New York Law Review

Tag: Freedom of Information Law

  • Capital Newspapers Division of the Hearst Corp. v. Burns, 67 N.Y.2d 562 (1986): Defining “Record” and Agency Obligations Under FOIL

    Capital Newspapers Division of the Hearst Corp. v. Burns, 67 N.Y.2d 562 (1986)

    Under New York’s Freedom of Information Law (FOIL), personal or unofficial documents intermingled with official government files and held by a governmental entity are considered “records” of an “agency” and are subject to disclosure unless a specific statutory exemption applies.

    Summary

    This case clarifies the scope of New York’s Freedom of Information Law (FOIL) regarding access to documents held by government agencies. The Court of Appeals held that personal or unofficial documents intermingled with official government files and held by a governmental entity are considered “records” of an “agency” under FOIL and are subject to disclosure unless a specific statutory exemption applies. The decision emphasizes the broad definition of “record” and “agency” under FOIL, rejecting a narrow interpretation that would limit disclosure only to documents directly related to governmental decision-making. This ruling prevents agencies from unilaterally prescreening documents and potentially thwarting legitimate FOIL requests.

    Facts

    Following the death of Albany Mayor Erastus Corning, II, his extensive collection of documents (the Corning papers) was stored at City Hall. These papers included personal correspondence and documents related to his activities as Albany County Democratic Committee Chairman. A reporter from The Knickerbocker News initially gained access to the papers but was later denied further access while the city reviewed and removed documents it deemed personal and not subject to FOIL. The city argued that the personal letters and Democratic Committee correspondence were not covered by FOIL because Corning did not create them in his capacity as mayor.

    Procedural History

    The newspaper appealed the denial of access to the city’s FOIL Appeals Officer, then sought an advisory opinion from the State Committee on Open Government, which supported disclosure. The newspaper then commenced a proceeding to obtain court-ordered access. Special Term granted the request, allowing the city to claim exemptions for specific documents. The Appellate Division modified, excluding papers of a personal nature and those related to the Albany County Democratic Committee. The Court of Appeals then reviewed the Appellate Division’s decision based on a certified question.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the Appellate Division erred in modifying Special Term’s judgment by reversing so much thereof as required disclosure of the papers of the late Erastus Corning, II, for the years 1980-1983 relating solely to his personal activities and those made or received in his capacity as Chairman of the Albany County Democratic Committee.

    Holding

    Yes, because the documents fall within the broad definition of “record” under FOIL as information “kept, held, filed, produced or reproduced by, with or for an agency” (Public Officers Law § 86 [4]), and the City of Albany is an “agency” as a “governmental entity” (Public Officers Law § 86 [3]).

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized that statutory language should be given its natural and obvious meaning. The Corning papers fit the definition of “record” under FOIL. The court rejected the argument that only records dealing with governmental decision-making should be subject to disclosure. The court stated that FOIL is based on the principle that “the public is vested with an inherent right to know and that official secrecy is anathematic to our form of government” (Matter of Fink v Lefkowitz, 47 NY2d 567, 571). The Court held that FOIL is to be liberally construed and its exemptions narrowly interpreted. Allowing agencies to unilaterally prescreen documents would be inconsistent with the detailed system FOIL establishes for determining exemptions. The Court reasoned that if agencies could simply remove documents they deemed outside the scope of FOIL, they could bypass the statutory process of articulating a specific exemption and avoid judicial review. This could allow an agency to block a legitimate FOIL request by simply labeling a public record “purely private”, thus thwarting the objective of FOIL.

  • De Zimm v. Connelie, 64 N.Y.2d 862 (1985): Discretion in FOIL Cases Regarding Law Enforcement Materials

    De Zimm v. Connelie, 64 N.Y.2d 862 (1985)

    A court’s determination regarding whether disclosure of particular law enforcement materials would reveal criminal investigative techniques is an exercise of discretion, and the Appellate Division’s determination will only be disturbed if there is an abuse of discretion as a matter of law.

