New York Law Review

Tag: Freedom of Information Law

  • Matter of Newsday, Inc., 97 N.Y.2d 651 (2001): Limits on Appellate Review of Orders in Criminal Proceedings

    Matter of Newsday, Inc., 97 N.Y.2d 651 (2001)

    Orders issued by the Supreme Court in criminal proceedings, such as those concerning access to search warrant records, are generally not appealable to the Appellate Division or the Court of Appeals unless specifically authorized by statute.

    Summary

    Newsday sought to intervene in a criminal proceeding to gain access to records supporting the issuance of a search warrant. The New York Court of Appeals held that there was no statutory authority for the Court of Appeals to review the Supreme Court’s order regarding access to those records. The Court reasoned that Newsday’s application was part of a criminal investigation, rendering the Supreme Court’s order unappealable under the relevant criminal procedure law. The Court suggested alternative remedies, such as a Freedom of Information Law request or a civil proceeding, which could potentially lead to an appeal to the Court of Appeals.

    Facts

    Newsday, Inc., sought access to records supporting the issuance of a search warrant in a criminal investigation. The Supreme Court issued an order concerning this access. Newsday attempted to appeal this order.

    Procedural History

    Newsday appealed the Supreme Court’s order to the Appellate Division. The Appellate Division’s decision was then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals, sua sponte, dismissed the appeal, finding no statutory basis for its review.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the Court of Appeals has statutory authority to review a Supreme Court order concerning access to records supporting a search warrant issued in a criminal proceeding.

    Holding

    No, because no statutory authority exists for the Court of Appeals to review the Supreme Court’s order in this criminal proceeding.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals based its decision on the principle that appellate review in criminal proceedings is limited to instances where it is explicitly authorized by statute. The Court determined that Newsday’s application to access search warrant records was part of a criminal investigation. Consequently, the Supreme Court’s order was deemed to have been issued in a criminal proceeding. Under CPL Article 450, such orders are not directly appealable to the Appellate Division, and under CPL 460.20 and 450.90, the Appellate Division’s order is not appealable to the Court of Appeals without specific statutory permission, which was lacking here.

    The Court distinguished this situation from cases involving motions to quash subpoenas, which have historically been treated as final orders in special proceedings on the civil side of the court due to stare decisis, originating with People v. Doe, 272 N.Y. 473 (1936). However, the Court acknowledged the asymmetry in the support for that rule.

    The Court highlighted that Newsday had alternative remedies available, such as filing a Freedom of Information Law (FOIL) request under Public Officers Law § 87 or initiating a civil proceeding under CPLR Article 78 at the trial court level. Appeals from such civil proceedings could potentially reach the Court of Appeals. Citing Matter of Gannett Co. v. De Pasquale, 43 N.Y.2d 370 (1977) and Matter of Associated Press v. Bell, 70 N.Y.2d 32 (1987), the Court emphasized that these avenues could provide a path for appellate review that was unavailable through a direct appeal in the criminal proceeding.

    In essence, the Court emphasized the importance of adhering to statutory frameworks governing appellate jurisdiction and highlighted alternative legal pathways for seeking access to information in criminal investigations.

  • Matter of Rattley v. New York City Police Dept., 96 N.Y.2d 873 (2001): Sufficiency of Agency Certification in FOIL Requests

    Matter of Rattley v. New York City Police Dept. 96 N.Y.2d 873 (2001)

    Under New York’s Freedom of Information Law (FOIL), an agency satisfies its obligation to certify that it cannot locate requested documents by averring that all responsive documents have been disclosed and that it conducted a diligent search for the missing documents; a detailed description of the search or a personal statement from the searcher is not required.

    Summary

    A prison inmate filed a FOIL request with the New York City Police Department (NYPD) for documents related to his conviction. After delays and a lack of complete response, he filed an Article 78 proceeding. The NYPD claimed some documents were unlocatable after a diligent search. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition as moot, contingent on the NYPD providing an update on the remaining lab reports search. The Appellate Division reversed, requiring more detailed certification of the search. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division, holding that the NYPD’s certification was sufficient because the Department asserted that all responsive documents had been disclosed and that a diligent search for the remaining documents had been conducted.

