New York Law Review

Tag: Fourth Amendment

  • People v. Floyd, 26 N.Y.2d 558 (1970): Exclusionary Rule and Unlawful Entry for Arrest

    People v. Floyd, 26 N.Y.2d 558 (1970)

    Evidence obtained as a result of an unlawful arrest, specifically one where police fail to announce their presence and purpose before entering a private residence without exigent circumstances, is inadmissible under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.

    Summary

    Floyd was convicted of felony and misdemeanor narcotics possession. The conviction stemmed from evidence seized after police, acting on an anonymous tip and verifying a federal forgery warrant, entered his hotel room at 7:00 AM without knocking or announcing themselves. Observing drug paraphernalia in plain view, they arrested and searched Floyd, discovering heroin. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, holding that the evidence was illegally obtained because the police violated the state’s “knock and announce” rule without justification, and the evidence was therefore inadmissible under the exclusionary rule.

    Facts

    An anonymous tip alerted New York City police that Floyd was wanted on a federal forgery warrant.

    Police verified the warrant and proceeded to Floyd’s hotel.

    At 7:00 AM, three officers obtained a passkey from the hotel clerk and entered Floyd’s room without knocking or announcing their presence or purpose.

    Upon entering, the police observed narcotics paraphernalia in plain view.

    Floyd was arrested and handcuffed, and a subsequent search revealed heroin hidden in a pillowcase.

    Procedural History

    The trial court denied Floyd’s motion to suppress the seized evidence.

    Floyd was convicted of felony and misdemeanor drug possession.

    The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction.

    The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    Whether evidence seized following a “no-knock” entry by police to execute an arrest warrant is admissible when there are no exigent circumstances justifying the failure to announce their presence and purpose.

    Holding

    Yes, because the police failed to comply with the “knock and announce” rule without any exigent circumstances excusing their non-compliance, rendering the subsequent search and seizure unlawful, and the evidence inadmissible.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court relied on New York statutes and common law requiring police to announce their presence and purpose before forcibly entering a residence to make an arrest. The Court acknowledged exceptions to this rule in exigent circumstances, such as the imminent destruction of evidence, escape, or increased risk to the police or others. It cited Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963) regarding the potential destruction of evidence. However, the Court found no such circumstances present in Floyd’s case. There was no reason to believe Floyd was likely to escape or present a danger to the officers. The court noted, “True, in this case there was matter that was both contraband and evidence, but before entry the police did not have the slightest reason to believe that the matter was present in the premises.” The Court stated the police’s belief that he had previously evaded an officer was irrelevant. Furthermore, the court found that the officers drawing their weapons before entering the room, did not demonstrate that there were exigent circumstances, but that this was extrahazardous given that they were entering by stealth without notice. The Court determined that the arrest was unlawful, citing Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301 (1958) and Sabbath v. United States, 391 U.S. 585 (1968). Because the arrest was unlawful, the evidence seized during the subsequent search was inadmissible under the exclusionary rule, which applies to state arrests through the Fourteenth Amendment, as established in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) and Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963). The court explicitly declined to determine if the search had been permissible under Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969), given that there was already a violation based on the entry of the room.

  • People v. Marsh, 20 N.Y.2d 98 (1967): Limits on Vehicle Searches Incident to Arrest

    People v. Marsh, 20 N.Y.2d 98 (1967)

    A warrantless search of a vehicle is not justified as incident to an arrest when the arrestee is secured away from the vehicle, and there is no reasonable belief that the vehicle contains fruits, instrumentalities, contraband, or evidence related to the crime for which the arrest was made.

    Summary

    Marsh was convicted of felony weapon possession after the denial of his motion to suppress a loaded revolver found in his car. An officer arrested Marsh based on an outstanding warrant for receiving stolen property. After securing Marsh inside a police station, the officer searched Marsh’s car, discovering the weapon. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, holding that the search was not a valid search incident to arrest because it was not contemporaneous with the arrest and there was no probable cause to believe the car contained evidence related to the crime for which Marsh was arrested. The Court emphasized that once Marsh was secured inside the station, there was no risk he could access any weapons in the car.

