New York Law Review

Tag: Fourth Amendment

  • People v. Orlando, 56 N.Y.2d 446 (1982): Warrantless Vehicle Search Incident to Arrest Based on Probable Cause

    People v. Orlando, 56 N.Y.2d 446 (1982)

    A warrantless search of a vehicle parked in a public place is permissible when the police have probable cause to believe it contains contraband or evidence of a crime, especially when the search is closely connected in time and location to a lawful arrest of the vehicle’s owner.

    Summary

    Orlando was arrested after presenting forged prescriptions at a pharmacy. He admitted his car, parked nearby, contained more forged prescriptions and illegally obtained drugs. Without a warrant, police searched the car and found incriminating evidence. The New York Court of Appeals upheld the search, finding that the police had probable cause to believe the car contained contraband based on Orlando’s statements and the pharmacist’s information. The court emphasized the car’s public location and the close proximity in time and place of the search to the lawful arrest, justifying the warrantless search under established precedent concerning vehicle searches.

    Facts

    Detectives investigated forged prescriptions at a Pathmark Pharmacy. A pharmacist trainee identified Orlando as the person who submitted three prescriptions for Charles Bandel. These prescriptions were on Dr. Leon Oxman’s forms. Dr. Oxman confirmed he did not prescribe drugs for anyone named Bandel and reported missing prescription pads. Orlando returned to the pharmacy and was identified by the trainee. He admitted to presenting the prescriptions and was arrested. After receiving Miranda warnings and waiving his rights, Orlando admitted his car, parked alongside the pharmacy, contained additional forged prescriptions and illegally obtained drugs.

    Procedural History

    Orlando was indicted on 36 counts of possessing forged instruments and one count of illegal drug possession. The trial court suppressed the 33 prescriptions found in an attaché case in the car but denied the motion to suppress the drugs found in paper bags. Orlando pleaded guilty to three counts related to the Pathmark prescriptions, satisfying the entire indictment. The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court’s decision. Orlando appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the warrantless search of Orlando’s parked vehicle, which yielded illegally obtained drugs, violated his Fourth Amendment rights against unreasonable searches and seizures, despite the existence of probable cause.

    Holding

    No, because the police had probable cause to believe the car contained contraband, and the search was closely connected in time and location to a lawful arrest, justifying the warrantless search of the vehicle parked in a public place.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized the vehicle was parked in a public place, negating the need for a warrant based on location. The drugs were in paper bags within the passenger compartment, an area permissible for search under United States v. Ross and People v. Belton. While acknowledging that those cases involved moving vehicles, the court focused on the probable cause the detectives possessed. The pharmacist trainee, Dr. Oxman, and Orlando himself provided information leading the detectives to reasonably believe the car contained further contraband. The court cited Colorado v. Bannister, Carroll v. United States, and Chambers v. Maroney to support the warrantless search based on probable cause, even after the arrest of the vehicle’s occupant. The Court highlighted the lack of constitutional significance whether the vehicle is searched on-site or after impoundment, referencing Texas v. White and Cardwell v. Lewis. Quoting United States v. Ross, the court stated, “if an individual gives the police probable cause to believe a vehicle is transporting contraband, he loses the right to proceed on his way without official interference.” The Court also stated this result was based upon “the practicalities of the situations presented and a realistic appraisal of the relatively minor protection that a contrary rule would provide for privacy interests”. The court found this case consistent with prior holdings in People v. Middleton, People v. Milerson, People v. Clark, and People v. Singleteary, emphasizing the close proximity in time and space between the arrest and search. The court declined to address scenarios with greater separation in time, place, or circumstances.

  • In the Matter of an Investigation into the Death of Abe A., 53 N.Y.2d 291 (1981): Compelling a Suspect to Provide a Blood Sample

    In the Matter of an Investigation into the Death of Abe A., 53 N.Y.2d 291 (1981)

    A court order to obtain a blood sample from a suspect is permissible if the prosecution establishes probable cause, a clear indication that relevant evidence will be found, and the method is safe and reliable, balancing the crime’s seriousness against the suspect’s right to bodily integrity.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether a suspect in a homicide investigation can be compelled to provide a blood sample. The New York Court of Appeals held that a court order to obtain a blood sample from a suspect may be issued if the People establish probable cause that the suspect committed the crime, a clear indication that relevant evidence will be found, and that the method used is safe and reliable. The court must balance the seriousness of the crime, the importance of the evidence, and the unavailability of less intrusive means against the suspect’s constitutional right to be free from bodily intrusion. The court found the standard was met in this case, reversing the Appellate Division’s decision.