    Summary

    De Zimm, involved in litigation against the State, requested disclosure under the Freedom of Information Law (FOIL) of State Police regulations on recording conversations while wearing a monitoring device. The request was denied, citing law enforcement and intra-agency exemptions. Special Term ordered disclosure of article 13G of the Administrative Manual of the New York State Police after in camera inspection, but the Appellate Division reversed, fearing it would allow criminals to evade detection. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the Appellate Division’s determination was an exercise of discretion, which it would only overturn for abuse of discretion as a matter of law, a contention not made by the petitioner.

    Facts

    Petitioner De Zimm was involved in litigation against the State of New York.
    De Zimm requested disclosure from the State Police, pursuant to the Freedom of Information Law (FOIL), of regulations concerning an officer’s duty to record conversations while wearing a monitoring device.
    The State Police denied the request, arguing the materials were compiled for law enforcement purposes and would reveal criminal investigative techniques and procedures, and that they were intra-agency materials.

    Procedural History

    Special Term conducted an in camera inspection and ordered disclosure of article 13G of the Administrative Manual of the New York State Police.
    The Appellate Division conducted its own in camera inspection and reversed the Special Term’s order.
    The Court of Appeals granted review.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the Appellate Division abused its discretion as a matter of law in determining that disclosure of the requested materials was not required under the Freedom of Information Law.

    Holding

    No, because the determination made below regarding whether disclosures of particular sections of the Administrative Manual would reveal criminal investigative techniques and procedures plainly involved an application of the courts’ discretion to their inspection of the materials in dispute. As an exercise of discretion, the determination of the Appellate Division will be disturbed by this court only where there is an abuse of discretion as a matter of law.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized that the determination regarding disclosure of law enforcement materials under FOIL involves an exercise of discretion by the courts based on their inspection of the materials.
    The Court noted that the Appellate Division has the same power and discretion as Special Term, and it reached a different conclusion after its own in camera inspection.
    The court articulated a highly deferential standard of review: “As an exercise of discretion, the determination of the Appellate Division will be disturbed by this court only where there is an abuse of discretion as a matter of law”.
    Since the petitioner did not argue that the Appellate Division abused its discretion as a matter of law, the Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.
    The Appellate Division reasoned that the procedures in article 13G were not routine, and revealing them, including special restrictions on State Police and trade names, could allow criminals to tailor their activities to evade detection. The court quoted the Appellate Division: “allow miscreants to tailor their activities to evade detection.”

  • M. Farbman & Sons, Inc. v. New York City Health and Hospitals Corp., 62 N.Y.2d 75 (1984): Freedom of Information Law Rights for Litigants

    M. Farbman & Sons, Inc. v. New York City Health and Hospitals Corp., 62 N.Y.2d 75 (1984)

    The Freedom of Information Law (FOIL) provides a right of access to government agency records that is not diminished or altered by the fact that the requester is also engaged in litigation with the agency; CPLR Article 31 discovery rules do not create a blanket exemption to FOIL disclosure requirements.

    Summary

    M. Farbman & Sons, Inc. sought documents from the New York City Health and Hospitals Corporation (HHC) under FOIL related to a construction project. HHC denied the request, arguing it was overly broad and aimed at circumventing CPLR discovery rules in pending litigation. The Court of Appeals held that FOIL rights are independent of litigation status and that CPLR Article 31 does not create a blanket exemption to FOIL. The Court ordered an in camera inspection to determine if any specific exemptions applied, emphasizing the broad public right of access to government records under FOIL.

    Facts

    M. Farbman & Sons contracted with HHC for plumbing work at Harlem Hospital, with the project experiencing delays and cost overruns. Farbman filed a FOIL request seeking 14 categories of documents related to the construction project. HHC denied the request, citing its broad scope. Farbman appealed, and HHC affirmed the denial, stating the request did not comport with the spirit or letter of FOIL.

    Procedural History

    Farbman initiated an Article 78 proceeding to compel production of the records. HHC argued the petition should be dismissed because Farbman was attempting to circumvent CPLR discovery rules. Special Term ordered an in camera inspection of the documents. Farbman then filed a notice of claim and commenced a breach of contract action against HHC. HHC moved to reargue, but Special Term adhered to its original determination. The Appellate Division reversed, dismissing the petition based on its precedent against using FOIL to further ongoing litigation. The Court of Appeals then reversed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether a party involved in litigation with a government agency is restricted to CPLR Article 31 discovery rules, or retains the same rights as any member of the public to access agency records under FOIL.

