New York Law Review

Tag: Freedom of Information Law

  • Empire Center v. NY State Teachers’ Retirement System, 23 N.Y.3d 440 (2014): FOIL and Disclosure of Retiree Names

    Empire Center for N.Y. State Policy v. New York State Teachers’ Retirement Sys., 23 N.Y.3d 440 (2014)

    Under New York’s Freedom of Information Law (FOIL), the names of retirees receiving benefits from public employee retirement systems are subject to disclosure, while their home addresses remain exempt.

    Summary

    The Empire Center sought disclosure of the names of retired members from the New York State Teachers’ Retirement System and the Teachers’ Retirement System of the City of New York under FOIL. The retirement systems refused, citing Public Officers Law § 89(7), which protects the home addresses of retirees. The Court of Appeals reversed the lower courts’ decisions, holding that the statute explicitly exempts only home addresses, not the names, of retirees. The Court distinguished its prior decision in Matter of New York Veteran Police Assn., clarifying that it only applied to requests for both names and addresses, not names alone.

    Facts

    The Empire Center for New York State Policy, a “think tank,” requested the names of retired members from two retirement systems under FOIL.
    The retirement systems denied the request, citing Public Officers Law § 89(7).
    The Empire Center then filed Article 78 proceedings to compel disclosure.

    Procedural History

    Supreme Court dismissed both petitions.
    The Appellate Division affirmed the Supreme Court’s decisions.
    The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and reversed the Appellate Division’s orders.

    Issue(s)

    Whether Public Officers Law § 89(7) exempts the names of retirees from disclosure under FOIL, or only their home addresses.

    Holding

    No, because Public Officers Law § 89(7) explicitly exempts only the home addresses of retirees, not their names. The statute differentiates between “retirees” and “beneficiaries,” exempting both the name and address of the latter, but only the address of the former.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court’s reasoning hinged on the plain language of Public Officers Law § 89(7), which states that “Nothing in this article shall require the disclosure of the home address … of a retiree,” but does not similarly restrict the disclosure of a retiree’s name. The court emphasized the contrast between the treatment of retirees and “beneficiaries,” for whom both name and address are protected.

    The Court distinguished its prior ruling in Matter of New York Veteran Police Assn. v New York City Police Dept. Art. I Pension Fund, where it had appeared to deny a request for names and addresses of retirees. The Court clarified that the Veteran Police case only addressed the denial of a request for both names and addresses. Since the Empire Center only sought the names, the prior ruling was not controlling.

    The Court also addressed the retirement systems’ argument that disclosing names could lead to an “unwarranted invasion of personal privacy” under Public Officers Law § 87(2)(b). The Court dismissed this concern as speculative, noting that the Empire Center was not seeking the information for solicitation or fund-raising purposes, which would trigger the privacy exemption. The Court stated that the privacy exemption could be reconsidered if future FOIL requests raised similar privacy concerns, particularly if they involved solicitation.

    The Court emphasized the importance of adhering to the specific language of the statute and cautioned against reading its prior decisions too broadly, stating, “Our decisions are not to be read as deciding questions that were not before us and that we did not consider.”

  • Harbatkin v. New York City Dept. of Records & Info. Servs., 19 N.Y.3d 370 (2012): Balancing Privacy Interests and Public Access to Historical Records Under FOIL

    Harbatkin v. New York City Dept. of Records & Info. Servs., 19 N.Y.3d 370 (2012)

    Under New York’s Freedom of Information Law (FOIL), when deciding whether disclosing information constitutes an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, courts must balance the privacy interests at stake against the public interest in disclosure, and the government cannot break a promise of confidentiality made to individuals, even after a significant period has passed.

    Summary

    An historian sought unredacted transcripts of interviews conducted by the New York City Board of Education during its “Anti-Communist Investigations” in the mid-20th century. The City had redacted names and identifying information, citing privacy concerns. The Court of Appeals held that while names of individuals mentioned in the transcripts (but not interviewed) should be disclosed due to the diminished privacy concerns over time, the identities of interviewees who were promised confidentiality should remain protected to uphold the government’s promise, balancing the interests of historical transparency and individual privacy. This case clarifies the application of FOIL exemptions for privacy interests in the context of historical records.

