New York Law Review

Tag: Fourth Amendment

  • People v. Scully, 16 N.Y.3d 862 (2011): Establishing Standing to Challenge a Search

    People v. Scully, 16 N.Y.3d 862 (2011)

    A defendant seeking to suppress evidence obtained during a search must demonstrate a legitimate expectation of privacy in the searched premises and provide factual allegations that the search was not legally justified.

    Summary

    Ranee Scully was arrested after police, executing a search warrant, found a weapon on his person and drugs in an apartment he was staying in. Scully moved to suppress the evidence, arguing the warrant lacked probable cause. The New York Court of Appeals held that Scully failed to establish standing to challenge the search of the apartment because he didn’t assert a privacy interest in it. Additionally, he didn’t provide sufficient factual allegations to support his claim that the search of his person was unlawful, beyond asserting the warrant lacked probable cause. Thus, the Court affirmed the lower court’s denial of his motion to suppress.

    Facts

    An investigator obtained a warrant to search a specific apartment for drugs and weapons, also including “any other person who may be found” with such items. Upon executing the warrant, the investigator encountered Scully at the entrance, who possessed a loaded weapon and a large sum of cash. Other officers searched the apartment, finding drugs and drug paraphernalia. Scully, after being Mirandized, admitted to possessing the weapon but denied knowledge of the drugs.

    Procedural History

    Scully was indicted on weapon and drug charges. He moved to suppress the evidence, claiming the warrant lacked probable cause concerning him. The trial court denied the motion without a hearing. Scully was convicted in absentia. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, and Scully appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether Scully was entitled to a suppression hearing regarding the weapon found on his person, based on his claim that the search warrant lacked probable cause.

    2. Whether Scully had standing to challenge the search of the apartment where drugs were found.

    Holding

    1. No, because Scully did not provide sufficient factual allegations to support his claim that probable cause was lacking to search him, beyond asserting the warrant’s deficiency.

    2. No, because Scully did not assert a personal legitimate expectation of privacy in the searched apartment.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on precedent establishing that a defendant must demonstrate a legitimate expectation of privacy in the searched area to challenge a search’s validity. The Court cited People v. Burton, noting that merely claiming contraband was recovered doesn’t create a factual issue. The defendant must also assert the search was legally unjustified and provide factual allegations to support that contention.

    Regarding the weapon, the Court noted Scully only argued the warrant lacked probable cause but didn’t supplement his motion with specific factual allegations supporting this claim. Therefore, he failed to raise a factual issue warranting a hearing.

    Regarding the apartment search, the Court cited People v. Wesley, stating a defendant must demonstrate a personal legitimate expectation of privacy in the searched premises. Scully only argued the warrant lacked probable cause and that he didn’t match the warrant’s description, failing to assert any privacy interest in the apartment. The Court concluded that without asserting a privacy interest, Scully lacked standing to challenge the apartment search. The court emphasized that “a defendant seeking to challenge a search and seizure… [is] required to demonstrate a personal legitimate expectation of privacy in the searched premises”.

  • People v. McBride, 14 N.Y.3d 440 (2010): Warrantless Home Entry Based on Exigent Circumstances

    14 N.Y.3d 440 (2010)

    Exigent circumstances, such as a reasonable belief that someone inside a residence is in imminent danger, can justify a warrantless entry into a home, even if the police had time to obtain a warrant previously.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals held that police officers’ warrantless entry into the defendant’s apartment was justified by exigent circumstances. Although the police had probable cause to arrest the defendant for armed robbery and several days to obtain a warrant, they entered the apartment after a woman inside appeared distressed and unresponsive, leading them to believe she was in danger. The Court emphasized that the ultimate inquiry is whether an urgent need justified the entry, but also noted that obtaining a warrant would have been more prudent.

    Facts

    A man robbed a Cosi restaurant at gunpoint. An employee, Mangual, identified defendant McBride, a former employee, from a photo array. Mangual gave police a detailed physical description of the defendant. Police learned McBride was on parole and obtained his address. Three days after the robbery, at 11 PM, five officers went to McBride’s apartment. Hearing voices inside, they knocked and identified themselves, but no one answered. Some officers went to the fire escape, peered into a window, and saw a man lying on the floor. The police demanded the occupants open the door. A woman, Mitchell, eventually opened the door, appearing shaken and unable to speak clearly.