    Facts

    Patrolman Beedenbender, while directing traffic, recognized Marsh, a driver with Virginia license plates, from a prior narcotics arrest (later dismissed). The officer was aware of an outstanding warrant for Marsh’s arrest from February 1, 1965, related to a charge under Penal Law §1308. Beedenbender followed Marsh, requested him to park near the 30th precinct, and inspected Marsh’s license and registration, finding them in order. He then took Marsh inside to confirm the warrant’s validity. Upon confirmation, Marsh was arrested. Ten minutes after the arrest and while Marsh was inside the station, the officer searched Marsh’s vehicle, finding a loaded .45 caliber revolver under the driver’s seat. Marsh and his passengers were then arrested for weapon possession.

    Procedural History

    The trial court denied Marsh’s motion to suppress the weapon. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, finding sufficient unity of time and place between the arrest and search. The District Attorney conceded error on appeal to the Court of Appeals, but the Court considered the merits. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s decision, dismissing the indictment.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a warrantless search of a vehicle, conducted after the driver has been arrested, secured inside a police station, and where there is no reasonable belief that the vehicle contains evidence related to the crime for which the driver was arrested, is a valid search incident to arrest under the Fourth Amendment?

    Holding

    No, because the search was not contemporaneous with the arrest, and there was no reasonable belief that the vehicle contained evidence related to the crime for which the driver was arrested. The Court emphasized that “[o]nce an accused is under arrest and in custody, then a search made at another place, without a warrant, is simply not incident to the arrest.”

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court relied heavily on Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364 (1964), which held that a search of a vehicle is not incident to arrest if it is remote in time or place from the arrest. The Court reasoned that the justifications for a search incident to arrest—officer safety and preventing the destruction of evidence—are absent when the arrestee is secured away from the vehicle. In this case, once Marsh was inside the station, there was no danger he could use a weapon from the car. The Court acknowledged the exceptions to the warrant requirement for vehicle searches, particularly where securing a warrant is impractical due to the vehicle’s mobility, as articulated in Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925). However, the Court emphasized that even in such cases, a reasonable belief that the search will produce fruits, instrumentalities, contraband, or evidence is required. Here, the outstanding warrant for receiving stolen property, issued almost three years prior, did not provide a sufficient basis for a reasonable belief that a search of the vehicle would be productive. The Court distinguished this case from others where vehicle searches were upheld, noting that in those cases, the car itself was seized as an instrumentality or evidence of the crime. The Court stated, “Rather it is the lack of any justification to make the search after the 10 minutes had elapsed which brings about the result herein.”

  • People v. Mack, 26 N.Y.2d 311 (1970): Justification for Frisk Incident to Lawful Stop for Violent Crime

    People v. Mack, 26 N.Y.2d 311 (1970)

    When a police officer lawfully stops a suspect based on reasonable suspicion of a violent crime, a frisk for weapons is permissible without requiring a separate, independent basis for believing the suspect is dangerous.

    Summary

    James Mack was convicted of unlawful possession of a weapon. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that a police officer who reasonably suspects an individual of committing a violent crime like burglary is justified in performing a frisk for weapons incident to a lawful stop, without needing an independent basis to believe the suspect is dangerous. The court reasoned that the inherent danger in confronting a suspect potentially involved in a violent crime necessitates allowing officers to take immediate steps to ensure their safety and the safety of others. This decision balances individual rights against the practical realities of law enforcement.

    Facts

    On October 20, 1968, police officers were investigating narcotics activity in Brooklyn. Uniformed officers informed them that three burglaries had been committed that day by two males in the vicinity, providing descriptions of the suspects: one six feet tall wearing a camel hair overcoat and brown hat, the other five feet nine inches wearing a black hat. Fifteen minutes later, the officers observed Mack and another man matching the descriptions entering and exiting multiple buildings suspiciously. The officers approached the suspects, identified themselves, and ordered them to stop. Mack was wearing a camel hair overcoat and brown hat. An officer frisked Mack and discovered a revolver in his coat pocket, leading to his arrest.

