New York Law Review

Tag: Freedom of the Press

  • Matter of Winter, 22 N.Y.3d 234 (2013): New York’s Strong Public Policy Protecting Journalists’ Confidential Sources

    Matter of Winter, 22 N.Y.3d 234 (2013)

    A New York court should not issue a subpoena compelling a New York journalist to appear as a witness in another state when there is a substantial likelihood that she will be compelled to identify sources promised confidentiality, which would offend New York’s strong public policy protecting journalists’ confidential sources under the Shield Law.

    Summary

    Jana Winter, a New York-based journalist, published an article about a notebook belonging to James Holmes, the suspect in the Aurora, Colorado movie theater shooting. Holmes sought to compel Winter to testify in Colorado to reveal her confidential sources, claiming they violated a gag order. The New York Court of Appeals held that it would violate New York public policy to force Winter to disclose her sources in Colorado, where journalist protections are weaker than New York’s absolute Shield Law, which protects journalists from being compelled to reveal confidential sources, deeming such protection essential for a free press.

    Facts

    James Holmes, charged with murder for a mass shooting in Colorado, mailed a notebook to a psychiatrist before the event. The court issued a pretrial publicity order. Jana Winter, a New York-based Fox News reporter, published an article about the notebook, citing unnamed law enforcement sources. Holmes alleged law enforcement leaked the information, violating the court order, and sought sanctions. He then sought to compel Winter to testify in Colorado to reveal her sources.

    Procedural History

    Holmes obtained a certificate from the Colorado court to compel Winter’s attendance. He then commenced a proceeding in New York Supreme Court to issue a subpoena. The Supreme Court granted Holmes’s application. The Appellate Division affirmed, holding that privilege issues should be resolved by the Colorado court. A dissenting opinion argued that the subpoena violated New York’s strong public policy. Winter appealed to the New York Court of Appeals based on the two-Justice dissent.

    Issue(s)

    Whether it violates New York public policy for a New York court to issue a subpoena directing a New York reporter to appear at a judicial proceeding in another state where there is a substantial likelihood that she will be directed to disclose the names of confidential sources or face being held in contempt of court.

    Holding

    Yes, because compelling a New York journalist to reveal confidential sources in a state with weaker protections would offend New York’s strong public policy, as embodied in its Constitution and Shield Law, which prioritizes the anonymity of confidential sources to ensure a free and informed press.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court emphasized New York’s long-standing tradition of protecting freedom of the press, tracing it back to the colonial era and the Zenger case. Article I, § 8 of the New York Constitution and the New York Shield Law provide strong protections for journalists and their confidential sources. The Court distinguished this case from Matter of Codey, where the privilege claim was based on another state’s law. Here, Winter relied on New York’s Shield Law, and Colorado offers significantly less protection to journalists. The Court emphasized that the sole purpose of requiring Winter’s testimony was to compel her to reveal the identities of her confidential sources. Quoting Matter of Beach v. Shanley, the Court stated, “[t]he inescapable conclusion is that the Shield Law provides a broad protection to journalists without any qualifying language… Even if one were to be in disagreement with the wisdom of the policy underlying section 79-h and no matter how heinous the crime under investigation, the courts are not free to ignore the mandate of the Legislature and substitute a policy of their own”. This would undermine the core principle of New York’s journalistic privilege, which is the protection of confidential sources. The Court found that Winter reasonably relied on New York’s Shield Law when she made promises of confidentiality. While reaffirming the general rule from Codey, the Court recognized a narrow exception when a strong public policy of New York is threatened. Applying Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 139 was deemed unsuitable. The Court clarified that this decision does not expand New York law beyond its borders but protects the integrity of its own processes and policies. This exception will only apply in unusual circumstances where a strong public policy is implicated, and there is a substantial likelihood that compelling the witness’s appearance would directly offend that policy. The Court concluded that the subpoena application should have been denied.

  • Courtroom Television Network LLC v. State of New York, 5 N.Y.3d 222 (2005): No Constitutional Right to Televise Trials

    5 N.Y.3d 222 (2005)

    Neither the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution nor Article I, Section 8 of the New York Constitution grants the media a constitutional right to televise courtroom proceedings; the decision to allow cameras in the courtroom is a legislative prerogative.