    Procedural History

    McBride was indicted for robbery. He pleaded guilty to attempted robbery after the trial court denied his motion to suppress evidence, arguing the police unlawfully entered his home and the lineup was suggestive. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the police violated McBride’s Fourth Amendment right against unlawful search and seizure when they entered his apartment without a warrant.

    Holding

    No, because exigent circumstances justified the warrantless entry.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court acknowledged that warrantless entries are presumptively unreasonable, citing Payton v. New York. However, exigent circumstances can justify a warrantless entry to effectuate an arrest, provided probable cause exists. Factors indicating exigent circumstances include the gravity of the offense, whether the suspect is armed, probable cause to believe the suspect committed the crime, strong reason to believe the suspect is on the premises, likelihood of escape, and the peacefulness of the entry, citing United States v. Martinez-Gonzalez. Here, the crime was a violent armed robbery. There was strong reason to believe McBride was inside. The Court deferred to the lower courts’ factual findings that the police only entered after Mitchell opened the door and appeared to be in distress. The Court distinguished People v. Levan, noting that the police did not create the exigency. The Court noted it would have been more prudent to obtain a warrant but the presence of exigent circumstances ultimately legitimized the entry. The Court also found the lineup was not unduly suggestive, as the gray hooded sweatshirt worn by McBride was a “generic and common article of clothing.”

  • People v. Gomez, 13 N.Y.3d 9 (2009): Establishing a Valid Inventory Search of a Vehicle

    13 N.Y.3d 9 (2009)

    For an inventory search of a vehicle to be valid, the prosecution must demonstrate that the search was conducted according to a standardized procedure designed to produce an inventory, and that the results were fully recorded in a usable format.

    Summary

    Victor Gomez was arrested for driving with a suspended license, and his vehicle was impounded. Police searched the vehicle, finding drugs and drug paraphernalia. Gomez moved to suppress the evidence, arguing the search was illegal. The New York Court of Appeals held that the prosecution failed to establish a valid inventory search because they did not demonstrate that the search was conducted according to a standardized procedure or that a meaningful inventory was created. The court emphasized that while a formal inventory search form isn’t strictly required, the search must be designed to create an inventory, and the results must be recorded effectively.

    Facts

    On June 23, 2005, NYPD officers observed Victor Gomez driving erratically. A license plate check revealed Gomez owned the vehicle but his driver’s license was suspended. The officers stopped Gomez, confirmed his license was suspended, arrested him, and impounded his vehicle. An officer, recognizing Gomez from a prior incident involving threats, searched the vehicle. They found drugs, drug paraphernalia, and empty plastic baggies. The search was continued at the precinct due to a gathering crowd.

    Procedural History

    Gomez was charged with criminal possession of a controlled substance and criminally using drug paraphernalia. He moved to suppress the evidence found in his vehicle. The Supreme Court denied the motion. Gomez pleaded guilty to criminal possession of a controlled substance. The Appellate Division reversed the conviction, granted the suppression motion, and dismissed the indictment. The People appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the People met their initial burden of establishing a valid inventory search of the defendant’s vehicle, justifying the admission of the seized evidence.

    Holding

    No, because the People failed to demonstrate that the search was conducted according to a standardized procedure designed to produce an inventory, and that the results were fully recorded in a usable format.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on its prior holdings in People v. Galak, 80 N.Y.2d 715 (1993), and People v. Johnson, 1 N.Y.3d 252 (2003), reiterating that inventory searches are an exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement. The court stated that “[a]n inventory search is . . . designed to properly catalogue the contents of the item searched. The specific objectives of an inventory search, particularly in the context of a vehicle, are to protect the property of the defendant, to protect the police against any claim of lost property, and to protect police personnel and others from any dangerous instruments.” Florida v. Wells, 495 U.S. 1, 4 (1990), was also cited.

