New York Law Review

Tag: Fourth Amendment

  • People v. Rivera, 20 N.Y.2d 244 (1967): Justifying Stop and Frisk Based on Reasonable Suspicion

    People v. Rivera, 20 N.Y.2d 244 (1967)

    A police officer may stop and frisk an individual based on reasonable suspicion of criminal activity and a reasonable belief that the officer’s safety is at risk, and evidence discovered during such a frisk is admissible.

    Summary

    The case concerns the legality of a stop and frisk conducted by an off-duty police officer, Lasky, who observed suspicious activity in his apartment building. Lasky confronted the defendant, frisked him, and discovered burglar’s tools. The New York Court of Appeals held that the stop and frisk were justified based on reasonable suspicion, making the evidence admissible. The court emphasized the importance of allowing police officers to prevent crime and protect themselves when faced with potentially dangerous situations. The decision upholds the constitutionality of stop and frisk laws and affirms the conviction.

    Facts

    Officer Lasky, an off-duty New York City patrolman residing in a Mount Vernon apartment building, heard a noise at his door after showering. He observed two men tiptoeing in the hallway through his peephole. Lasky called the police, armed himself, and pursued the men, who were hurrying down the stairway. He apprehended the defendant between the fifth and fourth floors. The defendant claimed to be looking for a girlfriend but refused to identify her. Lasky frisked the defendant, felt a hard object, and retrieved an envelope containing burglar’s tools from the defendant’s pocket.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was indicted for unlawful possession of burglar’s tools. The defendant’s motion to suppress the evidence was denied. He was convicted upon a guilty plea. The case reached the New York Court of Appeals after an appeal regarding the admissibility of the evidence obtained during the search.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the evidence of the burglar’s tools was the result of an unlawful search and seizure and thus inadmissible.

    Holding

    No, because the officer’s actions were justified under the ‘stop and frisk’ doctrine given the suspicious circumstances and the officer’s reasonable concern for his safety.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court applied the rationale of People v. Rivera (14 N.Y.2d 441), which established that police officers have the right to stop and frisk individuals based on reasonable suspicion. The court reasoned that preventing crime is a crucial police function, and prompt inquiry into suspicious activity is essential. The standard for inquiry is lower than that for arrest. Officer Lasky had a reasonable basis to suspect criminal activity: he twice observed unfamiliar men tiptoeing around the top floor of his apartment building, and they hastily exited via the stairway. “The stopping of the individual to inquire is not an arrest and the ground upon which the police may make the inquiry may be less incriminating than the ground for an arrest for a crime known to have been committed.” The court held that the frisk was justified by the need to ensure the officer’s safety. The court emphasized that the critical question is whether there was a right to find anything, not what was ultimately found. The court stated, “The question is not what was ultimately found, but whether there was a right to find anything.” The court noted the location of the confrontation (narrow stairwell) made the frisk a necessity. The court also upheld the constitutionality of Section 180-a of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which codified the stop and frisk doctrine, emphasizing that it strikes a fair balance between individual rights and the need for effective law enforcement.

  • People v. De Lago, 16 N.Y.2d 287 (1965): The ‘No-Knock’ Exception to Warrant Requirements

    People v. De Lago, 16 N.Y.2d 287 (1965)

    A ‘no-knock’ search warrant is permissible under the Fourth Amendment when there is reasonable cause to believe that evidence sought will be quickly destroyed if notice is given.

    Summary

    This case addresses the constitutionality of a ‘no-knock’ search warrant, specifically, whether police officers must announce their presence and purpose before forcibly entering a residence. The New York Court of Appeals held that a ‘no-knock’ warrant is permissible under the Fourth Amendment if the issuing judge finds, based on sworn proof, that the property sought (here, gambling paraphernalia) is easily destroyed or disposed of if advance notice is given. The court emphasized that the validity of a warrant is assessed at the time of its issuance, and the judge can infer the likelihood of destruction based on the nature of the contraband.

    Facts

    Police obtained a warrant to search the apartment of Anthony De Lago, located in a four-apartment building. The warrant authorized a search of “the structure” at a specified address, believed to be occupied by De Lago, but the caption clarified it was for “The first floor apartment at 2 Abendroth Place.” Based on an affidavit, the warrant included a provision dispensing with the need for the officers to announce their authority and purpose before entering. Police executed the warrant, found policy slips and other gambling paraphernalia in De Lago’s apartment, and arrested him.