    Facts

    The New York City Board of Education conducted “Anti-Communist Investigations” from the 1930s to the 1960s, intensely during the 1940s and 1950s, interviewing approximately 1,100 individuals. Interviewees were promised confidentiality. An historian, whose parents were targets of these investigations, sought access to the City’s records. The City’s Department of Records and Information Services redacted names and identifying information under a rule requiring redaction unless the person or their heirs consented to disclosure. The historian rejected the City’s offer to access unredacted files if she agreed not to publish names, and filed suit to compel disclosure without redaction.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the City could redact the documents to avoid an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy. The Appellate Division affirmed. The historian appealed to the Court of Appeals as of right, arguing a constitutional issue, and also moved for permission to appeal. The Court of Appeals retained the appeal as of right but ultimately dismissed it on constitutional grounds, granted the motion for permission to appeal, and modified the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether, under New York’s Freedom of Information Law (FOIL), the City’s redaction of names and identifying information from transcripts of the Board of Education’s Anti-Communist Investigations, to protect the privacy of individuals mentioned or interviewed, constitutes an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, considering the historical context and promises of confidentiality.

    Holding

    No, in part and yes, in part. The redaction of names of individuals mentioned in the interviews, but not promised confidentiality, is not permissible because the privacy interest has diminished over time. Yes, the redaction of names and identifying details of interviewees who were promised confidentiality is permissible because the government must uphold its promise, even after a long period.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court applied Public Officers Law § 87 (2) (b), which allows agencies to deny access to records that would constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy. Because none of the specific examples of unwarranted invasion of privacy in Public Officers Law § 89 (2) (b) applied, the Court balanced the privacy interests against the public interest in disclosure, citing Matter of New York Times Co. v City of N.Y. Fire Dept., 4 NY3d 477, 485 (2005). The Court reasoned that the privacy interests of those merely mentioned in the interviews had diminished over time because the stigma associated with being labeled a Communist had lessened. Therefore, disclosing their names would not be an unwarranted invasion of privacy. However, the Court emphasized the importance of upholding the government’s promise of confidentiality to interviewees, stating, “We find it unacceptable for the government to break that promise, even after all these years.” The Court acknowledged that the risk of harm to the interviewees or their families might be small, but the promise must be honored. The decision reflects a balancing act between historical transparency and the protection of individual privacy rights, particularly when a promise of confidentiality was made.

  • Town of Waterford v. New York State Department of Environmental Conservation, 18 N.Y.3d 647 (2012): Clarifying the Scope of FOIL’s Inter-Agency Exemption

    18 N.Y.3d 647 (2012)

    The Freedom of Information Law’s (FOIL) inter-agency and intra-agency exemption, which protects predecisional deliberative materials, does not extend to communications between a New York state agency and a federal agency because the statutory definition of “agency” is limited to state and municipal entities.

    Summary

    The Town of Waterford sought information from the New York State Department of Environmental Conservation (DEC) regarding the Hudson River dredging project, particularly concerning alternative water supplies due to PCB contamination. The DEC denied access to certain records exchanged with the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), claiming the inter-agency exemption under FOIL. The New York Court of Appeals held that the inter-agency exemption does not apply to communications with federal agencies, as the FOIL statute defines “agency” as state or municipal entities only. The court emphasized FOIL’s policy of open government and narrow interpretation of exemptions, ordering the release of the withheld documents.

    Facts

    The EPA placed a 200-mile portion of the Hudson River on the National Priorities List in 1984 due to PCB contamination.
    The EPA, DEC, and New York State Department of Health (DOH) collaborated on addressing the contamination, with the EPA as the lead agency.
    In 2002, the EPA approved a remediation plan requiring dredging, and General Electric (GE) was directed to prepare a “Water Supply Options Analysis” for the Towns of Waterford and Halfmoon.
    The Town of Waterford subsequently made a FOIL request to DEC seeking documents related to alternative water supplies, PCB levels, and modifications to regulations governing PCB exposure, along with materials related to GE’s analysis.

    Procedural History

    The DEC provided some documents but withheld others, citing the inter-agency or intra-agency exemption and other state/federal law exemptions.
    The Town commenced a CPLR Article 78 proceeding challenging the withholding.
    Supreme Court directed disclosure of additional records, finding the EPA was not an “agency” under the Public Officers Law.
    The Appellate Division modified, holding that communications between federal and state agencies could be considered deliberative material subject to exemption, and remitted for in camera review.
    Supreme Court then concluded the records qualified as exempt deliberative material.
    The Town appealed to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether communications with the EPA, a federal agency, fall within the inter-agency or intra-agency exemption for predecisional materials under Public Officers Law § 87(2)(g).

