New York Law Review

Tag: Full and Fair Opportunity

  • People v. Kevin W., 22 N.Y.3d 287 (2013): Limits on Reopening Suppression Hearings for the Prosecution

    People v. Kevin W., 22 N.Y.3d 287 (2013)

    The People are not entitled to reopen a suppression hearing to bolster their evidentiary or legal position unless they demonstrate they were deprived of a full and fair opportunity to present their case initially.

    Summary

    This case addresses the circumstances under which the prosecution can reopen a suppression hearing. The Court of Appeals held that a trial judge cannot reopen a suppression hearing to allow the prosecution to strengthen its case unless the prosecution demonstrates it was denied a full and fair opportunity to present its evidence initially. The Court reasoned that allowing the prosecution a “second bite at the apple” after failing to adequately present its case would undermine the principles of fairness and finality, and would give the prosecution an unfair advantage.

    Facts

    Two police officers, Gungor and Indiviglio, were patrolling a subway platform following a recent robbery. They observed Kevin W. and his brother acting suspiciously. The officers followed them onto a train and then off at a subsequent station. The officers stopped the brothers, identified themselves, and attempted to question them. Kevin W. resisted, and during the encounter, he discarded a bag. After a chase, the officers apprehended Kevin W.’s brother. Another officer retrieved Kevin W.’s bag, searched it, and found a loaded pistol. Kevin W. was arrested and charged with weapon possession and resisting arrest.

    Procedural History

    Kevin W. moved to suppress the evidence found in the bag. At the initial suppression hearing, Officer Gungor testified. The JHO recommended suppression, finding Gungor’s testimony insufficient to justify the stop. The Supreme Court adopted the JHO’s recommendation and granted suppression. The People moved to reargue, but the Supreme Court, instead of ruling on the reargument motion, reopened the hearing to allow the People to call Sergeant Indiviglio. Based on Indiviglio’s testimony, the JHO then recommended denying suppression, which the Supreme Court adopted. Kevin W. was convicted. The Appellate Division reversed, granted suppression, and dismissed the indictment, holding that reopening the hearing was improper under People v. Havelka. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a trial court can reopen a suppression hearing at the prosecution’s request to allow the introduction of additional evidence when the prosecution has not demonstrated that it was denied a full and fair opportunity to present its case at the initial hearing.

    Holding

    No, because the People had a full and fair opportunity to present their evidence at the initial suppression hearing. Permitting the reopening of the hearing without such a showing undermines the principles of fairness and finality.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on People v. Havelka, which held that the People are not entitled to a second chance to succeed where they previously failed, absent a showing that they were deprived of a full and fair opportunity to present evidence on dispositive issues at the initial hearing. The Court distinguished this case from People v. Crandall, where a second hearing was permitted because the initial denial of suppression was based on a legal error that prevented the People from presenting an alternative basis for the search. Here, the Court found no such error. The JHO’s initial ruling concluded that Officer Gungor’s testimony was “sketchy” and “undeveloped,” not that the People were legally precluded from presenting other evidence. The Court noted that the People were aware of Sergeant Indiviglio’s relevant information before the first hearing. The Court emphasized that allowing the reopening here would give the People an unfair advantage, allowing them to tailor their presentation based on the court’s initial assessment of the case. The Court stated, “[i]t is impossible to know if he would have testified in the same vein if he had been called at the first hearing. But the nature of his later testimony underscores the risk of presentations shaped, whether deliberately or subconsciously, by hindsight.”

  • Liss v. Fuld, 68 N.Y.2d 16 (1986): Preclusive Effect of Workers’ Compensation Determinations on Non-Parties

    Liss v. Fuld, 68 N.Y.2d 16 (1986)

    A determination by the Workers’ Compensation Board regarding compensability does not bind defendants in a subsequent civil action who were not parties to the workers’ compensation proceeding and did not have a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue.

    Summary

    Bernice Liss sued Fuld and other defendants for injuries sustained in a car accident during their commute. The defendants asserted a workers’ compensation defense, arguing the accident occurred during Liss’s employment. The Workers’ Compensation Board found the injuries non-compensable after a hearing where the present defendants had limited participation. The New York Court of Appeals held that the Board’s decision did not preclude the defendants from litigating the issue of workers’ compensation coverage in the civil suit, as they were not full parties to the compensation proceeding and thus lacked a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue. The court emphasized that preclusion requires a full and fair prior opportunity to litigate.

    Facts

    Bernice Liss, an employee of Major Watch Case Co. for 35 years, was injured in a car accident while being driven to work by Fuld, the company’s president. This was a regular practice for 20 years. The car, driven by Fuld, collided with a train pillar. Liss sued Fuld, Trans Auto and Holiday alleging negligence. The defendants asserted that Liss’s injuries were covered by workers’ compensation, as the accident occurred in the course of her employment. A hearing occurred before the Workers’ Compensation Board with limited participation of the defendants.

    Procedural History

    Liss sued Fuld, Trans Auto, and Holiday in state court. Defendants asserted the affirmative defense of workers’ compensation coverage. A workers’ compensation judge initially found possible evidence that the accident arose out of and in the course of employment. After a later hearing, the Workers’ Compensation Board found the accident did not arise out of and in the course of Liss’s employment. Defendants then moved for summary judgment in the state court action, arguing the evidence proved the accident arose out of and in the course of Liss’s employment. The Supreme Court denied the motion, finding factual issues and that the defendants had been improperly excluded from the worker’s compensation hearing. The Supreme Court later dismissed the affirmative defense, reasoning that only the employer could raise it. The Appellate Division affirmed but on different grounds holding that the Workers’ Compensation Board’s finding of non-compensability was final as to all parties involved in the accident. The Court of Appeals reversed.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a determination by the Workers’ Compensation Board that an injury is not compensable precludes defendants who were not parties to the workers’ compensation proceeding from asserting the workers’ compensation defense in a subsequent civil action arising from the same injury.

    Holding

    No, because defendants who were not parties to the workers’ compensation proceeding are not bound by the Board’s determination, as they did not have a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue of compensability.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court held that while the Workers’ Compensation Board has primary jurisdiction over factual issues concerning compensation coverage, its decisions are only binding on parties who had the opportunity to participate in the hearing. The court relied on the principle that issue preclusion requires a “full and fair opportunity” to litigate the issue. The defendants were not considered parties in interest in the compensation case because they had no enforceable interest in a workers’ compensation award. Since the defendants were effectively precluded from fully participating in the workers’ compensation hearing, they are not bound by its outcome in the subsequent civil action. The court emphasized that defendants had no control over the direction of the testimony, no opportunity to cross-examine, and no counsel to guide them. The court noted, “It is clear that where a defendant was not afforded an opportunity to cross-examine witnesses or present evidence at the prior hearing, the outcome of the hearing cannot have preclusive effect on that party.” Further, the court reasoned, “defendants were the only parties who would have favored a finding of compensability at the hearing. Plaintiff and the compensation carrier were of one mind on that issue. Thus… [t]he prior hearing was nonadversarial in nature and defendants’ point of view was never presented.” The court also noted the plaintiff’s ability to re-open the case before the board. Therefore, the defendants were entitled to litigate the affirmative defense of workers’ compensation coverage in the civil action.