    Procedural History

    De Lago was convicted based on the evidence seized during the search. He moved to suppress the evidence, arguing the search warrant was invalid because it was overly broad and unconstitutionally authorized a ‘no-knock’ entry. The trial court denied the motion to suppress. De Lago appealed to the New York Court of Appeals, challenging the validity of the search warrant.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the search warrant, which authorized a search of “the structure” but was clarified in the caption to specify De Lago’s apartment, was sufficiently particular to satisfy the Fourth Amendment’s requirement that warrants “particularly describ[e] the place to be searched.”

    2. Whether Section 799 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which allowed a judge to authorize a ‘no-knock’ entry if there was proof that the property sought could be easily destroyed, violated the Fourth Amendment.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the caption of the warrant clarified that the search was limited to De Lago’s apartment, thus curing any ambiguity in the broader language of the warrant’s body.

    2. No, because the Fourth Amendment permits a ‘no-knock’ entry where there is reasonable cause to believe that giving notice would lead to the destruction of the evidence sought.

    Court’s Reasoning

    Regarding the warrant’s specificity, the court held that the caption clarified the scope of the search to De Lago’s apartment, curing any potential overbreadth in the initial description. The court cited People v. Martell and Squadrito v. Griebsch to support using the caption for clarification.

    On the ‘no-knock’ provision, the court acknowledged the general Fourth Amendment requirement of announcement, citing Boyd v. United States. However, it also recognized an exception when police have a reasonable basis to believe that evidence will be destroyed if notice is given, citing Ker v. California. The court noted that even Ker, which reaffirmed the announcement requirement, upheld a search where officers entered quietly to prevent the destruction of contraband.

    The court reasoned that the validity of the warrant is determined at the time of its issuance. The judge issuing the warrant could reasonably infer, based on the affidavit presented and judicial notice, that gambling materials are easily secreted or destroyed if the occupants are alerted to an impending search. The court stated, “Even though there is nothing in the affidavit to show specifically how or where these gambling materials would be likely to be destroyed or removed, the likelihood that they would be was an inference of fact which the Judge signing the warrant might draw.” The court concluded that Section 799 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, as applied here, complied with the Fourth Amendment.

  • People v. Pugach, 15 N.Y.2d 65 (1964): Legality of “Frisk” Extended to Briefcase

    People v. Pugach, 15 N.Y.2d 65 (1964)

    A “frisk” for weapons, permissible during a lawful detention for inquiry, can extend to containers, such as a briefcase, carried by the suspect if there is reasonable concern for officer safety.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals upheld the conviction of Burton Pugach for unlawfully possessing a loaded firearm. Police officers, investigating Pugach for an unrelated matter, stopped him, and escorted him to a squad car. Inside the car, officers “frisked” Pugach and then searched the briefcase he was carrying, discovering an unlicensed, loaded pistol. The Court found that the search of the briefcase was a permissible extension of a lawful “frisk” and not an unreasonable search under the Fourth Amendment, given the circumstances of the detention and the officers’ safety concerns. The court reasoned that a weapon concealed in a briefcase is the same as concealed on the person.

    Facts

    New York City police were investigating Burton Pugach concerning an unrelated matter. On October 30, 1959, three officers observed Pugach entering an office building carrying a briefcase. Two officers approached him and asked him to accompany them to a squad car for questioning about the other matter. Inside the car, officers began to “frisk” Pugach. Pugach placed the briefcase on the floor. After the frisk, an officer took the briefcase, unzipped it, and discovered a loaded pistol. Pugach admitted he did not have a permit for the weapon and stated he would explain his possession of the gun “at the right time and place.”

    Procedural History

    Pugach was convicted in the Bronx County Court for violating Section 1897 of the Penal Law (illegally carrying a concealed, loaded firearm without a license). The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal to determine the legality of the search and seizure of the briefcase and its contents.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the search of the defendant’s briefcase during a “frisk” in a police car, leading to the discovery of an unlicensed loaded firearm, constituted an unreasonable search and seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment.