    Facts

    Petitioner, a prison inmate, submitted a FOIL request to the NYPD for specific documents concerning his second-degree murder conviction.
    The NYPD acknowledged the request, estimating a 120-day processing time.
    After no substantive response within the timeframe, the petitioner filed an administrative appeal, claiming constructive denial.
    After no response to the administrative appeal, the petitioner initiated a CPLR Article 78 proceeding.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court initially dismissed the Article 78 petition as moot, provided the NYPD updated the petitioner on the missing lab reports within 60 days.
    The Appellate Division reversed, finding the NYPD’s certification of a diligent search insufficient, and reinstated the petition.
    The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order, reinstating the Supreme Court’s order dismissing the petition.

    Issue(s)

    Whether, under Public Officers Law § 89(3), the New York City Police Department adequately certified that it could not locate requested documents by averring that all responsive documents had been disclosed and that it conducted a diligent search for the documents it could not locate, without providing a detailed description of the search or a personal statement from the person who conducted the search.

    Holding

    Yes, because Public Officers Law § 89(3) does not specify the manner in which an agency must certify that documents cannot be located. The Department satisfied the certification requirement by averring that all responsive documents had been disclosed and that it had conducted a diligent search for the documents it could not locate.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized that Public Officers Law § 89(3) mandates certification of non-possession or inability to locate records after a diligent search but does not dictate the form of certification. The court reasoned that requiring a detailed search description or personal statement would place an unreasonable burden on agencies responding to FOIL requests. The Court explicitly stated that “[n]either a detailed description of the search nor a personal statement from the person who actually conducted the search is required.” The court found that the NYPD’s assertion that all responsive documents had been disclosed and that a diligent search had been conducted satisfied the statutory requirement. The Court stated, “Here, the Department satisfied the certification requirement by averring that all responsive documents had been disclosed and that it had conducted a diligent search for the documents it could not locate.” The Court disapproved of prior Appellate Division decisions that imposed stricter certification requirements, clarifying that those decisions should not be followed. The Court concluded that because the Police Department rectified its failure to respond to the FOIL request, the Article 78 proceeding was properly dismissed as moot.

  • Matter of Fappiano v. New York City Police Dept., 95 N.Y.2d 744 (2000): FOIL and Civil Rights Law § 50-b

    Matter of Fappiano v. New York City Police Dept., 95 N.Y.2d 744 (2000)

    Civil Rights Law § 50-b(2)(a), which allows disclosure of sex crime victim information to a person “charged” with a sex offense, does not apply to individuals already convicted of such offenses seeking documents for collateral review.

    Summary

    Three petitioners, each convicted of sex crimes, sought to compel police departments to disclose records related to their cases via Freedom of Information Law (FOIL) requests. The police departments denied the requests, citing Civil Rights Law § 50-b(1), which protects the identity of sex crime victims. The petitioners argued that § 50-b(2)(a), allowing disclosure to persons “charged” with a sex offense, applied to them. The Court of Appeals reversed the lower courts’ decisions, holding that “charged” does not include convicted individuals, and the police departments must still demonstrate that each document sought contains identifying information before denying disclosure.

    Facts

    Scott Fappiano was convicted of rape, sodomy, sexual abuse, and burglary in 1985 and sought 25 categories of police reports for a federal habeas corpus petition.
    Ceasar Stapleton was convicted of rape, sodomy, and assault in 1988 and sought nine categories of reports for CPL article 440 and federal habeas corpus proceedings, even though he received similar material from the District Attorney’s Office.
    Charles Doyen was convicted of sodomy and kidnapping in 1987 and requested 13 categories of documents from the New York State Police for collateral review.

    Procedural History

    Fappiano’s conviction and denial of his CPL article 440 motion were affirmed on appeal.
    Stapleton’s conviction was affirmed, and his applications for a writ of error coram nobis and CPL article 440 motions were denied. His federal habeas corpus petition was largely denied.
    Doyen’s sodomy conviction was affirmed, and kidnapping conviction was reversed on appeal.
    In all three cases, the police departments denied the FOIL requests under Civil Rights Law § 50-b(1). The Supreme Court initially ordered disclosure or reinstatement of the petition in each case, and the Appellate Division affirmed, equating the petitioners to persons “charged” with a crime. The Court of Appeals then reviewed these decisions.

