New York Law Review

Tag: Free Exercise Clause

  • Catholic Charities of Albany v. Serio, 7 N.Y.3d 510 (2006): Free Exercise Clause and Contraceptive Coverage Mandates

    Catholic Charities of Albany v. Serio, 7 N.Y.3d 510 (2006)

    When a state law imposes an incidental burden on the right to free exercise of religion, the courts must balance the interests advanced by the legislation against the burden on religious freedom, with substantial deference given to the legislature, and the party claiming an exemption bears the burden of showing that the law, as applied to them, is an unreasonable interference with religious freedom.

    Summary

    Ten faith-based social service organizations challenged New York’s Women’s Health and Wellness Act (WHWA), which requires health insurance policies covering prescription drugs to also cover contraception. The organizations argued that the law violated their religious freedom by compelling them to finance conduct (contraception) that they condemn. The New York Court of Appeals upheld the law, finding that it was a neutral law of general applicability with a valid secular purpose. The court held that while the law did burden the plaintiffs’ religious practices, the burden was not unreasonable, especially when weighed against the state’s interest in gender equality and women’s health. The court emphasized that the plaintiffs could choose not to offer prescription drug coverage at all and that many of their employees did not share their religious beliefs.

    Facts

    Ten faith-based social service organizations, including eight affiliated with the Roman Catholic Church and two with the Baptist Bible Fellowship International, brought suit against the Superintendent of Insurance, challenging provisions of the Women’s Health and Wellness Act (WHWA). These organizations object to the WHWA’s requirement that health insurance policies providing prescription drug coverage must also include coverage for contraception. The organizations believe contraception is sinful and that the law compels them to violate their religious tenets. None of the plaintiffs qualify as “religious employers” under the WHWA’s narrow exemption, which requires that the inculcation of religious values be the primary purpose of the entity, that the entity primarily employ and serve persons who share its religious tenets, and that the entity be a non-profit organization falling under specific sections of the Internal Revenue Code.

    Procedural History

    The plaintiffs filed suit in Supreme Court, seeking a declaration that the challenged provisions of the WHWA were invalid and an injunction against their enforcement. The Supreme Court rejected the challenge and granted summary judgment dismissing the complaint and declaring the legislation valid. The Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the provisions of the Women’s Health and Wellness Act (WHWA) requiring coverage of contraception violate the Free Exercise clauses of the New York and United States Constitutions.

    Holding

    No, because the WHWA is a neutral law of general applicability that serves a legitimate secular purpose and does not impose an unreasonable burden on the plaintiffs’ religious freedom.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals analyzed the plaintiffs’ claims under both the federal and state constitutions. Under the federal Free Exercise Clause, the court relied on Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Ore. v Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), which holds that a neutral law of general applicability does not violate the Free Exercise Clause, even if it incidentally burdens religious practice. The Court found the WHWA to be such a law, as its purpose was to promote women’s health and gender equality, not to target religious beliefs. As the court stated, “[t]he burden on plaintiffs’ religious exercise is the incidental result of a ‘neutral law of general applicability,’ one requiring health insurance policies that include coverage for prescription drugs to include coverage for contraception.”

    Under the New York Constitution’s Free Exercise Clause, the court adopted a balancing test, weighing the state’s interests against the burden on religious freedom. The court held that substantial deference is due the Legislature, and the party claiming an exemption bears the burden of showing that the challenged legislation, as applied to that party, is an unreasonable interference with religious freedom. The court acknowledged that the WHWA placed a serious burden on the plaintiffs’ religious practices but found that the burden was not an unreasonable interference. The court emphasized that the plaintiffs were not literally compelled to purchase contraceptive coverage, as they could choose not to offer prescription drug coverage at all. Additionally, the court noted that many of the plaintiffs’ employees did not share their religious beliefs. The court also weighed the State’s substantial interest in fostering equality between the sexes and in providing women with better health care, finding that the Legislature’s decision to prioritize these interests over a broader religious exemption was entitled to deference. The court stated that it could not say that “the choice the Legislature made has been shown to be an unreasonable interference with plaintiffs’ exercise of their religion.” The Court also dismissed the Establishment Clause claim, finding that the WHWA was not designed to favor or disfavor any particular religion but was a generally applicable and neutral law.

  • People v. Grossman, 85 N.Y.2d 144 (1995): Jury Cannot Decide Constitutionality of Religious Freedom Restriction

    People v. Grossman, 85 N.Y.2d 144 (1995)

    The determination of whether state action unconstitutionally infringes upon religious freedom is a question of law to be decided by the court, not a question of fact for the jury.

    Summary

    Grossman was convicted in Town Court for violating a zoning ordinance. He argued his religion required him to violate the ordinance and requested the court include the Free Exercise of Religion Clause from the New York Constitution in its jury charge. The Town Court refused. The County Court reversed, finding Grossman presented enough evidence to warrant the instruction. The Court of Appeals reversed the County Court’s decision, holding that determining whether state action unconstitutionally abridged religious freedom is a question of law for the court, not a question of fact for the jury. The case was remitted to County Court for factual determinations.