    Procedural History

    Mack moved to suppress the weapon, arguing the search was unlawful. The trial court denied the motion, finding the stop and frisk justified under Section 180-a of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Mack pleaded guilty to unlawful possession of a weapon. The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court’s judgment. Mack then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a police officer, having lawfully stopped an individual based on reasonable suspicion of committing a violent crime, must have an independent basis for believing the individual is dangerous before conducting a frisk for weapons.

    Holding

    No, because when an officer reasonably suspects an individual has committed, is committing, or is about to commit a serious and violent crime, that suspicion alone justifies both the detention and the frisk, eliminating the need for a separate, independent basis for believing the individual is dangerous.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals acknowledged prior cases like People v. Rivera, which emphasized the inherent dangers faced by police officers during street encounters. The court recognized that Section 180-a of the Code of Criminal Procedure and the Supreme Court’s decision in Terry v. Ohio established a standard for justifying a frisk separate from the justification for the detention itself. However, the court distinguished between different types of crimes. When an officer reasonably suspects an individual of a non-violent crime, an independent basis for believing the suspect is dangerous is required before a frisk. But when the suspected crime is serious and violent, like burglary, the very nature of the crime creates a sufficient basis for the officer to believe the suspect may be armed and dangerous. Quoting Justice Harlan’s concurring opinion in Terry v. Ohio, the court stated, “Where such a stop is reasonable, however, the right to frisk must be immediate and automatic if the reason for the stop is, as here, an articulable suspicion of a crime of violence… There is no reason why an officer rightfully but forcibly confronting a person suspected of a serious crime, should have to ask one question and take the risk that the answer might be a bullet.” The court concluded that requiring officers to develop an independent belief of danger in such circumstances would unnecessarily endanger them. The court emphasized the importance of allowing police officers to take necessary measures to ensure their safety while investigating serious criminal activity.

  • People v. Rosemond, 26 N.Y.2d 101 (1970): Lawful Street Inquiry and Probable Cause Based on Answers

    People v. Rosemond, 26 N.Y.2d 101 (1970)

    A police officer’s common-law right to inquire about unusual or suspicious circumstances on the street is not limited by the statutory requirements of reasonable suspicion needed for a stop and frisk; probable cause for arrest can arise from the answers to a lawful street inquiry combined with observed circumstances.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed the legality of a street inquiry and subsequent arrest. Police observed Rosemond and another man entering an apartment building empty-handed and exiting shortly after, carrying bags. When questioned, Rosemond claimed he didn’t know what was in the bag he was carrying. This response, combined with the officers’ observations, provided probable cause for arrest. The court held that the initial inquiry was lawful under the common-law duty of police to investigate suspicious circumstances, and Rosemond’s evasive answer justified further action leading to the discovery of stolen property. The court affirmed the conviction, finding no violation of Rosemond’s Fourth Amendment rights.

    Facts

    A police officer observed Rosemond and another man entering an apartment building empty-handed. A short time later, the officer saw them exiting the same building, one carrying a plaid zippered suitcase and the other a plaid plastic shopping bag. The officer followed them and, as they were entering a hallway, approached and asked Rosemond what he had in the package. Rosemond replied that he did not know. The officer then discovered that an apartment in the building they had exited had been burglarized.

    Procedural History

    Rosemond and his companion were indicted for burglary, petit larceny, and receiving stolen property. A motion to suppress the evidence, arguing an unlawful search, was denied. Rosemond pleaded guilty to attempted burglary in the third degree. The Appellate Division affirmed the lower court’s decision by a divided court, and Rosemond appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether Section 180-a of the Code of Criminal Procedure is the exclusive basis for a policeman to stop and question a citizen.
    2. Whether Rosemond’s Fourth Amendment rights were violated by the police conduct in this case.