    Issue(s)

    Whether Civil Rights Law § 50-b(2)(a), which allows disclosure of sex crime victim information to a person “charged” with an offense, applies to individuals already convicted of such offenses seeking documents for collateral review.
    Whether a blanket denial of a FOIL request for documents relating to a sex crime is justified under Civil Rights Law § 50-b, even if some documents do not contain information that tends to identify the victim.

    Holding

    No, because a person “charged” with a crime is distinctly different from someone already convicted, possessing rights such as the presumption of innocence and the right to confront accusers.
    No, because Civil Rights Law § 50-b shields documents containing information that tends to identify the victim, the police departments must still show that each requested document contains such identifying information.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that statutory interpretation requires giving words their natural meaning. The term “charged” cannot be equated with “convicted,” as a person charged has different legal rights. The legislative history supports this interpretation, as the sponsor’s memorandum refers to the individual as involved at the “investigation and prosecution” stage. The Court emphasized that the constitutional right of confrontation, the sole justification for the exception in § 50-b(2)(a), does not extend to CPL article 440 motions and federal habeas corpus review.

    Regarding the blanket denial, the Court stated that while Civil Rights Law § 50-b protects the privacy of sex crime victims, this does not justify denying access to documents that do not contain identifying information. The police departments must make a particularized showing as to why each document should not be disclosed. Citing Matter of John P. v Whalen, the Court noted, “the standing of one who seeks access to records under the Freedom of Information Law is as a member of the public.” Therefore, even if the petitioners knew the victim’s identity, they are treated as any other member of the public seeking access to these records.

    The Court also noted that Stapleton’s petition should be dismissed because he conceded receiving most of the requested documents from the District Attorney’s Office and because he sought “serial numbers” or “lot numbers” in his Article 78 proceeding that were not originally requested in the FOIL request to the NYPD, holding that the relief sought here is academic, citing Matter of Moore v Santucci.

  • Stoll v. New York State College of Veterinary Medicine, 94 N.Y.2d 162 (1999): Determines FOIL applicability to Cornell’s Statutory Colleges

    Stoll v. New York State College of Veterinary Medicine, 94 N.Y.2d 162 (1999)

    Records related to disciplinary actions against faculty at Cornell University’s statutory colleges are not subject to disclosure under the Freedom of Information Law (FOIL) because Cornell acts independently in these matters, not as an agent of the State.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether Cornell University, while administering New York State’s statutory colleges, is subject to the Freedom of Information Law (FOIL) regarding faculty disciplinary records. The Court of Appeals held that Cornell acts independently in these matters, not as an agent of the State, and therefore is not subject to FOIL. The Court reasoned that while the state provides funding and owns the property, Cornell maintains sufficient autonomy in its operations to be considered a private entity for the purposes of faculty discipline. The dissent argued that Cornell acts as a representative of the State University Trustees and thus should be subject to FOIL.

    Facts

    The plaintiff sought records concerning disciplinary actions taken against a professor at the New York State College of Veterinary Medicine, a statutory college administered by Cornell University. Cornell denied the request, claiming it was not an “agency” subject to FOIL. The statutory colleges are funded by the state, and the state owns the buildings and property. Cornell, however, manages the colleges, including faculty appointments, disciplinary actions, and educational policies.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court initially granted the petitioner’s application, ordering Cornell to release the documents. The Appellate Division reversed, holding that Cornell was not an agency subject to FOIL. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether Cornell University, in administering the New York State statutory colleges, acts as an “agency” of the State and is therefore subject to the Freedom of Information Law (FOIL) regarding records of faculty disciplinary proceedings.

    Holding

    No, because Cornell University, while administering the statutory colleges, acts with sufficient independence and is not considered an agent of the state for purposes of faculty disciplinary proceedings; therefore, it is not subject to FOIL regarding these records.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that the key inquiry is whether the entity is performing a governmental function. While the statutory colleges receive state funding and the state owns the property, Cornell maintains significant autonomy in administering the colleges, particularly concerning faculty matters. The Court emphasized that the day-to-day operations and academic decisions are controlled by Cornell, and the disciplinary actions against faculty are internal matters managed by the university’s own policies and procedures. The Court distinguished the statutory colleges from other state agencies, noting Cornell’s unique position as a private university managing state-funded institutions.

