New York Law Review

Tag: Fourth Amendment

  • People v. Morales, 22 N.Y.2d 55 (1968): Authority to Detain Suspects for Questioning on Less Than Probable Cause

    22 N.Y.2d 55 (1968)

    Law enforcement officials have the authority to temporarily detain and question suspects on less than probable cause, provided the detention is reasonable in scope and duration, the questioning is conducted under controlled conditions protecting Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights, and the circumstances involve a serious crime affecting public safety.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether police can detain a suspect for questioning without probable cause. Morales, suspected in a brutal murder, was picked up and questioned, eventually confessing after being informed of his rights. The court held that temporary detention for questioning is permissible even without probable cause, balancing individual rights with the need for effective law enforcement. This power is limited to situations with serious crimes and is contingent on advising suspects of their rights.

    Facts

    Addie Brown was murdered in her apartment building. Police learned Morales, a known narcotics addict who frequented the building, was present at the time but had not been seen since. After several attempts to locate him, detectives apprehended Morales at his mother’s beauty parlor. He was taken to the police station for questioning, during which he was informed of his right to remain silent and to have an attorney. Morales then confessed to the murder.

    Procedural History

    Morales was convicted of felony murder in the Supreme Court, Bronx County, and sentenced to life imprisonment. The Appellate Division unanimously affirmed the conviction without opinion. Morales appealed, arguing his confession should have been suppressed as the product of an unlawful seizure.

    Issue(s)

    Whether law enforcement officials, lacking probable cause to arrest, may temporarily detain a suspect for questioning without violating the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable seizures.

    Holding

    Yes, because under exceptional circumstances involving a serious crime affecting public safety, a suspect may be detained upon reasonable suspicion for a reasonable and brief period of time for questioning under carefully controlled conditions protecting his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that not every detention constitutes an unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment. It balanced the individual’s right to freedom of movement with society’s need to prevent crime. The court acknowledged the lack of clear Supreme Court precedent on this issue. Quoting Justice Frankfurter in Culombe v. Connecticut, the court noted the need for “reconciling the responsibility of the police for ferreting out crime with the right of the criminal defendant, however guilty, to be tried according to constitutional requirements.” The Court emphasized that the detectives informed Morales of his rights prior to questioning. The Court limited its holding to the “exceptional circumstances presented on this appeal involving a serious crime affecting the public safety,” explicitly prohibiting “mass detentions for questioning.” The Court stated, “The scope of the authority to question is limited to those persons reasonably suspected of possessing knowledge of the crime under investigation in circumstances involving crimes presenting a high degree of public concern affecting the public safety.” The Court concluded that, given the brutal nature of the crime, the circumstantial evidence pointing to Morales, and the brief duration of the detention, the police action was reasonable.

  • People v. Cefaro, 21 N.Y.2d 252 (1967): Standing to Challenge Search of Another’s Property

    People v. Cefaro, 21 N.Y.2d 252 (1967)

    A defendant does not have standing to challenge the search and seizure of evidence from another person’s property if the defendant’s own privacy rights were not violated during the search.

    Summary

    Defendants Cefaro, Josephs, and Russo were convicted of burglary and grand larceny. A key piece of evidence, a stolen camera, was found in the apartment of one Barth during a search for narcotics under a warrant. While the prosecution initially agreed to suppress the camera, they later successfully argued that the defendants lacked standing to challenge the search of Barth’s apartment. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions, holding that the defendants’ Fourth Amendment rights were not violated since the search occurred on Barth’s property and not their own, and they were not present during the search. The Court also rejected the argument that Barth was an accomplice whose testimony required corroboration.

    Facts

    On February 29, 1964, a burglary occurred at the premises of William Mendolia, resulting in the theft of cash, jewelry, and a Polaroid camera. On the same evening, binoculars, two television sets, and liquor were stolen from Thomas Simonetti’s apartment at the same address.

    On March 2, 1964, police searched the apartment of Barth pursuant to a warrant for narcotics. During the search, the stolen Polaroid camera was found in a bureau drawer belonging to one of Barth’s children. Barth testified that the defendants brought the stolen items to his apartment and that Russo sold him the camera.