    Summary

    Courtroom Television Network (Court TV) sued New York State, challenging the constitutionality of Civil Rights Law § 52, which generally bans audiovisual coverage of courtroom proceedings. Court TV argued that the statute violated its First Amendment and New York Constitution rights of access to trials. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the lower courts’ rulings, holding that neither the U.S. Constitution nor the New York Constitution guarantees the media a right to televise trials. The Court emphasized that the press has the same right of access as the public, which does not extend to a right to televise trials. The decision to allow cameras in the courtroom is a policy determination to be made by the legislature.

    Facts

    Court TV filed a lawsuit against New York State, seeking a declaratory judgment that Civil Rights Law § 52 was unconstitutional. Civil Rights Law § 52 generally prohibits the televising, broadcasting, or taking of motion pictures of courtroom proceedings in which the testimony of witnesses is or may be taken. Court TV argued that this law violated its rights under the First Amendment and the New York State Constitution.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court granted summary judgment to the State, upholding the constitutionality of Civil Rights Law § 52. The Appellate Division affirmed this decision. Court TV appealed to the New York Court of Appeals based on constitutional grounds.

    Issue(s)

    Whether Civil Rights Law § 52, which bans audiovisual coverage of most courtroom proceedings, violates the First Amendment to the United States Constitution.

    Whether Civil Rights Law § 52 violates Article I, Section 8 of the New York State Constitution.

    Holding

    No, because the First Amendment does not guarantee a right to televise courtroom proceedings; the press has the same right of access as the public, which does not extend to a right to televise trials.

    No, because Article I, Section 8 of the New York Constitution provides no greater right of access to court proceedings for the press than that provided by the First Amendment, and the decision to allow cameras in the courtroom is a legislative prerogative.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that while the First Amendment guarantees the press and public a right of access to trials, this right is not absolute and does not extend to a right to televise proceedings. The press has the same right of access as the public, allowing them to report on what attendees see and hear, but does not grant any special right or privilege beyond that of any other citizen. Quoting Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v Virginia, the Court stated that, “the media possesses `the same right of access as the public . . . so that they may report what people in attendance have seen and heard’ (Richmond Newspapers, 448 US at 573).” It cited Estes v. Texas and Chandler v. Florida to support the conclusion that the Supreme Court has never recognized a constitutional right to have live witness testimony recorded and broadcast.

    Regarding the New York Constitution, the Court stated that Article I, Section 8, which guarantees freedom of speech and of the press, does not provide a broader right of access to trials than the First Amendment. It cited previous New York cases such as Matter of Westchester Rockland Newspapers v Leggett and Matter of United Press Assns. v Valente to show that the press in New York has no independent right beyond that of the public to have access to the court. The Court emphasized that guaranteeing a fair trial is a primary governmental interest, and the trial court must be concerned with the defendant, jurors, witnesses, attorneys, and the public. The Court concluded that the decision to allow cameras in the courtroom is a legislative prerogative, noting the legislature’s past experimentation with rules regarding audiovisual broadcasts of trial proceedings.

  • Finger v. Omni Publications Int’l, Ltd., 77 N.Y.2d 138 (1990): Newsworthiness Exception to Privacy Law

    77 N.Y.2d 138 (1990)

    The “newsworthiness exception” to New York’s privacy law (Civil Rights Law §§ 50 and 51) protects publications from liability for using a person’s image in connection with a newsworthy article, unless the image has no real relationship to the article or the article is essentially an advertisement in disguise.

    Summary

    The Fingers sued Omni Publications for publishing their family photograph in an article about caffeine and fertility. The New York Court of Appeals held that Omni’s use of the photo was protected by the “newsworthiness exception” to the state’s privacy law. Even though the Fingers had no connection to the research discussed in the article, the court found a reasonable relationship between the photo of a large, healthy family and the article’s theme of fertility. This case illustrates the broad scope of the newsworthiness exception and emphasizes judicial deference to editorial judgment in determining what constitutes a matter of public interest.

    Facts

    Omni magazine published an article titled “Caffeine and Fast Sperm” discussing research on caffeine-aided fertilization. The article included a photograph of Joseph and Ida Finger with their six children. The caption read, “Want a big family? Maybe your sperm needs a cup of Java in the morning. Tests reveal that caffeine-spritzed sperm swim faster, which may increase the chances for in vitro fertilization.” The Fingers had no connection to the research, and none of their children were conceived through in vitro fertilization.