    The dissent argued that Education Law explicitly grants Cornell authority to administer the statutory colleges “as the representative of the state university trustees.” To exempt Cornell from FOIL regarding disciplinary actions would undermine the transparency intended by FOIL and contradict the statutory framework. The dissent also distinguished the cases cited by the majority, arguing that they did not involve the specific provisions of the Education Law relating to statutory colleges.

  • Mantica v. New York State Department of Health, 94 N.Y.2d 58 (1999): Patient Access to Medical Records Under FOIL

    Mantica v. New York State Department of Health, 94 N.Y.2d 58 (1999)

    A patient may obtain their own medical records from a state agency under New York’s Freedom of Information Law (FOIL), even with Public Health Law § 18(6)’s restrictions on third-party redisclosure, unless those records contain information that could cause substantial harm to the patient or others, or contain privileged doctor’s notes.

    Summary

    James Mantica sought his medical records from the New York State Department of Health (DOH) under FOIL after receiving allegedly deficient medical care. DOH denied the request, citing Public Health Law § 18(6), which restricts third-party redisclosure of patient information. The New York Court of Appeals held that Mantica was entitled to his records because the intent of Public Health Law § 18(6) was not to prevent patients from accessing their own medical records, but rather to prevent disclosure to other third parties. The Court emphasized that FOIL mandates broad disclosure unless a specific statutory exemption applies and the agency demonstrates that the material qualifies for exemption.

    Facts

    James Mantica received allegedly deficient medical care at St. Peter’s Hospital, leading to the amputation of his legs. His wife filed a complaint with the DOH. Subsequently, the Manticas commenced a medical malpractice action against several physicians and the hospital. They requested Mantica’s medical records from DOH, who provided redacted versions of some documents. When a second, more detailed request invoking FOIL was denied, the Manticas initiated a CPLR article 78 proceeding to compel disclosure.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court initially ordered disclosure, except for quality assurance review activities. The Appellate Division affirmed, stating that denying a patient their own health information was illogical. The New York Court of Appeals granted DOH leave to appeal, limiting the scope to the production of Mantica’s medical records.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a patient can obtain their own medical records from a state agency under FOIL, notwithstanding Public Health Law § 18(6)’s prohibition against redisclosure of patient information by third parties.

    Holding

    Yes, because the legislative intent of Public Health Law § 18(6) was to protect patient privacy by preventing disclosure to third parties, not to deny patients access to their own medical information. Public Health Law § 18(3) and (4) might provide a specific statutory exception to FOIL, and the patient might be required to obtain the records directly from the health care provider pursuant to section 18, if the records contain information that could cause substantial harm to the patient or others, or contain privileged doctor’s notes.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that FOIL imposes a broad standard of open disclosure on government agencies, and documents are presumptively discoverable unless a specific statutory exemption applies. The burden rests on the agency to demonstrate that the requested material qualifies for exemption. DOH argued that Public Health Law § 18(6) provided such an exemption. However, the court determined that the intent of § 18(6) was to prevent disclosure of confidential medical records to third parties, not to patients themselves. The Court cited the legislative record, including a DOH memorandum recommending approval of the bill, which stated, “There is no legitimate reason to withhold information related to a person’s physical health from that person particularly when insurers, government agencies and employers are routinely granted access.” The Court clarified that a patient’s right to access their records is not absolute; Public Health Law § 18(3) allows denial of access if the information could cause “substantial and identifiable harm” or contains privileged doctors’ notes, with a detailed mechanism for administrative and judicial review. However, since there was no allegation of harmful information or privileged notes in this case, § 18(3) and (4) did not provide an exemption to FOIL. The Court emphasized that the patient’s right to obtain the records under FOIL is not diminished by the possibility of obtaining them directly from the hospital under § 18. The Court stated, “Information so disclosed should be kept confidential by the party receiving such information and the limitations on such disclosure in this section shall apply to such party.”

  • Daily Gazette Co. v. City of Schenectady, 93 N.Y.2d 145 (1999): Balancing FOIL and Police Officer Privacy

    Daily Gazette Co. v. City of Schenectady, 93 N.Y.2d 145 (1999)

    Civil Rights Law § 50-a protects police officer personnel records from Freedom of Information Law (FOIL) disclosure when there is a substantial and realistic potential for abusive use of the information against the officer, balancing the public’s right to know with the need to prevent harassment.

