New York Law Review

Tag: Gender Discrimination

  • People v. Allen, 86 N.Y.2d 101 (1995): Burden of Proof in Batson Challenges

    People v. Allen, 86 N.Y.2d 101 (1995)

    In a Batson challenge, the prosecution only needs to provide facially neutral reasons for striking potential jurors; the burden then shifts to the defendant to prove those reasons are pretextual.

    Summary

    Allen was convicted of incest and sexual abuse. During jury selection, the prosecutor used 14 of 15 peremptory challenges against male jurors. Allen moved for a mistrial, alleging discriminatory use of peremptory challenges. The trial court denied the motion. The Appellate Division reversed, holding Allen established a prima facie case of discrimination, requiring the prosecution to provide gender-neutral explanations. After a hearing, the trial court found the prosecutor gave gender-neutral reasons. The Appellate Division again reversed, finding the prosecutor’s reasons were pretextual because they were not consistently applied to female jurors. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the Appellate Division incorrectly imposed a new standard of proof on the prosecution. The prosecution only needs to offer facially neutral reasons; it is the defendant’s burden to prove pretext.

    Facts

    Allen was on trial for incest and sexual abuse.

    During voir dire, the prosecutor used 14 of her 15 peremptory challenges to strike male jurors.

    Defense counsel used all 15 peremptory challenges to strike female jurors.

    The final jury consisted of five men and seven women.

    Procedural History

    Allen moved for a mistrial, alleging the prosecutor’s strikes were discriminatory.

    The trial court summarily denied the mistrial motion.

    The Appellate Division reversed and remanded, finding Allen established a prima facie case of discrimination and the trial court erred in not requiring the prosecution to offer neutral reasons for the strikes.

    On remand, the trial court held a hearing where the prosecutor provided gender-neutral reasons for striking the 14 men, and the trial court found that the prosecutor had given gender-neutral reasons.

    The Appellate Division reversed, holding that the prosecution’s reasons were pretextual because the prosecutor did not apply the same neutral reasons to similarly situated female jurors.

    The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order and remitted the case to the Appellate Division for consideration of the facts.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the prosecution, in rebutting a prima facie showing of gender discrimination in jury selection, must demonstrate that its gender-neutral reasons for striking male jurors were evenly applied to similarly situated female jurors.

    Holding

    No, because the prosecution only needs to offer facially neutral reasons for its strikes. The burden shifts to the defendant to prove that those reasons are pretextual.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals analyzed the three-step process for evaluating Batson challenges. First, the defendant must make a prima facie showing of discrimination. Second, the burden shifts to the prosecution to articulate a neutral explanation for the strikes. Finally, the trial court must determine whether the proffered reasons are pretextual.

    The Court emphasized that at the second step, the prosecution’s explanation need only be facially neutral. As the Supreme Court held in Purkett v. Elem, “‘At this [second] step of the inquiry, the issue is the facial validity of the prosecutor’s explanation. Unless a discriminatory intent is inherent in the prosecutor’s explanation, the reason offered will be deemed race neutral.’” (quoting Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 360).

    The Court found that the Appellate Division erred by imposing a requirement that the prosecution demonstrate that its neutral reasons were evenly applied to seated jurors. This improperly shifted the burden to the prosecution to prove they did not engage in intentional discrimination. Instead, the defendant must raise the issue of pretext to the trial court.

    The Court stated, “Apparently uneven application of neutral factors may not always indicate pretext, however, but simply an incomplete understanding of the full reasons for the prosecutor’s decision to seat some jurors while challenging others. For that reason, where counsel has perceived something suggesting a discriminatory motive in the questioning of a prospective juror, we require that those concerns be fully articulated to the trial court during its factual inquiry.” (citing People v. Childress, 81 N.Y.2d 263, 269).

  • People v. Bolling, 79 N.Y.2d 317 (1992): Preserving Batson Challenges Based on Combined Race and Gender Discrimination

    People v. Bolling, 79 N.Y.2d 317 (1992)

    A Batson challenge based on the exclusion of a cognizable group defined by the intersection of race and gender must be explicitly raised at trial to be preserved for appellate review.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s decision, holding that the defendant failed to preserve his Batson challenge for appellate review. The defendant argued that the prosecutor used peremptory challenges to strike African-American women from the jury based on a combination of their race and gender. The Court of Appeals found that this specific argument was not explicitly raised at trial; the defense’s objections focused primarily on race, with only descriptive, not categorical, references to gender. Therefore, the defendant was foreclosed from raising this combined race and gender argument for the first time on appeal, underscoring the importance of clearly articulating the basis of a Batson challenge at the trial level.