    Facts

    Abe A. was found murdered in his apartment with signs of a violent struggle. Jon L., Abe’s business partner, discovered the body. Jon L. had abrasions on his face and bruises on his hands, including tooth marks, which he claimed were from an unreported mugging. Blood analysis in Abe’s apartment revealed two blood types: Abe’s and a rare type found in less than 1% of the population. Jon L. refused to voluntarily submit to a blood test. The District Attorney sought a court order to compel Jon L. to provide a blood sample.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court, New York County, granted the District Attorney’s motion for an order compelling Jon L. to provide a blood sample, finding probable cause and a minimal intrusion. Jon L. refused to comply, and the People moved to punish him for contempt. The court found him guilty of criminal contempt but stayed the sentence pending appeal. The Appellate Division reversed the contempt order and dismissed the order directing the blood draw as academic, arguing that Jon L. had not been formally charged with a crime. The People appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a suspect in a homicide investigation can be compelled, pursuant to a court order, to supply a blood sample for scientific analysis before being formally charged with a crime.

    Holding

    Yes, because a court order to obtain a blood sample from a suspect may be issued provided the People establish probable cause to believe the suspect committed the crime, a “clear indication” that relevant material evidence will be found, and the method used to secure it is safe and reliable. The issuing court must also weigh the seriousness of the crime, the importance of the evidence, and the unavailability of less intrusive means against concern for the suspect’s constitutional right to be free from bodily intrusion.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that while New York law does not explicitly authorize courts to compel suspects to provide nontestimonial evidence, the court’s power to issue a search warrant implicitly grants this authority. CPL 690.05 (subd 2) empowers a criminal court to order a search of a designated person to seize evidence related to an offense. The court emphasized that Fourth Amendment safeguards are implicated at two levels: the seizure of the person and the subsequent search for evidence. Seizure requires probable cause; detention of an individual to obtain physical evidence also necessitates probable cause. The court rejected the Appellate Division’s requirement of a formal charge, stating, “There is no constitutional right to be arrested.”

    Regarding the bodily intrusion itself, the court established a multifaceted inquiry. A “clear indication” that the intrusion will supply substantial probative evidence is essential. The method must be safe, reliable, and impose minimal discomfort, performed by qualified medical personnel. Finally, the court must consider the worth of the evidence, the nature of alternative means, and minimize the intrusion. The court found probable cause that Jon L. committed the crime, noting the suspicious injuries and inconsistencies in his alibi. His blood type constituted material probative evidence, and no alternative means were available. The court noted, “That the incidence of the presumed killer’s blood type in the general population is less than one to a hundred is well documented by medical statistics.”

    The court emphasized the balancing act between individual rights and societal interests, concluding that the stringent standards were met in this case.

  • People v. Benjamin, 51 N.Y.2d 25 (1980): Justification for Stop and Frisk Based on Anonymous Tip

    People v. Benjamin, 51 N.Y.2d 25 (1980)

    An anonymous tip, when corroborated by independent observation of the suspect matching the tip’s description in the specified location, can provide reasonable suspicion for a lawful stop and frisk.

    Summary

    In People v. Benjamin, the New York Court of Appeals addressed the legality of a stop and frisk based on an anonymous tip. Police officers, acting on a tip that a man matching a specific description and carrying a gun was in a nearby building, encountered the defendant who fit the description in the location indicated. The defendant failed to respond to the officers’ questions, leading them to conduct a pat-down search, which revealed a loaded pistol. The court held that the corroborated anonymous tip provided reasonable suspicion justifying the stop and frisk, emphasizing the immediacy and specificity of the information received and the officers’ prompt corroboration.

