New York Law Review

Tag: Fourth Amendment

  • People v. Buongermino, 34 N.Y.2d 206 (1974): Consent to Airport Security Search & Magnetometer Use

    People v. Buongermino, 34 N.Y.2d 206 (1974)

    Airport security searches, including the use of magnetometers, are constitutionally permissible when conducted to prevent air piracy, provided individuals voluntarily consent to further searches after initial screening or are otherwise not compelled to board the aircraft.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed the constitutionality of predeparture airport security searches. Defendants Buongermino and Kuhn argued that airport security measures violated their Fourth Amendment rights. The court held that the searches were permissible because both defendants voluntarily consented to the searches. The court reasoned that the governmental interest in preventing air piracy outweighed the minimal intrusion of magnetometer searches. The decision clarified that while a magnetometer search itself is permissible, a subsequent personal search requires consent, and refusal to consent only bars boarding, not further search beyond preventing boarding.

    Facts

    Buongermino was subjected to a predeparture search at Kennedy International Airport where signs were posted indicating searches were possible and announcements were made to that effect. After waiting in line and observing others being frisked, he was asked if he “would mind being searched” and consented. A bulge was found in his pocket, which contained marijuana. Kuhn triggered a magnetometer at LaGuardia Airport. An agent requested identification, and then asked if Kuhn would consent to a search, to which he agreed. A pat-down revealed a cigarette package containing a hypodermic syringe and heroin.

    Procedural History

    Buongermino was convicted of attempted criminal possession of a dangerous drug, and Kuhn was convicted of criminal possession of a hypodermic instrument, both in the Criminal Court of the City of New York. The Appellate Term of the Supreme Court affirmed both convictions.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether predeparture airport security searches violate the Fourth Amendment rights of passengers.
    2. Whether the consent to be searched at an airport can be considered free and voluntary absent being informed of the right to refuse the search.
    3. Whether the use of a magnetometer constitutes an unreasonable search in violation of the Fourth Amendment.

    Holding

    1. No, because under the circumstances, the defendants voluntarily consented to the search.

    2. No, because voluntariness is a question of fact determined from all circumstances; knowledge of the right to refuse is a factor but not a prerequisite to voluntary consent.

    3. No, because the governmental interest in preventing air piracy outweighs the minimal intrusion into personal privacy.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that a defendant can waive Fourth Amendment rights and consent to a search. The prosecution bears the burden of proving voluntariness, which is a question of fact. The court found no evidence of inherently coercive tactics by security officers in either case. The court cited Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, stating that knowledge of the right to refuse is not a prerequisite for establishing voluntary consent. The court distinguished between consent and waiver, noting that a “knowing and intelligent waiver” is required only when a defendant waives rights to preserve a fair trial, whereas Fourth Amendment consent need not meet this strict standard. The court acknowledged that while the magnetometer constitutes a search, its minimal intrusion is justified by the overwhelming governmental interest in preventing air piracy. The court quoted Camara v. Municipal Court, emphasizing the importance of balancing the need to search against the invasion the search entails. Immediate action is required to prevent hijack attempts, making search warrants impractical. The court clarified that a further personal search requires consent after a magnetometer is triggered. Refusal to consent bars boarding, but no further search is justified, as the individual no longer poses an immediate hijacking threat. The court cited Chimel v. California, affirming that contraband found during a valid search is admissible as evidence.

  • People v. Bennett, 33 N.Y.2d 850 (1973): Specificity Requirements for Obscenity Search Warrants

    People v. Bennett, 33 N.Y.2d 850 (1973)

    A search warrant authorizing the seizure of obscene materials must describe the items to be seized with sufficient particularity to prevent the warrant from becoming a general warrant.

    Summary

    This case concerns the validity of a search warrant for obscene materials. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the lower court’s decision, holding that the warrant lacked sufficient specificity in describing the items to be seized. The warrant authorized the seizure of “8mm films cut and uncut, depicting males and females in various positions of sexual intercourse, sodomy and masturbation.” The Court found that this description was too broad and delegated to the police officer executing the warrant the function of determining whether the material was obscene, rendering the warrant invalid. The dissent argued that the warrant was sufficiently specific under the circumstances, especially given the nature of the materials and the evidence presented to the magistrate.