    Holding

    No, because under the circumstances, the inclusion of the briefcase in the “frisk” was not so unreasonable as to be constitutionally illegal.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that the Fourth Amendment proscribes “unreasonable” searches and seizures, and that determining “unreasonableness depends on surrounding facts and circumstances and involves a balancing of interests.” Referencing *People v. Rivera*, the court stated that a “frisk” is a reasonable and constitutionally permissive precaution to minimize the danger to a policeman who is trying to determine whether a crime has been or is about to be committed. The right to “frisk” is justified as an incident to an inquiry upon grounds of safety and precaution which might not initially sustain a search. The court held that the fact that the loaded gun was found concealed in the briefcase, rather than in a pocket of defendant’s clothing, affords no ground for saying that this “frisk” was in reality a constitutionally protected search. In the language of the statute, “the loaded firearm concealed in the brief case carried in the hands of the defendant was concealed upon his person (Penal Law, § 1897).” The court deemed disclosure of the “other matter” unnecessary, given the ongoing surveillance of the defendant and the intent to bring him to the police station for questioning. Therefore, under all the circumstances the inclusion of the brief case in the “frisk” was not so unreasonable as to be constitutionally illegal.

  • People v. Huntley, 43 N.Y.2d 175 (1977): Parolee’s Fourth Amendment Rights and Search Incident to Arrest

    People v. Huntley, 43 N.Y.2d 175 (1977)

    A parolee retains Fourth Amendment rights, and a search of a parolee’s residence must be justified either by probable cause or as a valid search incident to a lawful arrest for a parole violation, but cannot be a pretext for a general exploratory search.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether evidence seized during a search of a parolee’s apartment should be suppressed. The parole officer searched Huntley’s apartment after arresting him for violating parole by associating with a known criminal. The search uncovered narcotics, leading to a drug conviction. The court affirmed the conviction, holding that the search was a valid search incident to a lawful arrest. However, a strong dissent argued the search was unreasonable and violated Huntley’s Fourth Amendment rights, as it was not truly incident to the arrest, but rather an improper evidence-gathering expedition.

    Facts

    Huntley was on parole. His parole officer received information that Huntley was associating with a known criminal, a violation of his parole conditions. The parole officer arrested Huntley at his apartment for this violation. Following the arrest, the parole officer conducted a 2 1/2-hour search of Huntley’s apartment. The search uncovered narcotics, which led to Huntley being charged with drug offenses.

    Procedural History

    Huntley was convicted on drug charges based on the evidence found during the search of his apartment. He moved to suppress the evidence, arguing the search was illegal. The trial court denied the motion. The appellate division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals then reviewed the case.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the search of Huntley’s apartment, conducted after his arrest for a parole violation, was a valid search incident to arrest, or an unreasonable search violating his Fourth Amendment rights?

    Holding

    No, according to the dissent, because the search was unreasonable by constitutional standards and the evidence should have been suppressed. The majority affirmed the lower court’s decision without a majority opinion.

    Court’s Reasoning

    Judge Fuld, in dissent, argued that a parolee does not lose all Fourth Amendment protections. While a parolee is in some sense still in legal custody, allowing a complete stripping of Fourth Amendment rights would undermine the rehabilitative purpose of parole. The blanket permission given to a Parole Officer to visit the parolee’s residence should not be construed as a waiver of constitutional guarantees or a consent to a general exploratory search. The dissent emphasized the limitations on searches incident to arrest. Such searches are justified by the need to seize weapons or evidence related to the crime for which the arrest was made. Here, the arrest was for associating with a known criminal; a lengthy search of the apartment did not logically flow from that charge. Citing Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364, 367, the dissent noted the justification for a search incident to arrest is to seize weapons or fruits of the crime. The dissent suspected the parole warrant was used as a pretext to gather evidence in a criminal case, which is an improper purpose, citing Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217, 226. Therefore, the dissent concluded the search was unreasonable and the evidence should have been suppressed.

  • People v. Rivera, 14 N.Y.2d 441 (1964): Legality of Stop and Frisk Based on Reasonable Suspicion

    People v. Rivera, 14 N.Y.2d 441 (1964)

    Police may stop and question a person based on reasonable suspicion of criminal activity and, as an incident to that inquiry, conduct a limited “frisk” of the outer clothing for weapons if they reasonably believe they are in danger.

