the letter was insufficient because it was tentative, did not specify damages, and appeared as routine correspondence rather than a formal notice of claim, failing to provide the City with adequate information to investigate the claim.

    Facts

    Rosenbaum purchased an apartment building in the Bronx in 1993. He entered into an in rem installment agreement with the City to pay delinquent taxes. Prior to Rosenbaum’s purchase, HPD had loaned money for repairs to the building and subsequently filed liens. Rosenbaum disputed the validity of these liens. His attorney sent a letter to an HPD attorney on August 18, 1994, complaining about the liens and stating that Rosenbaum “may lose his current sale” if the liens weren’t removed, and that “if an action is brought” the owner would be entitled to costs and legal fees.

    Procedural History

    Rosenbaum sued the City in October 1994 for, among other things, slander of title. He served a notice of claim in January 1995 related to a tax foreclosure proceeding. The City moved to dismiss the slander of title claim for failure to comply with notice-of-claim requirements. Supreme Court granted the City’s motion. The Appellate Division reversed, finding the August 18, 1994 letter sufficient notice. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division, holding the letter was insufficient.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a letter from an attorney to a city agency, suggesting that unmet demands might lead to litigation, satisfies the notice-of-claim requirements under General Municipal Law § 50-e for a tort action against a municipality.

    Holding

    No, because the letter was tentative, did not specify the items of damage or injuries claimed, and did not alert the recipient to the imminence of litigation, thus failing to provide the City with sufficient information to investigate the claim as required by General Municipal Law § 50-e.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court emphasized that the purpose of General Municipal Law § 50-e is to enable the city to investigate claims. The Court stated, “[t]he test of the sufficiency of a Notice of Claim is merely whether it includes information sufficient to enable the city to investigate…” The Court found the August 18, 1994 letter insufficient because it used tentative language (“may lose,” “if an action is brought”), making it appear as routine correspondence rather than a formal notice of claim. The letter also failed to specify the items of damage, particularly the special damages required for a slander of title claim. The Court noted that special damages, such as a lost sale, must be identified with sufficient detail (e.g., the name of the prospective purchaser, the purchase price) to allow the city to investigate. The Court distinguished between ongoing negotiations and a clear notice of an impending lawsuit seeking specific damages. The Court directly quoted Brown v. City of New York, 95 N.Y.2d 389, 393 (2000) stating that courts should focus on “whether based on the claimant’s description municipal authorities can locate the place, fix the time and understand the nature of the [claim].” The court concluded, “Section 50-e does not abet notice of claim by stealth.”

  • Scantlebury v. New York City Health & Hosps. Corp., 4 N.Y.3d 606 (2005): Notice of Claim Must Be Served on the Correct Public Entity

    4 N.Y.3d 606 (2005)

    General Municipal Law § 50-e (3)(c) does not excuse a plaintiff’s failure to serve a timely notice of claim on the correct public entity; it only excuses defects in the manner of service when the notice is served on the appropriate entity.

    Summary

    Plaintiff sued New York City Health and Hospitals Corporation (HHC) for medical malpractice, serving a notice of claim on the Comptroller of the City of New York, not HHC. After the Comptroller held a General Municipal Law § 50-h hearing, plaintiff commenced the action. The HHC moved for summary judgment, arguing failure to serve a timely notice of claim. The New York Court of Appeals held that serving the Comptroller, not HHC, was a failure to serve the correct public entity and wasn’t excused by General Municipal Law § 50-e (3)(c), which addresses defects in the *manner* of service, not *who* was served.

    Facts

    Janet Olivia Scantlebury received treatment at Kings County Hospital (part of HHC) from July 31, 1999, to November 18, 1999, for an elbow injury.
    On November 3, 1999, the Comptroller of the City of New York received a notice of claim from Scantlebury alleging medical malpractice against HHC.
    The Comptroller served Scantlebury with notice of a General Municipal Law § 50-h hearing, directing her to appear at the Office of the Corporation Counsel.
    The § 50-h hearing occurred on July 19, 2000.

    Procedural History

    On August 8, 2000, Scantlebury filed a summons and complaint against HHC for medical malpractice and failure to obtain informed consent; HHC was served on August 15, 2000.
    HHC’s answer, dated September 5, 2000, admitted a notice of claim was presented to the Comptroller but denied proper service.
    Scantlebury filed a note of issue on February 7, 2003.
    On February 25, 2003, HHC moved for summary judgment to dismiss the complaint due to failure to serve a timely notice of claim on HHC, noting the time to apply for leave to serve a late notice had expired.
    Supreme Court granted HHC’s motion for summary judgment, dismissing the complaint.
    The Appellate Division affirmed.