    Facts

    Police obtained a search warrant to search the defendants’ premises. The warrant authorized the seizure of “8mm films cut and uncut, depicting males and females in various positions of sexual intercourse, sodomy and masturbation.” The magistrate had viewed a sample of the films. Based on the search, the defendants were charged with obscenity-related offenses.

    Procedural History

    The trial court denied the defendants’ motion to suppress the evidence seized during the search. The Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order and granted the motion to suppress, holding that the search warrant was invalid.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a search warrant authorizing the seizure of “8mm films cut and uncut, depicting males and females in various positions of sexual intercourse, sodomy and masturbation” is sufficiently specific to satisfy the Fourth Amendment’s particularity requirement.

    Holding

    No, because the warrant delegated to the executing officer the determination of what constituted obscenity, which is a judicial function.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that the warrant lacked sufficient specificity. The warrant’s language authorized the police to seize films based on their own determination of whether the films depicted “various positions of sexual intercourse, sodomy and masturbation.” The Court cited People v. Abronovitz, 31 N.Y.2d 160, 164, and People v. Rothenberg, 20 N.Y.2d 35, 38, emphasizing that a warrant phrased in language which delegates to a police officer the function of determining whether material is obscene is invalid. The Court found that the description in the warrant was too broad and did not adequately limit the discretion of the executing officer. The dissent argued that the language of the warrant was considerably more specific than the warrants in Rothenberg or Abronovitz, and that the magistrate had before him a film, a scrap of uncut film, and testimonial data which established probable cause for believing that the defendants’ premises housed a large supply of contraband. The dissent also cited United States v. Marti, 421 F.2d 1263, 1268, suggesting that the description was sufficiently specific under the circumstances. The dissent maintained that the warrant told the police, within the limits of the circumstances, exactly what they were to seize. The majority, however, was not persuaded, and reversed the order affirming the denial of the motion to suppress.

  • People v. Fitzpatrick, 32 N.Y.2d 499 (1973): Inevitable Discovery Exception to Exclusionary Rule

    People v. Fitzpatrick, 32 N.Y.2d 499 (1973)

    Evidence obtained as a result of illegal police conduct is admissible if the prosecution proves that the evidence inevitably would have been discovered through legal means.

    Summary

    Fitzpatrick was convicted of murdering two police officers. After being apprehended in a house, he made statements (later suppressed) that led police to a gun in a closet. The trial court admitted the gun into evidence, reasoning that it would have been discovered anyway. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that the “inevitable discovery” exception to the exclusionary rule applied. The court also addressed the constitutionality of the death penalty in light of Furman v. Georgia, ultimately modifying the judgment to vacate the death sentence.

    Facts

    Following a gas station robbery and the shooting of two police officers, Fitzpatrick fled in a car later found abandoned. He then forced Marie DiLapi at gunpoint to drive him to Syracuse. DiLapi informed the police. The police traced the car to Fitzpatrick, surrounded his house, and, after receiving no response, entered without a warrant. Upon entering, Fitzpatrick surrendered from a closet. After being advised of his rights (though the adequacy of the warnings was later disputed), he told police the gun was in the closet. A search of the closet revealed the gun. The police officers died from their wounds.

    Procedural History

    Fitzpatrick was indicted for murder. At a suppression hearing, the trial court ruled his oral statements inadmissible due to insufficient Miranda warnings but admitted the gun and other items found in the closet, arguing they would have been inevitably discovered. A jury found Fitzpatrick guilty. He was sentenced to death. Fitzpatrick appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the gun and other items found in the closet were inadmissible as fruit of the poisonous tree.
    2. Whether the search and seizure of the gun violated constitutional requirements.
    3. Whether the death sentence constituted cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment, as interpreted in Furman v. Georgia.