    Russo admitted that he was with the other defendants on the night of the burglary and that he and Cefaro entered a house and committed a burglary. Josephs admitted to being a lookout during the burglary. Cefaro denied participating in the burglary.

    Procedural History

    The defendants were convicted of burglary in the third degree (two counts), grand larceny in the first degree, and grand larceny in the second degree. Prior to trial, the assistant district attorney consented to the suppression of the camera, but later successfully moved to be relieved of this consent. The trial court denied the motion to suppress, holding that the defendants lacked standing to challenge the seizure of the camera from Barth’s apartment. The Appellate Division affirmed the convictions without opinion. The defendants appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the trial court erred in refusing to charge that Barth was an accomplice as a matter of law or, at least, that the jury could find Barth to have been an accomplice, requiring corroboration of his testimony?

    2. Whether it was improper to revoke the order suppressing the camera and whether revoking it during the trial was unfair and deprived the defendants of a fair trial?

    3. Whether the refusal to charge that the jury must find the confessions were voluntary deprived the defendants of their constitutional right to trial by jury?

    Holding

    1. No, because the evidence indicated Barth was a receiver of stolen property, not an accomplice to the burglary and larceny.

    2. No, because the defendants lacked standing to challenge the search and seizure of evidence from Barth’s apartment.

    3. No, because there was no evidence presented that the confessions were involuntary, and no proper requests or exceptions were made regarding jury instructions on voluntariness (except for Josephs, whose request was declined).

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that Barth could not have been convicted of burglary or larceny based on the evidence presented. The court referenced People v. Foley, 307 N.Y. 490 and People v. Roman, 12 N.Y.2d 220, indicating that while possession of stolen goods can be evidence of larceny, the possession must be unexplained. In this case, Barth’s testimony and the statements of the defendants indicated that he was merely a receiver of stolen property, which is a mutually exclusive crime from larceny. The court cited People v. Kupperschmidt, 237 N.Y. 463, 465, stating, “The crimes of larceny and receiving are mutually exclusive.” Thus, Barth could not have been an accomplice.

    Regarding the camera, the Court held that the defendants lacked standing to challenge its seizure because it was found in Barth’s apartment, not their own. The Court distinguished the case from People v. McDonnell, 18 N.Y.2d 509, where a wiretap was installed in premises maintained for the defendant’s benefit. The Court clarified that the decision in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, did not overrule prior precedent established in Goldstein v. United States, 316 U.S. 114; Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 261; and Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471. These cases established that a defendant cannot assert that evidence seized unlawfully from another person’s property should be suppressed. The court emphasized that if the defendants had been present in Barth’s apartment and the camera had been taken from their possession, they might have had standing to challenge its use.

    The Court did not find any evidence presented demonstrating the involuntariness of the confessions and noted the appellants’ failure to properly request or except to the court’s failure to charge the jury concerning the voluntariness of these admissions.

  • People v. Kaiser, 21 N.Y.2d 86 (1967): Retroactivity of Fourth Amendment Protections in Wiretapping

    People v. Kaiser, 21 N.Y.2d 86 (1967)

    The Supreme Court’s decision in Berger v. New York, which imposed stricter Fourth Amendment requirements on eavesdropping, is applied prospectively only, and wiretap evidence obtained before Berger in substantial compliance with existing constitutional standards is admissible.

    Summary

    Thomas Kaiser was convicted of coercion, attempted extortion, and conspiracy to commit extortion based on wiretap evidence. He appealed, arguing that the wiretap evidence was inadmissible because the statute authorizing the wiretap, Section 813-a of the Code of Criminal Procedure, was struck down as unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in Berger v. New York. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that Berger should be applied prospectively only and that the wiretap order in Kaiser’s case complied with existing constitutional standards at the time it was issued. The court also addressed the issue of federal preemption under Section 605 of the Federal Communications Act, declining to exclude the evidence based on a perceived lack of federal enforcement.

