New York Law Review

Tag: Frivolous Appeal

  • People v. Mateo, 24 N.Y.3d 491 (2014): Appellate Counsel Withdrawal When Appeal Is Not Wholly Frivolous

    People v. Mateo, 24 N.Y.3d 491 (2014)

    Appellate counsel may not withdraw from representing a defendant if the appeal is not wholly frivolous, meaning there are non-frivolous arguments that could be raised on appeal.

    Summary

    Mateo pleaded guilty to first-degree manslaughter and was sentenced to 23 years’ incarceration, with no mention of post-release supervision (PRS). The Department of Correctional Services later added a five-year PRS term. Mateo, after learning of the PRS, filed a motion claiming her plea was defective because she was never informed about the PRS. The People consented to resentencing without PRS under Penal Law § 70.85. On appeal of the resentence, assigned counsel filed a Crawford motion to withdraw, arguing no non-frivolous issues existed. Mateo argued pro se that her sentence was illegal and that she received ineffective assistance. The Appellate Division granted counsel’s motion and affirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that because Mateo’s claims were not wholly frivolous, counsel should not have been allowed to withdraw, and a de novo appeal was warranted.

    Facts

    Mateo pleaded guilty to first-degree manslaughter for a shooting. She received a determinate sentence of 23 years. Neither during the plea proceedings nor at sentencing was there any mention of post-release supervision (PRS). After incarceration, the Department of Correctional Services added a five-year PRS term to her certificate of commitment. Mateo learned of the PRS period from her attorney, who did not advise her whether she could challenge the PRS term on appeal. Her conviction was initially affirmed.

    Procedural History

    Following People v. Catu, Mateo filed a pro se motion pursuant to CPL 440.10, claiming her plea was defective due to the lack of information regarding PRS. The People consented to resentencing under Penal Law § 70.85 to remove the PRS term. Mateo appealed the resentence. Assigned counsel, after reviewing the file and citing People v. Boyd, filed a Crawford motion to withdraw, arguing there were no non-frivolous issues. Mateo filed a pro se supplemental brief arguing her sentence was illegal and that she was denied effective assistance of counsel. The Appellate Division granted counsel’s motion and affirmed the resentence. This appeal to the New York Court of Appeals followed.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the Appellate Division erred in granting appellate counsel’s Crawford motion to withdraw, where the defendant’s claims on appeal (the constitutionality of Penal Law § 70.85 as applied to her case and ineffective assistance of counsel) were not wholly frivolous.

    Holding

    Yes, because the defendant’s claims were not wholly frivolous at the time appellate counsel filed his Crawford motion, the Appellate Division should have denied appellate counsel’s motion.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that under Crawford, appellate counsel may withdraw only if the appeal is “wholly frivolous,” as a defendant with a frivolous appeal has no right to have an advocate argue their case. The Court found that Mateo’s claims—the unconstitutionality of Penal Law § 70.85 as applied to her, and ineffective assistance of counsel—were not wholly frivolous. The Court emphasized that it was expressing no opinion on the ultimate merits of those claims, but that the claims warranted further review. Because counsel should not have been permitted to withdraw, the Court reversed and remitted the case to the Appellate Division for a de novo appeal. The Court cited People v. Stokes, People v. Pignataro, and People v. Catu in support of this remedy. The Court’s decision underscores the importance of ensuring that defendants receive adequate representation on appeal, particularly when there are potentially meritorious issues to be raised, such as the constitutionality of a statute or ineffective assistance of counsel.

  • People v. Crawford, 94 N.Y.2d 636 (2000): Adequacy of Anders Briefs for Indigent Criminal Appeals

    94 N.Y.2d 636 (2000)

    When assigned counsel determines an appeal is wholly frivolous, their ‘Anders’ brief must identify arguable issues, act as an advocate, and avoid factual errors to safeguard the indigent defendant’s right to appellate counsel.

    Summary

    Crawford, an indigent inmate convicted of aggravated harassment, appealed after his assigned counsel filed a no-merit brief, claiming no non-frivolous issues existed. Crawford submitted supplemental briefs highlighting potential errors, including being shackled during trial and an excessive sentence. The Appellate Division affirmed, but the Court of Appeals reversed, finding the counsel’s brief inadequate. The Court emphasized that assigned counsel must act as an advocate, identify arguable issues, and ensure factual accuracy in Anders briefs, not simply advise the court on the appeal’s merit. This case underscores the importance of diligent advocacy for indigent defendants on appeal.

    Facts

    Crawford, an inmate, was convicted of aggravated harassment for allegedly spraying a correction counselor with a mixture of excrement and urine. At trial, Crawford was shackled, a decision his counsel objected to. Another inmate testified that a different inmate committed the act. The assigned appellate counsel filed a no-merit brief, stating there were no non-frivolous issues to appeal.

    Procedural History

    The trial court convicted Crawford. He appealed, and the assigned counsel filed a no-merit brief. The Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the ‘Anders’ brief submitted by assigned counsel adequately safeguarded Crawford’s right to appellate counsel, considering its lack of identified arguable issues and factual inaccuracies.

    Holding

    No, because the ‘Anders’ brief failed to identify potentially arguable issues, contained factual errors, and did not function as an advocacy document, thus failing to adequately safeguard the defendant’s right to appellate counsel.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized the constitutional right of indigent defendants to effective assistance of counsel on appeal. Referring to Anders v. California, the Court reiterated that while counsel can seek to withdraw from a frivolous appeal, they must submit a brief “referring to anything in the record that might arguably support the appeal.” The Court found Crawford’s assigned counsel’s brief deficient because it failed to raise several potentially arguable issues, including the shackling of the defendant during trial, the court’s refusal to give a circumstantial evidence charge, and the possible excessiveness of the sentence. The Court noted the brief contained factual errors, such as misstating the crime charged and the facility where the incident occurred. The Court criticized counsel for appearing to “have found it sufficient to review the record in order to conclude and advise the court on the ultimate merit of defendant’s appeal” rather than acting as an advocate. The court stated, “assistance given must be that of an advocate rather than amicus curiae.” Because New York has repeatedly adhered to the protocol outlined in Anders, the court found no compelling reason to alter New York State’s “Anders” rule. The Court reversed the Appellate Division’s order and remitted the case for a de novo appeal with newly assigned counsel. The People conceded the sentencing issue was not frivolous, further compelling reversal.