    Facts

    On April 17, 1978, two police officers were on foot patrol in a New York City apartment complex. An unidentified person approached them and reported seeing a man with a gun in the hallway of the adjacent building. The informant described the man as white, 20-22 years old, and wearing a brown, short-waisted jacket. Within approximately 20 seconds, the officers entered the hallway and observed the defendant, who was the only person present and matched the description provided by the informant.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was charged with a crime related to the possession of the weapon. He moved to suppress the evidence (the gun) arguing that the stop and frisk was unlawful. The suppression court denied the motion, finding that the officers had reasonable suspicion. The Appellate Division affirmed this determination, and the case was appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether an anonymous tip, corroborated by the police’s observation of a suspect matching the tip’s description in the location specified, provides reasonable suspicion for a lawful stop and frisk.

    Holding

    Yes, because the officers independently verified the descriptive details provided in the anonymous tip, and the defendant’s silence in response to questioning further contributed to a reasonable suspicion that he was armed and dangerous.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court emphasized that the police officers acted on specific information concerning an individual with a gun in a particular location. The officers corroborated the anonymous tip within seconds by observing the defendant, who matched the description, in the exact location provided. The court highlighted the immediacy of the situation and the potential danger involved. The defendant’s silence when asked to identify himself and explain his presence further heightened the officers’ suspicion. The court implicitly balanced the individual’s right to privacy against the public’s interest in safety and crime prevention. The court found that the totality of the circumstances – the corroborated tip, the defendant’s presence in the specified location, and his failure to respond to questioning – provided the requisite reasonable suspicion for the stop and frisk. The court stated that the suppression court’s determination, affirmed by the Appellate Division, was not erroneous as a matter of law.

  • People v. Jennings, 54 N.Y.2d 518 (1981): Arrests Based on Incorrect Criminal Justice System Records

    People v. Jennings, 54 N.Y.2d 518 (1981)

    An arrest is invalid, and evidence obtained as a result must be suppressed, when the arresting officer relies on criminal justice system records that, through the fault of the system, contain incorrect information about an outstanding warrant.

    Summary

    Jennings was arrested based on a National Crime Information Center (NCIC) teletype indicating an active parole violation warrant. A search incident to the arrest uncovered stolen property. However, the warrant had been executed and vacated months before the arrest, and the New York State Identification and Intelligence System (NYSIIS) had been notified. The New York Court of Appeals held the arrest invalid because it was based on incorrect information in the criminal justice system records, requiring suppression of the evidence. The court emphasized that probable cause must be objectively reasonable and that an officer’s good faith cannot validate an arrest based on an invalid warrant.

    Facts

    In September 1978, police circulated a flyer about Jennings, who was suspected of burglaries. Officer Enright stopped Jennings for traffic violations. Enright requested a warrant check through Hempstead Police Headquarters. Hempstead headquarters relayed the information to NCIC and NYSIIS. The teletype response indicated an active parole violation warrant issued in November 1977. The warrant had been executed in January 1978, and NYSIIS was notified. Furthermore, a Supreme Court order vacated the warrant in June 1978. Based on the teletype, Enright arrested Jennings. A search incident to arrest revealed stolen jewelry and other items.

    Procedural History

    Jennings was indicted for burglary. He moved to suppress the evidence, palmprint, and statement based on Fourth Amendment grounds. The trial court denied the motion, and Jennings was convicted. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The New York Court of Appeals reversed, granting the motion to suppress.

    Issue(s)

    Whether an arrest based on a computer record indicating an active warrant, when that warrant has been executed and vacated, is valid and whether evidence seized incident to that arrest is admissible.

    Holding

    No, because the arrest was based on incorrect information in the criminal justice system records, making it invalid, and the evidence seized must be suppressed as a result.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court relied on the “fellow officer” rule established in Whiteley v. Warden, which states that an officer can rely on information from another officer, but if the underlying warrant is invalid, the evidence seized is inadmissible. The court rejected the People’s argument to distinguish between an invalidly issued warrant and a validly issued but vacated warrant, stating, “In each case, police intrude upon protected Fourth Amendment interests under the purported authority of a warrant which is subsequently revealed to have furnished, at the time of the intrusion, no justification for such police conduct.” The Court further rejected the argument that Officer Enright’s “good faith” reliance on the warrant made the exclusionary rule inapplicable. The Court stated, “An assessment of probable cause turns on what was reasonably and objectively in the mind of law enforcement authorities. It does not turn on such subjective considerations as the absence of malice against a suspect, the lack of intent to violate constitutional rights…” The Court reasoned that the good faith of the officer does not validate an arrest based on a warrant that had been vacated months before the arrest. The Court emphasized the importance of accurate record-keeping within the criminal justice system to protect Fourth Amendment rights. The inevitable discovery argument was rejected because the officer conceded he would not have arrested the defendant absent the warrant information.