    Summary

    This case addresses the legality of a police stop and frisk conducted before New York’s “stop and frisk” law was enacted. Detectives observed two men, including Rivera, acting suspiciously in an area known for crime. The men looked into a bar window, walked away, returned, and then rapidly walked away when they noticed the detectives. The detectives stopped Rivera, frisked him, and discovered a loaded gun. The court considered whether the police action of stopping and frisking Rivera was justified under the Fourth Amendment, ultimately holding that, under the circumstances, the stop and frisk was reasonable given the need to protect the officers and maintain public order.

    Facts

    On May 25, 1962, at 1:30 a.m., three plainclothes detectives were patrolling in an unmarked car near 7th Street and Avenue C in Manhattan. Detective Bennett observed Rivera and another man behaving suspiciously for about five minutes. The men repeatedly looked into the window of a bar and grill. Rivera looked towards the detectives’ car, said something to his companion, and both men began walking rapidly away. Detective Bennett described the area as having “quite a bit of crime…Muggings, stick-ups, assaults, larcenies, burglaries.” The detective stopped Rivera and, for his own protection, patted down the outside of Rivera’s clothing, feeling what he believed to be a weapon. He then removed a loaded .22 caliber gun from Rivera’s person.

    Procedural History

    Rivera was arrested and indicted for criminally carrying a loaded pistol and for criminally possessing a pistol. He moved to suppress the evidence (the gun and bullets). The Supreme Court granted the motion to suppress. The Appellate Division affirmed this decision without opinion.

    Issue(s)

    Whether police officers, based on reasonable suspicion, may stop and question an individual in public.

    Whether police officers, incident to a lawful stop, may conduct a limited search (frisk) of an individual’s outer clothing for weapons when they have a reasonable fear for their safety or the safety of others.

    Holding

    Yes, because prompt inquiry into suspicious street action is an indispensable police power in the orderly government of large urban communities.

    Yes, because the right to frisk may be justified as an incident to inquiry upon grounds of elemental safety and precaution which might not initially sustain a search.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that police have a duty to prevent crime and must be able to make prompt inquiries into suspicious behavior. The level of evidence needed for inquiry is less than that required for an arrest. Stopping someone for questioning is not an arrest. The court emphasized, “The business of the police is to prevent crime if they can.” The court recognized the inherent dangers faced by police officers when questioning individuals in public. The court stated, “The answer to the question propounded by the policeman may be a bullet; in any case the exposure to danger could be very great.” Therefore, a limited frisk for weapons is a reasonable precaution to ensure the officer’s safety. The court acknowledged that a frisk is a limited invasion of privacy, but it is less intrusive than a full search. The court balanced the individual’s right to privacy against the need for public safety and the safety of police officers. The Court noted that the constitutional restriction is against unreasonable searches, not all searches, and that reasonableness requires a balancing of interests. The court concluded that the precautionary procedures followed by the police in questioning Rivera met the practical demands of effective criminal investigation without being unreasonable.

  • People v. Laverne, 14 N.Y.2d 304 (1964): Warrantless Searches for Criminal Prosecution are Unconstitutional

    People v. Laverne, 14 N.Y.2d 304 (1964)

    A public officer’s warrantless entry into private premises, against the occupant’s resistance, to gather evidence for a criminal prosecution violates the Fourth Amendment, rendering evidence obtained inadmissible.

    Summary

    Laverne was convicted of violating a village ordinance prohibiting business operations in a residential zone, based on evidence gathered by the Building Inspector during three warrantless entries onto his property. Laverne resisted two of the entries. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, holding that the warrantless searches violated Laverne’s constitutional rights because they were conducted for the purpose of gathering evidence for a criminal prosecution, not for administrative or civil purposes related to public health and safety. The court distinguished this from cases where warrantless inspections are permitted for regulatory purposes.

    Facts

    Laverne operated a design business from his residence in Laurel Hollow, New York, which was located in an area zoned for residential use. The Village of Laurel Hollow had a Building Zone Ordinance that prohibited operating a business in a residential zone. The Village Building Inspector, acting under the authority of the ordinance, entered Laverne’s property on three separate occasions in 1962 to observe his activities. Laverne objected to the inspector’s entry on two occasions. The inspector’s observations formed the basis of three criminal prosecutions against Laverne for violating the ordinance.

    Procedural History

    Laverne was convicted in the Village Police Court on all three charges, which were consolidated for trial, and received a suspended six-month jail sentence. The County Court affirmed the convictions. Laverne appealed to the New York Court of Appeals, which granted permission for the appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a village ordinance authorizing a building inspector to enter private premises without a warrant, against the occupant’s resistance, to obtain evidence for a criminal prosecution, violates the Fourth Amendment’s protection against unreasonable searches and seizures.