    The Court found that the People failed to demonstrate the search was conducted according to a standardized procedure, even though the NYPD has a written protocol. They failed to establish the circumstances justifying the search of the closed trunk or door panel. Moreover, the Court stressed the importance of a meaningful inventory. While the arresting officer filled out a voucher and forfeiture paperwork, the People didn’t prove that no other items besides contraband were found. The Court clarified that while using an inventory search form isn’t mandatory, the search must still be designed to produce an inventory with results fully recorded. The Court concluded that the search in this case was not designed to produce an inventory.

  • People v. Hall, 10 N.Y.3d 303 (2008): Warrantless Body Cavity Searches and Reasonable Suspicion

    10 N.Y.3d 303 (2008)

    A visual body cavity inspection may be conducted if the police have a factual basis supporting a reasonable suspicion that the arrestee has evidence concealed inside a body cavity and the search is conducted in a reasonable manner; however, if the visual inspection reveals the presence of a suspicious object, the police must obtain a warrant authorizing the object’s removal unless there are exigent circumstances.

    Summary

    This case addresses the constitutionality of warrantless body cavity searches following a drug arrest. Police observed Hall engaging in a drug sale. After arresting and searching him, officers conducted a visual body cavity inspection, spotting a string protruding from his rectum. They forcibly removed a bag of cocaine. The Court of Appeals held that while the visual inspection was justified by reasonable suspicion, the forced removal of the drugs without a warrant or exigent circumstances violated the Fourth Amendment. This case clarifies the line between permissible visual inspections and unlawful physical intrusions into body cavities.

    Facts

    Sergeant Burnes, observing from a rooftop, witnessed Hall hand money to Meyers, who then entered a bodega and gave something to two individuals. Burnes saw what appeared to be crack cocaine in Meyers’ hand. After arresting Hall, a clothing search revealed nothing. In a private cell, officers ordered Hall to disrobe and bend over. Burnes and Spiegel observed a string or plastic hanging from Hall’s rectum and, believing it was attached to drugs, ordered Hall to remove it. Hall refused, and officers forcibly removed a plastic bag containing crack cocaine.

    Procedural History

    Hall was indicted for criminal possession of a controlled substance. The Supreme Court granted Hall’s motion to suppress the drug evidence, dismissing the indictment. The Appellate Division reversed, finding the visual inspection justified and the immediate retrieval of drugs permissible. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the police violated the Fourth Amendment by conducting a visual body cavity inspection of Hall without a warrant based on reasonable suspicion?

    2. Whether the police violated the Fourth Amendment by forcibly removing the drugs from Hall’s rectum without first obtaining a warrant?

    Holding

    1. Yes, but only because the police had reasonable suspicion to believe Hall was concealing evidence inside a body cavity.

    2. Yes, because absent exigent circumstances, a warrant is required to remove an object protruding from a body cavity.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court distinguished between strip searches, visual body cavity inspections, and manual body cavity searches, noting increasing levels of intrusion. Citing Schmerber v. California, the court reiterated that intrusions into the body require a warrant unless exigent circumstances exist. While Bell v. Wolfish allows visual cavity searches of pretrial detainees based on reasonableness, the court held that visual body inspections of arrestees require at least reasonable suspicion, supported by specific and articulable facts. In Hall’s case, the police had reasonable suspicion based on his observed drug sale, his retreat into a building, the absence of drugs on his person, and the officer’s experience with similar cases. However, once the officers observed the string, they needed a warrant to remove the drugs. Because no exigent circumstances existed (imminent destruction of evidence or medical distress), the warrantless removal of the drugs was unlawful under People v. More, mandating suppression of the evidence. The court emphasized that blanket policies for body cavity searches are unconstitutional; individualized suspicion is required. The court also noted that inspections should be conducted in a private location by an officer of the same gender, avoiding undue humiliation to the arrestee. Quoting People v Cantor, the court stated that police need “specific and articulable facts which, along with any logical deductions, reasonably prompted th[e] intrusion.”