  • People v. Price, 54 N.Y.2d 557 (1981): Dog Sniffs and Fourth Amendment Rights

    People v. Price, 54 N.Y.2d 557 (1981)

    The use of a trained dog to sniff luggage for the presence of controlled substances in a public place does not constitute a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.

    Summary

    Leonard Price was arrested after a trained dog alerted police to the presence of drugs in his luggage at an airport. Price argued that the dog sniff was an unlawful search requiring a warrant, and thus the subsequent warrant obtained based on the dog’s reaction was invalid. The New York Court of Appeals held that a dog sniff of luggage in a public place is not a search under the Fourth Amendment because it does not intrude upon a reasonable expectation of privacy. The court reasoned that individuals do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the odors emanating from their luggage into the surrounding air. This case establishes an exception to the warrant requirement based on the limited and non-intrusive nature of a canine sniff.

    Facts

    Leonard Price and Carl Parsons were observed at the Los Angeles airport exhibiting nervous behavior and carrying large sums of cash while purchasing tickets for a flight to Buffalo shortly before departure.

    Detective Kaiser, suspicious of their behavior, alerted other officers who brought a trained narcotics detection dog named Frog to the airline’s baggage area.

    Frog alerted to the presence of controlled substances in the defendants’ luggage.

    Based on the dog’s reaction and Detective Kaiser’s observations, a special agent of the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) was contacted, who then relayed the information to the New York State Police.

    The State Police obtained a search warrant for the defendants and their luggage.

    After the defendants claimed their baggage at the Buffalo airport, drug enforcement agents stopped and searched them, finding a large amount of heroin in one of the suitcases.

    Procedural History

    Price was indicted on charges related to criminal possession of a controlled substance and drug paraphernalia.

    Price moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that the dog sniff in Los Angeles was an unlawful search requiring a warrant, and that the subsequent warrant in New York was therefore invalid.

    The trial court denied the motion to suppress.

    Price pleaded guilty to a reduced charge of criminal possession of a controlled substance.

    The Appellate Division affirmed the judgment.

    The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the use of a trained dog to sniff luggage for the presence of controlled substances in a public place constitutes a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, thus requiring a warrant.

    Holding

    No, because a person does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the odors emanating from their luggage into the surrounding air in a public place.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that the Fourth Amendment protects individuals from unreasonable governmental intrusion where they have a reasonable expectation of privacy, citing Terry v. Ohio and Katz v. United States.

    While acknowledging that individuals have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of closed luggage (United States v. Chadwick), the court distinguished this from the act of a dog sniffing the air surrounding the luggage.

    The court stated, “Since the dog does nothing more than smell the air surrounding the luggage in order to detect odors emanating from that luggage, there was no intrusion or search of the luggage. Defendant must assert a reasonable expectation that the air surrounding his luggage and the odor apparent in that surrounding air will remain private. In such circumstances, the Fourth Amendment affords no protection.”

    The court relied on analogous precedent regarding items in plain view and odors noticeable to the public, noting that there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in items left in plain view of an officer lawfully in the position from which he observes the item (Harris v. United States), and that “there can be no reasonable expectation that plainly noticeable odors will remain private.”

    The court cited federal cases that have considered the use of drug-sniffing dogs and concluded that there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in the air surrounding one’s possessions (e.g., United States v. Fulero, United States v. Venema, United States v. Bronstein, United States v. Solis, United States v. Goldstein).

    The court reasoned that “once one releases something into the open air, there can be little reasonable expectation of asserting one’s claims of privacy in either the item itself or in the surrounding air.”

    The court compared the use of a dog to track contraband to the use of dogs to track escaped criminals or lost persons, as well as the use of a flashlight to enhance an officer’s vision (People v. Cruz, People v. Sullivan).

