New York Law Review

Tag: Fourth Amendment

  • People v. Ortiz, 83 N.Y.2d 840 (1994): Standing to Challenge a Search in Another’s Home

    People v. Ortiz, 83 N.Y.2d 840 (1994)

    A defendant must demonstrate a legitimate expectation of privacy to have standing to challenge a Fourth Amendment violation, and casual visitors generally lack such an expectation in another’s apartment.

    Summary

    Ortiz was convicted of criminal possession of a controlled substance. He challenged the warrantless entry into his girlfriend’s apartment and the seizure of evidence. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that Ortiz lacked standing to contest the search because he was merely a casual visitor and did not demonstrate a legitimate expectation of privacy in the apartment. The court deferred to the undisturbed findings of the trial court and Appellate Division, which indicated Ortiz’s tenuous connection to the premises. Additionally, the court found that the officers had objective reasons to enter the bedroom based on information about drug activity and Ortiz’s suspicious behavior.

    Facts

    Police received information about drug activity at an apartment. Upon entering the apartment, officers observed Ortiz in a bedroom holding a plastic bag containing a white powder that appeared to be narcotics. Ortiz was arrested, and the substance was seized. Ortiz claimed the warrantless entry violated his Fourth Amendment rights and moved to suppress the evidence.

    Procedural History

    The trial court denied Ortiz’s motion to suppress, finding he lacked standing to challenge the entry. Ortiz was convicted of criminal possession of a controlled substance. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, agreeing with the suppression court’s standing determination. Ortiz appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether Ortiz, as a visitor in his girlfriend’s apartment, had a legitimate expectation of privacy sufficient to confer standing to challenge the warrantless entry and subsequent search and seizure.

    Holding

    No, because the undisturbed findings of the trial court and Appellate Division demonstrate that Ortiz was merely a casual visitor and did not establish a sufficient connection to the apartment to have a reasonable expectation of privacy.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court emphasized that to claim a Fourth Amendment violation, a defendant must demonstrate a legitimate expectation of privacy. While such an expectation can exist in premises not owned by the defendant, such as for an overnight guest or someone with a familial relationship to the resident, Ortiz’s ties to the apartment were too tenuous. The court deferred to the affirmed findings of the lower courts, concluding there was evidence supporting the conclusion that Ortiz was a casual visitor without a reasonable expectation of privacy. The court stated that its review power was limited and found no basis to overturn the lower court’s conclusion regarding the officers’ objective, credible reasons for entering the bedroom, noting, “They had received information about drug activity and, upon observing defendant on the bed holding a plastic bag containing a white powder which appeared to be narcotics, were justified in seizing the contraband.” The court distinguished the case from situations where the defendant had a more established connection to the premises. This case highlights the need for a defendant to demonstrate a concrete connection to the searched premises to assert Fourth Amendment rights successfully. The ruling underscores the principle that Fourth Amendment protections are personal and cannot be vicariously asserted based solely on presence at a location.

  • People v. Tejada, 81 N.Y.2d 819 (1993): Scope of Mapp Hearing and Emergency Exception to Warrant Requirement

    People v. Tejada, 81 N.Y.2d 819 (1993)

    The scope of a Mapp hearing is limited to whether evidence was obtained in violation of a defendant’s constitutional rights, and does not extend to determining ultimate issues of fact, such as whether the defendant possessed the contraband in question; also, police may enter a premises without a warrant when they are in pursuit of a suspect in a shooting.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals held that the Supreme Court erred in suppressing contraband based on the defendant’s claims at the suppression hearing. The Court clarified that a Mapp hearing’s purpose is to determine if evidence was obtained in violation of constitutional rights, not to resolve factual disputes about possession of contraband. Further, the Court upheld the Appellate Division’s finding that the police properly entered the defendant’s apartment in pursuit of a shooting suspect. The Court could not review the security sweep justification as it was not properly raised and decided below.