    Issue(s)

    Whether General Municipal Law § 50-e (3)(c) excuses the plaintiff’s failure to serve HHC with a timely notice of claim when she served the Comptroller of the City of New York, who then held a General Municipal Law § 50-h hearing to examine the claim.

    Holding

    No, because General Municipal Law § 50-e (3)(c) only excuses defects in the *manner* of service, not a failure to serve the *correct public entity*.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court emphasized that HHC and the City of New York are separate entities for notice of claim purposes, citing Bender v. New York City Health & Hosps. Corp., 38 N.Y.2d 662 (1976).
    General Municipal Law § 50-e (3)(c) is a savings provision intended to cure improper methods of service, such as using ordinary mail instead of registered mail, but not service on the wrong public entity. The court stated, “[Section] 50-e (3) (c) was designed to permit effective service within the statutory period by means other than (those articulated in the former statute).”
    The court distinguished Mercado v. New York City Health & Hosps. Corp., 247 A.D.2d 55 (1st Dept. 1998), which held that service on the Comptroller was sufficient if the Comptroller demanded a § 50-h hearing. The Court of Appeals disagreed with Mercado‘s reasoning.
    It cited Stallworth v. New York City Health & Hosps. Corp., 243 A.D.2d 704 (2d Dept. 1997), for the proposition that service on the Comptroller is insufficient to constitute service on HHC, and HHC’s participation in a § 50-h hearing does not cure the lack of proper service. The court stated, “In order for (General Municipal Law § 50-e [3] [c]) to apply . . . service must have been made on the proper party; service cannot be ‘valid’ if it was never made.”
    Because Scantlebury served the wrong public entity, HHC, the savings provision of General Municipal Law § 50-e (3)(c) did not apply. Scantlebury was put on notice of her error when HHC answered the complaint and had ample time to seek leave to serve a late notice of claim.

  • Baez v. New York City Health & Hospitals Corp., 8 N.Y.3d 533 (2007): Proper Service of Notice of Claim on NYC Health and Hospitals Corp.

    Baez v. New York City Health & Hospitals Corp., 8 N.Y.3d 533 (2007)

    Service of a notice of claim against the New York City Health and Hospitals Corporation (HHC) may be properly effected by serving the New York City Corporation Counsel.

    Summary

    This case addresses the proper method for serving a notice of claim against the New York City Health and Hospitals Corporation (HHC). The plaintiff sought damages for dental malpractice and served the notice of claim on the New York City Law Department and the Comptroller, but not on an officer or director of HHC. The Court of Appeals held that serving the Corporation Counsel constitutes proper service on HHC because General Municipal Law § 50-e(3)(a) allows service on an attorney regularly engaged in representing the public corporation, and the Corporation Counsel fulfills this role for HHC. The Court emphasized the legislative intent behind the amendments to § 50-e to create uniform notice of claim provisions.

    Facts

    Plaintiff sought damages for alleged dental malpractice by HHC and an HHC doctor at the Segundo Ruiz Belvis Neighborhood Family Care Clinic in 1993-1994.

    In October 1994, plaintiff served a notice of claim directed to the City of New York, HHC, the Belvis Clinic, and several doctors on the New York City Law Department and the New York City Comptroller.

    Plaintiff never served the notice of claim on an officer or director of HHC.

    The Comptroller noticed plaintiff to appear for a General Municipal Law § 50-h hearing.

    Procedural History

    In July 1997, after the summons and complaint were served, the defendants moved to dismiss the action because the plaintiff failed to serve the notice of claim on an officer or director of HHC, as required by McKinney’s Unconsolidated Laws of NY § 7401(2).

    Supreme Court denied the motion, holding that General Municipal Law § 50-e(3)(a) provides the method of service and authorizes service on the Corporation Counsel.

    The Appellate Division affirmed, concluding that the general provisions of General Municipal Law § 50-e(3)(a) override the specific requirements of McKinney’s Unconsolidated Laws of NY § 7401(2).