    The court also noted that airline passengers surrender some expectation of privacy by entrusting their luggage to a common carrier responsible for ensuring passenger safety, referencing airport searches (People v. Kuhn, United States v. Bronstein, United States v. Goldstein).

    The court concluded that the police acted properly by seeking a warrant to search the luggage after the dog alerted to the presence of drugs (United States v. Chadwick), finding that there was probable cause to issue the warrant based on the defendants’ behavior, the large amount of cash they carried, and the dog’s reaction and training.

  • People v. Ponder, 54 N.Y.2d 160 (1981): Abrogating Automatic Standing in Search and Seizure Cases

    People v. Ponder, 54 N.Y.2d 160 (1981)

    New York State abandons the “automatic standing” rule, requiring a defendant to demonstrate a legitimate expectation of privacy in the premises searched to challenge the legality of a search and seizure, even when charged with a possessory offense.

    Summary

    Defendant Ponder was convicted of felony murder, manslaughter, and criminal possession of a weapon. The key evidence was a sawed-off rifle found in his grandmother’s washing machine during a warrantless search. Ponder sought to suppress the weapon, claiming the search was illegal. The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether Ponder had standing to challenge the search, specifically reevaluating the “automatic standing” rule. The Court abrogated the rule, holding that Ponder needed to demonstrate a reasonable expectation of privacy in his grandmother’s home to challenge the search’s validity. Because he failed to prove such an expectation, the weapon was deemed admissible.

    Facts

    Joseph Salerno was shot during a robbery. A bystander informed police that she saw Ponder running from the hardware store with a black and silver object protruding from his jacket. Police knew Ponder from prior criminal activity and that he had been apprehended at his grandmother, Louise Ponder’s, residence before. Police went to Louise Ponder’s residence. Two officers found a .22 caliber bullet near the side door. They knocked, and Ponder answered. He pointed upstairs when asked if “Wade” was inside. Ponder fled and was apprehended. Police searched the house without a warrant (believing Mrs. Ponder consented, though she did not), finding a sawed-off .22 caliber rifle in a washing machine in the basement. Ponder later confessed to the crime.

    Procedural History

    Ponder was indicted and convicted of felony murder, manslaughter, and criminal possession of a weapon. He appealed, arguing the warrantless search of his grandmother’s home was illegal, and the weapon should have been suppressed. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. Ponder appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether New York should continue to apply the “automatic standing” rule, allowing a defendant charged with a possessory offense to challenge a search’s validity without demonstrating a legitimate expectation of privacy in the searched premises.

    Holding

    No, because New York abandons the “automatic standing” rule, requiring a defendant to demonstrate a legitimate expectation of privacy in the area searched to challenge the search’s validity under the New York State Constitution.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court acknowledged the “automatic standing” rule originated in Jones v. United States, and that New York had previously retained the rule in People v. Hansen. However, the Supreme Court abrogated the rule in United States v. Salvucci. The Court then reevaluated the rule under the New York State Constitution. The Court noted that even in Jones, the Supreme Court stated, “it is entirely proper to require of one who seeks to challenge the legality of a search as the basis for suppressing relevant evidence that he * * * establish, that he himself was the victim of an invasion of privacy.” The Court emphasized that the language of the New York State Constitution mirrors the Fourth Amendment. Since the Supreme Court removed the constraint imposed by Jones, the Court was free to reevaluate the rule. The court found no reason to diverge from the Supreme Court’s analysis in Salvucci and abrogated the rule. Applying this new standard, the Court found Ponder failed to demonstrate a reasonable expectation of privacy in his grandmother’s home. The Court cited People v. Henley, a case where the court denied standing to a brother who sought to suppress evidence based on the illegal detention of his brother, as foreshadowing the present holding.

  • People v. De Bour, 40 N.Y.2d 210 (1976): Establishing a Four-Tiered Framework for Police Encounters

    People v. De Bour, 40 N.Y.2d 210 (1976)

    Police encounters with citizens are governed by a four-tiered framework that balances an individual’s right to privacy against the needs of law enforcement; the permissible level of intrusion increases as the level of suspicion increases.