    Facts

    Detectives entered the defendant’s apartment while pursuing a suspect in a shooting, whom they knew by sight. After entering, they discovered contraband. The defendant testified at the suppression hearing that he never touched the contraband and that the police planted it on him after searching the apartment. The defendant argued this showed a lack of probable cause for his arrest. The defense also challenged the legality of the officers’ search under the Fourth Amendment.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court suppressed the contraband. The Appellate Division reversed, concluding that the Supreme Court erred in suppressing the evidence. The case then went to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the Supreme Court erred in suppressing contraband based on factual claims made by the defendant at the suppression hearing regarding his lack of possession and police planting of evidence.
    2. Whether the scope of a Mapp hearing extends to determining the ultimate issue of whether the defendant was actually in possession of the contraband.
    3. Whether the police’s entry into the defendant’s apartment was proper under the Fourth Amendment.

    Holding

    1. Yes, the Supreme Court erred because the defendant’s factual claims, even if true, did not directly address the legality of the apartment search under the Fourth Amendment.
    2. No, because the issue before the court in the Mapp hearing is limited to whether the evidence was obtained in violation of the defendant’s constitutional rights, not whether the contraband belonged to the defendant.
    3. Yes, because the detectives properly entered the apartment in pursuit of a suspect in a shooting, who was known to them by sight.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that the defendant’s claims regarding lack of possession and police misconduct, while potentially relevant to guilt or innocence, did not impact the legality of the search itself. The Mapp hearing is specifically designed to address constitutional violations in obtaining evidence, not to resolve factual disputes about possession. The Court emphasized that defense counsel did not explain how these factual claims impacted the legality of the search under the Fourth Amendment. The court cited People v. Burr, 70 N.Y.2d 354, 360-361, affirming that police entry was justified based on the emergency circumstances, as they were in pursuit of a known suspect. The court stated, “The issue before the court in the Mapp hearing was limited to whether the evidence was obtained in violation of defendant’s constitutional rights, not whether the contraband found in the apartment belonged to someone other than defendant.” The Court declined to review the Appellate Division’s security sweep justification, noting that this issue was not properly raised at the initial hearing, citing CPL 470.05 [2]. This case clarifies that suppression hearings have a limited scope, focused solely on the constitutionality of the evidence gathering, and provides a practical reminder to defense counsel to clearly articulate how factual claims relate to constitutional violations. It reinforces the emergency exception to the warrant requirement in cases of hot pursuit.

  • In the Matter of Gregory M., 82 N.Y.2d 588 (1993): Standard for School Searches of Student Belongings

    82 N.Y.2d 588 (1993)

    A minimal intrusion, such as touching the outside of a student’s bag left with school authorities, requires less justification than reasonable suspicion, balancing the student’s diminished expectation of privacy against the school’s compelling interest in preventing weapons in schools.

    Summary

    This case addresses the level of suspicion required for school officials to search a student’s belongings. Gregory M., a student, was required to leave his bag with a security officer. The officer heard an unusual metallic thud when Gregory placed the bag down and felt the outline of a gun when touching the outside of the bag. The New York Court of Appeals held that the investigative touching of the bag’s exterior was a minimal intrusion justified by the school’s need to prevent weapons in schools, requiring less than reasonable suspicion. Once the touching revealed a gun-like object, a full search was justified under the reasonable suspicion standard.

    Facts

    Gregory M. arrived at his high school without proper identification and was instructed to leave his book bag with a security officer. When Gregory placed the bag on a shelf, the security officer heard an unusual metallic thud. The officer ran his fingers over the bag’s exterior and felt the outline of a gun. The bag was opened, revealing a handgun.

    Procedural History

    A juvenile delinquency petition was filed. The Family Court denied Gregory’s motion to suppress the gun. The Appellate Division upheld the denial of the motion to suppress but reversed the adjudication on evidentiary grounds and remanded for a new hearing. Upon remand, Gregory admitted to criminal possession of a weapon. The Court of Appeals granted permission to appeal the suppression ruling.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the school security officer needed reasonable suspicion before touching the outside of Gregory M.’s book bag to investigate its contents, given the school’s policy requiring students to leave their bags temporarily.