    Facts

    During jury selection, the prosecutor used peremptory challenges to exclude several African-American women from the jury. Defense counsel objected to the prosecutor’s strikes, arguing that they were racially motivated in violation of Batson v. Kentucky. While defense counsel occasionally mentioned the gender of the excluded jurors, the primary focus of the objection was on the exclusion of black jurors, both male and female. The defendant was subsequently convicted.

    Procedural History

    The case proceeded to the New York Court of Appeals after conviction. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The New York Court of Appeals then reviewed the case to determine whether the Batson challenge was properly preserved for appellate review.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a Batson challenge based on the discriminatory exclusion of a cognizable group defined by the intersection of race and gender is preserved for appellate review when the objection at trial focused primarily on race and not explicitly on the combined characteristics of race and gender?

    Holding

    No, because the defendant’s Batson claim, based on a combination of race and gender, was never articulated as such and never presented to the trial court in those terms. The trial court understood the claim to be grounded solely in the race of the excluded jurors, and defense counsel did not clarify otherwise.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized that arguments must be properly preserved at the trial level to be considered on appeal. The Court found that while defense counsel mentioned the gender of the excluded jurors, the primary objection was based on race. The court stated, “Although defense counsel alluded on occasion to the gender of the excluded members of the venire, it is clear that his use of gender terms was purely descriptive, not categorical.” The Court further noted that the motion for a mistrial was based solely on the race of the excluded jurors. The court applied the general rule requiring a defendant to preserve claims for appellate review, even claims involving constitutional rights. The court cited *People v. Iannelli, 69 N.Y.2d 684*, stating this general rule applies to claims of error involving state and federal constitutional rights. Because the defendant failed to explicitly argue at trial that African-American women constituted a separately cognizable group for Batson purposes, the Court held that this argument was not preserved for appellate review.

  • People v. Santorelli, 80 N.Y.2d 872 (1992): Gender Discrimination in Public Exposure Laws

    People v. Santorelli, 80 N.Y.2d 872 (1992)

    A statute that criminalizes exposure of a specific part of a woman’s breast, but not a comparable part of a man’s body, is unconstitutional gender discrimination unless the state demonstrates an important governmental interest and a substantial relationship between the classification and that interest.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Monroe County Court’s order and dismissed the informations against the defendants, who were arrested for violating Penal Law § 245.01 (exposure of a person) for baring a portion of their breasts in a public park. The court held that the statute was discriminatory on its face because it defined “private or intimate parts” of a woman’s body to include a specific part of the breast, but did not provide a similar definition for men. The court found that the People failed to demonstrate an important governmental interest justifying this gender classification and that the statute was not applicable to the conduct presented.

    Facts

    Defendants were arrested in a Rochester public park for violating Penal Law § 245.01 for exposing “that portion of the breast which is below the top of the areola.” The statute defined “private or intimate parts” of a woman’s body as including a specific part of the breast, but lacked a comparable provision for men. The defendants argued that the statute was discriminatory on its face.

    Procedural History

    The Rochester City Court initially dismissed the informations. The Monroe County Court reversed the City Court’s decision. The New York Court of Appeals then reviewed the County Court’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether Penal Law § 245.01 violates the Equal Protection Clauses of the Federal and State Constitutions by defining “private or intimate parts” of a woman’s body, but not a man’s, as including a specific part of the breast.

    Holding

    Yes, because the People failed to demonstrate an important governmental interest justifying the gender classification and that the statute was not applicable to the conduct presented. The court also relied on its prior holding in People v. Price to determine the statute did not apply to this instance.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court held that the statute was discriminatory on its face since it defined “private or intimate parts” of a woman’s but not a man’s body as including a specific part of the breast. Once that assertion was made, the burden shifted to the People to prove there was an important government interest at stake and that the gender classification was substantially related to that interest. The court noted that the People made no attempt to demonstrate that the statute’s discriminatory effect served an important governmental interest or that the classification was based on a reasoned predicate. The court further emphasized that New York was one of only two states which criminalized the mere exposure by a woman in a public place of a specific part of her breast.

    Even in the absence of proof by the People, the court still attempted to construe the statute to uphold its constitutionality if a rational basis could be found to do so. Referencing the statute’s legislative history, the court noted that Penal Law § 245.01 was originally aimed at discouraging topless waitresses and their promoters. The court then relied on the underlying principle of People v. Price, 33 NY2d 831 (1974), which held that the statute “should not be applied to the noncommercial, perhaps accidental, and certainly not lewd, exposure alleged.”