  • People v. Diaz, 9 N.Y.3d 24 (2007): Applying the Emergency Exception to the Warrant Requirement

    9 N.Y.3d 24 (2007)

    The emergency exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement allows police to conduct a search when they have reasonable grounds to believe an emergency exists requiring immediate assistance to protect life or property, when the search is not primarily motivated by intent to arrest and seize evidence, and when there is a reasonable basis to associate the emergency with the area to be searched.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals upheld the search of the defendant’s apartment under the emergency exception to the warrant requirement. Police responded to a call from the defendant’s neighbor reporting sounds of a violent domestic dispute. Upon arrival, officers heard yelling and sounds of distress coming from within the apartment. Believing there was an immediate threat to someone’s safety, the officers entered the apartment without a warrant and discovered evidence that led to the defendant’s arrest. The court found that the officers’ actions were justified under the emergency doctrine because they had reasonable grounds to believe an emergency existed, their primary motivation was to ensure safety, and they had a reasonable basis to connect the emergency to the apartment searched.

    Facts

    A neighbor reported hearing a violent domestic dispute emanating from the defendant’s apartment.
    Police officers responded to the scene and upon arrival, they heard yelling and sounds suggesting someone was in distress inside the apartment.
    Based on these sounds, the officers believed that someone inside the apartment was in immediate danger.
    Without obtaining a warrant, the officers entered the apartment.
    Inside, the officers observed evidence that led to the defendant’s arrest.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was charged with crimes based on evidence found during the warrantless search of his apartment.
    The defendant moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that the search violated his Fourth Amendment rights.
    The County Court denied the motion to suppress.
    The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the County Court’s order, upholding the search under the emergency exception to the warrant requirement.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the warrantless search of the defendant’s apartment was justified under the emergency exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement.

    Holding

    Yes, because the police had reasonable grounds to believe that an emergency existed requiring immediate assistance to protect life or property, the search was not primarily motivated by intent to arrest and seize evidence, and there was a reasonable basis to associate the emergency with the apartment searched.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals applied the three-pronged test established in People v. Mitchell (39 N.Y.2d 173 (1976)) for determining the applicability of the emergency exception. The court emphasized that the applicability of the emergency doctrine is a mixed question of law and fact, and deferred to the findings of the lower courts that the three elements were satisfied.

    The court reasoned that the officers had reasonable grounds to believe an emergency existed based on the neighbor’s report and the sounds of distress they heard upon arriving at the apartment. This satisfied the first prong of the Mitchell test. The court further determined that the officers’ primary motivation in entering the apartment was to ensure the safety of the occupants, not to gather evidence for an arrest, thus satisfying the second prong. Finally, the court found that the sounds emanating from the apartment provided a reasonable basis to associate the emergency with that particular location, satisfying the third prong.

    The court quoted People v. Mitchell stating the test: “(1) The police must have reasonable grounds to believe that there is an emergency at hand and an immediate need for their assistance for the protection of life or property. (2) The search must not be primarily motivated by intent to arrest and seize evidence. (3) There must be some reasonable basis, approximating probable cause, to associate the emergency with the area or place to be searched.”

    The court explicitly declined to consider whether the holding in Mitchell should be modified in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398 (2006), noting that any further review was beyond the Court’s jurisdiction because the lower courts’ determination was supported by the record.

  • People v. Burton, 6 N.Y.3d 584 (2006): Establishing Standing to Challenge a Search Without Admitting Possession

    6 N.Y.3d 584 (2006)

    A defendant can establish standing to challenge a search and seizure by relying on the People’s evidence, such as a police officer’s statement, to show that the search occurred, without personally admitting possession of the contraband.

    Summary

    Thomas Burton was arrested after a police officer allegedly found crack cocaine in his pocket during a search. Burton moved to suppress the evidence, arguing the search was unlawful because he was searched without probable cause. The prosecution argued Burton lacked standing because he didn’t admit the drugs were his. The New York Court of Appeals held that Burton’s motion, combined with the officer’s statement, was sufficient to establish standing, even without Burton’s admission of possession, and that a hearing was required to determine the legality of the search.

    Facts

    On January 16, 2001, a police officer searched Thomas Burton on a Manhattan street. The officer allegedly found a plastic bag containing crack cocaine in Burton’s sweatpants pocket. Burton was subsequently charged with criminal possession of a controlled substance.

    Procedural History

    Burton moved to suppress the drug evidence, but the Supreme Court denied the motion without a hearing, finding he lacked standing. Burton pleaded guilty but appealed the suppression ruling. The Appellate Division affirmed the denial of the suppression motion. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a defendant must personally admit possession of contraband to establish standing to challenge the legality of a search that yielded the contraband, or whether the defendant can rely on the prosecution’s evidence to establish standing.