    Holding

    No, because the investigative touching of the bag’s exterior was a minimal intrusion justified by the school’s compelling interest in preventing weapons in schools, requiring less than reasonable suspicion. Once the touching revealed a gun-like object, a full search was justified under the reasonable suspicion standard.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court balanced Gregory’s expectation of privacy against the school’s interest in preventing weapons in schools. The court acknowledged that students have constitutional rights against unreasonable searches, citing People v. Scott D. and New Jersey v. T.L.O. However, it distinguished this case from more intrusive searches, finding the touching of the bag’s exterior to be a minimal intrusion. The “unusual” metallic thud, suggesting the possibility of a weapon, justified the limited intrusion. The court reasoned that because Gregory had a diminished expectation of privacy when he left the bag with the officer according to school policy, a less strict justification than reasonable suspicion was sufficient. Once the touching revealed a gun-like object, reasonable suspicion existed to search the bag’s contents. The Court rejected the dissent’s argument that reasonable suspicion is always required for any search, emphasizing the need for a flexible approach based on the specific circumstances. The court stated, “Because appellant’s diminished expectation of privacy was so clearly outweighed by the governmental interest in interdicting the infusion of weapons in the schools, we think the `unusual’ metallic thud heard when the book bag was flung down — quite evidently suggesting to the school security officer the possibility that it might contain a weapon — was sufficient justification for the investigative touching of the outside of the bag…”

  • In re Marrhonda G., 81 N.Y.2d 942 (1993): Warrantless Searches and the Plain Touch Doctrine

    In re Marrhonda G., 81 N.Y.2d 942 (1993)

    The ‘plain touch’ exception to the warrant requirement is not recognized in New York; therefore, feeling the shape of a weapon inside a bag, without more, does not justify a warrantless search of the bag.

    Summary

    A juvenile, Marrhonda G., was observed by a Port Authority police officer in the bus terminal. Based on her behavior and responses to questioning, the officer suspected she was a runaway and took her to the Youth Services Unit office. After she placed her bag on the floor, another officer picked it up to move it and felt what he believed to be a gun. The officers opened the bag and found weapons. The New York Court of Appeals held that while the initial detention was justified, the search of the bag was not, because New York does not recognize the ‘plain touch’ exception to the warrant requirement. The Court reversed the Appellate Division’s order and granted the motion to suppress the evidence.

    Facts

    On April 5, 1990, a Port Authority Police Officer observed Marrhonda G. standing alone in the Port Authority Bus Terminal with a large knapsack-type bag. After several hours, the officer approached and questioned her. The officer concluded she might be a runaway because she was traveling alone, initially lied about her age, had no identification, appeared nervous, could not contact her mother, and could not provide a local address or telephone number for the relative she claimed to be waiting for.

    Procedural History

    Family Court denied Marrhonda’s motion to suppress the weapons, holding the detention proper and the search justified under a ‘plain-touch’ exception. The court determined she committed acts that would constitute criminal possession of a weapon if committed by an adult. The Appellate Division affirmed, finding the detention proper and the search permissible because the discovery of the weapons was inadvertent. The New York Court of Appeals reversed.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the warrantless search of the respondent’s bag was justified under a ‘plain-touch’ exception to the warrant requirement, given that an officer felt what he believed to be a gun inside the bag.

    Holding

    No, because New York does not recognize a ‘plain-touch’ exception to the warrant requirement. Therefore, the warrantless search of the bag was unjustified.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court agreed with the lower courts that the detention of the juvenile was proper under Family Court Act § 718, which allows police to detain a juvenile who “in the reasonable opinion of the officer, appears to have run away from home without just cause.” The Court found the circumstances provided probable cause to believe the juvenile was a runaway.