    2. Whether CPLR Article 31 constitutes a statute “specifically exempting” public records from disclosure under FOIL.

    3. Whether Farbman’s FOIL request was sufficiently specific.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because FOIL’s mandate of open disclosure requires that an agency’s public records remain as available to its litigation adversary as to any other person.

    2. No, because CPLR Article 31 does not reflect a clear legislative intent to establish and preserve confidentiality equivalent to a specific exemption under FOIL.

    3. Yes, because FOIL requires only that records be “reasonably described,” and the HHC has not shown that the descriptions were insufficient to locate and identify the documents.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that FOIL implements a broad standard of open disclosure, reflecting the principle that government is the public’s business. All agency records are presumptively available unless specifically exempted. These exemptions are narrowly construed, and the agency bears the burden of proving an exemption applies.

    The Court contrasted FOIL with CPLR Article 31, which is more restrictive and depends on a showing that requested discovery is “material and necessary.” While CPLR 3101(a) speaks of “full disclosure,” it is in the context of litigation needs. The Court found no legislative intent to create a blanket exception to FOIL for agencies involved in litigation.

    The Court stated, “Given FOIL’s purpose, its broad implementing language, and the narrowness of its exemptions, article 31 cannot be read as a blanket exception from its reach.”

    Allowing an Article 31 exemption would be unique because it would depend on the requester’s status, not on the nature of the records themselves. The Court quoted Matter of John P. v Whalen, stating that the standing of a FOIL requester is as a member of the public, neither enhanced nor restricted by their status as a litigant.

    Regarding the specificity of the request, the Court differentiated the “specifically designated” standard of CPLR 3120 from the “reasonably described” standard of FOIL. The Court acknowledged potential for abuse of FOIL during litigation but noted that this should not undermine the statute.

    The Court also found that HHC had not adequately demonstrated that the requested materials were exempt as inter-agency or intra-agency communications. The Court emphasized that “[w]here an exemption is claimed, the burden lies with the agency ‘to articulate particularized and specific justification’, and to establish that ‘the material requested falls squarely within the ambit of [the] statutory exemptions.’” The Court thus reinstated the Special Term’s order for in camera inspection.

  • M. Farbman & Sons, Inc. v. New York City Health, 62 N.Y.2d 75 (1984): Freedom of Information Law Rights During Litigation

    62 N.Y.2d 75 (1984)

    The Freedom of Information Law (FOIL) provides a right of access to government records that is separate and distinct from discovery rights in litigation, and a party’s status as a litigant does not automatically preclude them from utilizing FOIL to obtain agency records.

    Summary

    M. Farbman & Sons, Inc. sought access to records from the New York City Health and Hospitals Corporation (HHC) under FOIL, related to a construction project that was also the subject of a breach of contract lawsuit between Farbman and HHC. HHC denied the FOIL request, arguing that Farbman was using it to circumvent discovery rules. The Court of Appeals held that FOIL rights are not extinguished by pending or potential litigation, and CPLR Article 31 (governing discovery) is not a blanket exemption from FOIL. The court emphasized the broad public right of access under FOIL and the narrow interpretation of its exemptions. The case was remanded for an in camera inspection to determine if any specific exemptions applied.

    Facts

    M. Farbman & Sons, Inc. contracted with HHC to perform plumbing work at Harlem Hospital, with completion delayed and cost overruns incurred.
    On April 13, 1981, Farbman made a FOIL request for 14 categories of records related to the construction project.
    HHC denied the request, deeming it overly broad.
    Farbman appealed, and the denial was affirmed.
    Farbman then commenced an Article 78 proceeding to compel production of the records.
    Subsequently, Farbman filed a notice of claim and commenced a breach of contract action against HHC.