    Holding

    No, because the statutory definition of “agency” in the Public Officers Law is explicitly limited to state and municipal entities, and does not include federal agencies like the EPA.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized that FOIL is based on the principle that “the public is vested with an inherent right to know and that official secrecy is anathematic to our form of government.” Therefore, FOIL must be liberally construed, and its exemptions narrowly interpreted.
    The statute defines “agency” as “any state or municipal department, board, bureau, division, commission, committee, public authority, public corporation, council, office or other governmental entity performing a governmental or proprietary function for the state or any one or more municipalities thereof, except the judiciary or the state legislature” (Public Officers Law § 86 [3]).
    The Court rejected the DEC’s argument that the definition of “agency” should not apply to the phrases “inter-agency” and “intra-agency,” finding no indication of legislative intent to treat the term differently.
    While acknowledging the collaborative relationship between the EPA and DEC, the Court distinguished the EPA from an outside consultant retained by an agency. The Court noted the EPA was the lead agency and represented different constituencies, whose interests may diverge.
    The Court cited the Committee on Open Government’s opinion that the EPA cannot be characterized as a consultant “retained” by the DEC and that the definition of “agency” does not include federal agencies.
    The Court concluded that the DEC failed to meet its burden of proving that the requested material fell within the statutory exemption. “It would make little sense to protect the deliberative process when such reports are prepared by agency employees yet deny this protection when reports are prepared for the same purpose by outside consultants retained by agencies”.

  • Schenectady County SPCA v. Mills, 16 N.Y.3d 44 (2010): Redaction Required for FOIL Requests

    Schenectady County Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, Inc. v. Mills, 16 N.Y.3d 44 (2010)

    An agency responding to a Freedom of Information Law (FOIL) request must redact a record to remove exempt information if it can do so without unreasonable difficulty, rather than withhold the entire record.

    Summary

    Schenectady County SPCA requested a list of names and addresses of licensed veterinarians and veterinary technicians from the New York State Education Department under FOIL. The Department offered names and city/state portions of addresses but refused to provide street addresses, claiming they could not distinguish between business and residential addresses. The SPCA sought only business addresses. The Court of Appeals held that the Department could not refuse to produce the entire record simply because some of it might be exempt. The court emphasized the duty to redact exempt information when reasonably possible, to fulfill FOIL obligations efficiently.

    Facts

    The Schenectady County Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (SPCA) requested, via email and then formally under FOIL, a list of names and addresses of licensed veterinarians and veterinary technicians in Schenectady County from the Education Department.

    The Department offered a list of names, cities, and states but refused to provide street addresses, stating that it did not provide home addresses for licensed professionals and could not distinguish between business and residential addresses in its computerized files.

    The SPCA clarified it was seeking only business addresses.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court dismissed the SPCA’s petition to compel production of the list.

    The Appellate Division reversed the Supreme Court’s decision and granted the petition, compelling the Department to produce the list.

    The Department appealed to the New York Court of Appeals as of right.

    Issue(s)

    Whether an agency responding to a FOIL request may withhold a record entirely because some of the information in that record may be exempt from disclosure, even if the exempt information could be redacted.

    Holding

    No, because an agency responding to a FOIL request must redact the record to remove exempt information if it can do so without unreasonable difficulty, rather than withhold the entire record.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals held that the Education Department could not refuse to produce the entire list of names and addresses simply because it contained some information (home addresses) that might be exempt from disclosure under FOIL’s privacy provisions.

    The Court reasoned that the SPCA was only seeking business addresses, which the Department did not claim were private. The Court found it “obvious” that the Department should simply delete the home addresses from the list, especially because the SPCA was only seeking business addresses.

    The Court distinguished between creating a new record (which FOIL generally does not require) and redacting an existing one. Citing Matter of Data Tree, LLC v Romaine, 9 NY3d 454, 464 (2007), the court noted that “even when a document subject to FOIL contains . . . private, protected information, agencies may be required to prepare a redacted version with the exempt material removed.”

