In re P., 54 N.Y.2d 110, 419 N.E.2d 7 (1981)

When reviewing an agency’s denial of foster parents’ adoption request and decision to remove a child from their care, courts apply an “arbitrary and capricious” or “substantial evidence” standard, not a de novo “best interests of the child” standard, although the child’s best interests remain paramount in the ultimate adoption proceeding.

Summary

This case concerns a foster parent’s challenge to a social services agency’s decision to deny her request to adopt a child she had cared for six years and to remove the child for adoption by a different family. The New York Court of Appeals held that the appropriate standard of review for the agency’s decision was whether it was arbitrary and capricious or unsupported by substantial evidence, not a de novo determination of the child’s best interests. The court emphasized that while the foster parent was entitled to a “preference and first consideration” due to her long-term care, this only altered her burden of proof before the agency, not the standard of judicial review. The child’s best interests would be fully considered in the subsequent adoption proceeding where the foster parent could intervene.

Facts

Stephanie P. was surrendered to the Suffolk County Department of Social Services shortly after her birth in 1975 and placed in the foster care of the appellant. After the natural mother’s death in 1977, the agency obtained guardianship of Stephanie in 1978, freeing her for adoption. The agency considered the appellant as an adoptive resource but ultimately denied consent, believing a younger, two-parent family would better serve Stephanie’s needs. The agency then served the appellant with a 10-day notice of removal. After a hearing, the State agency affirmed the local agency’s determination.

Procedural History

The foster parent commenced two Article 78 proceedings, one to review the denial of consent to adopt and another to review the decision to remove the child. The proceedings were consolidated. Special Term upheld the local agency’s decision and referred the proceeding against the State agency to the Appellate Division. The Appellate Division affirmed, finding the denial of consent was not arbitrary and capricious and the removal decision was supported by substantial evidence. The foster parent then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

Issue(s)

1. Whether the appropriate standard of judicial review for an agency’s denial of a foster parent’s adoption request and decision to remove a child from foster care is a de novo determination of the child’s best interests, or whether the usual Article 78 standards of review (arbitrary and capricious or substantial evidence) apply?

Holding

1. No, because the court’s role is to review the rationality of the agency’s decision-making process, not to substitute its own judgment regarding the child’s best interests at this stage. The usual Article 78 standards of review (arbitrary and capricious or substantial evidence) apply.

Court’s Reasoning

The court reasoned that Social Services Law § 383(3), which grants foster parents with continuous care of two years or more a “preference and first consideration,” does not mandate a de novo review of the child’s best interests when reviewing an agency’s denial of consent to adopt. This preference alters the foster parent’s burden of proof at the administrative level, requiring the agency to give their application due consideration. However, it does not change the standard of judicial review. The court emphasized that a full “best interests” review will occur in the adoption proceeding itself, where the foster parent has the right to intervene and present their case. The court stated, “Rather, we must make a determination of whether respondents’ actions were irrational, i.e., “arbitrary and capricious” or unsupported by “substantial evidence”, which involves consideration of whether appellant was held by the agency only to a lesser burden of proof.” The court found that the agency’s decision was based on multiple factors including the foster parent’s health, finances, and support system, as well as concerns about the relationship’s impact on the child’s special needs. The court noted that the agency considered all relevant factors pertaining to appellant’s qualifications as an adoptive parent, before it considered any other adoptive resource, and concluded that appellant failed to meet what it believed to be the minimum standard for an adoptive resource for Stephanie. Considering this, the agency’s denial of consent was not arbitrary and capricious. Similarly, the State agency’s decision to remove Stephanie was supported by substantial evidence, as it considered the local agency’s rationale and the availability of other adoptive resources. The court emphasized that the foster parent could still advocate for adoption in the future adoption proceeding.