    Holding

    1. No, because the gun would have been inevitably discovered during a lawful search.
    2. No, because the search was incident to a lawful arrest and justified by exigent circumstances.
    3. Yes, because the New York statute left the imposition of the death penalty to the jury’s discretion, violating the Eighth Amendment as interpreted in Furman v. Georgia.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals addressed the “fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine, citing Wong Sun v. United States, stating that evidence is not automatically inadmissible simply because it would not have been discovered “but for” illegal police actions. The relevant question is whether the evidence was obtained by exploiting the illegality or by means sufficiently distinguishable to purge the primary taint. The court adopted the “inevitable discovery” exception, noting that “evidence obtained as a result of information derived from an unlawful search or other illegal police conduct is not inadmissible…where the normal course of police investigation would, in any case, even absent the illicit conduct, have inevitably led to such evidence.” The court reasoned that the gun, used in a robbery and the shooting of two police officers, was a “prime object of any investigation,” and the closet was the most reasonable place to look for it. Therefore, a search of the closet was inevitable, regardless of Fitzpatrick’s statements.

    The court then addressed the legality of the search and seizure, dismissing the argument that the search violated Chimel v. California. The court clarified that Chimel did not disapprove of searches of the area where the arrest occurs, only searches remote in time or place. The immediate search of the closet was permissible. The court found the warrantless entry, search, and arrest justified by probable cause and exigent circumstances. Given the shootings, the threat to DiLapi’s life, and Fitzpatrick’s armed status, the police reasonably believed he would conceal himself, necessitating a swift search to prevent escape and protect lives.

    Finally, regarding the death sentence, the court analyzed Furman v. Georgia. While some justices in Furman viewed the death penalty as inherently cruel and unusual, the court noted that the critical point was the arbitrary and discriminatory application of the death penalty when left to the discretion of judges or juries. The New York statute (Penal Law § 125.35, subd. 5) allowed the jury discretion in imposing the death penalty; therefore, the court held that the sentence constituted cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment. The court modified the judgment by vacating the death sentence and remitting the case for resentencing.

  • People v. Brosnan, 32 N.Y.2d 254 (1973): Warrantless Vehicle Search Based on Plain View

    People v. Brosnan, 32 N.Y.2d 254 (1973)

    Evidence of a crime observed in plain view inside a vehicle, with the defendant’s consent, provides probable cause for a warrantless search and seizure of the vehicle incident to a lawful arrest.

    Summary

    Brosnan was convicted of larceny and assault after a brutal attack on a woman he met in a bar. Police, investigating the crime, found Brosnan and asked to see his truck. He voluntarily showed them the truck, and through the windows, they observed bloodstains, a woman’s shoe, and glasses. Brosnan was arrested and the truck was seized. A subsequent search revealed more evidence. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that the initial observation of incriminating evidence in plain view justified the warrantless seizure and subsequent search of the vehicle incident to a lawful arrest. The court also addressed concerns about the prosecutor’s summation, ultimately deeming it not prejudicial enough to warrant a new trial given the overwhelming evidence of guilt.

    Facts

    Margaret Sullivan met Brosnan at a bar and later left with him in his panel truck.
    Sullivan was found unconscious and severely injured the next morning near a gas station. Her injuries included a fractured skull, lacerations, and bite marks.
    Police learned of Brosnan’s association with Sullivan and went to his home.
    Brosnan voluntarily led the police to his panel truck in a public garage.
    Through the truck’s window, police saw bloodstains on the dashboard, a woman’s shoe, and a pair of glasses.

    Procedural History

    Brosnan was convicted of larceny and assault in a jury trial.
    The Appellate Division modified the conviction, upholding only the assault conviction.
    Two justices dissented, arguing that the prosecutor’s summation warranted a new trial.
    The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the warrantless seizure and subsequent search of Brosnan’s panel truck violated his Fourth Amendment rights against unreasonable searches and seizures.
    Whether the prosecutor’s summation was so inflammatory as to require a new trial.

