New York Law Review

Tag: Foster Care

  • City of New York v. Maul, 14 N.Y.3d 499 (2010): Predominance of Common Questions in Class Action Certification

    City of New York v. Maul, 14 N.Y.3d 499 (2010)

    A class action may be certified where common questions of law or fact predominate over individual issues, even if individualized inquiries are still necessary for certain aspects of the case.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether a class action was properly certified for developmentally disabled children in New York City’s foster care system, alleging failures by the Administration for Children’s Services (ACS) and the Office of Mental Retardation and Developmental Disabilities (OMRDD) to provide legally mandated services. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision, holding that common questions of law and fact predominated, despite the individualized needs of each class member. The Court emphasized that the agencies’ alleged systematic delays and failures in referrals and placements created common issues suitable for class action treatment, even if individual inquiries were needed to determine specific placements.

    Facts

    The City of New York initiated an action against OMRDD, alleging failures to properly place and care for developmentally disabled children referred by ACS. Intervenor plaintiffs, developmentally disabled children in or formerly in ACS care, joined the suit, claiming ACS and OMRDD failed to place them in appropriate, least restrictive settings. They asserted ACS delayed referrals to OMRDD, submitted incomplete referral packets, and failed to adequately plan for permanency, causing them to age out of the foster care system without necessary services. Plaintiffs also alleged OMRDD improperly denied nonresidential services to foster children and maintained unreasonably long waiting lists for placements.

    Procedural History

    Supreme Court granted intervenor status to the plaintiffs and certified the class action. ACS’s motion for partial summary judgment, arguing mootness because some plaintiffs received placements, was denied. The Appellate Division affirmed class certification, finding plaintiffs’ claims not entirely moot due to an exception and that CPLR Article 9 requirements were met. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the Appellate Division abused its discretion in affirming the Supreme Court’s order granting class action certification, specifically regarding the predominance of common questions of law or fact over individual issues as required by CPLR 901(a)(2)?

    Holding

    No, because the Appellate Division weighed the statutory criteria and acted within its discretion in determining that common questions predominated under CPLR 901(a)(2). Although individual circumstances exist, the allegations of systematic delays and failures in providing services by ACS and OMRDD create common issues that predominate.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals found that the Appellate Division did not abuse its discretion in determining that common questions predominated. The Court highlighted four common allegations: (1) ACS’s failure to make timely referrals to OMRDD; (2) submission of incomplete or outdated referral packets; (3) failure to meet permanency planning obligations, causing children to age out of foster care; and (4) OMRDD’s failure to provide timely services and placement on lengthy waiting lists. These allegations, if proven, would demonstrate a de facto policy of delaying services. The Court distinguished this case from others involving systemic failure, noting the narrower, more discrete common questions present. The Court emphasized that class action certification is appropriate even if individual questions remain after the common issues are resolved, stating, “[I]t is ‘predominance, not identity or unanimity,’ that is the linchpin of commonality.” The Court also pointed to the flexibility afforded to trial courts under CPLR Article 9, including the ability to create subclasses or decertify the class if necessary. The court cited federal jurisprudence, noting that similar claims had been certified as class actions at the federal level, such as in Baby Neal for & by Ranter v Casey and Marisol A. v Giuliani.

  • Longwood Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Springs Union Free Sch. Dist., 772 N.E.2d 387 (2002): Determining School District Responsibility Based on ‘Residence’

    Longwood Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Springs Union Free Sch. Dist., 772 N.E.2d 387 (2002)

    Under Education Law § 3202 (4)(a), a student’s “residence,” for determining which school district bears educational costs, requires both physical presence and an intent to remain, akin to domicile, not merely temporary presence in a location like a homeless shelter.

    Summary

    This case addresses which school district is financially responsible for the education of foster children who resided in a homeless shelter with their mother immediately before entering foster care. The New York Court of Appeals held that the term “resided” in Education Law § 3202(4)(a) requires both physical presence and an intent to remain permanently, similar to the concept of domicile. Since the children’s stay in the homeless shelter was temporary, their last permanent residence (Springs Union Free School District) was responsible for their educational costs, not the district where the shelter was located (Longwood Central School District). The Court emphasized the importance of predictable cost allocation and avoiding penalizing districts that host homeless shelters.

    Facts

    A family with four children lived in the Springs Union Free School District from December 1991 until their eviction in July 1993. After the eviction, the family moved between temporary housing, including motels and relatives’ homes. For a period, the mother was incarcerated. In August 1993, the family moved into Shelter Plus, a homeless shelter in Lake Grove. The children did not attend school while at the shelter. In September and October 1993, the Suffolk County Department of Social Services (DSS) placed the children in foster care within the Longwood Central School District. DSS records listed Springs as the “district of origin” for each child.

    Procedural History

    Longwood filed a claim against Springs for the cost of educating the children. When Springs did not pay, Longwood initiated three lawsuits seeking tuition reimbursement for the 1994-1995, 1995-1996, and 1996-1997 school years. The Supreme Court consolidated the actions and granted summary judgment to Longwood, concluding the mother’s last permanent residence was Springs. The Appellate Division reversed, holding that the temporary residence at Shelter Plus obligated the Longwood district to pay. Longwood appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the term “resided” in Education Law § 3202(4)(a) requires only physical presence, or does it also require an intent to remain in a place permanently for the purposes of determining which school district bears the cost of instruction for foster children.