    Summary

    The Daily Gazette newspaper sought access to Schenectady Police Department records concerning disciplinary actions against 18 officers involved in an off-duty incident. The City denied the request, citing Civil Rights Law § 50-a, which protects police personnel records from disclosure. The Court of Appeals held that while FOIL generally mandates open access to government records, § 50-a provides a specific exemption for police personnel records to prevent their use for harassment or embarrassment. The Court ruled that the City must demonstrate a substantial risk of abusive use to justify withholding the records, balancing FOIL’s goals with the protections afforded by § 50-a.

    Facts

    Following news reports of an incident involving off-duty Schenectady police officers who allegedly threw eggs at a civilian’s car, the Daily Gazette and Capital Newspapers filed FOIL requests for documents related to disciplinary actions taken against the officers.

    The police chief confirmed the incident and that 18 officers admitted involvement, receiving disciplinary sanctions. The newspapers sought the identities of the officers and the specific punishments imposed.

    The City’s records officer denied the FOIL requests, citing Civil Rights Law § 50-a.

    Procedural History

    The newspapers initiated proceedings in Supreme Court to compel disclosure.

    Supreme Court rejected the City’s arguments for nondisclosure, except for the § 50-a exemption, and ruled in favor of the City.

    The Appellate Division reversed, concluding that the disciplinary records were not exempt under § 50-a.

    The City appealed to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether Civil Rights Law § 50-a exempts police disciplinary records from disclosure under FOIL, and if so, under what circumstances?

    Holding

    No, not automatically. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division. The City must demonstrate a substantial and realistic potential for abusive use of the requested material against the officers to justify withholding the records under Civil Rights Law § 50-a, balancing the goals of FOIL with the protections of § 50-a.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court rejected the newspapers’ argument that § 50-a only applies in the context of actual or potential litigation, finding that this interpretation conflicted with the statute’s plain wording and legislative history.

    The Court emphasized that the legislative intent behind § 50-a was to prevent the use of personnel records for harassment and reprisals, not just in litigation. Quoting the legislative history, the Court noted, “It has become a matter of harassment of police officers that personnel records be constantly requested, scrutinized, reviewed and commented upon, sometimes publicly.”

    The Court also cited its prior FOIL decisions, noting that “the status or need of the person seeking access is generally of no consequence in construing FOIL and its exemptions.”

    The Court distinguished Matter of Capital Newspapers v. Burns and Matter of Prisoners’ Legal Servs. v. New York State Dept. of Correctional Servs., explaining that the key factor is the potential use of the information, not the specific purpose of the individual requesting access.

    The Court held that while the agency opposing disclosure bears the burden of demonstrating that the requested information falls within the § 50-a exemption, this requires showing a “substantial and realistic potential of the requested material for the abusive use against the officer or firefighter.”

    The Court acknowledged that the status and purpose of the applicant may be relevant in determining the risk of oppressive utilization of the materials sought. Furthermore, disclosure could be tailored through restrictive formulations of the FOIL request or redaction by the agency to preclude use in personal attacks, as exemplified by Matter of Scott, Sardano & Pomeranz v Records Access Officer of City of Syracuse.

    The Court concluded that the comprehensive access to disciplinary records sought by the newspapers presented a risk of use to embarrass or humiliate the officers, and thus Matter of Prisoners’ Legal Servs. was controlling: “documents pertaining to misconduct or rules violations by correction officers…are the very sort of record which, the legislative history reveals, was intended to be kept confidential.”

  • Citizens for Alternatives to Animal Labs, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of the State University of New York, 87 N.Y.2d 357 (1995): Mandated Records and FOIL Disclosure

    Citizens for Alternatives to Animal Labs, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of the State University of New York, 87 N.Y.2d 357 (1995)

    Records held by a state agency are subject to disclosure under the Freedom of Information Law (FOIL), regardless of whether they are maintained to comply with a federal mandate, unless a specific statutory exemption applies.