    However, the Court disagreed with the lower courts’ conclusion that the warrantless search was justified under a ‘plain-touch’ exception. The Court had rejected that exception in People v. Diaz, 81 N.Y.2d 106, decided the same day. The Court stated that “[i]n the absence of some other applicable exception to the warrant requirement, the warrantless search of respondent’s bag was unjustified.”

    The Court noted several other possible exceptions that could have applied. These include searching the bag if it had been within the juvenile’s “grabbable area,” if the juvenile had consented to the search, or if the juvenile had been placed under arrest and the bag then searched incident to that arrest. The Court also suggested that the police could have detained the bag while obtaining a warrant or simply asked the juvenile about the bag’s contents. The court referenced Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 766, regarding detaining the bag while a warrant is obtained. The key takeaway is the rejection of the plain touch doctrine; absent another exception, a warrant is required.

  • People v. Diaz, 81 N.Y.2d 106 (1993): “Plain Touch” Doctrine and Warrantless Searches

    81 N.Y.2d 106 (1993)

    The “plain touch” doctrine, an extension of the plain view exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement, is not recognized in New York; tactile impressions during a Terry frisk, absent reasonable suspicion a weapon is present, cannot justify a warrantless search.

    Summary

    Robert Diaz was observed by police officers in an area known for drug activity. After observing Diaz participating in several groups and walking away from a stopped car, officers stopped and frisked him. During the frisk, an officer felt what he believed to be vials of crack cocaine in Diaz’s pocket. The officer then reached into Diaz’s pocket, seized the vials, and arrested Diaz. The New York Court of Appeals held that the search of Diaz’s pocket was unconstitutional. The Court reasoned that because the officer knew Diaz’s pocket did not contain a weapon, the search was not justified under the Terry stop-and-frisk exception. Further, the court declined to adopt a “plain touch” exception to the warrant requirement, distinguishing it from the plain view doctrine.

    Facts

    Officers Healey and Gordon were patrolling an area known for drug activity. They observed several groups of people on the sidewalks, appearing to exchange objects. Over 20 minutes, the officers saw Diaz at the center of several of these groups. They later saw Diaz standing next to a stopped car. When the police car approached, Diaz walked away.

    The officers called Diaz over to the car. Diaz repeatedly put his hand in his pocket, despite Officer Healey’s warnings. Healey noticed a bulge in Diaz’s pocket and again told him to remove his hand. Fearing a weapon, Healey grabbed Diaz’s pocket, feeling what he thought were vials. Diaz attempted to flee. Healey reached into Diaz’s pocket and removed 18 vials of crack cocaine. Diaz was then arrested.

    Procedural History

    The trial court granted Diaz’s motion to suppress the drugs, finding the stop and frisk lacked reasonable suspicion.

    The Appellate Division reversed, finding reasonable suspicion for the stop and frisk. It further held that the seizure of the drugs was permissible based on what Officer Healey felt during the pat-down.

    The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division.

    Issue(s)

    Whether information allegedly obtained by an officer through a protective pat-down that reveals the suspect is unarmed justifies a subsequent warrantless search of the suspect’s pocket based on a “plain touch” exception to the warrant requirement.

    Holding

    No, because the “plain touch” doctrine is rejected as an unconstitutional extension of the plain view exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court held that the search of Diaz’s pocket was not within the scope of a Terry pat-down because Officer Healey knew the pocket did not contain a weapon. Under Terry v. Ohio, a protective pat-down is limited to what is necessary to ascertain the presence of weapons. Once an officer determines that no weapon is present, the search is over.

    The Court declined to adopt a “plain touch” exception to the warrant requirement. The Court distinguished this from the plain view doctrine, which allows seizure of an object if (1) the police are lawfully in the position from which the object is viewed; (2) the police have lawful access to the object; and (3) the object’s incriminating nature is immediately apparent. The Court emphasized that the plain view doctrine addresses seizures, not searches. Because an item in plain view is already exposed, there is no further invasion of privacy in viewing it.