    Facts

    Irving Holzman, an executive, was targeted for extortion. The extortionists demanded $25,000 and 25% of his business. Holzman contacted the Nassau County police, who, with his consent, recorded conversations between Holzman and Salvator Granello. Holzman’s daughter received a threatening call. Based on this, the District Attorney obtained a court order to wiretap Granello and Dino Conte’s phones. Conversations between Conte and Kaiser were recorded, implicating Kaiser in the extortion plot. Kaiser was arrested and indicted.

    Procedural History

    Kaiser was convicted in the trial court. Wiretap evidence was admitted over defense counsel’s objection. Kaiser appealed to the Appellate Division, which affirmed his conviction. Kaiser then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals by permission of the Chief Judge.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the Supreme Court’s decision in Berger v. New York, which struck down Section 813-a of the Code of Criminal Procedure, should be applied retroactively to exclude wiretap evidence obtained before the Berger decision.

    2. Whether wiretap evidence obtained in compliance with state law should be excluded under Section 605 of the Federal Communications Act.

    Holding

    1. No, because the purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter future police misconduct, and applying Berger retroactively would not serve this purpose. The admission of the wiretap evidence did not affect the integrity of the fact-finding process.

    2. No, because the Supreme Court has held that the states are not required to exclude such evidence, and Congress did not intend to thwart state rules of evidence.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court analyzed the Supreme Court’s decision in Berger v. New York, which found Section 813-a of the Code of Criminal Procedure unconstitutional on its face due to its broad scope and lack of procedural safeguards. However, the court determined that Berger should be applied prospectively only, relying on the standards set out in Stovall v. Denno for determining the retroactivity of constitutional rulings. These standards consider the purpose of the new rule, the reliance of law enforcement on the old standards, and the effect on the administration of justice of a retroactive application. The court emphasized that the wiretap order in Kaiser’s case complied with existing constitutional standards at the time it was issued, including a showing of probable cause. The court stated: “The purpose of the exclusionary rule, to which Berger made eavesdropping evidence subject, is deterrence of future police conduct. Applying Berger retroactively will not, therefore, undo the violation of the defendant’s rights which may have already taken place.”

    Regarding the Federal Communications Act, the court cited Benanti v. United States and Schwartz v. Texas, stating that due regard for federal-state relations precluded the conclusion that Congress intended to thwart a state rule of evidence. The court also noted the lack of federal enforcement of Section 605 against state officials, suggesting a policy of nullification by federal officials. It stated: “Under these circumstances we decline to hold that wiretap evidence obtained in substantial compliance with the strictest provisions of the Constitution of the United States and of this State must be excluded in criminal prosecutions in this State.”

    The court further clarified the proper procedure for obtaining wiretap orders post-Berger, requiring particularity in describing the conversations sought, provisions for a return, strict time limitations, termination as soon as the conversations are seized, and allegations of exigent circumstances justifying the waiver of notice. The court concluded by emphasizing the need for regulated intrusion to combat organized criminal activity.

  • People v. Rodriguez, 21 N.Y.2d 392 (1968): Probable Cause for Warrantless Search Based on Informant Tip

    People v. Rodriguez, 21 N.Y.2d 392 (1968)

    An informant’s tip, without specific details connecting the suspects to illegal activity at a particular location, and the mere fact that arrestees stated they came from a specific apartment, are insufficient to establish probable cause for a warrantless search of that apartment.

    Summary

    This case concerns the legality of a warrantless search based on an informant’s tip and statements made by arrestees. Police Detective Dorrish received information from a reliable informant and placed an apartment building under surveillance. After arresting two men who stated they came from the building’s basement, Dorrish entered the basement apartment without a warrant, found drugs in plain view, and arrested the defendants. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, holding that the informant’s tip lacked specificity and the arrestees’ statements did not provide sufficient probable cause to justify the warrantless search.

    Facts

    Detective Dorrish received confidential information from a previously reliable informant regarding possible drug activity at a three-story apartment building.

    Two men were observed entering the building and were arrested upon exiting, charged with heroin possession.

    The arrestees stated they had come from the basement of the building.

    Without obtaining a warrant, Detective Dorrish went to the building, opened the unlocked building door, and entered the basement.

