New York Law Review

Tag: Foul Ball

  • Haymon v. Pettit, 9 N.Y.3d 324 (2007): No Duty to Protect Non-Patrons Chasing Foul Balls Outside Stadium

    Haymon v. Pettit, 9 N.Y.3d 324 (2007)

    A baseball park operator generally owes no duty to warn or protect non-patron spectators who are injured while chasing foul balls outside the stadium, even if the operator offers an incentive for retrieving such balls.

    Summary

    A 14-year-old, L.H., was injured when struck by a drunk driver after chasing a foul ball into a public street near Falcon Park. The baseball association operating the park offered free tickets for returned foul balls. L.H.’s mother sued the association, arguing its promotion created a duty to protect or warn participants. The New York Court of Appeals held that the association owed no such duty. The inherent dangers of crossing a street, coupled with the association’s lack of control over the street and third parties, negated any duty of care.

    Facts

    L.H., a 14-year-old, regularly retrieved foul balls outside Falcon Park, a baseball stadium operated by the Auburn Community Non-Profit Baseball Association, Inc. (Ball Club). The Ball Club offered free tickets for returning foul balls. L.H. was struck by a vehicle driven by Donald Pettit, who was intoxicated, after L.H. chased a foul ball into a public street adjacent to the stadium while wearing headphones and failing to look for traffic. The parking lot across the street was owned by the City of Auburn and used by baseball fans.

    Procedural History

    L.H.’s mother sued the Ball Club, Pettit, and the City of Auburn. The Supreme Court denied the Ball Club’s motion for summary judgment, finding it had a duty. The Appellate Division reversed, dismissing the complaint against the Ball Club, holding that no legal duty existed. Two justices dissented. The New York Court of Appeals then reviewed the Appellate Division’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a baseball park operator owes a duty to warn or protect non-patron spectators who are injured while chasing foul balls that are hit out of the stadium when the operator offers an incentive for retrieving those balls.

    Holding

    No, because an owner or occupier of land generally owes no duty to warn or protect others from a dangerous condition on adjacent property unless the owner created or contributed to such a condition and, here, the dangers of crossing the street exist independent of the Ball Club’s promotion.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that landowners generally don’t owe a duty to protect others from dangers on adjacent property unless they created or contributed to the condition. Citing Galindo v Town of Clarkstown, 2 NY3d 633, 636 (2004), the court stated, “The reason for such a rule is obvious—a person who lacks ownership or control of property cannot fairly be held accountable for injuries resulting from a hazard on neighboring property.” Foreseeability alone doesn’t create a duty. The Court distinguished the case from situations where a landowner created a dangerous condition on adjacent property. It drew an analogy to Darby v Compagnie Natl. Air France, 96 NY2d 343 (2001), where a hotel wasn’t liable for a guest’s drowning at a public beach despite encouraging its use. Here, the Ball Club’s promotion, like the hotel’s services, didn’t create a duty to ensure safety in an area they didn’t control. The court observed: “The dangers of crossing the street—and individuals electing to cross it in pursuit of foul balls—exist independent of the Ball Club’s promotion.” Even if the promotion contributed to the risk, the court considered the “practical realities” that “foul balls can land on virtually any square foot of property surrounding a stadium, and imposition of a duty to warn or protect under such circumstances is neither fair nor practical”. Imposing a duty would lead to limitless liability, requiring the stadium to control the conduct of third persons outside its premises, which is unrealistic. The court stated: “[I]t is difficult to imagine what steps the stadium operator could have taken that would have sufficed to meet a duty.”

  • Clapman v. New York Yankees, 63 N.Y.2d 669 (1984): Baseball Spectator’s Limited Right to Protection from Foul Balls

    Clapman v. New York Yankees, 63 N.Y.2d 669 (1984)

    Owners of baseball stadiums have a duty to provide adequately screened seating in the most dangerous areas (behind home plate) and a sufficient number of seats to meet reasonable demand, but they are not insurers of spectator safety from foul balls.

    Summary

    David Clapman, injured by a foul ball at Yankee Stadium, sued the stadium owner, operator, architect, and vendor concessionaire, alleging negligence in failing to extend protective screening, providing insufficient screened seating, and allowing vendors to obstruct views. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the lower courts’ grant of summary judgment for the defendants, holding that the stadium had met its duty by providing adequate screening behind home plate and a sufficient number of seats. The court also found that the plaintiff’s claim of obstructed view was contradicted by his own testimony and that the stadium had no duty to prevent vendors from briefly interfering with views.

    Facts

    David Clapman was seated in the box seat area behind the Yankee dugout at Yankee Stadium during a baseball game. He was struck by a foul ball and sustained personal injuries. Clapman alleged his view was obstructed by vendors moving in the aisles at the time he was struck.

    Procedural History

    Clapman and his wife sued the stadium owner, its lessee and operator, its architect, and its vending concessionaire. The defendants moved for summary judgment. The lower courts granted the motions for summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the respondents were negligent in not extending the protective screen behind home plate to the area where Clapman was seated?
    2. Whether the respondents were negligent in providing insufficient seating behind the existing screen?
    3. Whether the respondents were negligent in allowing Clapman’s view of the play to be obstructed by vendors who moved about the aisles during the game?

    Holding

    1. No, because the stadium owner has a duty to provide adequate screening in the most dangerous areas, and appellants failed to raise an issue of material fact that the stadium failed to do so.
    2. No, because the stadium owner has a duty to provide a sufficient number of seats behind the screen to accommodate those who may reasonably be expected to desire such seating, and appellants failed to raise an issue of material fact that the stadium failed to do so.
    3. No, because given the location of the vendors and Clapman’s seat, respondents had no duty to ensure that vendors moving about in the stadium did not interfere with Clapman’s view.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court relied on the principles established in Davidoff v. Metropolitan Baseball Club and Akins v. Glens Falls City School Dist.. These cases articulate that stadium owners must provide adequate protection in areas where the danger of being hit by projectiles is greatest, specifically behind home plate. The court reasoned that the stadium had met this duty by providing a screen in that high-risk area and providing sufficient seating behind the screen for spectators who wished to be protected. The court also noted that Clapman’s own deposition testimony contradicted his claim that vendors obstructed his view of the ball. The court emphasized that stadium owners are not insurers of spectator safety. The court stated, “Appellants failed to raise any issue of material fact concerning a failure to erect a screen providing adequate protection in the area behind home plate, where the danger of being hit by foul balls is greatest, or to provide sufficient seats behind the screen to accommodate as many spectators as reasonably may be expected to desire such seating. In such circumstances there is no breach of duty by respondents.”