    The Appellate Division certified the question of whether it correctly affirmed the Supreme Court to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether service of a notice of claim on the New York City Health and Hospitals Corporation (HHC) may be properly effected by serving the New York City Corporation Counsel, or whether service must be made on an officer or director of HHC as specified in McKinney’s Unconsolidated Laws of NY § 7401(2)?

    Holding

    Yes, because the notice of claim service provisions of General Municipal Law § 50-e(3)(a) are incorporated into the HHC Act, and therefore service on the Corporation Counsel constitutes proper service of the notice of claim.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that General Municipal Law § 50-e(3)(a) allows service on a public corporation by delivering the notice to the person designated by law to receive service (an HHC director or officer, per McKinney’s Unconsolidated Laws of NY § 7401(2)) or to an attorney regularly engaged in representing the public corporation.

    The Court noted that § 50-e was enacted to create a uniform system for tort claims against public corporations. Although not initially included in the HHC Act, a 1973 amendment incorporated § 50-e into the HHC Act.

    A 1976 amendment to § 50-e allowed service on an attorney regularly engaged in representing the public authority. The legislative history confirms this intent. As the Governor’s Memorandum indicates, the bill would “permit service of the notice of claim upon a public corporation by delivery of the notice to an attorney regularly engaged in representing such public corporation.” (Governor’s Mem, Bill Jacket, L 1976, ch 745).

    The court addressed concerns raised by New York City’s Mayor at the time, who protested that serving the Corporation Counsel would place an unreasonable burden on that office.

    The Court found no inconsistency between § 50-e(3)(a) and § 7401(2), as service on the Corporation Counsel is an alternative means of effecting service on HHC; therefore, the override provision of § 7405 does not apply.

    The court explicitly stated that, “To the extent that Robles v City of New York (251 AD2d 485, lv granted 93 NY2d 802, appeal withdrawn 94 NY2d 783) and Altabe v City of New York (264 AD2d 373) hold that service on HHC may be effected only through service on an officer or director, they are not to be followed.”

  • D’Alessandro v. New York City Tr. Auth., 83 N.Y.2d 390 (1994): Sufficiency of Notice of Claim Against Municipality

    D’Alessandro v. New York City Tr. Auth. 83 N.Y.2d 390 (1994)

    A notice of claim against a municipality is sufficient if it includes information that allows the city to investigate the claim, and literal nicety or exactness is not required.

    Summary

    Plaintiff sued New York City for injuries sustained from a fall on a defective sidewalk. The city argued the Notice of Claim was deficient because it described the defect as being on both the sidewalk and curb, while at trial, the plaintiff claimed the injury was caused solely by a defective sidewalk. The Court of Appeals reversed the dismissal of the complaint, holding that the Notice of Claim was sufficient because it identified the accident site with particularity and put the city on notice that the adjacent sidewalk was also a cause of the injuries, enabling a timely investigation. The court emphasized that the purpose of a Notice of Claim is to enable the city to investigate, not to achieve exact precision.

    Facts

    Plaintiff fell on a Brooklyn sidewalk, allegedly due to a broken and defective portion of the sidewalk and curb. The Notice of Claim stated the accident occurred on West 33rd Street, approximately 65 feet and 7 inches south of the southwest corner of Mermaid Avenue, and included precise measurements of the defect’s location and size. Three photographs, each circling the curb and including a portion of the sidewalk, accompanied the Notice of Claim. The Notice repeatedly referred to a “defective sidewalk.” At a hearing and deposition, plaintiff testified that he fell after stepping on a broken sidewalk and never reached the curb.

    Procedural History

    Plaintiff sued the City, and the jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff, specifically finding that he had fallen on the sidewalk. The City moved to set aside the verdict, arguing the Notice of Claim was defective. The trial court initially agreed with the City, but the Appellate Division affirmed solely on the ground that the Notice of Claim was deficient. The Court of Appeals reversed, finding the notice adequate and remitting the case to the Appellate Division to consider other issues.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a Notice of Claim against a municipality is sufficient when it describes the accident location as a “defective sidewalk and curb,” but the plaintiff’s trial evidence focuses solely on a defective sidewalk.

    Holding

    Yes, because the test of sufficiency of a Notice of Claim is merely “whether it includes information sufficient to enable the city to investigate.”