    Holding

    No, because a defendant can rely on the People’s evidence, including statements from law enforcement, to establish standing to challenge a search without admitting possession of the contraband, provided the defendant also alleges the search was not legally justified.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that CPL 710.60(1) allows a defendant to rely on allegations of fact from “the defendant or…another person or persons” to support a motion to suppress. The Court highlighted precedent allowing defendants to use the People’s proof to demonstrate standing, including statements from law enforcement officials. The Court distinguished between situations where probable cause is based on a buy-and-bust scenario (requiring a denial of participation) and situations where probable cause is based on furtive behavior. In the latter, a defendant can raise a factual issue by alleging they were doing nothing wrong when the police searched them. The Court emphasized that Burton alleged he was searched without legal justification while doing nothing suspicious. This, combined with the officer’s statement that drugs were found on Burton, was sufficient to require a hearing to determine the legality of the search. The court clarified that this ruling does not resurrect the “automatic standing” doctrine, as a defendant must still assert the search was not legally justified and provide factual allegations to support that contention. According to the court, “[S]tanding does not arise from a defense motion to suppress that merely states, as attested by police, that the arresting officer conducted a search of the accused’s person and allegedly found narcotics in an article of clothing—this alone does not create an issue of fact as to whether a Fourth Amendment violation occurred. A defendant must additionally assert that the search was not legally justified and there must be sufficient factual allegations to support that contention”.

  • People v. Moore, 6 N.Y.3d 496 (2006): Anonymous Tip Plus Evasion Insufficient for Reasonable Suspicion

    6 N.Y.3d 496 (2006)

    An anonymous tip, even when coupled with a suspect’s act of walking away from police, does not provide reasonable suspicion justifying a forcible stop and frisk; reasonable suspicion requires predictive information or observation of suspicious conduct.

    Summary

    Police officers, responding to an anonymous tip about a Black male with a gun, approached the defendant, who matched the description and began walking away. The officers drew their guns and ordered him to stop. The defendant then reached towards his waistband, and a subsequent search revealed a firearm. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the lower court’s decision, holding that the gun should have been suppressed because the initial gunpoint stop was not justified by reasonable suspicion. The anonymous tip, lacking predictive information, and the defendant’s act of walking away did not establish the necessary level of suspicion for a forcible stop under established Fourth Amendment principles.

    Facts

    On November 12, 1997, police officers received an anonymous radio call regarding a dispute involving a Black male with a gun, described as approximately 18 years old, wearing a gray jacket and red hat.
    The officers arrived at the scene within one minute and observed the defendant, who matched the description, but no dispute was in progress.
    As the officers approached, the defendant began to walk away.
    Without any verbal inquiry, the officers drew their guns and ordered the defendant to stop.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was charged with criminal possession of a weapon and moved to suppress the gun.
    Supreme Court denied the motion to suppress.
    The Appellate Division affirmed, concluding that the defendant’s movement toward his waistband justified the frisk.
    The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order, granting the motion to suppress and dismissing the indictment.

    Issue(s)

    Whether an anonymous tip, combined with a suspect’s act of walking away from police, provides reasonable suspicion to justify a forcible stop and frisk under the Fourth Amendment.

    Holding

    No, because an anonymous tip lacking predictive information, even when coupled with a suspect’s act of walking away from police, does not provide reasonable suspicion justifying a forcible stop and frisk; such a stop requires a higher level of suspicion based on predictive information from the tip or independent observation of suspicious conduct by the officers.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court applied the four-level test from People v. De Bour, which distinguishes between permissible police encounters based on the level of suspicion. Here, the gunpoint stop constituted a seizure requiring reasonable suspicion.
    An anonymous tip alone is insufficient for reasonable suspicion unless it contains predictive information that allows police to test the tip’s reliability, as established in Florida v. J.L. and People v. William II. The Court emphasized, “[R]easonable suspicion ‘requires that a tip be reliable in its assertion of illegality, not just in its tendency to identify a determinate person.’” (quoting Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 272 (2000)).
    Defendant’s act of walking away from the police, while potentially generating a common-law right of inquiry, did not elevate the encounter to reasonable suspicion justifying a forcible stop. The Court noted that “[T]he police may not forcibly detain civilians in order to question them . . . without a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.” (quoting People v. May, 81 N.Y.2d 725, 728 (1992)).
    Elevating a common-law inquiry to a forcible stop based solely on walking away would eliminate the “right to be let alone.” Additional information or observations of suspicious conduct are necessary to justify a forcible stop.
    The Court rejected the dissent’s argument that the combination of the anonymous tip and evasion created reasonable suspicion, asserting that a forcible stop requires more than just the possibility of a crime; it requires reasonable suspicion based on articulable facts.