    Summary

    This landmark New York case establishes a four-tiered framework for evaluating the legality of police encounters with citizens. The court recognized that not every encounter constitutes a seizure, and that the permissible level of police intrusion should be calibrated to the degree of suspicion they possess. From a simple request for information to a full-blown arrest, each level requires a different justification. The case emphasizes the importance of balancing individual rights with the legitimate needs of law enforcement in maintaining public order and investigating potential criminal activity. The court ultimately suppressed evidence because the police action exceeded the permissible level of intrusion justified by the circumstances.

    Facts

    A police officer, patrolling in New York City at night known for its high incidence of crime, observed the defendant walking on the same side of the street, approaching him. The officer noticed the defendant crossed the street when he was approximately 30 feet away. The officer became suspicious and called out to the defendant, asking him to stop and approach the officer. When the defendant complied, the officer asked him what he was doing in the neighborhood. The defendant gave an unsatisfactory answer. The officer then frisked the defendant and discovered a weapon. The defendant was arrested and charged with possession of the weapon.

    Procedural History

    The trial court denied the defendant’s motion to suppress the weapon, and the defendant was convicted. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal to determine whether the police encounter and subsequent search violated the defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the police officer’s initial encounter with the defendant, including the request to stop and the questioning, was justified under the Fourth Amendment.

    Whether the subsequent frisk of the defendant was justified.

    Holding

    No, the police officer’s actions were not justified because the officer lacked a reasonable suspicion to stop and frisk the defendant. The court articulated a four-tiered test that the officer’s actions violated. Evidence was suppressed.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals articulated a four-tiered method for evaluating police encounters with citizens. Tier 1 is a request for information, which requires only an objective, credible reason, not necessarily indicative of criminality. Tier 2 is the common-law right to inquire, which requires a founded suspicion that criminal activity is afoot. Tier 3 is a forcible stop and detention, which requires a reasonable suspicion that the person has committed, is committing, or is about to commit a crime (based on specific and articulable facts). Tier 4 is an arrest, which requires probable cause to believe that the person has committed a crime. The court found that the officer’s initial actions in this case constituted a Tier 2 encounter (common-law inquiry). However, the court held that the officer lacked the requisite founded suspicion to justify even this level of intrusion. The defendant’s act of crossing the street, even in a high-crime area, was not sufficient to create a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. The court stated, “[t]he police may not forcibly detain an individual without any indication of criminal activity.” The court reasoned that to justify a frisk, an officer must have a reasonable suspicion that the individual is armed and dangerous, which was absent here.

  • People v. Henley, 53 N.Y.2d 403 (1981): Effect of Illegal Detention on Consent to Search

    People v. Henley, 53 N.Y.2d 403 (1981)

    An individual’s consent to a search is invalid if it is the product of an illegal detention; however, a defendant cannot assert the violation of another person’s Fourth Amendment rights to challenge the validity of a search.

    Summary

    Two brothers, Jim Henley, Jr., and Willie Norman Henley, were arrested after police found stolen goods in their apartment. Jim was stopped near the scene of a burglary and brought to the apartment where he consented to a search. Willie was present in the apartment during the search. The court held that Jim’s consent was invalid because it followed an illegal detention, as police lacked probable cause to detain him initially. Therefore, the evidence seized should be suppressed as to Jim. However, Willie could not claim the violation of Jim’s rights; thus, the search was valid as to him.

    Facts

    Around 4:00 AM, police received a call about a burglary at Mercury Radio and Battery Company. Officer Szczur saw Jim Henley, Jr., walking from a yard onto the street about a block away from the reported burglary. Jim had nothing in his hands. Officer Szczur stopped Jim, who said he was going to buy a loaf of bread. Szczur, finding no open stores, took Jim to the scene of the burglary and then to his residence at 24 Spiess Street. Jim initially gave the wrong apartment, but then directed the officers to the upstairs apartment. Other officers arrived, and Jim was arrested. He consented to a search of the apartment. Willie Norman Henley, Jim’s brother, was present in the apartment. During the search, officers found boxes stamped with the name of Mercury Radio and Battery Company.

