Trans-Lux Distributing Corp. v. Board of Regents, 14 N.Y.2d 88 (1964)

A state may prohibit the licensing of films depicting explicit sexual conduct, similar to its power to regulate public displays of the same conduct, as such depictions are considered conduct rather than protected speech under the First Amendment.

Summary

Trans-Lux Distributing Corp. challenged the Board of Regents’ decision to require the removal of two scenes from the film “A Stranger Knocks” as a condition for licensing. The Board deemed the scenes, which depicted explicit sexual behavior, as obscene. The New York Court of Appeals considered whether the state’s film licensing statute, as applied to these scenes, violated the First Amendment. The court held that the state has the authority to regulate obscene conduct depicted in films, just as it can regulate similar conduct in public, because films can be viewed as conduct rather than pure speech in certain contexts.

Facts

Trans-Lux Distributing Corp. sought a license to exhibit the film “A Stranger Knocks” in New York. The Board of Regents mandated the removal of two scenes due to their alleged obscenity. The first scene showed a man and woman on a beach embracing, leading to a depiction of the woman’s facial expressions indicative of orgasm. The second scene showed the woman astride the man in bed, with movements suggestive of sexual intercourse and the woman displaying similar expressions. This scene was the film’s climax, coinciding with the woman’s realization that the man was her husband’s murderer.

Procedural History

The Board of Regents directed the elimination of two scenes from the film as a condition for granting a license. The Appellate Division annulled the Board’s determination. The case was appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

Issue(s)

Whether the state’s motion picture licensing statute, as applied to prohibit the exhibition of scenes depicting explicit sexual conduct, violates the First Amendment’s guarantee of freedom of speech.

Holding

Yes, because a filmed presentation of sexual intercourse, whether real or simulated, is subject to state prohibition to the same extent as the actual conduct would be if engaged in publicly. The state’s power to regulate conduct extends to its depiction on film when the conduct itself is deemed obscene and against public policy.

Court’s Reasoning

The court reasoned that while the First Amendment protects various forms of expression, including films, this protection is not absolute. Films, like conduct, can be regulated when they cross the line into obscenity. The court distinguished between advocating an idea (protected speech) and engaging in conduct (subject to regulation). The court stated, “Films, by their nature, may lie on either side of the division between speech and conduct.” The court analogized the depiction of sexual intercourse on film to public sexual exhibitionism, which the state has the power to prohibit. The court emphasized that the state’s regulation of films is not aimed at suppressing ideas but at proscribing certain behavior that is offensive and destructive of moral standards. The court stated: “It is my view that a filmed presentation of sexual intercourse, whether real or simulated, is just as subject to State prohibition as similar conduct if engaged in on the street.” It further explained that, “Freedom of expression can be suppressed if, and to the extent that, it is so closely brigaded with illegal action as to be an inseparable part of it.” The court concluded that the scenes in question were obscene and thus subject to regulation under the state’s licensing statute.