    Summary

    Citizens sought access to records held by SUNY regarding the source of animals used in research, as required by the federal Animal Welfare Act. SUNY denied the request, arguing it was not acting as a state agency when maintaining federally mandated records. The New York Court of Appeals reversed, holding that SUNY was an agency under FOIL, and the records were subject to disclosure because the function or purpose for which an agency’s documents are generated or held is not a basis for denying disclosure unless a specific statutory exemption applies. The case reinforces FOIL’s broad disclosure mandate.

    Facts

    SUNY’s Health Science Center at Brooklyn (SUNY HSC-B) conducts biomedical research using dogs and cats. The federal Animal Welfare Act requires dealers providing “random source” animals to research facilities like SUNY HSC-B to furnish certifications. These certifications contain data about the source of the animals, including the name and address of the provider. The Act aims to protect pet owners from theft by preventing the sale of stolen animals. Citizens for Alternatives to Animal Labs, Inc. requested access to these certifications under New York’s Freedom of Information Law (FOIL).

    Procedural History

    The Record Access Officer for SUNY HSC-B denied the FOIL request. Petitioners administratively appealed, but the denial was affirmed. Petitioners commenced a CPLR article 78 proceeding. Supreme Court granted the petition, directing SUNY to provide the requested documents. The Appellate Division reversed, holding SUNY HSC-B was not an “agency” under FOIL when maintaining records pursuant to federal mandate. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether SUNY HSC-B is an “agency” under Public Officers Law § 86(3) when maintaining random source certifications pursuant to a federal mandate, thus making those records subject to FOIL disclosure?

    Holding

    Yes, because SUNY HSC-B is an integral part of SUNY, which is an agency under FOIL, and the records were kept in connection with SUNY’s research mission, which constitutes a state governmental function. The purpose for which the certifications were kept (complying with a federal mandate) does not remove them from FOIL’s scope.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized that SUNY is an “agency” under FOIL, and SUNY HSC-B is an integral part of SUNY. SUNY HSC-B was fulfilling SUNY’s mission to provide educational services and facilitate research, a State governmental function. The court rejected the Appellate Division’s rationale that complying with a federal mandate exempted the records from FOIL. The Court stated that “FOIL’S scope is not to be limited based on the purpose for which the document was produced or the function to which it relates.” Quoting from Capital Newspapers v. Whalen, 69 N.Y.2d 246, 252-253 (1987), the court emphasized that FOIL’s scope is not limited by the purpose for which a document was produced. The Court distinguished Matter of American Socy. for Prevention of Cruelty to Animals v Board of Trustees, 79 NY2d 927 (1992), noting that case concerned the Open Meetings Law and a committee whose powers derived solely from federal law, whereas SUNY HSC-B is part of a state agency performing a state function. The Court clarified that records kept by an “agency” are subject to disclosure unless a specific exception in Public Officers Law § 87(2) applies. Since respondents did not preserve any claim of a specific statutory exemption, the records were subject to disclosure. The Court emphasized the legislative goal of liberal disclosure under FOIL, limited only by narrowly defined exemptions. It noted the importance of transparency and accountability in government operations, which FOIL aims to promote.

  • Gould v. New York City Police Dept., 89 N.Y.2d 267 (1996): Extent of FOIL Disclosure for Police Records

    Gould v. New York City Police Dept., 89 N.Y.2d 267 (1996)

    Under New York’s Freedom of Information Law (FOIL), records that constitute statistical or factual tabulations or data are generally subject to disclosure, even if inter-agency or intra-agency, unless specifically exempted.

    Summary

    This case concerns the scope of disclosure required of the New York City Police Department (NYPD) under the Freedom of Information Law (FOIL). Petitioners sought access to various police records, including complaint follow-up reports (DBS’s) and police officers’ memo books. The Court of Appeals held that these materials, to the extent they contain statistical or factual data, are subject to disclosure under FOIL, unless a specific exemption applies, emphasizing the public’s right to governmental information.