    Hearing a voice inside the basement apartment, he forced open the apartment door and observed drug paraphernalia in plain view, arresting the defendants.

    A search of the defendants revealed glassine envelopes containing heroin.

    Procedural History

    The defendants moved to suppress the evidence, but the motion was denied after a hearing.

    The defendants pleaded guilty to violating Section 3305 of the Public Health Law.

    The Appellate Term affirmed the judgments of the Criminal Court, Kings County.

    The New York Court of Appeals reversed the conviction.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the informant’s tip and the arrestees’ statement provided Detective Dorrish with probable cause to conduct a warrantless search of the basement apartment.

    Holding

    No, because the informant’s tip lacked specific details connecting the defendants to any illegal activity within the apartment, and the arrestees’ statement that they came from the apartment did not, by itself, establish probable cause that the occupants were involved in drug-related crimes.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court emphasized that stronger evidence is required for a search conducted without a warrant, citing Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948), which stresses the importance of having a neutral magistrate determine probable cause.

    The Court distinguished the facts from cases where informants provided specific information about illegal activity occurring at a particular location. Here, the informant did not specify any particular apartment in the building, and the arrestees’ statement that they “came from” the basement was insufficient to infer that the occupants were drug users or dealers.

    The court found the informant’s tip was too general: “Apparently, the informer did not even specify any particular apartment in the building.”

    The Court stated, “Thus, the statement that the arrested men came from the basement simply does not raise, in our view, the reasonable inference that the occupants of the basement are, therefore, drug pushers, users or possessors.”

    The Court distinguished the case from United States ex rel. Rogers v. Warden, 381 F.2d 209 (2d Cir. 1967), where the Second Circuit found a warrant invalid due to a deficient affidavit lacking personal knowledge from the informant. In Rodriguez, the informant’s information was even less specific.

    Because the only evidence against the defendants was illegally seized, the Court reversed the conviction and dismissed the indictment.

  • People v. Overton, 20 N.Y.2d 360 (1967): School Official’s Authority to Consent to Locker Search

    People v. Overton, 20 N.Y.2d 360 (1967)

    School officials have the authority to consent to the search of a student’s locker based on their duty to maintain discipline and a student’s diminished expectation of privacy in school lockers.

    Summary

    This case addresses the question of whether a school official can consent to a search of a student’s locker. Police obtained a warrant to search two students and their lockers. The warrant was later invalidated. However, a search of Overton’s locker, authorized by the vice-principal, revealed marijuana. The court held that the vice-principal’s consent validated the search. The court reasoned that school officials have a duty to maintain discipline and investigate potential illegal activity, giving them the authority to consent to searches of lockers under their control. The court found the students have a reduced expectation of privacy in lockers, especially given school regulations and practices.

    Facts

    Three detectives obtained a search warrant for two students, including Overton, and their lockers at Mount Vernon High School.
    The detectives presented the warrant to the vice-principal, Dr. Panitz, who summoned the students.
    A search of Overton and the other student revealed nothing.
    A subsequent search of Overton’s locker, however, revealed four marijuana cigarettes.
    Overton’s locker combination was on file in the school office, accessible to school authorities.

    Procedural History

    The defendant moved to invalidate the portion of the search warrant pertaining to his locker, which was granted.
    The defendant’s motion to suppress the evidence was denied because the court found that the vice-principal had the authority to consent to the search.
    The Appellate Term reversed, dismissing the information, holding that the vice-principal’s consent could not justify an otherwise illegal search.
    The People appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a high school vice-principal can validly consent to a search of a student’s locker, thereby rendering the search reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, when the initial search warrant is later invalidated.

    Holding

    Yes, because school officials have a duty to maintain discipline and investigate potential illegal activity, which, coupled with the non-exclusive nature of student lockers, empowers them to consent to a search when suspicion arises.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court grounded its decision in the unique relationship between school authorities and students. It emphasized the school’s duty to maintain discipline and provide a safe environment for students. The court stated: “It is in the high school years particularly that parents are justifiably concerned that their children not become accustomed to antisocial behavior, such as the use of illegal drugs.” This parental expectation necessitates an affirmative obligation for school authorities to investigate suspected narcotics use.