    Procedural History

    Farbman initiated an Article 78 proceeding to compel HHC to produce the requested documents.
    Special Term initially ordered an in camera inspection of the documents.
    After Farbman filed a breach of contract action, HHC moved to reargue, but Special Term adhered to its original determination.
    The Appellate Division reversed, dismissing the petition, holding that FOIL could not be used to further in-progress litigation.</n

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether a party involved in litigation with a government agency forfeits their rights under the Freedom of Information Law to access agency records related to the litigation.
    2. Whether CPLR Article 31 (governing discovery in litigation) constitutes a blanket exemption from FOIL disclosure requirements.
    3. Whether the specificity requirements for document requests under CPLR 3120 apply to FOIL requests under Public Officers Law § 89(3).

    Holding

    1. No, because FOIL provides a broad right of public access to government records that is independent of a party’s status as a litigant. A litigant does not forfeit their FOIL rights simply because they are engaged in litigation with the agency.
    2. No, because CPLR Article 31 does not demonstrate clear legislative intent to establish and preserve confidentiality that would qualify it as a specific exemption under FOIL.
    3. No, because FOIL requires only that records be “reasonably described” so that the agency can locate them, whereas CPLR 3120 demands that documents be “specifically designated.”

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that FOIL implements the principle that “government is the public’s business” and aims for broad disclosure. FOIL exemptions are narrowly interpreted, and the agency bears the burden of proving an exemption applies. The court stated “the standing of one who seeks access to records under the Freedom of Information Law is as a member of the public, and neither enhanced… nor restricted… because he is also a litigant or potential litigant.” CPLR Article 31, on the other hand, is more restrictive and depends on status and need related to the litigation. The court found no legislative intent to create an exemption from FOIL for agencies involved in litigation or to prevent the simultaneous use of both statutes.

    Article 31 document production in FOIL would depend not on the need to maintain individual privacy or the government’s need for confidentiality of the records but on the status of the party making the request.

    The court addressed concerns about potential abuse of FOIL during litigation but stated that this possibility is “a price of open government” that should not undermine the statute. The court also clarified that the specificity requirement for FOIL requests is less stringent than that under CPLR 3120, requiring only a “reasonable description” of the records sought. The Court remanded for an in camera inspection.

  • беременных v. Ravitch, 57 N.Y.2d 300 (1982): Freedom of Information and Collective Bargaining

    57 N.Y.2d 300 (1982)

    A memorandum prepared by a public agency for internal use, addressing a position in pending or prospective collective bargaining, is not a “final determination” accessible under the Freedom of Information Law.

    Summary

    The petitioner, an arbitrator, sought access under the Freedom of Information Law to a memorandum prepared by the Metropolitan Transit Authority (MTA) regarding his potential redesignation. The MTA denied access, arguing the memorandum was intra-agency material exempt from disclosure because it would impair collective bargaining negotiations and wasn’t a final agency determination. The court held that because collective bargaining positions are fluid until a binding agreement is reached, the memorandum was pre-decisional and thus exempt from disclosure under Public Officers Law § 87(2)(g). This case clarifies the scope of FOIL exemptions in the context of ongoing labor negotiations.

    Facts

    The petitioner had been an impartial arbitrator for transit disputes for 30 years. The president of MTA, Ravitch, allegedly stated that the MTA did not want to redesignate the petitioner. The petitioner requested access to a memorandum documenting his unfavorable rulings under the Freedom of Information Law after a news report detailed Ravitch’s statements. The MTA denied access, claiming it would impair collective bargaining and was exempt intra-agency material.

    Procedural History

    The petitioner filed an Article 78 proceeding seeking judicial review and access to the memorandum. The Supreme Court initially ordered the MTA to provide the memorandum. The Appellate Division reversed, holding the memorandum was exempt intra-agency material. The New York Court of Appeals then reviewed the Appellate Division’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a memorandum prepared by a public agency for internal use, addressing a position it may take in pending or prospective collective bargaining negotiations, constitutes a “final agency policy or determination” subject to disclosure under the Freedom of Information Law?