    The Court reasoned that the “plain touch” doctrine, however, concerns items not in plain view and thus justifies a further search, not just a seizure. “Unlike the item in plain view in which the owner has no privacy expectation, the owner of an item concealed by clothing or other covering retains a legitimate expectation that the item’s existence and characteristics will remain private.”

    The Court also expressed practical concerns about the “plain touch” exception. It noted that tactile impressions are inherently less reliable than visual observations in determining an object’s identity and criminal nature. Moreover, the Court worried that the exception could lead to officers exceeding the limited scope of a Terry search and using weapons searches as a pretext for unwarranted searches. As the court stated, “the proposed ‘plain touch’ exception could thus invite a blurring of the limits to Terry v Ohio searches and the sanctioning of warrantless searches on information obtained from an initial intrusion which, itself, amounts to an unauthorized warrantless search”.

    The dissent argued that the search was justified as incident to a lawful arrest. Because the officer had probable cause to arrest Diaz after feeling the vials, they argued that the search was valid, regardless of a “plain touch” theory.

  • People v. King, 75 N.Y.2d 924 (1990): Establishing Standing to Challenge a Search

    People v. King, 75 N.Y.2d 924 (1990)

    A defendant seeking to suppress evidence obtained through a search must demonstrate a legitimate personal expectation of privacy in the area or item searched, considering factors beyond mere possession, such as precautions taken to maintain privacy and the right to exclude others.

    Summary

    King was charged with drug possession offenses after a bag containing narcotics was discovered by police. King and his companion initially denied ownership of the bag. The Court of Appeals reversed the lower court’s suppression of the evidence, holding that King failed to establish standing to challenge the search. While the attorney’s affirmation claimed King had a possessory interest, and a police officer saw King holding the bag earlier, the Court emphasized that possessing an item alone is insufficient to establish a legitimate expectation of privacy; King needed to demonstrate he took steps to maintain privacy and had the right to exclude others.

    Facts

    Port Authority police officers observed King and a companion who “appeared relatively young.” King and his companion separated, heading for different buses. An officer approached the companion, who dropped a black bag and denied ownership. King was brought back, and he also denied owning the bag. A pat-down of the companion revealed a bullet, leading the officers to search the bag, where they found narcotics.

    Procedural History

    The hearing court granted King’s motion to suppress the evidence seized from the bag, finding that the search was unlawful and that King had standing to challenge it. The Appellate Division affirmed. The People appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the defendant established a legitimate expectation of privacy in the bag such that he had standing to challenge the search that revealed the narcotics.

    Holding

    No, because the defendant did not demonstrate a sufficient expectation of privacy in the bag beyond simply showing prior possession.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals held that the lower courts erred in finding that King had standing to seek suppression of the evidence. The Court reiterated that a defendant has the burden of establishing standing by demonstrating a personal, legitimate expectation of privacy. While the defendant can use evidence from the People’s case to meet this burden, the record here was insufficient. The Court emphasized that showing a possessory interest alone is not determinative. Instead, courts must consider factors such as whether the defendant took precautions to maintain privacy and whether the defendant had the right to exclude others from access. The court cited People v. Rodriguez, 69 N.Y.2d 159, 163, stating that “‘[a] showing of a possessory or proprietary interest in the item seized by itself…is not the determinative factor on the issue of standing’”. Even if the defendant once possessed the bag, his denial of ownership suggested a lack of intent to maintain privacy. The court found that the burden was on the defendant to establish a legitimate expectation of privacy under the circumstances and that he failed to do so. Therefore, the motion to suppress should have been denied.

  • People v. Holmes, 81 N.Y.2d 1056 (1993): Flight as Reasonable Suspicion for Police Pursuit

    People v. Holmes, 81 N.Y.2d 1056 (1993)

    Flight from police in conjunction with other factors, such as presence in a high-crime area and prior observed suspicious behavior, can provide reasonable suspicion justifying police pursuit.