    The Court criticized the extensive litigation of the case, stating, “It seems that an agency sensitive to its FOIL obligations could have furnished petitioner a redacted list with a few hours’ effort, and at negligible cost.” The Court expressed its hope that the Department and other government agencies would comply with their FOIL obligations more efficiently in the future.

  • New York State United Teachers v. Brighter Choice Charter School, 18 N.Y.3d 560 (2012): FOIL Exemption for Lists Used for Fundraising

    New York State United Teachers v. Brighter Choice Charter School, 18 N.Y.3d 560 (2012)

    Under New York’s Freedom of Information Law (FOIL), an agency may deny access to records, including lists of names, if disclosure would constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, such as when the list would be used for fundraising purposes.

    Summary

    New York State United Teachers (NYSUT) sought payroll records, including teacher names, from several charter schools via FOIL. The charter schools refused to disclose the teachers’ names, arguing it would be an unwarranted invasion of privacy because NYSUT would use the list for fundraising (i.e., soliciting membership). The New York Court of Appeals held that disclosing the names was not required under FOIL because NYSUT’s intended use of the list to solicit members constituted fundraising, triggering a FOIL exemption. The Court reasoned that the purpose for which the information is sought, not the public or private status of the individuals, determines whether the exemption applies.

    Facts

    NYSUT requested payroll records from six charter schools, including teacher names, titles, salaries, and home addresses. The charter schools partially denied the request, withholding teacher names and home addresses. NYSUT administratively appealed without success and then commenced legal action. NYSUT sought the teacher’s names, titles, and salaries. The Charter Schools agreed to provide titles and salaries but continued to withhold the names.

    Procedural History

    NYSUT commenced a hybrid CPLR article 78/declaratory judgment action in Supreme Court, seeking disclosure of the teacher’s names. Supreme Court ordered disclosure. The Appellate Division affirmed, reasoning that NYSUT dropped its request for home addresses and that the Charter Schools were required to keep basic employee information pursuant to Public Officers Law § 87 (3)(b). The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether charter schools must disclose the names of their teachers pursuant to FOIL when the requesting party intends to use the names for membership solicitation, which the charter schools argue constitutes fundraising, thus triggering an exemption to disclosure.

    Holding

    No, because NYSUT’s intent in requesting the teacher names is to expand its membership and, by extension, obtain membership dues; thus the request falls within the fund-raising exemption of Public Officers Law § 89 (2)(b)(iii).

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that while charter schools are subject to FOIL and must maintain a record of employee names, titles, and salaries under Public Officers Law § 87 (3)(b), there’s an exception. Under Public Officers Law § 89 (2), an agency may deny access to records if disclosure would constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, including the “sale or release of lists of names and addresses if such lists would be used for commercial or fund-raising purposes.” The court relied on Matter of Federation of N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Clubs v New York City Police Dept., 73 NY2d 92 (1989), stating that it is the purpose of the solicitation that matters, not what it is called. Giving the term “fund-raising” its “natural and most obvious meaning” (Matter of Capital Newspapers, Div. of Hearst Corp. v Whalen, 69 NY2d 246, 251 [1987]), NYSUT’s intent to expand its membership and obtain dues qualifies as fundraising. The court also noted that ordering disclosure of the names would not further the policies of FOIL, which are to assist the public in making informed choices about governmental activities. The court emphasized that the purpose for which the information is sought drives the analysis. The fact that NYSUT dropped its request for addresses is irrelevant; the fundraising exemption is implicated even when only names are sought, as they can be linked to addresses through other means. The court stated, “it is precisely because no governmental purpose is served by public disclosure’ of this information that section 87 (2) (b)’s privacy exemption falls squarely within FOIL’S statutory scheme”.

  • West Harlem Bus. Group v. Empire State Dev. Corp., 13 N.Y.3d 882 (2009): Freedom of Information Law & Specificity of Exemption Claims

    13 N.Y.3d 882 (2009)

    Under New York’s Freedom of Information Law (FOIL), an agency denying access to records must provide a particularized and specific justification for withholding the documents, demonstrating how a specific exemption applies; generalized claims are insufficient.

    Summary

    West Harlem Business Group (WHBG) sought documents from Empire State Development Corporation (ESDC) related to Columbia University’s campus construction under FOIL. ESDC initially denied access based on a broad exemption, later changing its justification during litigation. The court ordered disclosure, finding ESDC failed to provide a sufficiently detailed explanation of why specific exemptions applied. The Court of Appeals affirmed, emphasizing that agencies must articulate specific reasons for withholding documents under FOIL, rather than relying on blanket assertions of exemptions. This case highlights the importance of agency transparency and accountability in responding to FOIL requests.