    Procedural History

    Jim and Willie were indicted for burglary and grand larceny. Willie was also charged with possession of a controlled substance. Willie was charged under a separate indictment with possession of burglar’s tools and attempted burglary related to an earlier incident. The trial court denied the motion to suppress the evidence seized at the apartment. Jim pleaded guilty to attempted burglary, and Willie pleaded guilty to grand larceny and criminal trespass, resolving all charges. The Appellate Division affirmed all convictions. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed Willie’s convictions but reversed Jim’s.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether Jim Henley, Jr.’s, consent to the search of the apartment was valid, given that he was detained and transported to the apartment without probable cause.
    2. Whether Willie Norman Henley can challenge the validity of the search of the apartment based on the violation of his brother’s Fourth Amendment rights.

    Holding

    1. No, because Jim Henley, Jr.’s, consent to the search was tainted by his illegal custodial detention and transportation, rendering the consent invalid.
    2. No, because Willie Norman Henley cannot assert the violation of his brother’s Fourth Amendment rights to challenge the validity of the search.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that while Officer Szczur had reasonable suspicion to stop and question Jim, there was no probable cause to take him into custody and transport him to his residence. Jim’s presence near the burglary scene and his statement about buying bread did not provide probable cause to link him to the crime. Because the custodial detention and transportation violated Jim’s Fourth Amendment rights, his subsequent consent to the search was invalid. The court stated, “The custodial detention and transportation having violated Henley, Jr.’s, constitutional rights to be free from unreasonable seizure, his subsequent consent to the police to enter the upstairs apartment was fatally tainted.” Consequently, the evidence seized should have been suppressed as to Jim.

    However, the court held that Willie could not challenge the search’s validity based on the violation of his brother’s rights. Willie lacked standing to assert that Jim’s illegal detention invalidated the consent to search. Absent the illegal detention, there was no evidence to suggest that Jim’s consent was involuntary. Therefore, the entry into the apartment was authorized as to Willie, and the seizure of evidence did not violate his constitutional rights.

  • People v. Glover, 57 N.Y.2d 61 (1982): Defining ‘Lesser Included Offense’ and Preservation of Fourth Amendment Claims

    People v. Glover, 57 N.Y.2d 61 (1982)

    A crime is a ‘lesser included offense’ only if it is impossible to commit the greater offense without also committing the lesser offense; furthermore, failure to raise a specific legal argument at trial, such as a Fourth Amendment violation, forfeits the right to raise it on appeal.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order, holding that the defendant’s statements and eyewitness identification were properly admitted. The Court also found that the trial court did not err in refusing to submit a charge of assault in the third degree to the jury. The Court reasoned that assault in the third degree is not a lesser included offense of robbery in the second degree or felony assault because one can commit the latter offenses without necessarily committing the former. Additionally, the Court emphasized that the defendant’s failure to object to the admission of evidence based on Fourth Amendment grounds at the suppression hearing precluded appellate review of that issue.

    Facts

    The defendant was charged with robbery in the second degree and felony assault. Prior to trial, the defendant sought to suppress statements he made to the police and an eyewitness identification, arguing a violation of his right to counsel and the unreliability of the identification. The defendant did not argue that his detention or the evidence obtained violated his Fourth Amendment rights. At trial, the defendant requested that the court instruct the jury on assault in the third degree as a lesser included offense.

    Procedural History

    The trial court rejected the defendant’s suppression arguments and refused to submit the charge of assault in the third degree to the jury. The Appellate Division affirmed. The case then went to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the defendant’s failure to object to the admission of evidence on Fourth Amendment grounds at the suppression hearing precluded appellate review of that issue.

    2. Whether assault in the third degree is a lesser included offense of robbery in the second degree or felony assault, such that the trial court was required to submit that charge to the jury.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the defendant failed to object to the admission of the evidence on the ground that it was obtained in violation of his rights under the Fourth Amendment, the issue is beyond the Court’s power to review.

    2. No, because it is possible to commit robbery in the second degree and felony assault without concomitantly committing assault in the third degree.

    Court’s Reasoning

    Regarding the Fourth Amendment claim, the Court relied on the principle that issues not raised at the trial level are generally not preserved for appellate review. Citing People v. Martin, 50 N.Y.2d 1029, the Court emphasized the importance of timely objections to allow the trial court to address the alleged error.