    Holding

    No, because the fluidity of positions during collective bargaining means that internal memoranda reflecting potential negotiating stances are considered pre-decisional and not final agency determinations, and thus are exempt from disclosure.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that characterizing any position taken during collective bargaining as a “final agency determination” would be unrealistic due to the inherent give-and-take of negotiations. The court stated, “Given the fluidity of positions of parties engaged in such procedure, striving to arrive at mutually acceptable accommodations with the give and take endemic to the process of collective bargaining, it would be unrealistic to characterize as a ‘final agency determination’ any stance which either party to the process might appear to be adopting prior to a binding agreement’s having been reached by both sides.” The memorandum was prepared for internal use by the MTA’s bargaining team. Because the designation of an impartial arbitrator was indisputably a subject of negotiation, the MTA’s stance was considered unfixed and alterable. Therefore, the memorandum was exempt under Public Officers Law § 87(2)(g) as intra-agency material that was not a final agency policy or determination. The court explicitly declined to address whether the memorandum was exempt under paragraph (c) or whether post-decision materials are obtainable as final agency determinations under the statute.

  • Matter of Johnson Newspaper Corp. v. Stainkamp, 61 N.Y.2d 958 (1984): Access to Public Records and CPL 160.50 Sealing

    Matter of Johnson Newspaper Corp. v. Stainkamp, 61 N.Y.2d 958 (1984)

    CPL 160.50 mandates that records sealed pursuant to its provisions are exempt from public inspection, even under freedom of information laws.

    Summary

    This case concerns a newspaper’s attempt to access police records. The Court of Appeals modified the Appellate Division’s order, holding that while the newspaper was generally entitled to the requested records, any records sealed under CPL 160.50 must be excluded from inspection. The Court emphasized that CPL 160.50 protects the rights of third parties and overrides general freedom of information principles. The Court explicitly refrained from ruling on the applicability of CPL 160.50 to traffic tickets or the validity of any specific sealing orders.

    Facts

    Johnson Newspaper Corp. sought access to certain police records from the City of Watertown Police Department. The specific nature of the records wasn’t detailed, but the request was broad enough to encompass the records eventually described in the Appellate Division’s order.

    Procedural History

    The case originated in a lower court, where Johnson Newspaper Corp. sought access to the records. The Appellate Division granted relief to the newspaper. The City of Watertown Police Department appealed to the New York Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals modified the Appellate Division’s order to exempt records sealed under CPL 160.50 and affirmed the order as modified.

    Issue(s)

    Whether records sealed pursuant to CPL 160.50 are subject to public inspection under freedom of information laws.

    Holding

    Yes, because CPL 160.50 creates an exception to general freedom of information principles, protecting the rights of individuals whose records have been sealed under that statute.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals agreed with the Appellate Division’s decision to grant the newspaper access to the records, but emphasized the importance of CPL 160.50. The Court stated that the appellant raised contentions under CPL 160.50 for the first time in the Court of Appeals, which would normally preclude consideration of those arguments. However, because the rights of third parties were implicated, the Court modified the order to exempt sealed records. The Court referenced Public Officers Law § 87(2)(a), which allows agencies to deny access to records that “are specifically exempted from disclosure by state or federal statute.” The court emphasized it was not deciding whether CPL 160.50 applied to traffic tickets, and that the validity of any sealing orders was outside the scope of review. The Court determined that the records sought fell within the scope of the newspaper’s request, despite any potential lack of precise description. The court reasoned that the records described in the order of the Appellate Division fell well within the scope of the request, even if the request did not use the exact nomenclature for those records.

  • NY Veteran Police Assoc. v. NYC Police Dept., 61 N.Y.2d 659 (1983): Freedom of Information and Retiree Privacy

    61 N.Y.2d 659 (1983)

    The Freedom of Information Law does not require the disclosure of the home address of a retiree of a public employees’ retirement system where a statute explicitly prohibits such disclosure, especially when the statute is made retroactive to pending cases.