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that General Municipal Law § 50-e does not require literal exactness in the Notice of Claim. The key consideration is whether the notice allows the municipality to locate the place, fix the time, and understand the nature of the accident. Here, the court emphasized that plaintiff’s Notice identified the accident site with particularity, including precise measurements and photographs. Although the photographs circled the curb, the Notice repeatedly mentioned a “defective sidewalk,” putting the City on notice that the sidewalk was a contributing factor. The court distinguished this case from others where the Notice of Claim was materially misleading or inaccurate, preventing the municipality from conducting a proper investigation. The court stated, “Reasonably read, the statute does not require ‘those things to be stated with literal nicety or exactness’ (Purdy v City of New York, supra, 193 NY, at 523; see also, Schwartz v City of New York, 250 NY 332, 335). The test of the sufficiency of a Notice of Claim is merely ‘whether it includes information sufficient to enable the city to investigate’ (see, O’Brien v City of Syracuse, 54 NY2d 353, 358). ‘Nothing more may be required’ (Schwartz v City of New York, supra, 250 NY, at 335).” The court concluded that the purpose of the Notice of Claim – to enable the City to promptly investigate the alleged accident – was satisfied in this case.

  • Frugiuele v. City of New York, 77 N.Y.2d 883 (1991): Actual Notice Requirement for Late Notice of Claim

    77 N.Y.2d 883 (1991)

    To file a late notice of claim against a municipality, the claimant must demonstrate that the municipality had actual knowledge of the facts constituting the claim within the statutory 90-day period or a reasonable time thereafter.

    Summary

    This case concerns a plaintiff’s attempt to file a late notice of claim against the City of New York. The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower courts’ denial of the plaintiff’s motion, holding that the plaintiff failed to demonstrate that the City had actual knowledge of the facts constituting the claim within the statutory 90-day period. The court emphasized that speculative contentions and conclusory allegations are insufficient to establish actual notice. This case underscores the importance of providing concrete evidence of a municipality’s awareness of the incident giving rise to the claim.

    Facts

    The plaintiff, Frugiuele, sought to file a late notice of claim against the City of New York. The basis of the claim was an accident allegedly caused by the City’s negligence. The plaintiff argued that the City had actual notice of the accident because it was supposedly reported to City building inspectors assigned to the work site, and an accident report existed.

    Procedural History

    The trial court denied the plaintiff’s motion to file a late notice of claim. The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court’s decision. The Court of Appeals then affirmed the Appellate Division’s order, upholding the denial of the plaintiff’s motion.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the lower courts abused their discretion in denying the plaintiff’s motion to file a late notice of claim against the City of New York, given the plaintiff’s assertion that the City had actual notice of the facts constituting the claim within the statutory 90-day period.

    Holding

    No, because the plaintiff failed to sustain the burden of establishing that the City acquired knowledge of the accident within a reasonable time, offering only speculative contentions and conclusory allegations without a reliable basis.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals based its decision on General Municipal Law § 50-e (5), which grants the trial court discretion to extend the time to serve a late notice of claim if the municipality had actual knowledge of the facts constituting the claim within the 90-day statutory period. The court found that the plaintiff’s claim that the City had actual notice was purely speculative. The court stated, “Plaintiff failed to sustain his burden of establishing that the City acquired knowledge of the accident within a reasonable time, conclusorily alleging the existence of an accident report and offering no reliable basis to support his claim that the accident was reported to the City building inspectors who were assigned to the work site.” The court emphasized that the plaintiff’s allegations were insufficient to demonstrate actual notice to the City. The absence of reliable evidence to support the plaintiff’s claim was fatal to the motion. The court implicitly reinforced the policy that municipalities are entitled to timely and accurate notice of potential claims so they can properly investigate and defend themselves.

  • Pierson v. City of New York, 56 N.Y.2d 950 (1982): Time Limit for Filing Late Notice of Claim Against Municipality

    56 N.Y.2d 950 (1982)

    An application to file a late notice of claim against a municipality may be made after the commencement of an action, but no more than one year and 90 days after the cause of action accrued, unless the statute has been tolled.

    Summary

    These three consolidated cases concern the interpretation of General Municipal Law § 50-e regarding the filing of late notices of claim against the City of New York. The Court of Appeals held that an application for an extension to file a late notice of claim may be made before or after the commencement of the action, but it must be made within one year and 90 days after the cause of action accrued, unless the statute has been tolled. Permitting an extension after the statute of limitations has run would effectively allow the court to grant an extension exceeding the statute of limitations, which is expressly prohibited by the statute. Once the limitations period expires, any claim is barred.

