99 N.Y.2d 55 (2002)

Under the New York State Constitution, after a lawful stop of a vehicle and removal of its occupants, a limited search of the vehicle is permissible only if there is reasonable suspicion of criminal activity and an articulable basis to fear for officer safety due to an actual and specific danger, such as a substantial likelihood of a weapon in the vehicle.

Summary

Police lawfully stopped a vehicle for a traffic violation, but the vehicle twice pulled away. During a third attempt to stop the vehicle, the officers observed the defendant, a passenger, making furtive movements in the backseat. After the occupants were removed and patted down, police searched the backseat, found an access panel to the trunk, smelled a chemical associated with cocaine, and discovered a kilogram of cocaine in the trunk. The New York Court of Appeals upheld the search, finding the totality of the circumstances created an actual and specific danger to the officers, justifying the limited search. The furtive movements, combined with the driver’s attempts to evade the police, gave rise to a reasonable fear for the officers’ safety.

Facts

Two officers observed a vehicle make an illegal right turn on a red light. They activated their lights to initiate a traffic stop, but the vehicle pulled away as they approached. The officers pursued the vehicle, which stopped again but then drove away a second time. During the third pursuit, the vehicle nearly hit a pedestrian, and officers observed the defendant, a backseat passenger, turning and making a movement as if hiding something. After finally stopping the vehicle, officers removed all occupants and patted them down for weapons.

Procedural History

The defendant was charged with criminal possession of a controlled substance. The Supreme Court denied the defendant’s motion to suppress the cocaine. The defendant was convicted. The Appellate Division modified the conviction on other grounds but otherwise affirmed the lower court’s decision upholding the search.

Issue(s)

Whether, under the New York State Constitution, the officers’ search of the vehicle’s backseat after lawfully stopping the vehicle, removing the occupants, and patting them down was justified by an articulable basis to fear for their safety.

Holding

Yes, because the defendant’s furtive movements in the backseat during the pursuit, combined with the driver’s repeated attempts to evade the police and disregard for public safety, created an actual and specific danger to the officers’ safety, justifying a limited search of the area where the furtive movements were observed.

Court’s Reasoning

The Court relied on its prior holdings in People v. Torres, 74 N.Y.2d 224 (1989) and People v. Carvey, 89 N.Y.2d 707 (1997), which established that a vehicle search after the occupants have been removed requires both reasonable suspicion of criminal activity and an articulable basis to fear for the officers’ safety. The Court distinguished this case from Torres, where a search was deemed unconstitutional because there was no specific threat to the officers after the occupants were removed. In Carvey, the presence of a bulletproof vest, combined with furtive movements, created a substantial likelihood of a weapon in the vehicle. The Court in Mundo stated, “Indeed, there may well be circumstances where, following a lawful stop, facts revealed during a proper inquiry or other information gathered during the course of the encounter lead to the conclusion that a weapon located within the vehicle presents an actual and specific danger to the officers’ safety sufficient to justify a further intrusion, notwithstanding the suspect’s inability to gain immediate access to that weapon.” Here, the Court found that the repeated attempts to evade the police, nearly hitting a pedestrian, and the defendant’s furtive movements constituted an articulable basis to fear for the officers’ safety, justifying the limited search of the backseat area. The dissent argued that the majority broadened the exception set forth in Carvey to the point that it consumed the rule, because the officers had already removed the occupants from the vehicle and failed to articulate a specific concern for their safety from a weapon in the car.