    On the lesser included offense issue, the Court applied CPL 300.50 subds 1, 2, which requires the defendant to show both that the offense is a lesser included offense and that a reasonable view of the evidence would support a finding that the defendant committed the lesser offense but not the greater. The Court focused on the first prong, relying on CPL 1.20 (subd 37), which defines a lesser included offense as one where “it is impossible to commit a particular crime without concomitantly committing, by the same conduct, another offense of lesser grade or degree.”

    The Court reasoned that robbery in the second degree (Penal Law, § 160.10, subds 1, 2, par [a]) and felony assault (Penal Law, § 120.05, subd 6) can be committed without the specific intent or recklessness required for assault in the third degree (Penal Law, § 120.00). Specifically, robbery only requires forcible stealing, and felony assault requires causing physical injury during the commission of a felony, but neither inherently requires the specific intent or recklessness that defines assault in the third degree. Thus, the statutory elements of the greater offenses do not necessarily include the elements of the purported lesser offense.

    The Court acknowledged its prior holdings in People v. Lett, 39 N.Y.2d 966 and People v. Warren, 43 N.Y.2d 852, where assault in the third degree was considered a lesser included offense of robbery in the second degree. However, the Court explicitly stated that those cases were wrongly decided because they did not adequately consider whether it was impossible to commit the robbery without also committing the assault.

  • People v. Hughes, 57 N.Y.2d 44 (1982): Limits on Inventory Searches of Impounded Vehicles

    People v. Hughes, 57 N.Y.2d 44 (1982)

    An inventory search of an impounded vehicle does not automatically authorize the police to open closed containers found within the vehicle unless the container’s contents are in plain view, the contents’ incriminating nature is obvious from the exterior, or exigent circumstances exist.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether police could open a cigarette case found in an impounded vehicle during an inventory search. The court held that opening the case was an unlawful search. While police can inventory the contents of an impounded vehicle, this does not extend to opening closed containers within the vehicle unless certain exceptions apply. These exceptions include situations where the contents are in plain view, the nature of the contents is obvious from the container’s exterior, or exigent circumstances necessitate the search. The decision emphasizes the need to balance legitimate law enforcement interests with individuals’ Fourth Amendment rights.

    Facts

    The police lawfully stopped a car and arrested the defendant. The car was impounded. During an inventory search of the vehicle at the police precinct, an officer found a cigarette case on the floor near the front seat. The officer opened the cigarette case and observed its contents. The trial court suppressed the evidence found in the cigarette case and the defendant’s statements concerning it.

    Procedural History

    The trial court suppressed the evidence, holding that the search of the cigarette case was unlawful. The Appellate Division reversed the trial court’s decision. The defendant appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the police’s right to conduct an inventory search of an impounded vehicle extends to opening closed containers found within the vehicle.

    Holding

    No, because the scope of an inventory search does not automatically extend to opening closed containers unless the contents are in plain view, the incriminating nature of the contents is obvious from the exterior of the container, or exigent circumstances exist.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that while the Supreme Court has upheld the right of police to inventory the contents of an impounded vehicle (South Dakota v. Opperman), it has never suggested that this right includes opening closed containers found within the vehicle. The court emphasized that generally, such items should be removed and stored without examining their contents. Citing Arkansas v. Sanders, the court noted that the right to conduct an inventory search extends only to “some integral part of the automobile”, not to the contents of items found within the vehicle.

    The court acknowledged that Fourth Amendment protections do not apply fully to all containers. The court gave examples of exceptions, such as “a kit of burglar tools or a gun case”, where the contraband nature of the contents “can be inferred from their outward appearance” (Arkansas v. Sanders). Also, items where the contents are exposed to “plain view” are not protected. Exigent circumstances, such as a belief that a container holds explosives, may also justify a warrantless search (United States v. Chadwick).

    In this case, the cigarette case was at least partially opaque, and the officer could not determine its contents from its outward appearance. There was no suggestion that the case contained anything imminently dangerous, nor were there any exigent circumstances to justify the warrantless search. Therefore, the court concluded that opening the cigarette case was an unlawful search, and the evidence should have been suppressed.