    Facts

    WHBG, a business association, submitted FOIL requests to ESDC concerning Columbia University’s construction project. One request sought documents related to an agreement between Columbia and ESDC. ESDC denied the request, citing an exemption for impairing contract awards or collective bargaining negotiations. During subsequent litigation, ESDC changed its rationale, claiming exemptions for inter-agency materials and attorney-client privileged communications. ESDC provided documents for in-camera review but failed to specify which exemption applied to each document.

    Procedural History

    WHBG initiated a CPLR article 78 proceeding after ESDC denied its FOIL request. Supreme Court ordered an in-camera review of the withheld documents. Dissatisfied with ESDC’s lack of specificity, the Supreme Court created its own document log and ordered disclosure. The Appellate Division affirmed the Supreme Court’s decision. ESDC appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether ESDC met its burden under FOIL to justify withholding documents by articulating a particularized and specific justification for claiming that the requested documents were exempt from disclosure under Public Officers Law § 87(2)(a) and (g).

    Holding

    No, because ESDC provided only conclusory characterizations of the records without sufficiently identifying the particular exemption to which the submitted records were subject; therefore, ESDC failed to meet its burden of proof relative to the exemptions, and the Supreme Court properly ordered disclosure of the documents.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized that ESDC had a duty to conduct a diligent search for responsive documents and to fully explain in writing the reasons for denying access. The court criticized ESDC for initially relying on a broad exemption and later changing its justification during litigation, characterizing this as a failure to comply with FOIL’s requirements. The Court found that ESDC’s conclusory characterizations of the records were insufficient to meet its burden of establishing that the documents were exempt from disclosure. ESDC failed to articulate a particularized and specific justification for each document, instead providing blanket assertions of exemptions. Quoting Church of Scientology of N.Y. v State of New York, 46 NY2d 906, 907-908 (1979), the Court stated that ESDC provided “conclusory characterizations” of the records sought. Because ESDC failed to meet its burden of proof regarding the exemptions, the Supreme Court properly ordered disclosure of the documents. The court noted that it is not the function of the Supreme Court to apply the exemptions for the agency. This case reinforces the principle that agencies must provide detailed and specific explanations when denying access to records under FOIL.

  • Markowitz v. Serio, 11 N.Y.3d 43 (2008): FOIL Exemption and Competitive Injury in Insurance Regulation

    11 N.Y.3d 43 (2008)

    An insurance regulation mandating that reports be “public record” does not automatically negate an insurer’s right to assert a Freedom of Information Law (FOIL) exemption if disclosure would cause substantial competitive injury, but the burden of proving such injury is a high one requiring specific, persuasive evidence.

    Summary

    Brooklyn Borough President Markowitz sought zip code-level auto insurance data from the NYS Insurance Department under FOIL, arguing it was a public record under insurance regulations aimed at preventing redlining. The Department refused, claiming the data was a trade secret and its release would cause substantial competitive harm to insurers. The Court of Appeals held that while the reports are subject to FOIL, the insurers failed to demonstrate specific competitive injury. The court emphasized the narrow interpretation of FOIL exemptions and the requirement of concrete evidence of harm, reversing the Appellate Division’s decision and ordering disclosure.

    Facts

    Marty Markowitz, Brooklyn Borough President, filed FOIL requests with the NYS Insurance Department for Regulation 90 reports. These reports contain zip code-level data on auto insurance policies, including issuances, renewals, cancellations, and non-renewals, broken down by carrier. Markowitz argued the reports were public records under 11 NYCRR 218.7(d). The Insurance Department provided county-level data but refused to release zip code-specific data, asserting FOIL exemptions for trade secrets and potential competitive harm.

    Procedural History

    After exhausting administrative remedies, Markowitz filed an Article 78 proceeding. Supreme Court granted the petition, ordering disclosure. The Appellate Division reversed, finding the Department’s decision to withhold the reports reasonable, based on evidence of potential competitive harm to insurers. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether 11 NYCRR 218.7(d)’s designation of Regulation 90 reports as “public record” prevents the Insurance Department from withholding the reports under a FOIL exemption.