    Holding

    1. No, because Section 180-a does not limit the pre-existing common-law right of police to inquire about unusual or suspicious circumstances.
    2. No, because the initial street inquiry was lawful, and the answers given, combined with the officer’s observations, provided probable cause for arrest.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that Section 180-a of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which addresses police inquiry under specific circumstances (reasonable suspicion of a felony), does not eliminate the broader, pre-existing common-law right and duty of police to inquire about unusual situations. The court stated, “To be alert, aware and knowledgeable of street events would seem the fundamental test of competent and skillful police work.”

    The court emphasized that reasonable suspicion of a felony should not be the sole criterion for inquiry, and inquiry is not prohibited even if most of what it elicits may be innocent. The court provided an example: “For example, men carrying a cash register out of a grocery store may very well be taking it out for repair; but they may not; and under conditions of manner and attitude difficult to lay down categorically, police would be quite warranted in finding out by asking questions.”

    The court distinguished this case from others involving stop and frisk or other physical actions. The crucial difference was that the police only asked questions, and the answers themselves provided probable cause. Specifically, Rosemond’s statement that he did not know what was in the bag he was carrying, in the context of having just exited an apartment building with the bag, created a reasonable ground to believe that a larceny had occurred. The court analogized the facts to People v. Entrialgo, where the results of a street inquiry justified further police action.

    The court concluded that there was no evidence of official compulsion during the street questioning. The fact that uniformed officers asked questions did not automatically make the interrogation coercive. Therefore, Rosemond’s Fourth Amendment rights were not violated.

  • People v. Whitehurst, 25 N.Y.2d 389 (1969): Burden of Proof in Consent Searches

    People v. Whitehurst, 25 N.Y.2d 389 (1969)

    When a search and seizure is based on consent, the prosecution bears the burden of proving that the consent was freely and voluntarily given.

    Summary

    The defendant, Whitehurst, appealed his conviction for unlawful possession of narcotics, arguing that the contraband was obtained through an unlawful search. A detective, recognizing Whitehurst from a prior arrest, asked him, “What have you got this time?” Whitehurst then produced narcotics. The trial court incorrectly placed the burden of proof on Whitehurst to show lack of consent. The New York Court of Appeals reversed, holding that when a search is based on consent, the prosecution has the burden to prove that consent was given freely and voluntarily. This case clarifies the allocation of the burden of proof in suppression hearings involving consent searches.

    Facts

    Detective Bryan, familiar with Whitehurst from a previous narcotics arrest, observed Whitehurst for about 15 minutes. Inside a store, Whitehurst recognized Bryan and exclaimed, “Oh no. Not you again.” Bryan responded, “Yes, it’s me. What have you got this time?” Whitehurst then took two glassine envelopes from his pocket, placed them on the counter, and said, “That’s all I’ve got.” The envelopes contained narcotics.

    Procedural History

    Whitehurst was convicted in the Criminal Court of the City of New York, Kings County, after pleading guilty to unlawful possession of narcotics. He appealed, challenging the denial of his motion to suppress the narcotics. The Appellate Term affirmed the conviction. Whitehurst then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the hearing court improperly placed the burden of proof on the defendant to demonstrate a lack of consent when the search and seizure was predicated on consent.