    The court distinguished the locker from a private depository, noting that students are aware that school authorities possess locker combinations and issue regulations regarding locker contents. The court observed, “the student does not have such exclusivity over the locker as against the school authorities.” Dr. Panitz testified that he would have inspected the locker regardless of the warrant, demonstrating his understanding of his duty and authority.

    The court cited United States v. Botsch, illustrating circumstances where a third party can consent to a search when they possess common authority over the premises. The court analogized the vice-principal’s role to the landlord in Botsch, given the school’s retained control over the lockers.

    Therefore, the court concluded that Dr. Panitz’s consent justified the search, and the evidence obtained was admissible. The order of the Appellate Term was reversed, and the case was remitted for consideration of other unresolved issues raised by the defendant.

  • People v. Kaiser, 21 N.Y.2d 86 (1967): Exclusionary Rule and Good Faith Exception

    People v. Kaiser, 21 N.Y.2d 86 (1967)

    Evidence obtained through electronic eavesdropping, even when conducted under a statute later deemed unconstitutional, is inadmissible under the exclusionary rule, including any evidence derived from it, regardless of the good faith of law enforcement officers acting under the then-valid statute.

    Summary

    This case addresses the admissibility of evidence obtained through electronic eavesdropping conducted under a New York statute that was later declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in Berger v. New York. Kaiser and others were indicted for conspiracy to commit murder and for possession of revolvers. The conversations that led to the indictment were obtained via electronic devices installed under a court order pursuant to the eavesdropping statute. The New York Court of Appeals held that, despite the police acting in good faith under a seemingly valid statute, the evidence and its fruits (the revolvers) were inadmissible, mandating suppression and dismissal of the indictment.

    Facts

    Defendants were indicted for conspiracy to commit murder and for possession of revolvers.
    The indictment was based on recorded conversations obtained through electronic devices installed by the police as part of a larceny investigation.
    The conversations revealed a plot to murder witnesses in the larceny investigation, involving the acquisition of deadly weapons.
    The electronic devices were installed pursuant to a court order under a New York statute that had been considered valid for many years.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court granted the defendants’ motions to suppress the evidence (recorded conversations and revolvers) and dismissed the indictment.
    The Appellate Division reversed the Supreme Court’s order, reinstating the indictment.
    The defendants appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether evidence obtained through electronic eavesdropping, conducted under a statute later declared unconstitutional, is admissible in court, considering the law enforcement officers’ good faith reliance on the statute at the time of the eavesdropping.

    Holding

    No, because the subsequent invalidation of the statute renders the eavesdropping illegal from its inception, and the exclusionary rule applies to illegally obtained evidence regardless of the officers’ good faith.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court acknowledged that the police acted in good faith under a statute they reasonably believed to be valid.
    However, the Supreme Court’s decision in Berger v. New York rendered the eavesdropping statute unconstitutional, effectively nullifying the legal basis for the police action.
    The court relied on Mapp v. Ohio, which extended the exclusionary rule to state court proceedings. The exclusionary rule prohibits the use of illegally obtained evidence in criminal trials.
    The court stated that “it is as if there had never been any valid authority for the police to act as they did.”
    The purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter police misconduct by removing the incentive to violate constitutional rights.
    Despite recognizing that the deterrence rationale is less applicable when police act in good faith, the court felt constrained to apply the exclusionary rule broadly.
    Consequently, the court reversed the Appellate Division’s order, granted the motion to suppress the evidence, and dismissed the indictment.

  • People v. Marsh, 20 N.Y.2d 98 (1967): Search Incident to Arrest for Traffic Violation

    People v. Marsh, 20 N.Y.2d 98 (1967)

    A police officer is not authorized to conduct a search incident to an arrest for a traffic violation unless the officer has reason to fear an assault or probable cause to believe that the individual has committed a crime.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals held that a search incident to an arrest for a traffic violation is unlawful unless the officer has a reasonable fear of assault or probable cause to believe that the individual committed a crime beyond the traffic infraction. The defendant was arrested on an outstanding warrant for a traffic violation (speeding). A search incident to that arrest revealed a policy slip, leading to a conviction for possession. The court reversed the conviction, reasoning that treating traffic violations as non-criminal offenses while simultaneously allowing searches incident to arrest would be incongruous and violate constitutional protections against unreasonable search and seizure.