    Facts

    Grossman claimed his religious beliefs required him to violate a town zoning ordinance. During his trial in Town Court, Grossman requested the court include the language of the Free Exercise of Religion Clause from the New York Constitution in the jury charge. The Town Court refused to give the requested instruction.

    Procedural History

    The Town Court convicted Grossman of the zoning violation. Grossman appealed to the County Court. The County Court reversed and ordered a new trial, concluding that Grossman had presented a sufficient evidentiary basis for the jury instruction. The People appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a jury should determine if state action unconstitutionally abridges a defendant’s religious freedom.

    Holding

    No, because determining whether state action unconstitutionally abridges religious freedom is a question of law for the court to resolve, not a question of fact for the jury.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized that the jury’s role is to resolve factual disputes by assessing evidence and witness credibility, citing Dominguez v Manhattan & Bronx Surface Tr. Operating Auth., 46 NY2d 528, 534, and Wragge v Lizza Asphalt Constr. Co., 17 NY2d 313, 319. The court reasoned that Grossman’s proposed instruction would require the jury to determine the constitutionality of state action regarding religious freedom, a question of law reserved for the court.

    The court affirmed the Town Court’s role in balancing “the interest of the individual right of religious worship against the interest of the State which is sought to be enforced” (People v Woodruff, 26 AD2d 236, 238, affd no opn 21 NY2d 848). Therefore, the Town Court acted appropriately in refusing the requested jury instruction. The court did not elaborate further on the specific facts of the case or the zoning ordinance in question, focusing instead on the fundamental principle of separation of powers between judge and jury.

  • Dickens v. Erie County Dept. of Social Services, 31 N.Y.2d 63 (1972): Religious Matching in Adoption and the Establishment Clause

    Dickens v. Erie County Dept. of Social Services, 31 N.Y.2d 63 (1972)

    Religious matching in adoption proceedings, giving preference to adoptive parents of the same religion as the child, does not violate the Establishment Clause or the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, nor does it violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, as long as the child’s best interests remain the primary consideration.

    Summary

    Robert and Anne Dickens, a non-religious couple, were denied the opportunity to apply for adoption by the Erie County Department of Social Services solely because they lacked a religious affiliation. They challenged New York’s constitutional and statutory provisions favoring religious matching in adoption, arguing violations of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s decision, holding that the religious matching provisions, when considered in the context of the child’s best interests, do not create an establishment of religion, infringe upon religious freedom, or deny equal protection under the law. The court emphasized that religion is one of many factors and the child’s welfare is paramount.

    Facts

    Robert and Anne Dickens, with no religious affiliation, attempted to file an adoption application with the Erie County Department of Social Services.

    The Department refused to accept their application based solely on their lack of religious affiliation, citing New York laws favoring religious matching in adoptions.

    The Dickens initiated legal proceedings, arguing that the religious matching requirements violated their constitutional rights.

    Procedural History

    The petitioners, Robert and Anne Dickens, filed an Article 78 proceeding seeking a judgment declaring the religious affiliation requirements unconstitutional and directing the Department to process their application.

    The lower courts found no constitutional violation but directed the Department to accept and process the application.

    The petitioners appealed to the New York Court of Appeals as a matter of right.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether New York’s constitutional and statutory provisions requiring religious matching in adoption proceedings create an establishment of religion in violation of the First Amendment?

    2. Whether these provisions violate the petitioners’ right to free exercise of religion under the First Amendment?

    3. Whether these provisions deny the petitioners equal protection of the laws under the Fourteenth Amendment?

    Holding

    1. No, because the religious matching provisions serve a secular legislative purpose and do not have the primary effect of advancing or inhibiting religion, nor do they foster excessive government entanglement with religion.

    2. No, because the religious matching provisions, when balanced with the child’s best interests, do not discriminate against or penalize the petitioners for lacking a religious affiliation.

    3. No, because the religious matching provisions reasonably allow surrendering parents to express a religious preference and do not create an arbitrary classification denying the petitioners equal protection.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals applied the Establishment Clause test derived from Abington School District v. Schempp and Lemon v. Kurtzman, requiring a secular legislative purpose, a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion, and no excessive government entanglement with religion.

    The court reasoned that the religious matching provisions fulfill a secular legislative purpose by ensuring the child’s best interests while respecting the religious preferences of the natural parents. The provisions reflect a “benevolent neutrality” toward religion, as stated in Walz v. Tax Commission.

    The court highlighted that religion is not an exclusive or controlling factor in adoption proceedings; the “best interests of the child” standard provides flexibility and broad discretion to the court.

    The court noted that amendments to the Family Court Act and Social Services Law eliminated any mandatory requirement for religious matching, emphasizing the child’s welfare as the primary consideration.

    Regarding the Free Exercise Clause, the court found no coercion or penalty imposed on the petitioners for their lack of religious affiliation. The court suggested the Dickens could adopt children whose parents expressed indifference to religion or whose religious background was unknown.

    Addressing the Equal Protection argument, the court stated the issue was not with the religious matching provisions themselves, but with the scarcity of adoptive children whose parents lack religious preferences.

    The court quoted the statutes, underscoring that the religious wishes of parents must be given effect “so far as consistent with the best interests of the child.” The court emphasized that even within the religious matching framework, parents can express indifference to religion or make it a subordinate consideration.