    Summary

    Police officers observed the defendant in a high-crime area engaging in what appeared to be a drug transaction. Upon being approached by the officers, the defendant fled into a store, discarding a bag containing drugs. The New York Court of Appeals held that the defendant’s flight, combined with the prior observations, provided reasonable suspicion for the police pursuit, making the abandonment of the bag lawful and the drugs admissible as evidence. This case clarifies the circumstances under which flight can escalate an encounter from a mere approach to a justified pursuit.

    Facts

    On October 12, 1989, Officer Carney, stationed at a hidden observation post in a high-crime area of Manhattan, observed Holmes standing on a street corner. Carney witnessed Holmes remove a small plastic bag from a brown paper bag and exchange it with another man for money. Carney radioed Officers Shea and Fitzgerald, providing a detailed description of Holmes. Shea and Fitzgerald approached Holmes, who then quickened his pace and entered a delicatessen, where he discarded the brown paper bag. The bag was recovered and found to contain over 100 vials of crack cocaine.

    Procedural History

    Holmes was arrested and indicted for criminal possession of a controlled substance. He moved to suppress the physical evidence, which was denied. He was subsequently convicted. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, with a dissenting Justice granting leave to appeal to the New York Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the defendant’s flight from police officers, combined with the officers’ prior observations of the defendant engaging in suspicious behavior in a high-crime area, provided reasonable suspicion justifying the officers’ pursuit.

    Holding

    Yes, because the defendant’s street corner activity gave the police an objective, credible reason to approach him, and his subsequent flight furnished reasonable suspicion that he had committed or was about to commit a crime, thus justifying the pursuit.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals affirmed based on the motion court’s rationale, which the Appellate Division did not disturb. The court relied on the principle established in People v. De Bour, 40 N.Y.2d 210 (1976), that police may approach an individual when they have an objective, credible reason. Here, the observed hand-to-hand transaction provided such a reason. The court then applied the rule from People v. Martinez, 80 N.Y.2d 444 (1992), holding that flight in response to police presence can escalate the encounter to reasonable suspicion justifying pursuit. The court reasoned that Holmes’s abandonment of the bag was not in response to unlawful police conduct, and the contents of the bag (the crack cocaine) supplied probable cause for his arrest. The court emphasized the importance of considering the totality of the circumstances, including the high-crime area and the observed transaction, when evaluating the justification for the police action. The court stated, “Defendant’s street corner activity gave the police an objective, credible reason to approach him (see, People v De Bour, 40 NY2d 210, 223). In the circumstances presented, defendant’s flight furnished reasonable suspicion that he had committed or was about to commit a crime such that pursuit by the officers was justified (see, People v Martinez, 80 NY2d 444, 448).”

  • People v. May, 81 N.Y.2d 725 (1992): Reasonable Suspicion Required for Vehicle Stop

    People v. May, 81 N.Y.2d 725 (1992)

    A vehicle stop constitutes a seizure and is lawful only if supported by a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity; merely being parked on a deserted street known for criminal activity and slowly driving away from approaching police officers does not provide reasonable suspicion.

    Summary

    Defendant was sitting in a parked car with a companion on a deserted street known for criminal activity when police officers approached in a marked car with turret lights and a spotlight. The defendant started the car and slowly drove away. The officers ordered the defendant to pull over using a loudspeaker. After the stop, the officers discovered the car was stolen and found crack cocaine on the defendant. The New York Court of Appeals held that the initial stop was unlawful because the officers lacked reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. Evidence obtained as a result of the illegal stop was suppressed.

    Facts

    Two police officers, patrolling in a marked car, observed the defendant and a female companion seated in a parked Oldsmobile on a deserted street known for criminal activity at approximately 2:30 a.m. The officers approached the parked car, activating the patrol car’s red turret lights and spotlight. As the officers approached, the defendant started the engine of the Oldsmobile and slowly pulled away. One of the officers, using the police car’s loudspeaker, ordered the car to pull over. The defendant complied.