  • Matter of Wilson, 59 N.Y.2d 461 (1983): State Action and Discriminatory Charitable Trusts

    Matter of Wilson, 59 N.Y.2d 461 (1983)

    When a court applies neutral trust law that neither encourages, affirmatively promotes, nor compels private discrimination, allowing private parties to selectively devise or bequeath their property, that choice is not attributable to the State and therefore not subject to the Fourteenth Amendment’s equal protection strictures.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is violated when a court permits the administration of private charitable trusts that provide educational benefits exclusively to male students. The Court of Appeals held that judicial facilitation of such trusts does not constitute state action violating equal protection, provided the state law applied is neutral and does not compel or encourage discrimination. The court distinguished between state-mandated discrimination and private choices facilitated by neutral state laws. The court found that the testator’s intent was specific and not impossible to achieve, and that the trusts could be administered by replacing uncooperative trustees or deviating from administrative terms without frustrating the charitable purpose.

    Facts

    Matter of Wilson: A will established a trust to fund the first year of college for male graduates of Canastota High School who excelled in science and chemistry. The school superintendent traditionally certified eligible students, but ceased doing so due to concerns about violating Title IX. The trustee sought a determination of the trust’s validity. Matter of Johnson: A will created a trust to provide scholarships for deserving young men graduating from Croton-Harmon High School whose parents could not afford college. The board of education, acting as trustee, faced a complaint from the National Organization for Women alleging illegal gender-based discrimination.

    Procedural History

    Matter of Wilson: The Surrogate’s Court ordered the trustee to continue administering the trust according to its terms. The Appellate Division modified, exercising cy pres to remove the school superintendent’s certification role, allowing students to apply directly to the trustee. Matter of Johnson: The Surrogate’s Court declined to reform the trust, replacing the school district with a private trustee. The Appellate Division reversed, holding that judicial reformation to substitute trustees would itself violate the Fourteenth Amendment and reformed the trust by eliminating the gender restriction.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether judicial facilitation of gender-restrictive charitable trusts violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

    2. Whether the trusts’ limitation of beneficiaries by gender is invalid and incapable of being accomplished as violative of public policy.

    Holding

    1. No, because applying neutral trust principles that permit private discrimination, but do not encourage, affirmatively promote, or compel it, does not constitute state action violating the Fourteenth Amendment.

    2. No, because simply running contrary to public efforts promoting equality of opportunity for women does not justify a per se rule that gender restrictions in private charitable trusts violate public policy.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that charitable trusts are favored in law and that while gender-based discrimination is against public policy, it does not automatically invalidate a gender-restrictive charitable trust. The key is whether the state is compelling or encouraging the discrimination. The court emphasized that the Fourteenth Amendment protects against state action, not private conduct, and that simply permitting private discrimination does not equate to state endorsement. The court distinguished this case from Shelley v. Kraemer, where state courts actively enforced discriminatory covenants. Here, the courts were merely applying neutral trust law, not compelling discriminatory outcomes. The court also noted that invalidating gender restrictions could negatively impact trusts benefiting women, undermining efforts to address historical discrimination. The court found the testators’ intent was specific and not inherently impossible to achieve. The appropriate remedy was to replace uncooperative trustees or deviate from administrative terms, such as the school’s certification role, without altering the trusts’ core purpose. The court stated that “[o]nly by sifting facts and weighing circumstances can the… involvement of the State in private conduct be attributed its true significance.”

  • People v. Liberta, 64 N.Y.2d 409 (1985): Constitutionality of Gender-Specific Statutory Rape Laws

    People v. Liberta, 64 N.Y.2d 409 (1985)

    A gender-based statutory rape law is constitutional if it serves important governmental objectives and is substantially related to achieving those objectives; preventing teenage pregnancy is such an objective.

    Summary

    The defendant pleaded guilty to rape in the third degree but challenged the constitutionality of the statutory rape laws, arguing they unlawfully discriminate against males. The New York Court of Appeals upheld the statute, finding that the prevention of teenage pregnancy is a legitimate state interest justifying the gender-based classification. The Court rejected the argument that the law was unconstitutional simply because only males could be convicted as principal actors, finding that the statute was substantially related to the important governmental objective of preventing teenage pregnancy and its associated consequences.

    Facts

    The defendant was indicted on multiple counts, including rape. He pleaded guilty to two counts of rape in the third degree. New York Penal Law § 130.25(2) states a male is guilty of rape in the third degree when, being twenty-one years old or more, he engages in sexual intercourse with a female less than seventeen years old. Prior to his plea, the defendant reserved his right to appeal the constitutionality of the statute, arguing it was gender-based and violated equal protection because it only penalized males.

    Procedural History

    The defendant pleaded guilty in the trial court but reserved his right to appeal the constitutionality of the statute. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The case then went to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a statutory rape law that only punishes males for engaging in sexual intercourse with underage females violates the equal protection clauses of the State and Federal Constitutions.