    Procedural History

    The Fingers sued Omni Publications, alleging violations of New York Civil Rights Law §§ 50 and 51. The Supreme Court dismissed the complaint, citing the newsworthiness exception. The Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the use of the Fingers’ photograph in connection with an article about caffeine-aided fertilization falls within the “newsworthiness exception” to New York Civil Rights Law §§ 50 and 51, even though the Fingers had no connection to the research discussed in the article.

    Holding

    Yes, because there is a “real relationship” between the photograph of a large family and the article’s theme of fertility, even if the family has no direct connection to the specific research discussed in the article.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal, reasoning that the “newsworthiness exception” to New York’s privacy law is to be liberally applied. The Court stated, “[a] picture illustrating an article on a matter of public interest is not considered used for the purpose of trade or advertising within the prohibition of the statute * * * unless it has no real relationship to the article * * * or unless the article is an advertisement in disguise.”
    The Court found that the article’s theme was fertility, and the photograph of a large, healthy family bore a “real relationship” to that theme, regardless of the family’s lack of connection to the in vitro fertilization research. The court emphasized that matters of scientific and biological interest, such as enhanced fertility, fall within the scope of the newsworthiness exception. “Questions of ‘newsworthiness’ are better left to reasonable editorial judgment and discretion…judicial intervention should occur only in those instances where there is ‘no real relationship’ between a photograph and an article or where the article is an ‘advertisement in disguise.’” The Court deferred to the magazine’s editorial judgment, finding no basis to conclude that the photograph lacked a real relationship to the article’s subject matter. The Court explicitly stated, “We conclude here that it cannot be said, as a matter of law, that there is no ‘real relationship’ between the content of the article and the photograph of plaintiffs. Thus the use of the photograph does not violate the prohibitions of Civil Rights Law §§ 50 and 51.”

  • Herald Co. v. Weisenberg, 59 N.Y.2d 378 (1983): Establishes Presumption of Openness in Unemployment Hearings

    Herald Co. v. Weisenberg, 59 N.Y.2d 378 (1983)

    Unemployment insurance hearings are presumed open to the public and press unless a compelling reason for closure is demonstrated, and affected news media are given an opportunity to be heard.

    Summary

    This case addresses the closure of an unemployment insurance hearing to the public and press. Two attorneys who resigned from the State Attorney-General’s office applied for unemployment benefits. The administrative law judge granted their motion to close the hearing, denying a reporter’s request for a delay to allow counsel to argue against closure. The New York Court of Appeals held that unemployment insurance hearings are presumed open, and closure requires a compelling reason and an opportunity for the news media to be heard. Section 537 of the Labor Law, concerning confidential information, does not mandate closure of hearings, and the Court affirmed the order to provide the petitioner with a hearing transcript.

    Facts

    Two attorneys resigned from the State Attorney-General’s office due to concerns about violating the Code of Professional Responsibility related to a political corruption investigation. They applied for unemployment insurance, which was initially denied. At the subsequent hearing before an administrative law judge, the attorneys moved to close the hearing to the public. A reporter for the Herald Company requested a brief delay to allow the company’s counsel to oppose the closure, but this was denied, and the hearing proceeded behind closed doors. The initial denial of benefits was later withdrawn, and benefits were granted. The Herald Company’s request for a transcript of the closed hearing was denied.

    Procedural History

    The Herald Company initiated an Article 78 proceeding seeking to vacate the closure order and obtain access to the hearing transcript. Special Term dismissed the petition. The Appellate Division reversed, granting the petition to the extent of directing that the petitioner be furnished with a copy of the transcript. The New York Court of Appeals then reviewed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether an unemployment insurance hearing can be closed to the public and press based solely on the possibility that confidential information, as described in Section 537 of the Labor Law, might be disclosed.