    Facts

    Several individuals independently filed FOIL requests with the NYPD seeking different types of records. These included requests for criminal complaint follow-up reports (known as DBS’s), and the memo books of individual police officers. The NYPD denied these requests, citing exemptions for inter-agency or intra-agency materials. The petitioners then initiated legal proceedings to compel disclosure under FOIL.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court initially ruled in favor of the NYPD, denying the petitioners’ requests. The Appellate Division reversed, holding that the requested materials were subject to disclosure under FOIL. The NYPD appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether criminal complaint follow-up reports (DBS’s) and police officer memo books are exempt from disclosure under the inter-agency or intra-agency exemption of the Freedom of Information Law (FOIL), specifically Public Officers Law § 87(2)(g), or whether they contain “statistical or factual tabulations or data” that must be disclosed.

    Holding

    Yes, the criminal complaint follow-up reports and police officer memo books are subject to disclosure because they contain statistical or factual tabulations or data, unless a specific exemption applies under FOIL. The Court reversed the order and remitted the matter.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that FOIL mandates broad access to governmental records, premised on the public’s right to know. The inter-agency or intra-agency exemption in Public Officers Law § 87(2)(g) does not provide a blanket exemption for all such materials. Instead, an exception to the exemption exists for “statistical or factual tabulations or data.” The Court found that DBS’s and police officers’ memo books often contain such statistical or factual information. The Court emphasized that the focus of FOIL is to provide the public with access to the same information used by public officials to arrive at official “determinations.”

    The Court distinguished between raw information and deliberative materials. While purely deliberative materials might be exempt, factual data is not. The Court noted that agencies cannot shield themselves from FOIL requests simply by commingling factual and deliberative information. Agencies must redact exempt portions and disclose the rest. It stated, “[A]gency records that fall within the statutory language ‘statistical or factual tabulations or data’ are subject to FOIL disclosure, but that an agency may redact portions of such records that, if disclosed, would ‘impair present or imminent contract awards or collective bargaining negotiations’.”

    Judge Bellacosa dissented, arguing that the Court’s decision would lead to a “super-discovery tool affecting criminal proceedings.” He expressed concern that the decision would create systemic overload and inordinate delays within police departments and courts as they struggle to comply with the increased volume of FOIL requests. He argued that the focus of FOIL is to provide the public with access to the same information used by public officials to arrive at official “determinations,” and that raw information gathered for criminal investigation purposes does not meet that criteria.

  • Hanig v. State of New York Department of Motor Vehicles, 79 N.Y.2d 106 (1992): Defining ‘Medical Histories’ Under FOIL Exemption

    Hanig v. State of New York Department of Motor Vehicles, 79 N.Y.2d 106 (1992)

    Responses regarding current treatment for disabilities on a driver’s license application are considered ‘medical histories’ and are exempt from disclosure under New York’s Freedom of Information Law (FOIL) as an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.

    Summary

    Hanig, an attorney, sought an unredacted copy of a driver’s license application through FOIL, specifically the section asking about disabilities and treatments. The Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) redacted the applicant’s responses, citing the medical history exemption under FOIL. The court held that the disability information on the application constituted a ‘medical history’ and was therefore exempt from disclosure. The court reasoned that the plain language of the statute and the intent to protect personal privacy supported this interpretation, regardless of whether the information was provided to a healthcare provider.

    Facts

    Pamela Jo Nielson was injured by a driver, Frank Jordan. Nielson’s attorney, Hanig, requested Jordan’s driver’s license application from the DMV. The DMV provided the application but redacted Jordan’s answers to the question about whether he had or was receiving treatment for any disabilities. The application listed specific conditions such as convulsive disorder, heart ailment, and mental disability. The DMV masked the responses citing Section 89 of the Freedom of Information Law deeming the information confidential.

    Procedural History

    Hanig’s request for an unredacted copy was denied by the DMV. The DMV’s Administrative Appeals Board affirmed the denial, citing a policy to mask medical information without the applicant’s consent. Hanig then filed a CPLR Article 78 proceeding. Supreme Court dismissed the petition, finding the redacted portion concerned Jordan’s medical history. The Appellate Division affirmed, reasoning that the information was the type one would expect in a proper medical history. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether responses to questions regarding current treatment for disabilities on a driver’s license application constitute ‘medical histories’ exempt from disclosure under Public Officers Law § 89(2)(b)(i) of FOIL.