    Facts

    The cases consolidated in this appeal each involved the question of whether a late notice of claim against the City of New York was permissible under General Municipal Law § 50-e. The specific facts of each case are not detailed in the court’s memorandum decision, but the core issue revolved around the timeliness of the application for leave to file a late notice of claim relative to the statute of limitations.

    Procedural History

    The procedural history is not detailed for each individual case but is summarized by the court’s resolution. The lower courts had apparently allowed late notices of claim in situations where the application was made outside the one year and 90-day window following the accrual of the cause of action. The Court of Appeals reversed those decisions, clarifying the permissible timeframe for such applications.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the 1976 amendments to General Municipal Law § 50-e permit a court to grant an application to file a late notice of claim after the Statute of Limitations has run.
    2. In Moore v. City of New York, whether the statutory period began to run only when the plaintiff discovered that her building had been destroyed.

    Holding

    1. No, because permitting a court to grant an extension after the Statute of Limitations has run would, in practical effect, allow the court to grant an extension which exceeds the Statute of Limitations, thus rendering meaningless that portion of section 50-e which expressly prohibits the court from doing so.
    2. No, demolishing a building located on a city street cannot be fairly characterized as a surreptitious act akin to embezzlement, nor can it be said that the building after its removal is comparable to a hidden object.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that the 1976 amendments to General Municipal Law § 50-e were intended to relax the restrictive features of the old statute but not to abandon the requirement that the application be made within a specified and relatively short period. The court emphasized that allowing extensions after the statute of limitations would render meaningless the portion of the statute prohibiting such extensions. The court directly referenced Professor Graziano’s study, stating that even with the liberalizing amendments, “applications under subdivision 5 of section 50-e must still be made within one year after the happening of the event upon which the claim is based.” The final version simply extended that period by an additional 90 days.

    Regarding the discovery rule argument in Moore v. City of New York, the Court rejected the notion that the statute of limitations should be tolled until the plaintiff discovered the destruction of her building. The Court distinguished the demolition of a building on a city street from a surreptitious act, finding no basis to apply a discovery rule in this context.

    The Court underscored the importance of adhering to statutory deadlines and avoiding interpretations that would undermine the clear legislative intent. The Court noted that while calls for broader reform are often met by more modest revisions on the part of the Legislature, the existing statute should be followed.

  • Cohen v. Pearl River Union Free School District, 51 N.Y.2d 264 (1980): Tolling Infancy in Notice of Claim

    Cohen v. Pearl River Union Free School District, 51 N.Y.2d 264 (1980)

    The period during which a court may authorize service of a late notice of claim against a public corporation is coextensive with the time limited for commencing an action and is subject to the tolling provisions for infancy.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether the infancy toll under CPLR 208 applies to the period in which a court may grant an extension to serve a late notice of claim against a public corporation, as governed by General Municipal Law § 50-e(5). The Court of Appeals held that the time for applying for leave to serve a late notice of claim is tolled during the injured party’s infancy, aligning the extension period with the statute of limitations for commencing an action. This decision clarifies the interplay between notice of claim requirements and the protection afforded to infants under New York law.

    Facts

    Daniel Cohen, an infant, was injured on September 30, 1975, while playing soccer on Pearl River High School grounds due to a protruding object. On December 5, 1977, Cohen’s father applied for judicial leave to serve a late notice of claim on the Pearl River Union Free School District and the Orangetown Central School District. Pearl River School District opposed, citing prejudice due to the delay and the expiration of the time to grant such leave.

    Procedural History

    Special Term initially denied the application but granted it upon reconsideration, citing Matter of Beary v. City of Rye. The Appellate Division reversed, holding that the infancy toll did not apply to the limitations period in General Municipal Law § 50-e(5). The Court of Appeals then reviewed the Appellate Division’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the expanded limitations period contained in the amendments to section 50-e (subd 5) may be applied retroactively to the petitioner’s claim?

    2. Whether the period during which a court may grant an extension of the time within which to serve notice of claim is tolled during the infancy of the claimant in accordance with CPLR 208?

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the claim was still viable under the former one-year limitations period when the amendment took effect, and applying the new time provisions would not prejudice the school district.