    Procedural History

    The defendant moved to suppress the crack cocaine and police photographs of the stolen car, arguing they were the fruits of an illegal stop and seizure. The trial court denied the motion. The Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order, granted the defendant’s motion to suppress, and dismissed the indictment.

    Issue(s)

    Whether police officers, who observe a vehicle parked on a deserted street known for criminal activity and then slowly pulling away as they approach with activated turret lights and spotlight, have a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity justifying a vehicle stop.

    Holding

    No, because the police officers lacked reasonable suspicion that a crime had been or was about to be committed. The police officers only knew that the defendant and another person were sitting in a car parked on a desolate street, which provided them with no information regarding criminal activity.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals determined that the defendant was effectively “seized” when the police, using red turret lights, a spotlight, and a loudspeaker, ordered him to pull the car over. Because a seizure occurred, the stop was only proper if the officers had a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, as required by People v. Sobotker, 43 N.Y.2d 559 (1978), and People v. De Bour, 40 N.Y.2d 210 (1976). The Court reasoned that the circumstances did not give rise to a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. The Court noted that the defendant’s action in slowly moving the car away as the police approached could not create a reasonable suspicion because the defendant had a right “to be let alone” and refuse to respond to police inquiry, citing People v. Howard, 50 N.Y.2d 583 (1980). The Court stated that the police could have followed the car to keep it under observation while they checked on its plates, but they had no legal basis to stop the car when they did. The court emphasized that police cannot forcibly detain civilians for questioning without reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. The court stated, “once defendant indicated, by pulling away from the curb, that he did not wish to speak with the officers, they should not have forced him to stop without legal grounds to do so.” The evidence was suppressed based on Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963), because it was obtained as a result of the illegal stop.

  • People v. Scott, 79 N.Y.2d 474 (1992): State Constitution Affords Greater Privacy Protection for Posted Land

    People v. Scott, 79 N.Y.2d 474 (1992)

    Under the New York State Constitution, landowners who conspicuously post “No Trespassing” signs on their property have a reasonable expectation of privacy, protecting them from warrantless searches, even in open fields outside the curtilage of their home.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals held that the “open fields” doctrine, as articulated by the U.S. Supreme Court in Oliver v. United States, does not adequately protect the privacy rights guaranteed by Article I, Section 12 of the New York State Constitution. The court ruled that landowners who post “No Trespassing” signs or otherwise manifest an intent to exclude others have a reasonable expectation of privacy on their property, even in areas outside the curtilage of their dwelling. This decision allows for greater protection against warrantless searches on private land under the New York Constitution than is afforded under the Fourth Amendment.

    Facts

    Defendant Scott owned 165 acres of rural, undeveloped land in Chenango County, New York. He resided in a mobile home on the property. Scott conspicuously posted “No Trespassing” signs around the perimeter of his property, spaced approximately every 20 to 30 feet. William Collar, a private citizen, trespassed on Scott’s property and observed marihuana plants under cultivation. Collar reported this to the State Police, who requested that he obtain a leaf from one of the plants. Collar complied. Investigator Hyman accompanied Collar onto the property where Hyman personally observed the plants. Neither Collar’s nor Hyman’s entries were authorized by Scott. Based on this information, police obtained a search warrant and seized the marihuana plants.

    Procedural History

    Scott was charged with criminal possession of marihuana. He moved to suppress the evidence seized during the search, arguing that the warrant was based on illegal entries onto his property. The County Court denied the motion, relying on Oliver v. United States. The Appellate Division affirmed, holding that the “open fields” doctrine applied and that Scott had no legitimate expectation of privacy. Scott appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the “open fields” doctrine, as articulated in Oliver v. United States, should be adopted as the law of New York State under Article I, Section 12 of the New York State Constitution, where a landowner has posted “No Trespassing” signs and otherwise manifested an intent to exclude the public.