    2. Whether the Insurance Department and the intervening insurers met their burden of proving that disclosure of the Regulation 90 reports would cause substantial competitive injury under Public Officers Law § 87(2)(d).

    Holding

    1. No, because the “public record” designation does not negate the right of insurers to claim a FOIL exemption; the language means the reports are subject to public disclosure unless a FOIL exemption applies.

    2. No, because the Department and insurers failed to present specific, persuasive evidence that disclosure would cause substantial competitive injury; the evidence presented was theoretical at best.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that the “public record” language of 11 NYCRR 218.7(d) does not automatically mandate disclosure, but rather subjects the reports to FOIL provisions, including potential exemptions. The court deferred to the Department’s interpretation of the regulation, finding it reasonable and consistent with FOIL principles. Referencing previous cases, the Court stated that “the FOIL exemptions must be read as having engrafted, as a matter of public policy, certain limitations on the disclosure of otherwise accessible records”. The court emphasized that FOIL exemptions are narrowly construed to promote public access to government records. To justify a FOIL exemption under Public Officers Law § 87(2)(d), the party seeking the exemption must provide specific, persuasive evidence of substantial competitive injury, not merely speculative harm. Here, the insurers’ argument that competitors could exploit their geographic weaknesses was deemed theoretical, as they failed to demonstrate how zip code data alone would necessarily cause competitive disadvantage. The court stated that the party seeking the exemption must “articulating a particularized and specific justification for denying access”. Judge Smith concurred in result only, arguing the regulation made the reports automatically public records, but that if FOIL applied, the insurers had shown a substantial competitive injury. He criticized the majority for dismissing the insurers’ detailed factual submissions. The Court found that the Department and insurers did not meet their burden of justifying the exemption of the reports, and reversed the Appellate Division’s decision, ordering the reports be made available.

  • Perez v. City University, 6 N.Y.3d 522 (2006): Determining When University Committees are Subject to Open Government Laws

    Perez v. City University, 6 N.Y.3d 522 (2006)

    A committee within a public university system performs a governmental function, and is therefore subject to the Open Meetings Law and the Freedom of Information Law, when it exercises responsibilities delegated by the legislature and functions as a proxy for authorized faculty councils.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether the Hostos Community College Senate and its Executive Committee are subject to New York’s Open Meetings Law (OML) and Freedom of Information Law (FOIL). The Court of Appeals held that these entities do perform a governmental function because they have been charged with responsibilities delegated by the legislature to the CUNY Board, and they function as a proxy for the faculty councils authorized by the CUNY bylaws. The court further clarified that while the OML does not prohibit secret ballots, FOIL requires a record of each member’s final vote, thus precluding secret ballots.

    Facts

    Petitioners Chong Kim and Aneudis Perez were denied access to meetings of the Hostos Community College Senate and its Executive Committee, respectively. Kim was turned away from a meeting where curriculum changes were approved via secret ballot. Perez was barred from an Executive Committee meeting where he sought to deliver a petition. The College Senate, established by the Governance Charter, is responsible for recommending policy on all college matters and formulating academic policy. The Executive Committee organizes the Senate’s work. The CUNY Board of Trustees delegated some of its authority to faculty councils; the College Senate acts in place of this council at Hostos Community College.