    Holding

    No, because Section 537 of the Labor Law does not mandate closure of unemployment insurance hearings, and a presumption of openness applies unless a compelling reason for closure is demonstrated, and affected news media are given an opportunity to be heard.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized the strong public policy in New York of open judicial and administrative proceedings. It noted that exceptions to this presumption of openness must be explicitly stated by the legislature. The administrative law judge argued that Section 537 of the Labor Law created such an exception. However, the court found that Section 537, which protects the confidentiality of information acquired from employers or employees pursuant to the unemployment insurance program’s reporting requirements, does not mandate closure of hearings. The court reasoned that the absence of any provision for closure in Section 622 or its associated regulations, which detail hearing procedures, further supports the conclusion that Section 537 should not be interpreted as a blanket order of closure. The court acknowledged the potential for embarrassment or revelation of sensitive personal information during hearings but suggested that less drastic remedies, such as closing the hearing only during the presentation of specific evidence, could be employed when compelling reasons exist. The Court quoted Matter of Gannett Co. v De Pasquale, 43 NY2d 370, 381, stating that no hearing should be closed before affected members of the news media are given an opportunity to be heard. Regarding the specific facts of the case, the court found that an existing order prohibiting disclosure of Grand Jury matters did not justify closing the entire unemployment compensation hearing. The Court stated, “Merely because some of the testimony before the unemployment compensation hearing might touch on matters relating to the Grand Jury, however, did not justify closing the entire hearing or withholding a transcript of the remaining portions of the unemployment insurance hearing.”

  • Capital Newspapers v. Clyne, 56 N.Y.2d 870 (1982): Preliminary Inquiry Required Before Excluding Press from Sandoval Hearings

    56 N.Y.2d 870 (1982)

    Before excluding the press from a pretrial hearing (specifically, a Sandoval hearing), a trial court must conduct a preliminary inquiry to determine whether closure is warranted, and must articulate its reasons for closure on the record.

    Summary

    During a criminal trial, the defendant requested a Sandoval hearing to determine the admissibility of his prior criminal acts for impeachment purposes if he testified. The trial court, at the defendant’s request, summarily excluded a reporter from the hearing. The Court of Appeals held that the trial court erred by failing to conduct a preliminary inquiry before closing the hearing to the press. The Court emphasized the public interest in Sandoval hearings due to the significance of the rulings and their impact on the defendant’s decision to testify. The Court mandated that all proceedings on the motion, whether in open court or in camera, should be recorded for appellate review, and the reasons for closure should be given in open court.

    Facts

    During the midtrial of a criminal case, the defendant requested a hearing under People v. Sandoval to determine which, if any, of his prior criminal acts would be admissible to impeach his credibility if he chose to testify. A reporter from Capital Newspapers sought permission to attend the hearing. The trial court, acting at the defendant’s instance, summarily denied the reporter’s request and closed the hearing.

    Procedural History

    The petitioner, Capital Newspapers, challenged the trial court’s decision to exclude their reporter. The Appellate Division’s judgment was appealed to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a trial court must conduct a preliminary inquiry before excluding the press from a pretrial Sandoval hearing held during a criminal trial.

    Holding

    Yes, because despite the potential prejudice to the defendant, there is a genuine public interest in Sandoval hearings, thus requiring a preliminary inquiry before closure to the press.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s judgment, emphasizing the necessity of a preliminary inquiry before excluding the press from the Sandoval hearing. The court drew upon the procedural prescriptions set forth in Matter of Westchester Rockland Newspapers v. Leggett, which established guidelines for balancing the public’s right to access court proceedings with a defendant’s right to a fair trial. The court acknowledged that the Sandoval hearing was not part of the trial itself, nor was it directly related to the issue of guilt or innocence. However, it recognized the significant public interest in such hearings, given the importance of the rulings made and their potential impact on the defendant’s decision to testify. The court stated that the procedures laid down in Leggett and Hearst Corp. v. Clyne should have been followed, requiring that “all proceedings on the [defendant’s] motion, whether in open court or in camera, should [have been] recorded for appellate review” and “the reasons for closure [should have been] given in open court” (quoting Matter of Westchester Rockland Newspapers v. Leggett, 48 N.Y.2d 430, 442). Because no such preliminary inquiry was conducted, the Court did not reach the question of whether the reporter should have been permitted to attend the hearing. The Court’s decision underscores the importance of transparency in judicial proceedings and the need for a careful balancing of competing interests when considering closure motions. This case is significant because it extends the preliminary inquiry requirement to pretrial hearings that, while not directly determinative of guilt or innocence, are nonetheless important to the administration of justice and of public interest. The practical implication is that trial courts must follow specific procedures to justify closing such hearings to the press and public.