    2. Yes, because the amended version of section 50-e (subd 5) makes the period during which an extension may be granted coextensive with the Statute of Limitations governing the claim (General Municipal Law, § 50-i, subd 1, par [c]), and thus subject to tolling under CPLR 208.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that since the amendment to General Municipal Law § 50-e(5) makes the period for seeking an extension to file a late notice of claim coextensive with the statute of limitations for commencing an action, the tolling provisions of CPLR 208, including the infancy toll, apply. The Court emphasized that the legislature was aware of decisions applying the infancy toll to claims against public corporations when it amended § 50-e(5). By referencing the statute of limitations, the legislature intended to incorporate the tolling provisions. The Court stated, “[t]he extension shall not exceed the time limited for the commencement of an action by the claimant against the public corporation”. The court dismissed the argument that this created an incongruous result, clarifying that incorporating the toll expands the time frame for the court’s discretion, but does not mandate an extension in every case involving a disability. The decision to grant or deny remains discretionary, balancing the interests of the claimant and the public corporation. The Court distinguished this from situations where statutes of limitations are considered conditions precedent, noting that in this instance, the legislature explicitly linked the extension period to the general statute of limitations. Because the Appellate Division erroneously concluded the time for making the application had expired, the case was remitted for the court to exercise its discretion and determine whether an extension should be granted based on the specific facts, including whether the school district had notice of the incident. The Court emphasized that the availability of a toll does not mandate an extension, as the decision to grant or deny remains purely discretionary and subject to fairness concerns for the potentially liable public corporation.

  • Matter of O’Neil v. New York City Health and Hospitals Corp., 47 N.Y.2d 929 (1979): Late Notice of Claim and Discretionary Extension for Conscious Pain and Suffering

    Matter of O’Neil v. New York City Health and Hospitals Corp., 47 N.Y.2d 929 (1979)

    When a claim for conscious pain and suffering accrues to the injured party who dies before the notice of claim deadline, the court has discretion to grant an extension for filing a late notice of claim, even if the reason for the delay is unrelated to the death.

    Summary

    The case concerns a proceeding brought by an administrator seeking leave to serve a late notice of claim on the New York City Health and Hospitals Corporation, involving both wrongful death and conscious pain and suffering causes of action. The Court of Appeals addressed the applicability of General Municipal Law § 50-e(5)(1) and (2) to these distinct claims. The court held that while the administrator’s delay in filing the wrongful death claim was not excusable under the statute, the Appellate Division did not abuse its discretion in allowing the late notice of claim for conscious pain and suffering because the injured party’s death occurred before the expiration of the filing deadline, and no nexus between the death and the delay was required.

    Facts

    The administrator sought permission to file a late notice of claim against the New York City Health and Hospitals Corporation, encompassing causes of action for both wrongful death and the decedent’s conscious pain and suffering prior to death. The specific facts underlying the medical malpractice claim are not detailed in the opinion, the focus being on the procedural issue of the late notice.

    Procedural History

    The administrator initiated a proceeding under General Municipal Law § 50-e for leave to serve a late notice of claim. The Supreme Court denied the motion. The Appellate Division reversed the trial court’s decision regarding the conscious pain and suffering claim, finding the denial to be an improvident exercise of discretion. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the court had discretionary power under General Municipal Law § 50-e(5)(1) to grant an extension for filing a late notice of claim for wrongful death when the claimant administrator was neither an infant nor incapacitated.

    2. Whether the court had discretionary power under General Municipal Law § 50-e(5)(2) to grant an extension for filing a late notice of claim for conscious pain and suffering when the injured party died before the expiration of the time limited for service of the notice, regardless of the reason for the delay.

    Holding

    1. No, because the claimant administrator was not an infant or incapacitated, and therefore did not meet the requirements of General Municipal Law § 50-e(5)(1).

    2. Yes, because under General Municipal Law § 50-e(5)(2), there is no requirement to establish a nexus between the excuse for the delay and the death of the injured party when the death occurred before the notice deadline.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court distinguished between the wrongful death action and the action for conscious pain and suffering based on who the claim accrued to. The wrongful death action accrues to the personal representative, while the action for conscious pain and suffering accrues to the injured party. Regarding the wrongful death claim, the court found that the administrator did not meet the requirements of either paragraph (1) or (2) of General Municipal Law § 50-e(5). The administrator was not an infant or incapacitated under paragraph (1), nor was the administrator deceased under paragraph (2). Therefore, the court had no discretion to grant an extension for the wrongful death claim.