    Procedural History

    The petitioners filed a CPLR article 78 proceeding, arguing the College Senate and Executive Committee were subject to OML and FOIL. Supreme Court granted the petition. The Appellate Division reversed, concluding the Senate was merely advisory and thus not subject to these laws. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division, reinstating the Supreme Court’s judgment.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the Hostos Community College Senate and its Executive Committee perform a “governmental function” such that they are subject to the Open Meetings Law and the Freedom of Information Law.
    2. Whether the Open Meetings Law or the Freedom of Information Law prohibits secret ballots by the College Senate.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the College Senate and its Executive Committee have been charged with responsibilities delegated by the Legislature to the CUNY Board and function as a proxy for the faculty councils authorized by CUNY bylaws.
    2. No, the Open Meetings Law does not prohibit secret ballots, but the Freedom of Information Law does because it requires a record of each member’s final vote.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized that both the Open Meetings Law and the Freedom of Information Law aim to ensure transparency in governmental decision-making. The Court stated, “[I]n enacting the Open Meetings Law, the Legislature sought to ensure that ‘public business be performed in an open and public manner and that the citizens of this state be fully aware of and able to observe the performance of public officials and attend and listen to the deliberations and decisions that go into the making of public policy’ (Public Officers Law § 100).” They reiterated that these laws should be construed liberally. To determine whether an entity performs a governmental function, the court considers the entity’s authority, power distribution, role, and relationship to affected parties. The Court distinguished this case from purely advisory bodies, emphasizing the Senate’s significant role in policy-making. The court highlighted that the College Senate is the sole legislative body on campus authorized to send proposals to the CUNY Board of Trustees. The court quoted from the lower court decision, stating, “[T]he college senate and the executive committee thereof constitute integral components of the governance structure of Hostos Community College. The senate and its executive committee perform functions of both advisory and determinative natures which are essential to the operation and administration of the college.” (195 Misc 2d 16, 33 [Sup Ct, Bronx County 2002]). Regarding secret ballots, the Court noted that while the OML only requires a record of motions, proposals, resolutions, and other matters formally voted upon, the FOIL mandates a record of each member’s final vote, thus precluding secret ballots. The Court concluded that “under the Freedom of Information Law, voting by the College Senate and the Executive Committee may not be conducted by secret ballot.”

  • Beechwood Restorative Care Center v. Signor, 5 N.Y.3d 435 (2005): Recovery of Attorney’s Fees Under FOIL

    5 N.Y.3d 435 (2005)

    To recover attorney’s fees under New York’s Freedom of Information Law (FOIL), a party must demonstrate that the records obtained were of clearly significant interest to the general public, and the agency lacked a reasonable basis for withholding the record.

    Summary

    Beechwood Restorative Care Center sought attorney’s fees after successfully compelling the New York State Department of Health (DOH) to release documents under FOIL. Beechwood argued that the documents, related to the closure of its nursing facility, were of significant public interest. The Court of Appeals held that while Beechwood substantially prevailed in obtaining the documents, it failed to demonstrate that the specific records released were of clearly significant interest to the general public, as required for fee recovery under FOIL. The court also held that the New York State Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA) does not apply to FOIL proceedings.

    Facts

    The New York State Department of Health (DOH) initiated proceedings to revoke Beechwood Restorative Care Center’s license due to substandard care allegations. Between August 1999 and January 2001, Beechwood submitted 17 FOIL requests to DOH seeking documents related to DOH procedures and Beechwood’s license revocation. DOH provided some documents, but Beechwood claimed non-compliance regarding 12 requests. This prompted Beechwood to file suit seeking the remaining documents and attorney’s fees.

    Procedural History

    Beechwood commenced a CPLR Article 78 proceeding in Supreme Court, alleging DOH failed to respond to FOIL requests. Supreme Court ordered DOH to provide affidavits detailing their search efforts. After multiple rounds of affidavits and document production, Beechwood moved for attorney’s fees under FOIL and the EAJA. Supreme Court denied the motion, finding Beechwood failed to demonstrate the records were of significant public interest and that the EAJA was inapplicable. The Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the lower courts erred in determining that Beechwood failed to establish that the records obtained were of clearly significant interest to the general public, as required for an attorney’s fee award under FOIL.

    2. Whether the counsel fee provision in the New York State Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA) applies to FOIL proceedings.

    Holding

    1. No, because the records themselves must be of significant interest to the public, and Beechwood failed to demonstrate such interest in the documents it obtained from DOH.

    2. No, because the EAJA’s counsel fee provision does not apply when another statute, such as FOIL, specifically provides for counsel fees.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized that to recover attorney’s fees under FOIL, the specific records disclosed must be of “clearly significant interest to the general public” (Public Officers Law § 89[4][c][i]). The Court distinguished between public interest in the event (the nursing home closure) and public interest in the records themselves. Beechwood failed to show how the general agency records, job descriptions, employee training documents, and internal communications were of significant interest to the public. The Court cited the legislative history, noting that the public interest standard was intentionally tightened to require more than just potential public interest. Because Beechwood failed to satisfy this requirement, its claim for attorney’s fees under FOIL failed. Regarding the EAJA, the Court pointed to the statute’s introductory proviso, which states that the EAJA applies “except as otherwise specifically provided by statute” (CPLR 8601[a]). Since FOIL specifically provides for attorney’s fees in FOIL proceedings, the EAJA is inapplicable. The court emphasized that “the bill clarifies and tightens the public interest standard by requiring that the record be of ‘clearly significant interest to the general public’ and not just ‘potentially’ so” (Governor’s Mem approving L 1982, ch 73, 1982 NY Legis Ann, at 47). The court reinforced the principle that simply using the documents in litigation against the government does not automatically establish public interest. The court explicitly states that FOIL is a statute that “otherwise specifically provide[s]” an attorneys’ fee standard to be applied, thus, Beechwood may not seek counsel fees pursuant to the EAJA.