  • Matter of Westchester Rockland Newspapers, Inc. v. Clyne, 49 N.Y.2d 702 (1980): Mootness Doctrine and Closure of Plea Proceedings

    Matter of Westchester Rockland Newspapers, Inc. v. Clyne, 49 N.Y.2d 702 (1980)

    An appeal is considered moot unless the rights of the parties will be directly affected by the determination of the appeal, and the interest of the parties is an immediate consequence of the judgment; however, an exception exists for important and recurring issues that typically evade review.

    Summary

    The Albany Times-Union and one of its reporters, Shirley Armstrong, brought an Article 78 proceeding against Judge Clyne, seeking a declaration that his closure of a plea proceeding was illegal and an injunction against future closures without affording the press an opportunity to be heard. The Court of Appeals held that the appeal was moot because the transcript of the closed proceeding had already been furnished to the petitioners. While recognizing an exception to the mootness doctrine for recurring issues evading review, the Court found that the underlying principles had already been sufficiently addressed in prior decisions, specifically *Gannett* and *Leggett*.

    Facts

    Judge Clyne conducted a joint suppression hearing in a criminal case, closing it to the public and press. Armstrong, a reporter, observed the courtroom. She learned that Judge Clyne had closed a proceeding during which one of the defendants, Marathon, was expected to enter a plea. Armstrong requested a transcript of the plea proceeding, which the Judge refused. Marathon confessed his participation in the crime and implicated his codefendant, Du Bray. Later, Du Bray also pleaded guilty, and the petitioners were given the transcript of that closed proceeding.

    Procedural History

    The petitioners initiated an Article 78 proceeding in the Appellate Division, seeking a declaration that the closure was illegal and an injunction against future closures. The Appellate Division dismissed the petition, concluding the closure was a proper exercise of discretion. The petitioners then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the appeal of the closure of a plea proceeding is moot when the transcript of the proceeding has already been furnished to the petitioners.

    Holding

    No, the appeal is moot because the rights of the parties were no longer directly affected by the determination of the appeal. The Court reversed and remitted to the Appellate Division with directions to dismiss solely on the ground of mootness to prevent any legal consequences or precedent from arising from an unreviewable judgment.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals based its decision on the fundamental principle that courts should only decide actual controversies. An appeal is moot when the rights of the parties are no longer directly affected. Here, because the petitioners had already received the transcript, the issue was moot. The court acknowledged an exception to the mootness doctrine for important and recurring issues that evade review. However, the Court found that the principles governing fair trial-free press issues had already been largely declared in *Gannett* and *Leggett*. The court emphasized the importance of judicial restraint and incremental development of the common law. The Court distinguished the case from situations involving closure of trials versus pretrial proceedings, reaffirming the presumption that judicial proceedings are open to the public. The court also noted that the trial court’s decision occurred before the Court of Appeals decision in *Leggett*, which detailed the procedure to be followed when closure of a criminal proceeding is requested. The Court stated, “At the present time, in fact in most criminal cases, there are only pretrial proceedings. Thus if the public is routinely excluded from all proceedings prior to trial, most of the work of the criminal courts will be done behind closed doors”. The court decided that it should supervise dispositions made by lower courts after the applicable principles have been declared rather than retroactively appraising conduct of trial judges that preceded such declarations.

  • Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 43 N.Y.2d 370 (1977): Balancing Fair Trial Rights and Public Access to Pretrial Hearings

    Gannett Co., Inc. v. DePasquale, 43 N.Y.2d 370 (1977)

    Pretrial suppression hearings can be closed to the public, including the press, when there is a reasonable probability that an open hearing would prejudice the defendant’s right to a fair trial.

    Summary

    During a pretrial suppression hearing in a murder case, the trial court closed the proceedings to the public and press to protect the defendants’ fair trial rights. Gannett Co., a media organization, challenged the closure order. The New York Court of Appeals held that pretrial suppression hearings can be closed to the public when an open hearing poses a reasonable probability of prejudice to the defendant’s right to a fair trial. The Court emphasized the trial court’s inherent power to control its own process and ensure a fair trial, balancing the public’s right to access with the defendant’s constitutional rights.