    Holding

    No, because the prevention of teenage pregnancy is an important governmental objective, and the statute is substantially related to achieving that objective.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court acknowledged the gender-based classification inherent in the statutory rape law, noting that only males can be convicted as principal actors. The court applied the intermediate scrutiny standard applicable to gender-based classifications, requiring the statute to serve important governmental objectives and be substantially related to achieving those objectives. The court rejected the state’s argument that the law was justified by preventing psychological injury to young females, finding this rooted in outdated stereotypes. However, the court found the prevention of early pregnancy a sufficient justification, stating that “the unique vulnerability of young women in this area requires no empirical support, and a statute tailored to discourage sexual contact between fertile, underaged females and older men certainly can be viewed as one substantially related to the ‘important governmental objective’ of preventing the deleterious economic social and psychological consequences of premature parenthood.” The court addressed the underinclusiveness of the statute (not penalizing young females for sexual contact with teenage boys), justifying it as a societal decision not to penalize those not yet capable of mature judgment. The court explicitly rejected requiring legislative history to support the justifications for the law, stating that “it is certainly illogical to require the production of legislative history documenting the underlying purpose for enactment or retention of a statute where, perhaps due to the statute’s immutably sound basis, no such legislative history exists.” The court concluded that where the legislation is supported by plausible and constitutionally sufficient justifications, the challenge to that legislation must be rejected.

  • In re Patricia A., 31 N.Y.2d 83 (1972): Constitutionality of Gender-Based Age Differences in PINS Statute

    In re Patricia A., 31 N.Y.2d 83 (1972)

    A statute that treats males and females differently based on age for Persons in Need of Supervision (PINS) status violates the Equal Protection Clause if the classification lacks a reasonable basis related to the statute’s purpose.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed the constitutionality of a PINS statute that applied to females aged 16-18 but only to males under 16. Patricia A., a 16-year-old female, challenged her PINS adjudication, arguing the statute was unconstitutionally vague and discriminatory. The court found the terms in the PINS statute were not unconstitutionally vague, but the age-sex distinction violated equal protection because there was no reasonable basis for treating 16 and 17-year-old females differently from males of the same age. The court reversed the order and dismissed the petition.

    Facts

    Patricia A., a 16-year-old, was adjudicated a Person in Need of Supervision (PINS) under Section 712(b) of the Family Court Act. This section defined a PINS as a male under 16 or a female under 18 who is a truant, incorrigible, ungovernable, or habitually disobedient and beyond the lawful control of a parent or other lawful authority.

    Procedural History

    Patricia A. appealed her PINS adjudication, arguing the statute was unconstitutionally vague and violated the Equal Protection Clause. The New York Court of Appeals reviewed the Family Court’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the PINS statute, defining “person in need of supervision,” is unconstitutionally vague in violation of due process?

    2. Whether the PINS statute’s different age thresholds for males and females (under 16 for males, under 18 for females) violates the Equal Protection Clause of the State and Federal Constitutions?

    Holding

    1. No, because the terms used in the PINS statute such as “habitual truant,” “incorrigible,” “ungovernable,” and “habitually disobedient” are easily understood and provide sufficient notice of the prohibited conduct.

    2. Yes, because there is no reasonable basis for differentiating between males and females over 16 and under 18 in the context of the PINS statute, and therefore the statute violates the Equal Protection Clause.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals addressed the vagueness challenge first, stating that a statute is unconstitutionally vague if it “fails to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his contemplated conduct is forbidden by the statute.” The court found that the terms in the PINS statute were easily understood, and the potential for overly restrictive application by Family Court judges was unrealistic, citing United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 618, stating that “a statute will not be struck down as vague, even though marginal cases could be put where doubts might arise.” The court also noted that similar language had been used in prior juvenile delinquency statutes.

    Turning to the equal protection challenge, the court stated that discrimination between classes of citizens must have “some relevance to the purpose for which the classification is made” citing Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107, 111. The purpose of the PINS statute is to provide rehabilitation and treatment for young persons. However, the court reasoned that there was no reasonable ground for differentiating between males and females over 16 and under 18 for this purpose. “Girls in that age bracket are no more prone than boys to truancy, disobedience, incorrigible conduct and the like, nor are they more in need of rehabilitation and treatment by reason of such conduct.”

    The court rejected the argument that the age-sex distinction was justified by the danger of pregnancy in immature girls and the potential for out-of-wedlock births. The court stated that the statute covered far more than acts of sexual misconduct and that there was no rational basis for exempting the 16 and 17-year-old boy responsible for the girl’s pregnancy. The court implied that the discrimination was based on a moral presumption that females engaging in misconduct ought to be censured and controlled more than males. The court concluded that “a girl of 16 or 17 may not be subject to a possible loss of liberty for conduct which would be entirely licit for 16 and 17-year-old boys.”

    The dissenting judges argued that there was a rational basis for the distinction, finding the additional protection afforded females as provided for in the statute realistic and reasonable. They said that since the age differential applied to all females alike, there was no denial of equal protection.