    Holding

    Yes, the warrantless search and seizure was permissible, because the police had observed incriminating evidence in plain view inside the truck with the defendant’s consent prior to the arrest, justifying the seizure as incident to a lawful arrest.
    No, the prosecutor’s summation, while improper, did not warrant a new trial because it was not sufficiently prejudicial given the overwhelming evidence of the defendant’s guilt.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that the key factor was the police’s observation of incriminating evidence in plain view within the truck before any action was taken to seize it. Brosnan voluntarily showed the police the truck, and the bloodstains, shoe, and glasses were visible through the window. This established probable cause to believe the truck was the scene of the assault. The court emphasized, “Unlike the legion of automobile search and seizure cases which have occasioned interest and difficulty, in this case before the police took any action with respect to the panel truck, they had seen the incriminating evidence in the truck which identified it as the scene of the bloody assault and which linked the victim’s last-known companion, the defendant, to its perpetration.” The court distinguished this case from others where the search preceded the establishment of probable cause or where the evidence discovered was unrelated to the initial reason for the arrest. The seizure occurred when a police guard was placed on the truck, preventing its removal. The court cited Chambers v. Maroney, stating that there is no constitutional difference between seizing and holding a car before obtaining a warrant and conducting an immediate search without a warrant when probable cause exists. The court dismissed the claim that a delayed search was impermissible. It found that the later examination of the truck at the site was merely a further examination of an object of evidence already lawfully seized. Regarding the prosecutor’s summation, the court acknowledged it was improper, using inflammatory language and epithets. However, it held that the impropriety was not significant enough to influence the jury, given the overwhelming evidence. The court stated, “The rule is that an improper summation, at least when the objectionable parts consist largely of abusive and intemperate language as here, should be assessed for its prejudicial effect, and it requires greater impropriety to produce that effect in a stronger case.”

  • People v. Stokes, 32 N.Y.2d 204 (1973): Limits on Loitering Arrests and Searches

    People v. Stokes, 32 N.Y.2d 204 (1973)

    An arrest for loitering requires specific evidence that the suspect’s behavior suggests they are engaged in or about to engage in criminal activity, and a refusal to identify oneself, without more, is insufficient to justify such an arrest.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals reversed a conviction based on evidence obtained during a search incident to an arrest for loitering. The Court held that the arrest was unlawful because there was no probable cause to believe the defendant was engaged in criminal activity beyond simply being in a building lobby and refusing to identify himself. The Court emphasized that a refusal to answer police questions, without other suspicious circumstances, cannot justify an arrest for loitering. Therefore, the search was illegal, and the evidence seized should have been suppressed.

    Facts

    Albert Stokes and a friend entered the unlocked lobby of an apartment building. After a brief conversation, two housing authority policemen, who had been observing them, approached Stokes and asked if he lived there. Stokes said he did not. When asked to identify himself and explain his presence, Stokes refused. The officers arrested him for loitering, searched him, and discovered hypodermic instruments and heroin.

    Procedural History

    Stokes was charged with possession of a dangerous drug, possession of a hypodermic instrument, and loitering. After a hearing, his motion to suppress the evidence was denied, and he was convicted of loitering. Subsequently, he pleaded guilty to attempted possession of a hypodermic instrument. The Appellate Term reversed the loitering conviction but affirmed the judgment, finding probable cause for the loitering arrest. Stokes appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether there was probable cause to arrest Stokes for loitering under Penal Law § 240.35(6).
    2. Whether the evidence seized during the search incident to the arrest should have been suppressed.