    Holding

    Yes, because the plain language, the intent of FOIL, and the protection of personal privacy dictate that such information falls under the ‘medical histories’ exemption, regardless of whether it was provided to a healthcare provider or included in an employment application.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower courts’ decisions, holding that the redacted information was properly withheld. The court reasoned that FOIL exemptions, while narrowly construed, must be given their natural and obvious meaning consistent with legislative intent. The court emphasized that Public Officers Law § 89(2)(b)(i) is written in the disjunctive, meaning the ‘medical histories’ exemption applies independently of employment applications. The court stated, “[E]mployment, medical and credit histories or personal references of applicants for employment each enjoy exemption from disclosure.”

    The court found that the legislative intent behind the exemption is to protect against unwarranted invasions of personal privacy, and that disclosure of ongoing treatment for medical conditions threatens personal privacy. It rejected the argument that the exemption only applies to information provided to a health care provider, noting that the inquiry should focus on the nature of the information itself. “[T]he relevant inquiry is as to the nature of the information, not who compiled it, or where it appears, or whether it is a precise technical evaluation.”

    The court found that there was no need to balance interests since the legislature had determined that the release of such information constitutes an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy. The court quoted Matter of Federation of N. Y. State Rifle & Pistol Clubs v New York City Police Dept., 73 NY2d 92, 97 stating that “Once it is determined that the requested material falls within a FOIL exemption, no further policy analysis is required.”

  • Arms Access Info. v. New York City Police Dept., 79 N.Y.2d 102 (1992): Freedom of Information and Privacy Exemptions for Fundraising

    Arms Access Info. v. New York City Police Dept., 79 N.Y.2d 102 (1992)

    Under New York’s Freedom of Information Law (FOIL), an agency may deny a request for names and addresses if the list would be used for fundraising purposes, which includes soliciting membership dues to support an organization’s activities.

    Summary

    Arms Access Information sought the names and addresses of New York City rifle and shotgun permit holders from the New York City Police Department under FOIL, intending to solicit membership dues. The Police Department denied the request, arguing that releasing the information would be an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy because the organization intended to use the list for fundraising. The New York Court of Appeals held that soliciting membership dues to support an organization’s activities constitutes “fundraising” under FOIL, and thus the information could be withheld.

    Facts

    Arms Access Information, a pro-gun advocacy group, requested the names and addresses of individuals holding rifle or shotgun permits from the New York City Police Department. The group intended to use the information to solicit membership dues to support its activities, including lobbying and providing legal advice to members. The Police Department denied the request, citing the privacy exemption in Public Officers Law §§ 87(2)(b) and 89(2)(b)(iii), arguing that the release would be used for fundraising purposes.

    Procedural History

    Arms Access Information initiated a CPLR article 78 proceeding seeking to compel the Police Department to release the requested information. The Supreme Court initially granted the petition, then adhered to its original determination after reargument, despite finding the New York City Administrative Code inapplicable. The Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a request under the Freedom of Information Law (FOIL) for the names and addresses of persons holding rifle or shotgun permits may be denied as an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy because the requesting organization seeks the information to solicit membership dues to support its activities, which the Police Department argues constitutes “fund-raising” as the term is used in Public Officers Law § 89 (2) (b) (iii).

    Holding

    Yes, because soliciting membership dues to support the general activities of an organization and further its overall objectives constitutes “fund-raising” under FOIL, thus allowing the agency to deny the request to protect the privacy of permit holders.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals acknowledged FOIL’s strong policy of public access to government records but emphasized that exemptions must be given their natural and obvious meaning. The court held that soliciting membership dues to support an organization’s activities constitutes “fund-raising” within the meaning of Public Officers Law § 87(2)(b)(iii). The court reasoned that the purpose of the solicitation, to obtain funds to support the organization, is what matters, regardless of the form the solicitation takes or the incidental benefits offered to those who pay dues. The court distinguished this case from those where the information request served a governmental purpose or where disclosure would inform the public about governmental activities. Here, the court found that no governmental purpose was served by disclosing the permit holders’ information. The court stated that the Legislature classified releasing names and addresses for fundraising efforts as an unwarranted invasion of privacy, and it was not the court’s role to weigh the degree of annoyance that would result from the solicitations. “It is enough that the Legislature has seen fit to classify the release of the names and addresses of individuals for use in such fund-raising efforts as an unwarranted invasion of their privacy.”