    Facts

    Two individuals, Greathouse and Jones, were indicted for murder and robbery. Prior to trial, a pretrial suppression hearing was scheduled. Defense attorneys requested that the hearing be closed to the public due to concerns about prejudicial publicity. The District Attorney did not object. The trial court granted the motion, closing the hearing. Gannett Co., a news organization, sought access to the hearing transcript, arguing that the closure violated the public’s right to access criminal proceedings.

    Procedural History

    The trial court initially granted the closure motion. Gannett Co. requested reconsideration and access to the hearing transcripts, which was denied by the trial court. The Appellate Division disagreed and granted Gannett’s request for access. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a trial court can close a pretrial suppression hearing to the public and press to protect the defendant’s right to a fair trial.

    Holding

    Yes, because at the point where press commentary on pretrial hearings would threaten the impaneling of a constitutionally impartial jury in the county of venue, pretrial evidentiary hearings in this State are presumptively to be closed to the public.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals recognized the importance of public access to criminal trials but emphasized that this right is not absolute. The Court acknowledged that criminal trials are presumptively open to the public, but public access should not interfere with orderly judicial process. Quoting People v. Jelke, the Court stated that the public trial concept has “never been viewed as imposing a rigid, inflexible straitjacket on the courts. It has uniformly been held to be subject to the inherent power of the court to preserve order and decorum in the courtroom, to protect the rights of parties and witnesses, and generally to further the administration of justice”. The Court distinguished suppression hearings from trials, noting that suppression hearings are not specifically within the meaning of “trial.” The court’s role at the suppression hearing is to ensure that evidence obtained in violation of a defendant’s constitutional rights is not used against them. The Court reasoned that widespread knowledge of inadmissible evidence could predetermine guilt, and the trial court has a duty to prevent this. According to the court, “To allow public disclosure of potentially tainted evidence, which the trial court has the constitutional obligation to exclude, is to involve the court itself in the illegality. This potential taint of its own process can neither be condoned nor countenanced.” The Court further explained that “pretrial evidentiary hearings in this State are presumptively to be closed to the public” where press commentary on those hearings would threaten the impaneling of a constitutionally impartial jury. The court held that trial courts have the power to exclude the public from pretrial suppression hearings to avoid becoming a link in the chain of prejudicial disclosures, emphasizing the need to balance the public’s right to know with the defendant’s right to a fair trial. The court indicated that “the extent of the media’s right to access should not remain unresolved, for it places in issue the very integrity of our courts.”

  • Panarella v. Birenbaum, 32 N.Y.2d 108 (1973): Government Neutrality and Student Newspaper Content

    Panarella v. Birenbaum, 32 N.Y.2d 108 (1973)

    Tax-supported colleges may provide financial assistance for a student newspaper publishing an occasional article attacking religious beliefs, so long as the nature of the attack is arguably within constitutionally protected publication, evidencing a neutral forum for debate rather than an intent to advance or destroy religious beliefs.

    Summary

    This case concerns whether public colleges can fund student newspapers that publish articles critical of religion without violating the Establishment Clause. The New York Court of Appeals held that colleges may provide financial support to student newspapers that occasionally publish articles attacking religious beliefs, as long as the college maintains a neutral forum for diverse opinions and does not systematically attack religion. The court emphasized that censorship of occasional articles touching on religious beliefs would violate freedom of the press.

    Facts

    Two separate proceedings were consolidated: one involving Staten Island Community College’s newspaper, The Dolphin, which published an article entitled “The Catholic Church—Cancer of Society,” and the other involving Richmond College’s newspaper, The Richmond Times, which printed an article expressing a Black militant attitude toward Christianity. Both newspapers were funded by mandatory student fees and displayed official seals of their respective colleges. The petitioning students and taxpayers argued that permitting the publication of articles attacking religion in newspapers supported by public funds violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.

    Procedural History

    Special Term ruled in favor of the petitioners, directing college officials to prevent publication of similar articles in the future. The Appellate Division reversed, dismissing the petitions, holding that the colleges had merely established a forum for the free expression of ideas, and college officials could not infringe on the rights of students to free expression. The New York Court of Appeals then reviewed the Appellate Division’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    Whether tax-supported colleges violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment by providing financial assistance to student newspapers that occasionally publish articles attacking religious beliefs.