    Holding

    1. No, because the circumstances did not justify a suspicion that Stokes was engaged or about to engage in crime.
    2. Yes, because the arrest was unlawful, making the subsequent search and seizure also unlawful.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals held that an arrest for loitering under Penal Law § 240.35(6) requires evidence that the suspect is loitering “in or about a place without apparent reason,” that the circumstances justify suspicion that they may be engaged or about to engage in crime, and that they refuse to identify themselves or provide a credible explanation when questioned by a peace officer. The Court found that the police lacked any evidence suggesting Stokes was engaged in criminal activity. The complaint lacked any allegation that Stokes was suspected of being involved in a crime. The Court stated, “Absolutely lacking is evidence that the policeman had any information whatever…that would have rendered this otherwise innocent conduct suspicious within the sense of the statute.”

    The Court distinguished this case from People v. Gresham, where the defendant’s suspicious behavior (fleeing with an envelope in a deserted train station) provided probable cause. The Court emphasized that Stokes’s refusal to identify himself was insufficient to justify the arrest. Citing People v. Schanbarger, the Court noted that while it may have been preferable for Stokes to answer the officer’s questions, his failure to do so did not constitute a criminal act or a violation of the loitering statute. Since the arrest was unlawful, the search was also unlawful, and the evidence should have been suppressed. The Court found it unnecessary to address the constitutionality of the loitering statute.

  • People v. De Bour, 40 N.Y.2d 210 (1976): Justifying Warrantless Searches Based on Informant Tips

    People v. De Bour, 40 N.Y.2d 210 (1976)

    A warrantless search is permissible if based on a reasonable suspicion, supported by articulable facts, that the individual is carrying a weapon, especially when the suspicion arises from a known informant’s tip regarding a serious crime.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed the validity of a warrantless search of the defendant’s handbag and the seizure of a loaded revolver. The search occurred at a police station after the defendant reported being menaced with a knife by Felix Dotson, with whom she lived. Dotson, after being arrested, told the police the defendant had a gun. The court held that the motion to suppress the weapon was properly denied because the police had reasonable suspicion to believe the defendant possessed a weapon, justifying the search. The court emphasized the balance between individual rights and public safety, particularly when dealing with concealed weapons.

    Facts

    The defendant was accosted in her car by Felix Dotson, who threatened her with a knife. She escaped and reported the incident to the police, stating Dotson had been harassing her. Dotson was arrested and told the arresting officer that the defendant was his wife and was “sick” and that she had a gun in her possession. The defendant went to the police station to file a complaint against Dotson. At the station, an officer asked for her handbag, which she surrendered. A search of the handbag revealed a loaded .22 caliber revolver, for which she admitted she had no permit.

    Procedural History

    The defendant moved to suppress the revolver as evidence, arguing it was obtained through an illegal search. The suppression motion was denied after a hearing. The defendant pleaded guilty to attempted possession of a dangerous weapon. The Appellate Term, Second Department, affirmed the conviction. The case then went to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a warrantless search of the defendant’s handbag, which led to the discovery of a loaded revolver, violated the defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights against unreasonable searches and seizures.

    Holding

    No, because under the totality of the circumstances, the police officer had a reasonable suspicion based on reliable information that the defendant was carrying a concealed weapon, justifying the search of her handbag.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court balanced the need to seize weapons and the individual’s right to privacy, referencing Terry v. Ohio. Reasonable suspicion can be based on personal observation or information from another person. When the information comes from an informant, it must have sufficient indicia of reliability. Here, the informant (Dotson) had just been involved in an altercation with the defendant, involving a knife. He claimed the defendant had a gun. The court distinguished this case from those involving anonymous informants, noting Dotson’s information was immediately verifiable, and he would be subject to charges for falsely reporting an incident. The court emphasized the immediate danger posed by concealed weapons, stating, “Concealed weapons present an immediate and real danger to the public. Although that danger would not warrant a routine weapons check, it should support an appropriate police response on less than a probability.” Given the totality of the circumstances, including the report of a concealed weapon, the court found the search of the defendant’s handbag to be a reasonable, limited intrusion.