    Regarding the conscious pain and suffering claim, because the injured party died before the expiration of the time limited for service of notice, paragraph (2) was applicable. The court emphasized that paragraph (2) does not require a nexus between the excuse for the delay and the death. The court stated, “We emphasize the fact that under paragraph (2) there is no requirement to establish a nexus between the excuse and the untimeliness. Therefore, the trial court had the discretion to grant an extension despite the fact that the excuse was totally unrelated to the disability.” The Appellate Division considered the illness of counsel and the lack of prejudice to the defendant, concluding that the trial court’s refusal to grant an extension was an abuse of discretion. The Court of Appeals found that the Appellate Division did not abuse its discretion in reversing the trial court on the conscious pain and suffering claim.

  • Sherman v. Metropolitan Transit Authority, 36 N.Y.2d 776 (1975): Discretion to Allow Late Notice of Claim for Infants

    36 N.Y.2d 776 (1975)

    Section 50-e of the General Municipal Law confers discretion on courts to allow late filing of a notice of claim on behalf of infants, even if the infancy isn’t the direct cause of the late filing, but this discretion does not extend to adult claimants in the same case.

    Summary

    Sally Sherman, individually and as guardian for her son Steven, sought leave to file a late notice of claim against the Metropolitan Transit Authority (MTA). The notice was filed late due to attorney error, not the son’s infancy. The Court of Appeals held that while the statute technically requires a causal connection between infancy and late filing, precedent grants courts discretion to allow late filings for infants. However, this discretion doesn’t apply to the adult claimant (Sally Sherman) in the same action. Thus, the Court allowed the late filing for the son but not for the mother.

    Facts

    Sally Sherman, individually and as the natural guardian of her son, Steven Sherman, had a claim against the Metropolitan Transit Authority (MTA). A notice of claim was required to be filed within 90 days. The claim was prepared and verified 40 days *before* the deadline. The attorney failed to file the notice of claim within the statutory period.

    Procedural History

    The case was initially heard at Special Term, which made a determination (unspecified in the provided text). The Appellate Division then issued an order. The Metropolitan Transit Authority appealed to the New York Court of Appeals from the Appellate Division’s order. The Court of Appeals modified the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether Section 50-e of the General Municipal Law mandates a strict causal connection between the infancy of a claimant and the failure to file a timely notice of claim, precluding judicial discretion to allow late filing when the delay is due to attorney error.

    2. Whether the precedent established in Murray v. City of New York applies to adult claimants seeking to file a late notice of claim alongside an infant claimant in the same action.

    Holding

    1. No, because the statute is read as conferring discretion on the courts, in line with established precedent, to sustain or deny grants of permission for late filing for infants.

    2. No, because the Murray decision is not applicable to the late filing by the adult claimant.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals acknowledged that a literal interpretation of Section 50-e would require a causal connection between the claimant’s infancy and the failure to file on time. However, they emphasized the importance of long-standing precedent and the policy articulated in Matter of Murray v City of New York, which grants courts discretion in deciding whether to allow late filings for infants. The court stated that this statute must be interpreted as giving the discretion to the courts. Despite the fact that the delay was due to attorney error, not directly to the claimant’s infancy, the court upheld the Appellate Division’s decision to grant leave to serve a late notice of claim on behalf of the minor son, Steven Sherman.

    However, the court distinguished the situation of the adult claimant, Sally Sherman. They found that the Murray decision did *not* extend to adult claimants. Therefore, the Court modified the Appellate Division’s decision to disallow the parent claimant leave to serve a late notice of claim on her own behalf.

    The dissenting judge, Gabrielli, argued that the delay in filing was solely due to counsel’s failure and had no connection to the claimant’s infancy. The dissent cited Matter of Ostrander v City of Syracuse, stating that the relevant consideration is the claimant’s incapacities, not the lawyer’s. Because the notice of claim was prepared well before the deadline, the dissent found no basis for attributing the late filing to the claimant’s infancy. The dissent emphasized the need to read and interpret the statute as written, without judicial expansion based on equitable concerns, which should be addressed by the legislature. The dissent also cited Camarella v East Irondequoit School Bd., highlighting the harshness of section 50-e but acknowledging the court’s lack of power to substitute statutory requirements.