    Summary

    The New York Veteran Police Association sought to obtain the names and addresses of all retired New York City police officers receiving pensions through a Freedom of Information Law (FOIL) request. The lower courts initially differed on whether this information should be disclosed. However, while the appeal was pending, New York amended its Public Officers Law to explicitly prevent the disclosure of retirees’ home addresses. The Court of Appeals held that the amendment applied retroactively to pending cases, thus preventing the release of the requested information and reversing the Appellate Division’s decision.

    Facts

    The New York Veteran Police Association, a not-for-profit organization serving retired police officers, requested the names and addresses of all New York City Police Department retirees receiving pensions.
    The request was made under the Freedom of Information Law (FOIL).

    Procedural History

    Special Term denied the Association’s application and dismissed the petition.
    The Appellate Division reversed, granting the requested relief.
    While the appeal to the Court of Appeals was pending, the Public Officers Law was amended to prevent the disclosure of retirees’ home addresses.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the amendment to the Public Officers Law, which prohibits the disclosure of retirees’ home addresses and which became effective while the case was pending appeal, applies to the Association’s request for information.

    Holding

    Yes, because the amendment explicitly states that it applies to any request for information for which there had been no final determination on the effective date, including judicial review.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals focused on the explicit language of the amendment to the Public Officers Law (L 1983, ch 783), which added a new subdivision 7 to section 89. This new statute specifically stated that FOIL does not require the disclosure of the home address of a retiree of a public employees’ retirement system.
    The critical factor was the amendment’s retroactive application: “Its provisions provide that it was to take effect immediately and to apply to any request for information for which there had been no final determination on the effective date, ‘including judicial review.’”
    Because the case was still pending before the Court of Appeals when the amendment became effective, the court concluded that the amendment applied to the proceeding, effectively foreclosing any relief to the petitioner, the New York Veteran Police Association. The court emphasized that the legislature’s intent was clear in applying the amendment to cases still under judicial review, demonstrating a policy decision to protect the privacy of retirees’ home addresses even in ongoing legal disputes.

  • Short v. Board of Managers, 57 N.Y.2d 399 (1982): Limits on Deletion of Identifying Details Under Freedom of Information Law

    Short v. Board of Managers, 57 N.Y.2d 399 (1982)

    The statutory authority to delete identifying details to facilitate disclosure under the Freedom of Information Law (FOIL) is limited to records where disclosure would constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy and does not extend to records specifically exempted from disclosure by state or federal statute.

    Summary

    John Short sought access to medical records related to Medicaid reimbursements for abortions. The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether a state agency could be compelled to disclose records otherwise exempt from disclosure under FOIL after deleting identifying details. The Court held that the deletion of identifying details only applies to records whose disclosure would constitute an unwarranted invasion of privacy, but not to records exempted by other statutes. Therefore, the medical records, protected by state statutes ensuring patient confidentiality, remained exempt even after the proposed deletion of identifying information. The memorandum was subject to in camera review to determine if statistical or factual data existed.

    Facts

    John Short requested copies of 29 medical records from the Nassau County Medical Center related to Medicaid reimbursement claims for abortions performed between February and April 1972. He also sought a copy of a memorandum from the medical center to a Deputy County Attorney regarding medically related abortions at the center during 1972. The medical center denied the request based on statutory exemptions. Short then initiated a legal action to compel the medical center to release the records.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court directed disclosure of the 29 medical records after deletion of personal identifying details, with the medical center determining the extent of deletion. The court denied disclosure of the July 1972 memorandum. The medical center appealed the order to disclose the medical records, while Short cross-appealed the denial of access to the memorandum. The Appellate Division affirmed the Supreme Court’s judgment. Both parties then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the Freedom of Information Law requires disclosure of medical records, otherwise exempt under state statutes protecting patient confidentiality, if personal identifying details are deleted?

    2. Whether an interagency memorandum is entirely exempt from disclosure under FOIL, even if it contains statistical or factual data?

    Holding

    1. No, because the authority to delete identifying details applies only to records whose disclosure would constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, not to records already exempted from disclosure by other statutes like those protecting patient confidentiality.