  • People v. Wood, 31 N.Y.2d 1025 (1973): Third-Party Consent to Search Shared Living Spaces

    People v. Wood, 31 N.Y.2d 1025 (1973)

    A third party who shares a living space with a defendant can validly consent to a search of that space if the defendant does not have exclusive possession or a reasonable expectation of privacy there.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals held that a landlady’s consent to search a bedroom shared by her ten-year-old son and the defendant, a roomer in her house, was valid. The court reasoned that because the defendant did not have exclusive possession or use of the room, he lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy. Therefore, the landlady, who had a right to enter her son’s bedroom, could consent to the search, and evidence found during that search was admissible. This case illustrates that the scope of Fourth Amendment protections against unreasonable searches and seizures can be limited by shared living arrangements.

    Facts

    Mrs. Dale owned a one-family house and rented a room to the defendant, Wood. The room that Wood rented was also used by Mrs. Dale’s ten-year-old son. Police searched the bedroom with Mrs. Dale’s consent. The search yielded evidence used against Wood in a criminal proceeding.

    Procedural History

    The lower court admitted the evidence obtained during the search. The defendant appealed, arguing that Mrs. Dale’s consent was insufficient to authorize the search of his room. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s decision, upholding the admissibility of the evidence.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a landlady can validly consent to a search of a bedroom shared by her son and a roomer, when the roomer does not have exclusive possession or use of the room.

    Holding

    Yes, because the defendant did not have exclusive possession or use of the room and therefore had no reasonable expectation of privacy. The landlady, as a co-occupant with a right to access the room, could validly consent to the search.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals distinguished the case from situations where a person has exclusive possession and control over a room, such as in a hotel or apartment, citing Stoner v. California and Chapman v. United States. The court emphasized that because the bedroom was shared between the defendant and the landlady’s son, the defendant did not have exclusive possession or use of the space. The court stated: “Since that room was not set aside for the defendant’s exclusive possession or use, it follows that he had no reasonable expectation of privacy and that Mrs. Dale who, of course, had a right to enter her own son’s bedroom, was privileged to give consent to the search.”

    The court relied on prior New York cases such as People v. Carter, People v. Belin, People v. Kowalczyk, People v. Gallmon, and People v. D’Iorio, to support the principle that a co-occupant with a right of access to the premises can consent to a search. This principle stems from the understanding that a person sharing living space assumes the risk that the co-occupant will allow others access.

    The decision highlights that the scope of Fourth Amendment protection is not absolute and depends on the specific facts and circumstances, including the nature of the living arrangement and the reasonable expectations of privacy. This case serves as a practical example of how shared living spaces can diminish an individual’s privacy expectations and allow for third-party consent to searches.

  • People v. Dworkin, 30 N.Y.2d 706 (1972): Legality of Border Searches Without Probable Cause

    People v. Dworkin, 30 N.Y.2d 706 (1972)

    Border searches by customs officials do not require probable cause, and any vehicle, person, or baggage entering the United States is subject to search; contraband seized during a reasonable border search is admissible as evidence.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals affirmed an order denying the suppression of marijuana found in the defendants’ car during a border search. The court held that border searches do not require probable cause; customs officials have the authority to stop and examine vehicles entering the U.S. The mere act of crossing the border provides sufficient basis for a search. The court reasoned that, absent a showing that the search was unreasonable in its execution, contraband found during the search is admissible as evidence. The presence of antidraft literature in the car was irrelevant to the legality of the search.

    Facts

    The defendants were traveling in a vehicle that crossed the U.S. border. At a border checkpoint, customs officials stopped and searched the vehicle. During the search, officials discovered marijuana. The defendants moved to suppress the marijuana as evidence, arguing that the search was unconstitutional. The defendants contended that the customs inspector lacked any specific reason to suspect they possessed marijuana, noting that the inspector observed antidraft literature in the car before the search.

    Procedural History

    The trial court initially heard the motion to suppress. The trial court denied the motion. The Appellate Division affirmed the denial of the motion to suppress. The case then went to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether marijuana found in an automobile during a border search should be suppressed as evidence because the search was conducted without probable cause or reasonable suspicion.