    Holding

    Yes, because when a prosecutor seeks to rely upon consent to justify the lawfulness of a search, he has the burden of proving that the consent was, in fact, freely and voluntarily given.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals found that the trial court erred in placing the burden of proof on Whitehurst. The court emphasized that while the defendant generally carries the initial burden of proof when challenging a search and seizure, the People have the burden of going forward to show the legality of the police conduct. Specifically, the Court stated, “When a search and seizure is based upon consent… the burden of proof rests heavily upon the People to establish the voluntariness of that waiver of a constitutional right.” The court noted that Detective Bryan’s question, “What have you got this time?” injected the issue of consent into the case, making the voluntariness of Whitehurst’s actions a central question. Because the detective’s question prompted Whitehurst’s production of the narcotics, the People were required to prove that Whitehurst acted voluntarily, without coercion. The court referenced Bumper v. North Carolina, stating: “When a prosecutor seeks to rely upon consent to justify the lawfulness of a search, he has the burden of proving that the consent was, in fact, freely and voluntarily given” (p. 548). Since the trial court did not properly apply the burden of proof, a new suppression hearing was ordered. The Court stated that the defendant ought to have the factual issue determined in accordance with constitutional standards.

  • Matter of Finn’s Liquor Shop, Inc. v. State Liq. Auth., 24 N.Y.2d 647 (1969): Warrantless Search of Licensed Premises and Implied Consent

    Matter of Finn’s Liquor Shop, Inc. v. State Liq. Auth., 24 N.Y.2d 647 (1969)

    A licensee, by requesting the privilege to dispense liquor, implicitly consents to reasonable regulations and inspections by the State Liquor Authority, thereby making a limited waiver of their Fourth Amendment rights regarding administrative searches of the licensed premises.

    Summary

    Finn’s Liquor Shop challenged the State Liquor Authority’s suspension of its license based on evidence (sales slips indicating illegal credit sales) discovered during a warrantless inspection. The New York Court of Appeals upheld the suppression of the evidence. Although the Alcoholic Beverage Control Law grants the Authority broad inspection powers, the court determined that the search yielding the evidence was not incident to a lawful arrest, nor was it justified by exigent circumstances. The dissent argued that accepting a liquor license implies consent to inspections and a limited waiver of Fourth Amendment rights due to the heavily regulated nature of the alcohol industry.

    Facts

    Investigators from the State Liquor Authority entered Finn’s Liquor Shop during business hours and obtained permission to inspect the premises and its books and records. During the inspection, an investigator found sales slips in a coat hanging in the back of the premises. These slips indicated that Finn’s Liquor Shop had made sales on credit, a violation of section 100 of the Alcoholic Beverage Control Law. The State Liquor Authority subsequently initiated proceedings to suspend Finn’s Liquor Shop’s license based on this evidence.

    Procedural History

    The State Liquor Authority suspended Finn’s Liquor Shop’s license. The licensee challenged this decision, arguing the evidence was illegally seized. The lower courts affirmed the suspension. The case then reached the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether evidence discovered during a warrantless administrative inspection of a licensed liquor store, with the owner’s consent to inspect the premises and records, is admissible in a proceeding by the State Liquor Authority against the licensee.

    Holding

    No, because the evidence was unlawfully seized, as the search was not incident to a lawful arrest, nor were there exigent circumstances justifying a warrantless search beyond the scope of consent. The general power to inspect does not automatically validate every search.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that while the State Liquor Authority has broad powers to regulate the liquor industry, these powers are not unlimited and must be exercised within constitutional constraints. The court emphasized that the search of the coat in the back of the store was not incident to a lawful arrest. Furthermore, no exigent circumstances existed to justify a warrantless search. The court distinguished the right to inspect the premises and records from the right to conduct a general search for evidence of illegal activity. The court stated: “In the instant case, however, there was no claim that the search was incident to a lawful arrest, nor were there exigent circumstances to justify the failure to obtain a warrant. The Authority, therefore, had no right to seize the sales slips found in the coat hanging in the back of the premises.” The dissent argued that by accepting a liquor license, the licensee implicitly consents to reasonable inspections and makes a limited waiver of their Fourth Amendment rights. The dissent cited the peculiar nature of the liquor industry and the state’s recognized right to strictly control it, referencing Seagram & Sons v. Hostetter, 16 N.Y.2d 47. The dissent also noted prior cases such as Matter of Fortino v. State Liq. Auth., 273 N.Y. 31, where evidence found during an inspection was upheld. Judge Jasen, dissenting, stated: “I believe that, by requesting the privilege to dispense liquor, the licensee implicitly consents to such regulations and inspections and makes a limited waiver of his Fourth Amendment rights.” The majority, however, did not accept the argument of implied consent extending to the search that uncovered the sales slips, emphasizing the absence of exigent circumstances or a search incident to a lawful arrest.