  • Alderson v. New York State College of Agriculture and Life Sciences at Cornell University, 4 N.Y.3d 225 (2005): Delineating FOIL Access Based on Cornell’s Statutory Autonomy

    Alderson v. New York State College of Agriculture and Life Sciences at Cornell University, 4 N.Y.3d 225 (2005)

    When determining whether Cornell University is subject to Freedom of Information Law (FOIL) requests regarding its management of statutory colleges, courts must examine whether the requested documents relate to activities over which Cornell exercises statutory autonomy or to the expenditure of public funds, for which it is accountable to the state.

    Summary

    This case clarifies the scope of FOIL applicability to Cornell University concerning its administration of statutory colleges. The Court of Appeals held that while Cornell is generally a private institution, its management of state-funded statutory colleges involves “public aspects” subject to FOIL. However, this subjection is not absolute. Documents related to Cornell’s autonomous management of research and academic activities are exempt. Documents about the expenditure of public funds are subject to FOIL, as Cornell is accountable to the state in this regard. The case was remitted to determine which documents fell into each category.

    Facts

    Jeremy Alderson, a radio host, submitted FOIL requests to Cornell University seeking documents related to research activities and financial matters at the New York State Agricultural Experiment Station and a proposed Agricultural Technology Park. Cornell denied the requests, claiming it was not a state agency subject to FOIL.

    Procedural History

    Alderson sued Cornell, seeking a declaration that it was required to respond to the FOIL requests. The Supreme Court initially denied Cornell’s motion to dismiss, later ruling that Cornell had to provide the documents because the Agricultural Experiment Station served a public purpose. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Supreme Court then ordered Cornell to turn over most of the requested documents after an in-camera inspection, although some were exempted as trade secrets. Cornell appealed, challenging the ruling that it was a state agency subject to FOIL.

    Issue(s)

    Whether Cornell University, in managing the New York State College of Agriculture and Life Sciences and the New York State Agricultural Experiment Station, is a state agency subject to FOIL regarding: 1) documents pertaining to research and other academic activities, and 2) documents involving financial records and expenditures or sources of funding.

    Holding

    1. No, because Education Law § 5712 grants Cornell broad authority over educational policies, activities, and operations, including research work, at the statutory colleges.

    2. Yes, because the Legislature maintained the right to oversee Cornell’s use of public funding in managing the statutory colleges, making Cornell accountable for the expenditure of public funds.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals distinguished its prior holding in Matter of Stoll v New York State Coll. of Veterinary Medicine at Cornell Univ. (94 NY2d 162 [1999]), emphasizing that the nature of the activity underlying the FOIL request is critical. Applying the relevant statutes, particularly Education Law §§ 5712 and 5713, the Court found that Cornell exercises complete autonomy over research and academic activities at the statutory colleges. The Court quoted Education Law § 5712 (2), stating that Cornell “shall . . . administer the said college of agriculture and life sciences as to . . . all other matters pertaining to its educational policies, activities and operations, including research work.” Therefore, documents related to these activities pertain to a private function and are not subject to FOIL.

    However, the Court acknowledged that Cornell is subject to financial reporting requirements under Education Law § 5712 (4), which mandates an annual statement detailing the expenditure of public funds. Because the Legislature did not cede complete control of financial issues, Cornell is performing a public function to the extent it is accountable for public funds. Documents related to this public accounting function are subject to FOIL. The court reasoned that to the extent that Cornell is accountable for the expenditure of public funds, “it is performing a public function. Documents relating to this activity are subject to FOIL.”

    The Court remitted the case because the record was insufficient to determine which documents related to research activities (exempt from FOIL) and which related to the expenditure of public funds (subject to FOIL). This established a framework for assessing future FOIL requests concerning Cornell’s statutory colleges, based on the degree of Cornell’s statutory autonomy over the activities to which the requested documents relate.