    Holding

    No, because border searches need not be based on probable cause, and customs officials are permitted to stop and examine any vehicle entering the United States; contraband seized during a border search is admissible as evidence unless the search was unreasonable in its execution.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on the established principle that border searches are distinct from other types of searches and seizures. Citing Carroll v. United States, the court emphasized the broad authority of customs officials to conduct searches at the border. The court stated that “[t]he mere crossing of the border is a sufficient basis for a search.” The court reasoned that, once the defendants arrived at the checkpoint, they were legitimately subjected to questioning and a search of their vehicle. The court dismissed the relevance of the antidraft literature, stating that it did not affect the legality of the border search. The court implicitly adopted a balancing test, weighing the government’s interest in controlling its borders against the individual’s right to privacy. It found that the government’s interest outweighed the individual’s in the context of border crossings, justifying a lower standard than probable cause. The court did not elaborate on what might constitute an unreasonable border search, focusing instead on the principle that the mere crossing of the border is sufficient justification. No dissenting or concurring opinions were noted.

  • People v. Fein, 29 N.Y.2d 131 (1971): Admissibility of Wiretap Evidence Under Evolving Fourth Amendment Standards

    29 N.Y.2d 131 (1971)

    Evidence obtained from a wiretap, conducted pursuant to a court order that complied with then-existing state law, is admissible even if subsequent Supreme Court decisions altered the constitutional standards for such wiretaps, provided the seizure was lawful at the time it occurred and there was substantial compliance with later federal standards.

    Summary

    The case concerns the admissibility of wiretap evidence used to convict the defendant of bookmaking. The wiretap was authorized under New York law before the Supreme Court issued decisions that heightened Fourth Amendment scrutiny of wiretaps. The New York Court of Appeals held that the evidence was admissible because the wiretap was lawful under the standards prevailing at the time it was conducted and because the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 indicated a congressional policy of allowing judicially supervised wiretaps. The court emphasized that excluding the evidence would not serve the deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule.

    Facts

    In 1966, the Mount Vernon Police Department received a tip about illegal betting activity at a public phone in George’s Pharmacy. Detectives observed the defendant, a known gambler, repeatedly using the phone despite having a private phone in his office. An officer overheard the defendant discussing baseball lines and odds. Based on this information, a court order was obtained to tap the phone line. Police monitored the tap, and Detective Burke overheard sports bets being placed. Officers entered the pharmacy with a search warrant, found the defendant using the phone, and discovered betting slips and a large sum of cash on his person and nearby.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted in the City Court of Mount Vernon for bookmaking and possession of bookmaking records. He appealed, arguing the wiretap evidence was inadmissible due to constitutional and statutory violations. The New York Court of Appeals reviewed the case following evolving Supreme Court decisions on wiretapping.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the introduction of evidence obtained by wiretapping was constitutionally impermissible under evolving Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, specifically considering Katz v. United States and Berger v. New York.

    2. Whether the introduction of the wiretap evidence was prohibited by Section 605 of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended by the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968.

    Holding

    1. No, because at the time the wiretap occurred, the intrusion did not violate the then-prevailing constitutional standards under Olmstead and the seizure was constitutionally permissible by 1966 standards. Later decisions are not retroactively applied. The court found any deviation from Berger and Katz to be harmless error.

    2. No, because the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 indicated a congressional policy of allowing judicially supervised wiretaps, and there was substantial compliance with the new standards.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that the relevant constitutional standard is that which prevailed at the time the evidence was seized. The Supreme Court had ruled that Katz v. United States and Berger v. New York, which established stricter standards for wiretaps, were not retroactive. Since the wiretap in this case occurred before Katz, and without physical intrusion, its fruits were admissible, per Kaiser v. New York. The court emphasized that “if the evidence was seized in a manner constitutionally permissible at the time of seizure, it will subsequently be allowed into evidence at the defendant’s trial even though changing constitutional interpretations have since made a similar seizure impermissible.” The court found that the wiretap order, while issued under a law later declared unconstitutional, closely approximated the standards in Berger. The court noted the presence of probable cause due to the extensive observation of the defendant’s suspicious activities.