  • People v. Overton, 24 N.Y.2d 522 (1969): School Official’s Authority to Consent to Locker Search

    People v. Overton, 24 N.Y.2d 522 (1969)

    A school official with supervisory responsibility over student lockers can consent to a search of a locker when a reasonable suspicion arises that it contains evidence of illegal activity, and this consent is not considered coercion under the Fourth Amendment.

    Summary

    The case concerns the legality of a search of a high school student’s locker. Police detectives, with a warrant later deemed ineffective for searching the locker, searched the student’s locker with the vice-principal’s consent and found marijuana. The New York Court of Appeals held that the evidence was admissible, reasoning that the vice-principal, acting on a reasonable suspicion and having a duty to maintain order, had the authority to consent to the search. The court distinguished this situation from cases involving coerced consent, such as *Bumper v. North Carolina*, emphasizing the school official’s delegated duty and the school’s retained control over the lockers.

    Facts

    Three detectives obtained a warrant to search two students and their lockers at Mount Vernon High School. The vice-principal, Dr. Panitz, summoned the students. The detectives searched the defendant and found nothing. After questioning, the defendant vaguely admitted to possibly having marijuana in his locker. Dr. Panitz, using a master key, opened the locker, where detectives found marijuana cigarettes in the defendant’s jacket.

    Procedural History

    The trial court denied the defendant’s motion to suppress the evidence, arguing the school retained dominion over the lockers. The Appellate Term reversed, finding the search illegal. The New York Court of Appeals initially reversed the Appellate Term, upholding the search. The Supreme Court then granted certiorari, vacated the judgment, and remanded the case for reconsideration in light of *Bumper v. North Carolina*. On reargument, the New York Court of Appeals adhered to its original decision, upholding the admissibility of the evidence.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a high school vice-principal can validly consent to the search of a student’s locker, and whether evidence obtained from that search is admissible in a criminal proceeding against the student.

    Holding

    Yes, because the vice-principal had a duty to maintain order and security in the school, and the student did not have exclusive control over the locker. Therefore, the vice-principal’s consent was valid, and the evidence was admissible.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that Dr. Panitz, as the vice-principal, had a duty to enforce school rules and regulations. The court emphasized that school authorities have a right, and even a duty, to inspect lockers when suspicion arises that something illegal may be secreted there. The court distinguished this case from *Bumper v. North Carolina*, where the Supreme Court found coercion when officers claimed authority to search a home under a warrant. In *Overton*, the court found no coercion because Dr. Panitz was fulfilling his delegated duty as a public official by permitting an inspection of public property. The court stated, “Being responsible for the -order, assignment, and maintenance of the physical facilities, if any report were given to me by anyone of an article or item of the nature that does not belong there, or of an illegal nature, I would inspect the locker.” The court further noted that the lockers were not the private property of the defendant, and the school retained control over them. The consent was “equated to a nondelegable duty, which had to be performed to sustain the public trust.” Therefore, the evidence obtained from the search was admissible.

  • People v. Howard, 50 N.Y.2d 583 (1980): Establishing Abandonment of Property in Fourth Amendment Cases

    People v. Howard, 50 N.Y.2d 583 (1980)

    For property to be deemed abandoned, thereby allowing its seizure without a warrant, there must be sufficient evidence demonstrating a voluntary relinquishment of control and intent to abandon the property by the individual.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed the issue of whether a defendant’s act of dropping a tin box was sufficient to constitute abandonment, justifying its seizure and subsequent search by a police officer without a warrant. The Court held that the mere act of dropping an object, without further evidence of intent to relinquish control, does not constitute abandonment. The Court emphasized that the prosecution failed to demonstrate that the defendant intentionally discarded the box or was given the opportunity to retrieve it before the officer seized it, rendering the seizure unlawful.