    Holding

    No, because the colleges merely provided a neutral forum for debate and did not evidence an intent to advance or destroy religious beliefs. The court reasoned that only systematic and unbalanced attacks on religion might constitute an attempt to “establish” a “secular religion.”

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court applied the Establishment Clause principles, referencing cases like Abington School Dist. v. Schempp and Epperson v. Arkansas, which prohibit government action that advances or inhibits religion. However, the court also cited cases like Walz v. Tax Comm., which allows for “benevolent neutrality” that permits religious exercise without sponsorship or interference. The court emphasized that the secular objectives of the student newspapers (developing journalistic skills, providing campus news, and fostering intellectual exchange) outweighed any incidental impact on religion. The court stated, “The general principle deducible from the First Amendment and all that has been said by the Court is this: that we will not tolerate either governmentally established religion or governmental interference with religion. Short of those expressly proscribed governmental acts there is room for play in the joints productive of a benevolent neutrality which will permit religious exercise to exist without sponsorship and without interference.”

    The court reasoned that censoring the content of the newspaper would entail a sustained and detailed review of religious material submitted for publication, raising concerns about biased enforcement. The court also noted that excluding all religious material from a student newspaper, even under neutral supervision, could defeat acceptable civilized purposes, such as listing church events or studying comparative religion. The court concluded that the test is not the appearance of derogatory or critical material, but whether the government maintains neutrality by permitting all sides of any religious controversy to be raised without favoring any particular side.

    The court further stated, “Granting financial means to a newspaper occasionally publishing articles promoting or condemning religion may give rise to some, but yet a lesser, involvement than censoring articles having a religious subject, or terminating financial aid when religious attacks are published. The questions are ‘whether the involvement is excessive, and whether it is a continuing one calling for official and continuing surveillance leading to an impermissible degree of entanglement-’”

    The court also addressed the suggestion that The Richmond Times article should be suppressed to maintain an efficient school system, stating that neither petitioners nor college officials had urged suppression on this ground. The court stated, “unless it can be shown that suppression is necessary to avoid material and substantial interference with the requirements of order and discipline in the operation of the college, publication is protected by freedom of the press.”

  • Larkin v. G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 14 N.Y.2d 399 (1964): Establishes Standards for Obscenity and Freedom of the Press

    Larkin v. G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 14 N.Y.2d 399 (1964)

    A book should not be suppressed as obscene unless it is demonstrably without redeeming social value and appeals to prurient interest, judged by contemporary community standards, considering the work as a whole.

    Summary

    This case involved an action by the Corporation Counsel of New York City and district attorneys seeking to enjoin the book publisher G.P. Putnam’s Sons from selling and distributing “Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure” (“Fanny Hill”), arguing that it was obscene under New York law. The trial court dismissed the complaint, but the Appellate Division reversed, finding the book obscene. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division, holding that “Fanny Hill” did not warrant suppression because it possessed slight literary value, offered insight into 18th-century London, and was unlikely to adversely affect contemporary values. The court emphasized the importance of constitutional freedom of the press and the need to resolve doubtful cases in favor of publication.

    Facts

    Defendant G.P. Putnam’s Sons published and distributed “Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure” (Fanny Hill), a book written in 1749. The Corporation Counsel of New York City and district attorneys brought an action under Section 22-a of the Code of Criminal Procedure, claiming the book was obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, indecent, or disgusting. Testimony was presented at trial regarding the book’s literary merit and social value. Some critics, writers, and teachers testified the book had merit, while others held differing opinions.

    Procedural History

    The trial court dismissed the complaint. The Appellate Division reversed and granted the injunction sought by the plaintiffs. G.P. Putnam’s Sons appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether “Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure” (“Fanny Hill”) is obscene under Section 22-a of the Code of Criminal Procedure and whether its sale and distribution can be constitutionally enjoined.