    Facts

    The defendant was arrested pursuant to a warrant issued for a traffic violation (speeding) committed two years prior. Incident to the arrest, the police officer searched the defendant and found a sheet of paper in a matchbook cover that implicated him in playing policy (an illegal lottery). The defendant was charged and convicted for possession of a policy slip.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted in the trial court. Prior to trial, the defendant moved to suppress the evidence found during the search, arguing it was an unlawful search and seizure. The motion was denied, and that denial was renewed and again denied at trial. The defendant appealed the conviction, challenging the denial of his motion to suppress.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a police officer is authorized to conduct a search incident to an arrest when the defendant is taken into custody for a traffic violation based on an arrest warrant issued after the defendant failed to appear in court following the initial summons.

    Holding

    No, because the legislative policy treats traffic infractions differently from criminal offenses, and the constitutional prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures does not permit a search incident to arrest for a traffic violation unless the officer reasonably fears an assault or has probable cause to believe that the person committed a crime.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that the Vehicle and Traffic Law explicitly states that a traffic infraction is not a crime, and the punishment should not be considered a penal or criminal punishment. This policy reflects a legislative intent to treat traffic offenses differently from criminal offenses. While an officer has the authority to arrest for a traffic violation, they also have the option to issue a summons. The court stated, “The authority of the police to search a traveler on the highway may not be made to turn on whether the officer, in the exercise of his discretion, forthwith arrests the traffic offender instead of merely summoning him to court.”

    The general rule allows a search incident to a lawful arrest for weapons or for fruits/implements used to commit the crime. However, the court found this rule inapplicable to traffic violations. It noted that traffic infractions rarely involve “fruits” or “implements,” and it would be incongruous to treat traffic offenders as non-criminals while simultaneously subjecting them to a search for weapons.

    The court emphasized that a search for weapons is a special exception that should not be extended beyond securing the officer’s safety and preventing escape. It stated that a speeding motorist does not inherently indicate a propensity for violence. The court found no legislative intent to authorize a search of a traffic offender unless the officer has reasonable grounds to suspect danger or probable cause to believe the offender committed a crime. The court stated that, “no search for a weapon is authorized as incident to an arrest for a traffic infraction, regardless of whether the arrest is made on the scene or pursuant to a warrant, unless the officer has reason to fear an assault or probable cause for believing that his prisoner has committed a crime.”

    The court also relied on the constitutional prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures, stating that a uniform rule permitting searches for all valid arrests, including minor traffic violations, would preclude consideration of the reasonableness of a search. The court cited People v. Watkins, 19 Ill. 2d 11, 18, which observed that such a uniform rule “would take away the protection that the constitution is designed to provide.”

    Therefore, the court concluded that the search was unlawful, the evidence should have been suppressed, and the information dismissed.

  • People v. Heller, 29 N.Y.2d 319 (1971): Search Warrant Must Specifically Describe Obscene Material

    People v. Heller, 29 N.Y.2d 319 (1971)

    A search warrant authorizing the seizure of “obscene” materials must particularly describe the items to be seized and cannot delegate to police officers the discretion to determine obscenity, as that determination is reserved for the courts.

    Summary

    Heller was convicted of possessing obscene motion picture films with intent to sell, based on evidence seized under a search warrant. The warrant authorized the search and seizure of “obscene, indecent and hard core pornographic” pictures, photographs, and motion picture films. Heller moved to suppress the evidence, arguing the warrant was unconstitutionally broad. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, holding the warrant was invalid because it failed to particularly describe the items to be seized and improperly delegated the determination of obscenity to the police, a function reserved for the courts.