    Regarding Section 605, the court acknowledged that Lee v. Florida had made evidence seized in violation of Section 605 inadmissible in state courts. However, the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, enacted shortly after Lee, authorized the interception of telephonic communications under comprehensive standards. The court interpreted Congress’s findings in Section 801 of the Act as an endorsement of introducing court-authorized wiretaps in state courts. It found that excluding the evidence based on Lee would enforce a statutory policy that had been substantially modified. To exclude the wiretap evidence in this case on the basis of Lee would, in effect, be enforcing a statutory policy, since substantially modified and no longer applicable.

  • People v. Waitz, 31 A.D.2d 298 (N.Y. 1969): Establishing Probable Cause for Search Warrants

    People v. Waitz, 31 A.D.2d 298 (N.Y. 1969)

    A search warrant must be supported by an affidavit containing specific facts establishing unlawful activity on the premises to be searched; a conclusory statement that individuals frequenting the premises are “LSD users and sellers” is insufficient to establish probable cause.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals reversed the defendants’ convictions for possession of dangerous drugs, holding that the search warrant used to seize the drugs was issued without sufficient probable cause. The affidavit supporting the warrant stated only that “LSD users and sellers” frequented the defendant Waitz’s cottage. The court found this statement to be a conclusory assertion lacking specific facts to establish unlawful activity on the premises. Furthermore, the court held that the warrant, which described the cottage but not the surrounding area, did not justify the search of the defendant’s car when it was driven onto the property while officers were present. Because the warrant lacked proper foundation and the car search exceeded its scope, the evidence obtained should have been suppressed.

    Facts

    Police obtained a search warrant for a cottage belonging to defendant Waitz. The affidavit supporting the warrant stated that “LSD users and sellers are frequenting” the cottage. When the police arrived to execute the warrant, the defendant’s automobile was driven onto the property. The police searched the car, as well as the cottage, and seized LSD, marijuana, and hypodermic needles.

    Procedural History

    The defendants were convicted of possession of dangerous drugs based on the evidence seized during the search. Justice McInerney granted a certificate of reasonable doubt, questioning whether the mere presence of alleged drug users and sellers at a house was sufficient for probable cause. The Appellate Division reversed the judgment of conviction, and the People appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether an affidavit stating that “LSD users and sellers are frequenting” a premises provides sufficient probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant for that premises.
    2. Whether a search warrant authorizing the search of a specific building extends to a vehicle that is driven onto the property while the search is being conducted.

    Holding

    1. No, because the affidavit contains a conclusory statement lacking specific facts to establish unlawful activity on the premises.
    2. No, because the warrant must particularly describe the place to be searched, and the automobile was not included in the warrant’s description of the premises.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that the affidavit supporting the search warrant lacked the factual substance required to establish probable cause. The statement that “LSD users and sellers are frequenting” the cottage was deemed a conclusory characterization, without any specific facts to suggest that illegal activity was occurring within the premises. The court cited Spinelli v. United States and Aguilar v. Texas, emphasizing that a mere assertion of police suspicion or reputation is insufficient to justify a magistrate’s finding of probable cause. “But just as a simple assertion of police suspicion is not itself a sufficient basis for a magistrate’s finding of probable cause, we do not believe it may be used to give additional weight to allegations that would otherwise be insufficient.”

    The court also addressed the scope of the search warrant, noting that it authorized the search of the cottage but did not mention the automobile. Citing People v. Rainey, the court emphasized that the Fourth Amendment and the New York Constitution require that a search warrant “particularly describ[e] the place to be searched.” Since the warrant did not include the automobile, the search of the car was deemed unlawful. Probable cause must be shown in each instance, and a warrant to search a building cannot be extended to justify the search of a separate location, such as a vehicle that happened to be present at the time of the search. The court concluded that the evidence obtained from both the cottage and the car should have been suppressed, leading to the reversal of the defendants’ convictions.