  • People v. Fermin, 20 N.Y.3d 414 (2013): Limits on Consent Searches of Vehicles

    People v. Fermin, 20 N.Y.3d 414 (2013)

    A general consent to search a vehicle does not authorize law enforcement to damage the vehicle’s structural integrity without explicit consent or probable cause.

    Summary

    This case addresses the scope of a consent search of a vehicle under the Fourth Amendment. The New York Court of Appeals held that a general consent to search a car does not allow officers to cause structural damage to the vehicle, such as prying open a gas tank with a crowbar, without specific consent or probable cause. The Court reasoned that a reasonable person would not expect a general consent to include destructive actions that fundamentally alter the vehicle’s condition. The case was remitted to determine if probable cause existed to justify the search.

    Facts

    Police officers stopped a vehicle driven by Fermin for excessively tinted windows. During the stop, officers observed a fresh undercoating near the gas tank and discovered a tampered registration card. Suspecting drug activity, an officer asked Fermin if he had any drugs or weapons and then requested consent to search the vehicle, which Fermin granted. The officer then proceeded to remove the rear seat, pull up the carpet, cut into the floorboard, and ultimately use a crowbar to pry open the gas tank, where they found seven bags of cocaine.

    Procedural History

    Fermin was arrested and indicted on drug possession charges. He moved to suppress the evidence, arguing the search exceeded the scope of his consent. The Supreme Court denied the motion, finding voluntary consent and probable cause as alternative justifications. Fermin was convicted after a guilty plea. The Appellate Division affirmed, holding the consent was voluntary and the search was within its scope due to Fermin’s failure to object. The New York Court of Appeals reversed and remitted the case.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a general consent to search a vehicle authorizes law enforcement officers to cause structural damage to the vehicle without specific consent or probable cause.

    Holding

    No, because a reasonable person would not understand a general consent to search a vehicle to include actions that impair the structural integrity of the vehicle, such as using a crowbar to damage the gas tank, without specific consent or probable cause.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court applied an objective reasonableness standard to determine the scope of consent, asking what a typical reasonable person would have understood by the exchange between the officer and the suspect. Citing Florida v. Jimeno, the court acknowledged that a general consent to search a car for narcotics includes opening containers within the car that might contain drugs. However, the court distinguished this case, stating, “In the absence of other circumstances indicating that defendant authorized the actions taken by police, a general consent to search alone cannot justify a search that impairs the structural integrity of a vehicle or that results in the vehicle being returned in a materially different manner than it was found.” The court emphasized that the officer’s actions went beyond examining readily accessible containers and caused damage to the vehicle. The court stated: “Once a search exceeds the objectively reasonable scope of a voluntary consent, a more specific request or grant of permission is needed, in the absence of probable cause, in order to justify damage to the searched area or item sufficient to require its repair.” The Court reversed because the Appellate Division did not address the issue of probable cause. The dissent argued that the majority created a “bright-line rule” that is contrary to Fourth Amendment jurisprudence and that the totality of the circumstances indicated that Fermin’s consent extended to the search as conducted, especially since Fermin was present and did not object during the search.

  • People v. McIntosh, 96 N.Y.2d 521 (2001): Search Consent Requires Founded Suspicion

    People v. McIntosh, 96 N.Y.2d 521 (2001)

    A request to search, and any subsequent consent, is invalid unless supported by a founded suspicion of criminality.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s suppression order, holding that the police lacked a founded suspicion of criminal activity to justify their extended questioning of the defendant. The Court reiterated that consent to search is invalid unless the police have a founded suspicion of criminality prior to requesting the search. Because the lower courts found that the defendant only granted permission to search after being questioned in a manner that suggested he was suspected of a crime without any founded suspicion, the evidence obtained from the search was suppressed.