    2. No, because statistical or factual tabulations or data within an interagency memorandum are subject to disclosure, requiring an in-camera inspection to determine if such data exists.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the Freedom of Information Law allows agencies to deny access to records specifically exempted from disclosure by state or federal statute, as outlined in Public Officers Law § 87(2)(a). The medical records in question were protected by Public Health Law §§ 2803-c and 2805-g, and Social Services Law § 369, which ensure patient privacy and confidentiality of medical records. The court emphasized that the provision for deleting identifying details, found in Public Officers Law § 89(2), applies only to records whose disclosure would constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy. This provision does not extend to records exempted by other statutes. The court stated, “What is intended and accomplished by subdivision 2 of section 89 is provision of a means by which the single obstacle to disclosure — the invasion of personal privacy — may be overcome, i.e., by deleting identifying details.” Since the medical records were not “otherwise available” due to statutory exemptions, the deletion provision was inapplicable. Regarding the memorandum, the Court acknowledged its general exemption as “inter-agency or intra-agency materials” under § 87(2)(g), but noted the exception for “statistical or factual tabulations or data.” Thus, the case was remanded for an in-camera inspection to determine if such data existed within the memorandum. Chief Judge Cooke dissented in part, arguing that the court has discretionary power to order disclosure of patient records with identifying information deleted to promote public accountability. The majority rejected this argument, holding the statute does not permit such judicial revision.

  • McDermott v. New York State Board of Professional Medical Conduct, 49 N.Y.2d 134 (1980): Confidentiality of Medical Misconduct Records

    McDermott v. New York State Board of Professional Medical Conduct, 49 N.Y.2d 134 (1980)

    Records and proceedings of the State Board for Professional Medical Conduct relating to disciplinary inquiries are confidential under Public Health Law § 230 and thus exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Law (Public Officers Law § 87(2)(a)).

    Summary

    A doctor under investigation by the State Board for Professional Medical Conduct sought access to medical records, patient interviews, and interviews with other doctors obtained during the investigation through a Freedom of Information Law (FOIL) request. The New York Court of Appeals held that these records are confidential under Public Health Law § 230 and thus exempt from disclosure under FOIL. The Court reasoned that the legislative intent was to protect the confidentiality of all records and proceedings related to medical disciplinary inquiries.

    Facts

    Dr. McDermott was under investigation by the State Board for Professional Medical Conduct. During an adjournment of the hearing on charges against him, Dr. McDermott’s attorney subpoenaed records and sought to examine various individuals. After initially failing to obtain the records via subpoena, Dr. McDermott requested access to medical records, patient interviews, and interviews with other doctors obtained by the commissioner during the investigation, pursuant to the Freedom of Information Law.

    Procedural History

    The agency’s records access officer and appeals officer denied Dr. McDermott’s FOIL request. Dr. McDermott then filed an Article 78 proceeding to review these rulings. Special Term initially dismissed the petition. After the Freedom of Information Law was revised, McDermott made a new request which was again denied at the agency level, leading to a second Article 78 proceeding. Special Term ordered access to the requested materials, but the Appellate Division reversed and dismissed the petition. This appeal to the New York Court of Appeals followed.

    Issue(s)

    Whether records of disciplinary proceedings conducted pursuant to section 230 of the Public Health Law, including patient records and interviews, are exempt from public access under the Freedom of Information Law (Public Officers Law § 87(2)(a)) because they are specifically exempted from disclosure by state statute.

    Holding

    Yes, because Public Health Law § 230 establishes a legislative policy to protect the confidentiality of all records and proceedings of the State Board for Professional Medical Conduct related to disciplinary inquiries or proceedings.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that Public Officers Law § 87(2)(a) exempts records that are specifically exempted from disclosure by state statute. Public Health Law § 230, when read as a whole, demonstrates a clear legislative intent to protect the confidentiality of all records and proceedings of the State Board for Professional Medical Conduct and its committees concerning disciplinary inquiries. The Court emphasized that all parts of § 230 must be read together to understand the scheme of the entire section, citing People v. Mobil Oil Corp., 48 N.Y.2d 192, 199. The court noted that Subdivision 11(a) protects the confidentiality of reports to the board, and Subdivision 10(a) mandates investigation of complaints. Subdivision 10(l) authorizes the board to examine patient records, mandating that unless waived by the patient, any information obtained is confidential. The Court stated, “Any other use or dissemination by any person by any means, unless pursuant to a valid court order or otherwise provided by law, is prohibited.” The court rejected the argument that the FOIL law could be deemed to “otherwise provide by law” since this would render the prohibitory language of subdivision 10(l) meaningless.