    Holding

    Yes, because official searches of private premises without a warrant for the purpose of criminal prosecutions violate constitutional rights.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that the searches were conducted for the purpose of gathering evidence for a criminal prosecution, distinguishing them from searches conducted for administrative or civil purposes related to public health and safety, which may be permissible without a warrant. The court emphasized that the inspector’s entries were not consensual; resistance was met on two occasions, and mere submission to authority does not constitute consent. The court distinguished the case from Frank v. Maryland, where the Supreme Court upheld a conviction for refusing to allow a health inspector access to a property, noting that Frank dealt with a regulatory scheme for the general welfare, not a means of enforcing the criminal law. The court held that the searches violated Laverne’s constitutional rights under Mapp v. Ohio, which established that illegally obtained evidence is inadmissible in state criminal trials. The court also addressed the People’s argument that Laverne waived his objection to the unlawful search by failing to comply with the procedural requirements of Section 813-d of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The court rejected this argument, noting that the section primarily addresses physical evidence, not testimonial evidence based on observations made during an unlawful search, and that the People failed to raise this procedural argument in the lower courts.

  • People v. Rainey, 14 N.Y.2d 35 (1964): Search Warrant Must Particularly Describe Premises

    14 N.Y.2d 35 (1964)

    A search warrant that authorizes the search of an entire building containing multiple separate residential units, based on probable cause to search only one unit, violates the Fourth Amendment’s particularity requirement and is invalid.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals held that a search warrant authorizing the search of an entire building containing two separate apartments, based on probable cause relating only to one apartment, was unconstitutionally overbroad. The warrant failed to particularly describe the place to be searched, violating both the New York and U.S. Constitutions. Evidence seized from both apartments was deemed inadmissible, even though the occupant of the second apartment did not complain about the search. The Court reversed the lower court’s judgment and dismissed the indictment against the defendant.

    Facts

    A police officer obtained a search warrant for the premises at 529 Monroe Street, Buffalo, based on an affidavit stating probable cause to believe that the defendant, Rainey, was committing larceny and forgery at that address. The affidavit did not disclose that the building contained two separate apartments: one occupied by Rainey, and the other by Mildred Allison and her child. The warrant authorized a search of the “entire premises” at 529 Monroe Street.

    Procedural History

    The police searched both apartments. In Allison’s apartment, they found nothing. In a shed accessible from Allison’s apartment, they found a check writer and stolen checks. In Rainey’s apartment, they found a typewriter and checks. Rainey moved to vacate the search warrant and suppress the evidence, but the motion was denied. The evidence was admitted at trial over Rainey’s objection. Rainey was convicted. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a search warrant authorizing the search of an entire building containing multiple residential units, based on probable cause relating to only one unit, violates the Fourth Amendment’s requirement that the warrant particularly describe the place to be searched.

    Holding

    Yes, because the warrant’s failure to specify which part of the building was subject to the probable cause showing rendered it a general warrant, violating constitutional protections against unreasonable searches.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that searching multiple residential apartments in the same building is analogous to searching multiple separate houses; probable cause must be established for each unit. Because the affidavit supporting the warrant only established probable cause to search Rainey’s apartment, the warrant was invalid insofar as it authorized the search of Allison’s apartment. The Court emphasized that the officer knew Allison was an innocent party but failed to inform the court of the building’s layout when seeking the warrant. The Court stated, “It is to avoid ‘a blanket search’ with its obvious interference with the innocent that the State and Federal Constitutions provide that ‘No warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, * * * and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized’.” The Court cited federal cases holding that a search warrant commanding the search of an entire residential building is void if probable cause exists for the search of only a single residential space. The Court distinguished cases upholding warrants for single apartments within a multi-unit building when the warrant sufficiently identifies the target apartment. The Court rejected the argument that Allison’s lack of complaint validated the search, stating, “The warrant being void in its inception is void for all purposes, which in this instance includes the execution of its command against this defendant.” The Court emphasized that the focus is on the validity of the warrant at the time of issuance, not on subsequent events. The Court concluded that the warrant’s overbreadth rendered the seized evidence inadmissible.