    Facts

    A police officer obtained a warrant to search Heller’s premises based on information from an FBI agent and a State Police investigation suggesting Heller was producing pornographic films and possessed master reels for copying. The warrant authorized the search and seizure of “obscene, indecent and hard core pornographic” pictures, photographs, and motion picture films. Police executed the warrant and seized reels of film from Heller’s home.

    Procedural History

    Heller was convicted in the trial court. He moved to suppress the evidence seized during the search, but the motion was denied. The Appellate Term affirmed the conviction. Justice Shapiro dissented. Heller appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a search warrant authorizing the seizure of “obscene, indecent and hard core pornographic” materials is unconstitutionally general and vague, improperly delegating the determination of obscenity to the executing officers.

    Holding

    Yes, because the warrant’s language did not particularly describe the items to be seized and improperly delegated the determination of obscenity to the police, violating the Fourth Amendment’s requirement that warrants particularly describe the things to be seized.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals found the search warrant invalid because it was too general and delegated the determination of obscenity to the police. The court relied on the Fourth Amendment, which requires that warrants particularly describe the persons or things to be seized. The court reasoned that the term “obscene, indecent and hard core pornographic” was not sufficiently specific and left it to the police officer executing the warrant to determine whether the material was obscene. The court emphasized that determining what constitutes obscenity is a matter of constitutional law reserved for the courts, not law enforcement officers. Citing Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U.S. 717, 722, the court stated that “the power and duty of making that determination is conferred upon the courts rather than upon the police.” The court distinguished the case from People v. Richmond County News, 9 N.Y.2d 578, noting that even specifying “hard core pornography” was insufficient to define specifically in a search warrant what the police are to look for and seize. Because the motion to suppress was incorrectly denied, the judgment of conviction was reversed and a new trial ordered.

  • People v. Gallmon, 19 N.Y.2d 380 (1967): Investigatory Entries and the Announcement Rule

    People v. Gallmon, 19 N.Y.2d 380 (1967)

    A police officer’s entry into private premises to investigate a disturbance, as opposed to making an arrest, does not require announcement of office and purpose under Section 178 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

    Summary

    Gallmon was convicted of possessing narcotics instruments after police entered his room without announcing their presence and seized evidence. The police were responding to a noise complaint from the building manager. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that the police entry was investigatory, not for the purpose of arrest, and therefore, the announcement requirement of Section 178 of the Code of Criminal Procedure did not apply. The court emphasized the distinction between a private dwelling and a rooming house where the landlord retains a right of access for reasonable purposes. The court reasoned that the police were assisting the manager in his duty to maintain order and investigate disturbances.

    Facts

    A police officer, responding to a radio call about a “disorderly man” at a rooming house, was directed to Gallmon’s room by the night manager. The officer heard loud noises coming from the room. After the officer knocked, a voice inside said, “Wait a minute. Wait a minute, I’m not dressed.” After a minute, the officer had the manager open the door with a passkey. The officer found Gallmon stripped to the waist, holding a syringe, and the officer arrested Gallmon and seized the narcotics instrument.

    Procedural History

    Gallmon was convicted in the Criminal Court of the City of New York for possession of narcotics instruments. Prior to his guilty plea, Gallmon moved to suppress the evidence, arguing it was obtained through an unlawful entry. The motion to suppress was denied. The Appellate Term affirmed the conviction, and leave to appeal was granted by a judge of the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the police officer’s entry into the defendant’s room without announcing his office and purpose violated Section 178 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, thus rendering the subsequent arrest and seizure of evidence unlawful.