    Facts

    A police officer encountered the defendant. The officer testified that the defendant “dropped a tin box” just before the officer made contact with the defendant’s hand. The officer picked up the box immediately after it was dropped. Upon opening the box, the officer discovered glassine envelopes containing heroin.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was charged with drug possession based on the heroin found in the tin box. The defendant moved to suppress the evidence, arguing it was obtained through an unlawful search and seizure. The trial court denied the motion. The defendant appealed. The intermediate appellate court affirmed the trial court’s decision. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the defendant’s act of dropping a tin box, without additional evidence of intent to abandon, constitutes a voluntary abandonment of the property, thereby permitting a warrantless search and seizure of the box by a police officer.

    Holding

    No, because the prosecution failed to demonstrate sufficient evidence of the defendant’s intent to abandon the tin box. The mere act of dropping the box, without evidence of intent to discard it or being afforded an opportunity to retrieve it, does not constitute abandonment.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that for a search to be justified on the grounds of abandonment, there must be clear evidence that the individual intended to relinquish control over the property. The Court found the evidence presented by the prosecution to be insufficient to establish such intent. The Court emphasized that the officer picked up the box immediately after it was dropped, making it impossible to determine whether the defendant would have retrieved it if given the chance. The Court stated: “There is no proof that the defendant threw it away or attempted to dispose of it in any manner which might have manifested the requisite intention to abandon. Moreover, the police officer’s testimony reveals that he picked up the box so soon after it had been dropped that it is impossible to determine whether or not the defendant, if given the opportunity, would have picked up the box himself.” Absent such proof of intent, the seizure was deemed unlawful. The court explicitly stated that the search could not be justified as incident to a lawful arrest because the police lacked probable cause prior to opening the tin box.

  • People v. Berger, 21 N.Y.2d 611 (1968): Admissibility of Evidence Obtained via Consensual Electronic Surveillance

    21 N.Y.2d 611 (1968)

    Evidence obtained through electronic surveillance with the consent of one party to the conversation is admissible and does not violate the Fourth Amendment rights of the other party.

    Summary

    The Court of Appeals of New York addressed whether the use of a concealed radio device to transmit incriminating conversations between a defendant and a police informant violates the defendant’s constitutional rights. The court held that such transmission, with the consent of one party to the conversation, does not violate the Fourth Amendment. This decision rested on the principle that the real breach of privacy occurs when a party to a private conversation voluntarily discloses it, regardless of whether they rely on memory, notes, or electronic devices.

    Facts

    Five separate cases were consolidated on appeal, each involving a conviction for narcotics sales. In each case, a police informant, equipped with a concealed radio device, engaged in conversations with the defendant that were transmitted to and overheard by law enforcement. The defendants argued that the use of this transmitted evidence violated their constitutional rights.

    Procedural History

    The defendants were convicted at trial. They appealed, arguing that the evidence obtained through the electronic transmissions should have been suppressed as a violation of their Fourth Amendment rights. The appellate division affirmed the convictions, and the cases were subsequently appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the transmission to police by an informant, via a concealed radio device, of incriminating conversations with the defendants constitutes a violation of their constitutional rights, specifically their Fourth Amendment right to privacy?

    Holding

    No, because the voluntary disclosure of a conversation by one party to it, with or without electronic aids, does not violate the other party’s Fourth Amendment rights.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court relied on On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747 (1952) and Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427 (1963), which established that the use of electronic devices by one party to a conversation to record or transmit it does not violate the constitutional rights of the other party. The court reasoned that the fundamental breach of privacy occurs when a party to a conversation decides to disclose it, and the method of disclosure (memory, notes, or electronic devices) is immaterial. Quoting from Lopez, the court emphasized that the problem is essentially the same whether the informer tells about the conversation based on memory or uses sophisticated devices.