    Holding

    No, because the Oliver ruling does not adequately protect fundamental constitutional rights under the New York State Constitution.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court declined to adopt the U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling in Oliver v. United States, finding that it did not adequately protect the privacy rights guaranteed by the New York State Constitution. The court emphasized that Article I, Section 12 of the New York Constitution could provide greater protection than the Fourth Amendment. The court reasoned that landowners who conspicuously post “No Trespassing” signs or otherwise indicate that entry is not permitted have a reasonable expectation of privacy. The court distinguished Oliver by noting that the defendant in that case had not explicitly manifested an intent to exclude the public. The court emphasized the importance of the right to be let alone, citing Justice Brandeis’s dissent in Olmstead v. United States. The court criticized the Oliver court’s suggestion that the very conduct discovered by the government’s illegal trespass (i.e., growing marihuana) could be considered as a relevant factor in determining whether the police had violated the defendant’s rights, stating “Such after-the-fact justification for illegal police conduct would not be compatible with New York’s recognition of fairness as an essential concern in criminal jurisprudence.” The court stated, “where landowners fence or post ‘No Trespassing’ signs on their private property or, by some other means, indicate unmistakably that entry is not permitted, the expectation that their privacy rights will be respected and that they will be free from unwanted intrusions is reasonable.” Because the police entries onto Scott’s posted property were illegal, the search warrant obtained based on those entries was invalid, and the evidence seized should have been suppressed.

  • McKenzie v. Jackson, 76 N.Y.2d 995 (1990): Random Drug Testing of Probationary Correction Officers

    76 N.Y.2d 995 (1990)

    Random urinalysis drug testing of probationary correction officers, under a department policy known to the officer, is constitutionally permissible and does not require reasonable suspicion.

    Summary

    McKenzie, a probationary correction officer, was terminated after testing positive for cannabis in a random urinalysis. The test was part of the Westchester County Department of Correction’s policy for probationary officers. McKenzie was aware of this policy upon accepting the position. The New York Court of Appeals upheld the dismissal, finding the random drug testing constitutional, aligning with the established exception for employees in safety-sensitive positions, and consistent with its decision in Seelig v. Koehler regarding tenured correction officers. The court emphasized that the policy was known to the officer when accepting the position.

    Facts

    McKenzie was a probationary correction officer in Westchester County.

    The Westchester County Department of Correction had a policy mandating random urinalysis drug tests for probationary correction officers.

    McKenzie was aware of this policy when he accepted the position.

    During his probationary period, McKenzie tested positive for cannabis in a random urinalysis.

    He was subsequently dismissed from his position.

    Procedural History

    McKenzie challenged his dismissal, arguing the random drug test was unconstitutional.

    The lower court upheld the dismissal.

    The Appellate Division affirmed the lower court’s decision.

    The New York Court of Appeals granted review.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the random urinalysis drug testing of a probationary correction officer, without reasonable suspicion, violates the Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable searches and seizures.

    Holding

    No, because random drug testing of probationary correction officers is permissible under the exception articulated in Matter of Patchogue-Medford Congress of Teachers v Board of Educ., especially when the officer is aware of the policy upon accepting the position.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court relied on its decision in Matter of Seelig v Koehler, which held that random urinalysis testing of tenured correction officers in the New York City Department of Correction, without reasonable suspicion, was constitutionally permissible. The court found the circumstances and procedures in McKenzie’s case nearly identical to those in Seelig.

    The court also cited Matter of Caruso v Ward, further solidifying the permissibility of random drug testing for employees in safety-sensitive positions.

    The court emphasized that McKenzie was aware of the department’s policy requiring random drug tests when he accepted the probationary position. This awareness factored into the court’s determination that his reasonable expectation of privacy was diminished.

    The court reasoned that, given the nature of the position as a correction officer and the known policy of random drug testing, the intrusion on McKenzie’s privacy was outweighed by the government’s interest in maintaining a drug-free workplace, particularly in a correctional facility.

    The court did not provide direct quotes but referenced its previous holdings and applied similar reasoning to the case at hand.