    Facts

    The police questioned the defendant in circumstances that led him to believe he was suspected of criminal activity. After this questioning, the defendant granted the police permission to search his person and his car. The suppression court found that the police lacked a founded suspicion of criminal activity at the time of the questioning and the request for consent.

    Procedural History

    The suppression court ruled that the evidence obtained from the search should be suppressed. The Appellate Division affirmed this ruling. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a consent to search is valid when the request to search is not supported by a founded suspicion of criminality.

    Holding

    No, because a consent to search will not be upheld unless the request to search is supported by a founded suspicion of criminality.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on its prior holding in People v. Hollman, stating that a consent to search will not be upheld unless the request to search is supported by a founded suspicion of criminality. The Court emphasized that the lower courts had determined that the defendant only gave permission to search after questioning that reasonably led him to believe he was suspected of criminality, and that this questioning was not based on any founded suspicion. The Court stated, “When, as here, there is support in the record for the lower courts’ undisturbed finding as to the lack of a founded suspicion of criminality, our review is at an end.” The Court effectively deferred to the factual findings of the lower courts regarding the absence of founded suspicion.

  • People v. Salaman, 9 N.Y.3d 371 (2007): Justifying Minimal Intrusion During Warrant Execution

    People v. Salaman, 9 N.Y.3d 371 (2007)

    When executing an arrest warrant, a minimal police intrusion, such as asking an individual to show their hands, is justified if officers have a reasonable belief that the individual may be armed and dangerous, based on the totality of the circumstances.

    Summary

    During the execution of arrest warrants for a probation violator, officers found the defendant in an apartment with two other men. After discovering weapons near the other two men, officers asked the defendant to show his hands because he was fidgeting and mumbling while sitting on them. Upon doing so, a handgun was revealed. The New York Court of Appeals held that asking the defendant to shift his position was a minimal and justified intrusion under the Fourth Amendment because the officers had a reasonable basis to believe he might be armed and dangerous. This case illustrates the balance between individual privacy rights and officer safety during warrant executions.

    Facts

    Probation officers went to an apartment to execute two felony arrest warrants against a probation violator. Upon entering the apartment, they found three men, including the probationer and the defendant. After arresting the probationer, officers found loaded handguns near the other man on the floor. The defendant was sitting on a couch, fidgeting, mumbling, and sitting on his hands. Officer Groves asked the defendant to shift his position and show his hands. The defendant initially hesitated but eventually complied, revealing a loaded 9mm handgun under his thigh.

    Procedural History

    The defendant moved to suppress the handgun as the fruit of an unconstitutional seizure. The Supreme Court denied the motion. The defendant was convicted of criminal possession of a weapon. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, holding the search was a reasonable and lawful security sweep. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether, during the execution of arrest warrants in an apartment, it was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment for officers to ask the defendant to shift his position and show his hands, given that the officers had already discovered two loaded handguns near the defendant’s companions?

    Holding

    Yes, because under the totality of the circumstances, the officers had a reasonable belief that the defendant could be armed and dangerous, justifying the minimal intrusion of asking him to shift his position and show his hands.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals focused on the reasonableness of the officer’s conduct under the Fourth Amendment. The court distinguished this case from a protective sweep, stating that Maryland v. Buie did not apply because the circumstances did not involve searching for hidden individuals who posed a threat. Instead, the Court emphasized balancing the government’s interest in officer safety against the individual’s right to privacy and personal security. The court applied a dual inquiry: whether the officer’s action was justified at its inception, and whether it was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances. The court found that asking the defendant to show his hands was justified at its inception because the officers had discovered two loaded handguns near defendant’s companions, and the defendant was fidgeting and mumbling while sitting on his hands. The intrusion was minimal – merely asking the defendant to shift his position. The court deferred to the suppression court’s finding of reasonableness, stating “the determination of the suppression court with its peculiar advantages of having seen and heard” the testimony is entitled to great deference (Prochilo, 41 NY2d at 761). The Court concluded that the limited police action was reasonable, and the motion to suppress was properly denied.