    The court distinguished Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), which held that intercepting a private telephone conversation by attaching an electronic device to a public telephone booth violated Fourth Amendment rights. The court reasoned that using a public telephone booth constitutes seeking private telephone service, and the interception is akin to eavesdropping. However, Katz does not apply to a voluntary disclosure by a party to the conversation.

    The court also cited Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293 (1966), which allowed an informer to testify about private conversations even without electronic recording or transmission. The court adopted the Second Circuit’s reasoning in United States v. Kaufer, 406 F.2d 550 (2d Cir. 1969), which similarly distinguished Katz. The court stated that the New York statute prohibiting eavesdropping expressly excepts conversations overheard with the consent of a party to the conversation.

  • People v. Horman, 22 N.Y.2d 378 (1968): Admissibility of Evidence Obtained by Private Citizens

    People v. Horman, 22 N.Y.2d 378 (1968)

    The Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against unlawful searches and seizures applies only to governmental action; evidence obtained unlawfully by private citizens is admissible in criminal prosecutions.

    Summary

    Horman was apprehended by store detectives for shoplifting. A subsequent search by the store’s security manager revealed a loaded pistol. Horman was acquitted of shoplifting but convicted of unlawful possession of a weapon, after the trial court denied his motion to suppress the pistol. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that the Fourth Amendment does not apply to searches conducted by private citizens, and therefore, the evidence was admissible, even if the search was unlawful. The court emphasized that earlier Supreme Court rulings had not extended the exclusionary rule to evidence obtained by private actors.

    Facts

    Two store detectives apprehended Horman outside a department store for alleged shoplifting.
    Horman was taken to the store’s security office.
    The security manager requested Horman to empty his pockets, which he did.
    The security manager then “frisked” Horman, discovering a loaded semi-automatic pistol, which was forcibly taken from him.

    Procedural History

    Horman was indicted for felonious possession of a loaded firearm.
    The trial court denied Horman’s motion to suppress the pistol.
    Horman was convicted of criminal possession of a firearm as a misdemeanor in Nassau County Court.
    The Appellate Division, Second Department, affirmed the conviction.
    The New York Court of Appeals granted review.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the Fourth Amendment requires the exclusion of evidence in criminal prosecutions when that evidence was wrongfully obtained by private individuals?

    Holding

    No, because the Fourth Amendment’s protections against unlawful searches and seizures are intended as a restraint upon the activities of sovereign authority, and was not intended to be a limitation upon other than governmental agencies.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that the Fourth Amendment and its associated exclusionary rule, as applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, are designed to regulate the conduct of government officials, not private individuals. The court cited Burdeau v. McDowell, which established that the Fourth Amendment was intended as a restraint upon the activities of sovereign authority, and was not intended to be a limitation upon other than governmental agencies.
    The court acknowledged that the defendant argued that Burdeau had been overruled by Elkins v. United States and Mapp v. Ohio. However, the court distinguished these cases, explaining that they addressed the admissibility of evidence seized by state officials, not private actors.
    The court stated that, prior to Elkins, evidence seized by state officials was treated differently in federal prosecutions than evidence procured by private individuals. Elkins addressed the admissibility in federal court of evidence illegally seized by state officials, while Mapp extended the exclusionary rule to state courts for evidence seized in violation of the Federal Constitution. Neither case overruled the principle that the Fourth Amendment does not proscribe private conduct.
    The court noted that New York precedent also supported the admissibility of evidence obtained by private individuals, even if unlawfully obtained. “It has long been settled that our State’s prohibitions against unlawful searches and seizures (N. Y. Const., art. I, § 12; Civil Rights Law, § 8) do not require exclusion of evidence because a private individual has gathered it by unlawful means.”
    The court concluded that because the evidence in this case was seized without the participation or knowledge of any governmental official, it was admissible in a criminal prosecution. The actions of the store detectives were considered private action, not subject to Fourth Amendment scrutiny.