    The Court also addressed the argument that since the doctor already knew the contents of patient records related to his own treatment, the records should not be considered confidential. The court held that under FOIL, the standing of one seeking access is that of a member of the public, not enhanced or restricted by being a litigant. Finally, the Court stated that the burden is on the agency to show patient records are involved, but the petitioner can then offer proof of patient waiver of confidentiality, as the privilege is that of the patient. The Court held that requiring the agency to solicit waiver from each patient places an undue burden on the investigative process. Therefore, the Court affirmed the Appellate Division’s order dismissing the petition.

  • Doolan v. Board of Cooperative Educational Services, 48 N.Y.2d 341 (1979): Access to Government Records Under Freedom of Information Law

    Doolan v. Board of Cooperative Educational Services, 48 N.Y.2d 341 (1979)

    The Freedom of Information Law mandates the disclosure of salary and fringe benefit data compiled by one government agency for another, unless a specific statutory exception applies.

    Summary

    This case concerns a request under the Freedom of Information Law (FOIL) for salary data compiled by the Board of Cooperative Educational Services (BOCES). The petitioner, Doolan, sought access to a BOCES report detailing salary and fringe benefits for teachers and administrators. BOCES denied the request, arguing the report was a subscription service for member school districts only. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s decision, holding that FOIL requires disclosure of the requested data, as no specific exemption applied and the purpose of FOIL is to ensure governmental transparency.

    Facts

    The Board of Cooperative Educational Services (BOCES) annually prepares a “Negotiation Information Services Salary Study for Administrators,” compiling salary and fringe benefit data for educational personnel in Suffolk County. This report is part of a subscription service provided to member school districts. Doolan, a resident of Suffolk County and president-elect of a school administrators association, requested copies of the report for several years. BOCES denied the request, stating it was exclusively available to subscribing member districts.

    Procedural History

    Doolan appealed the denial pursuant to the Public Officers Law. After failing to receive a timely response, Doolan initiated an Article 78 proceeding. Special Term ruled in favor of Doolan, ordering disclosure upon payment of transcription costs. The Appellate Division reversed, holding that a subscription-based report falls outside FOIL’s purview. The New York Court of Appeals then reversed the Appellate Division’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the Freedom of Information Law excepts from its disclosure requirements salary and fringe benefit data compiled by one agency for the use and information of another, when the agency provides such data on a subscription basis to specific members.

    Holding

    No, because the Freedom of Information Law mandates broad access to government records, and none of the enumerated exceptions applied to the requested salary data.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized that the Freedom of Information Law (FOIL) establishes a broad right of public access to government records. The court stated: “The legislature therefore declares that government is the public’s business and that the public, individually and collectively and represented by a free press, should have access to the records of government in accordance with the provisions of this article.” The Court reasoned that nothing in FOIL limits its application to agencies directly involved in policy decisions or determinations. The statute’s language, particularly the reference to “statistical or factual tabulations or data” in the exception for inter-agency materials, demonstrates an intent to include data collected by one agency for another. The Court rejected BOCES’ argument that the Education Law restricted access to the report to only those school districts that paid for the service. The Court noted that Doolan was not a school district attempting to circumvent the Education Law’s restrictions. BOCES failed to demonstrate that disclosing the salary data would impair present or imminent collective bargaining negotiations, as required to fall under an exception to FOIL. The Court found that BOCES’ public policy argument, that disclosure would constitute an unlawful contribution of public funds, was without merit, arguing that meeting the public’s right to access to information is fulfillment of a government obligation, not a waste of public funds. The Court further explained that “[t]he public policy concerning governmental disclosure is fixed by the Freedom of Information Law; the common-law interest privilege cannot protect from disclosure materials which that law requires to be disclosed”.