    Holding

    No, because “Fanny Hill” has some literary value, offers insight into the life and manners of mid-18th Century London, and is unlikely to have any adverse effect on the sophisticated values of our century, and because recent Supreme Court decisions indicate that state obscenity statutes cannot constitutionally suppress books of this type.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court considered several factors, including the book’s slight literary value, its insight into 18th-century London, and its unlikely adverse effect on contemporary values. The court reviewed previous Supreme Court decisions, particularly Roth v. United States, Manual Enterprises v. Day, People v. Richmond County News, and People v. Fritch. The court emphasized that judicial definitions are unsafe vehicles in obscenity cases, highlighting the subjectivity inherent in censorship reviews. The court stated that it must respect and follow Supreme Court decisions regarding freedom of the press. The court noted, “When one looks carefully at the record since 1956 of what on constitutional grounds has been allowed to be printed and circulated, and what has been suppressed, ‘Fanny Hill’ seems to fall within the area of permissible publications.” Further, the court noted that recent Supreme Court decisions had overturned state court decisions that had found books with arguably more objectionable content obscene, such as Grove Press v. Gerstein and Tralins v. Gerstein. The court held that, in light of these precedents, New York was without authority to restrain “Fanny Hill.” The court placed a burden on the censor to justify the exercise of their powers constitutionally and to resolve doubtful cases in favor of freedom to print.

  • People v. Post Standard Co., 13 N.Y.2d 185 (1963): Intent Required for Contempt of Court for False Reporting

    13 N.Y.2d 185 (1963)

    To be convicted of contempt of court for publishing a false or grossly inaccurate report of court proceedings under New York Penal Law § 600(7), the publication must be made with the intent to defy the dignity and authority of the court, not merely be factually incorrect.

    Summary

    The Post Standard Company and several of its employees were indicted for contempt of court for publishing a false report of court proceedings, in violation of Penal Law § 600(7). The newspaper reported that a witness accused a particular officer of assault, which was inaccurate. The trial court sustained a demurrer, but the appellate division reversed. The Court of Appeals reversed again, holding that a conviction under § 600(7) requires proof of intent to defy the dignity and authority of the court. The court reasoned that interpreting the statute otherwise would create an unconstitutional restriction on freedom of the press by punishing minor, unintentional reporting errors.

    Facts

    The Post Standard newspaper published an article about a court proceeding in which a witness, Percy Lee Holloway, testified. The article falsely stated that Holloway accused Sgt. Thomas Sardino of assault during the proceeding. The official court minutes showed that Holloway made no accusations against Sgt. Sardino. The indictment alleged that the newspaper’s report was a false and grossly inaccurate report of the court proceedings.

    Procedural History

    The Onondaga County Court initially sustained a demurrer to the indictment, agreeing with the defendants that the indictment was deficient. The Appellate Division reversed the County Court’s decision and ordered the indictment reinstated. The case then came before the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a conviction for contempt of court under Penal Law § 600(7) for publishing a false or grossly inaccurate report of court proceedings requires proof that the publication was made with the intent to defy the dignity and authority of the court.

    Holding

    No, because the court held that § 600(7) requires proof of intent to defy the dignity and authority of the court. The statute penalizes the publication of a false report only when that publication constitutes a contempt of court in the traditional sense, meaning it is intended to impugn or defy the court’s authority.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the phrase “commits a contempt of court” in the statute’s opening paragraph limits and qualifies the language in subdivision 7, requiring an intent to assail the dignity and authority of the court. The court drew an analogy to Judiciary Law § 750, which contains similar language. Despite the seemingly absolute language in § 750, the Court of Appeals had previously held that an intent to defy the dignity and authority of a court is a necessary element of criminal contempt. The court emphasized that interpreting § 600(7) otherwise would allow convictions based on minor, unintentional errors, infringing on freedom of the press. The court quoted Craig v. Harney, stating that “mere errors in reporting, where no willfulness is alleged, are not usually considered a sound basis for contempt proceedings.” The court noted the lack of any allegation or evidence that the false report, on its face, affronted the dignity and authority of the court. Chief Judge Desmond dissented, arguing that the statute should be enforced as written and that the prosecution only needed to prove that the article was false or grossly inaccurate. He argued there is no constitutional right to publish false statements. The majority rejected this view, reversing the Appellate Division’s order and dismissing the indictment. The court also noted the potential for the Appellate Division’s construction of the statute to impinge upon the freedom of the press as guaranteed by the Federal Constitution.