    Holding

    No, because the officer’s entry was investigatory, not for the purpose of making an arrest; therefore, the announcement requirements of Section 178 of the Code of Criminal Procedure do not apply.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that Section 178, requiring announcement of office and purpose, only applies when the officer’s purpose is to make an arrest. In this case, the officer was responding to a disturbance call and was investigating the situation, not initially intending to make an arrest. The court emphasized that police officers have a duty to assist people in distress and investigate disturbances, functions that are independent of criminal law enforcement. The court distinguished this case from situations involving private dwellings, noting that in a rooming house, the landlord (and by extension, the police assisting the landlord) retains a right of access for reasonable purposes, such as investigating disturbances. The court cited de Wolf v. Ford, 193 N.Y. 397, for the proposition that an innkeeper has a right of access to a guest’s room “at such proper times and for such reasonable purposes as may be necessary in the general conduct of the inn or in attending to the needs of the particular guest.” The court cautioned that trial courts must carefully scrutinize claims of “investigatory entries” to prevent abuse, recognizing the factual inference that an entry leading to arrest or seizure was for the purpose of arrest or seizure. However, in this case, the court found sufficient objective evidence, including the disturbance call and the manager’s purpose, to justify the investigatory entry. The court also noted that even a private individual might make such an entry if it reasonably appears that his intrusion and presence would avert injury to the occupant or his chattels. The fact that a crime was discovered does not retroactively invalidate the entry if the officer’s intent prior to entry was investigatory and privileged. The court distinguished Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, noting that in Ker, the entry was for the purpose of making an arrest, which was not the case here. The court noted: “Perhaps it is of the greatest significance to this case that the police officer’s entry was pursuant to his general obligation to assist people in distress — a purpose often independent of considerations affecting the criminal law.”

  • People v. Morhouse, 21 N.Y.2d 66 (1967): Standing to Challenge a Wiretap

    People v. Morhouse, 21 N.Y.2d 66 (1967)

    A defendant has standing to challenge the validity of a wiretap and subsequent search if the defendant’s own privacy was violated, but not merely because evidence obtained from the violation of another person’s rights incriminates the defendant.

    Summary

    Morhouse was convicted of conspiracy based on evidence obtained from a wiretap on a phone not belonging to him and a search of premises he did not own. The New York Court of Appeals considered whether Morhouse had standing to challenge the legality of the wiretap and search. The court held that a defendant has standing only when their own privacy rights have been violated, not when evidence against them is derived from violations of another’s rights. Because Morhouse failed to demonstrate a violation of his own privacy, the court held that he lacked standing to challenge the wiretap and search.

    Facts

    The essential facts are that evidence used to convict Morhouse of conspiracy was obtained from:
    1. A wiretap on a telephone that was not owned by Morhouse.
    2. A search of premises not owned by Morhouse.
    Morhouse was charged with conspiring with the owners of the phone and the possessors of the searched apartment. Morhouse challenged the validity of the wiretap and the subsequent search, arguing that they were unlawful.

    Procedural History

    The District Court convicted Morhouse. The defendant appealed, arguing he had standing to challenge the legality of the wiretap. The Court of Appeals withheld determination of the appeal and remitted the case to the District Court for further proceedings consistent with its opinion.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a defendant has standing to challenge the validity of a wiretap or search when the defendant’s own privacy was not invaded, but the evidence obtained from the wiretap or search is used against them in a conspiracy charge?

    Holding

    No, because the right to privacy is personal, and a defendant cannot complain merely because the violation of another person’s right reveals evidence incriminating them.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that the essence of the Fourth Amendment is privacy and that the exclusion of evidence is a means to secure that privacy. Citing Jones v. United States, the court emphasized that restrictions on searches and seizures are for protection against official invasion of privacy. The court stated that “ordinarily, then, it is entirely proper to require of one who seeks to challenge the legality of a search * * * that he himself was the victim of an invasion of privacy.” The court distinguished Jones v. United States, noting that in Jones, the defendant was required to assert possession of the contraband to establish standing, which would force him to confess to the crime. Also, the defendant in Jones had a sufficient interest in the premises searched to claim a right of privacy. In Morhouse, the court found that Morhouse did not claim ownership of the phone tapped or the premises searched, nor could he. The court noted that Morhouse’s primary concern was to avoid any contact with the phone or premises. The court concluded that Morhouse was merely a “user” of the phone, which was insufficient to establish standing under the rationale of Jones. The dissenting opinion argued that Morhouse lacked standing because his privacy was not invaded. The dissent emphasized that the fact that the wiretap revealed Morhouse’s participation in the conspiracy did not, in itself, give Morhouse standing to challenge the wiretap.