    Holding

    No, because the term “resided” in Education Law § 3202(4)(a) requires both physical presence and an intent to remain in a place permanently. A temporary stay, such as in a homeless shelter, does not establish residence for the purpose of assigning educational costs under this statute.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that within Education Law § 3202, “residence” is consistently interpreted as akin to domicile, requiring both physical presence and an intent to make a place a fixed and permanent home. An existing domicile is presumed to continue until a new one is acquired. Education Law § 3202 creates a rebuttable presumption that children share the domicile of their parents. The purpose of § 3202 is to allocate educational costs sensibly between school districts and avoid burdening districts with the costs of educating nonresident children. The Court cited Matter of Newcomb, 192 N.Y. 238, 250 (1908). and Catlin v Sobol, 77 NY2d 552, 560 (1991). The court also referenced the Department of Education’s interpretation of “resided” in similar contexts, emphasizing the requirement of “physical presence as an inhabitant of the district combined with an intent to remain” (Appeal of Haldane Cent. School Dist., 32 Ed Dept Rep 156, 159 [Decision No. 12,790] [1992]). The Court emphasized that adopting a physical presence-only definition would create instability and unfairly penalize communities with homeless shelters. A short stay in a district before foster care placement should not obligate that district to pay educational costs for months or years thereafter. The Court specifically rejected Springs’ argument that the mother established a domicile at Shelter Plus. To illustrate the rule, the court quoted that “residence is established by one’s physical presence as an inhabitant within the district, combined with an intent to remain” (Appeal of Stokes, 32 Ed Dept Rep 93, 95 [Decision No. 12,769] [1992]).

  • Dutchess County Dept. of Social Services v. Day, 96 N.Y.2d 149 (2001): Applying CSSA Guidelines in Foster Care Cases

    Dutchess County Dept. of Social Services v. Day, 96 N.Y.2d 149 (2001)

    Child support obligations for children in residential or foster care are determined using the Child Support Standards Act (CSSA) guidelines, allowing for deviations based on specific, enumerated factors.

    Summary

    This case clarifies that the Child Support Standards Act (CSSA) governs parental support obligations even when a child is in residential or foster care. Dutchess County Department of Social Services sought reimbursement from parents for the costs of their child’s residential care. The Court of Appeals held that while Family Court Act § 415 establishes a general duty of support, the CSSA provides the specific framework for calculating child support, including in foster care cases. The court emphasized the need for uniform child support standards and affirmed the Hearing Examiner’s application of the CSSA, including permissible deviations based on relevant factors.

    Facts

    The Dutchess County Department of Social Services (DSS) commenced proceedings against two parents to recover funds spent on their child’s residential care. A Hearing Examiner calculated each parent’s basic child support obligation using the CSSA formula. The Hearing Examiner then deviated from the CSSA amount, considering factors such as the parents’ need to maintain a home for the child, the child’s home visits, and the mother’s temporary inability to work due to surgery. Support orders were issued against both parents.

    Procedural History

    The DSS objected to the support orders, arguing that the Hearing Examiner improperly deviated from the CSSA standards. The Family Court denied the objections, reasoning that Family Court Act § 415 applied, granting broader discretion. Alternatively, the Family Court found the orders reasonable even under the CSSA. The Appellate Division affirmed, agreeing that § 415 applied. The New York Court of Appeals then reviewed the case.

    Issue(s)

    Whether child support obligations for a child placed in residential or foster care should be determined under Family Court Act § 415, which allows for broader discretion, or under the Child Support Standards Act (CSSA), Family Court Act § 413.

    Holding

    No, because the CSSA provides the specific and uniform standard for determining child support obligations, including in cases involving children in residential or foster care. Deviations are permitted only based on the specific factors enumerated in the CSSA.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that statutes relating to the same subject matter should be construed together. While Family Court Act § 415 establishes a general duty to support relatives receiving public assistance, the CSSA, enacted later, provides a specific mathematical formula for calculating child support. The CSSA mandates that courts “shall” make child support awards according to its provisions (Family Ct Act § 413[1][a]). The court emphasized the need for uniform standards in child support awards, aligning with federal mandates for state child support programs. The court noted the legislative history of CSSA indicating that it “ends the use of different support criteria for awards made to recipients of public assistance from those made to non-public assistance recipients.” The Court held that Section 415 continues to establish support liability when a spouse or stepchild is a recipient of public assistance. The court distinguished Bast v. Rossoff, noting the policy considerations against encouraging parents to track visitation time to reduce support obligations were not relevant in the context of temporary residential or foster care. The Hearing Examiner appropriately considered parent-child visitation in the temporary residential/foster care context. Failing to consider expenses incurred during visitation would abrogate the strong public policy and underlying goal of returning the child home and reuniting the family. The court explicitly rejected contrary holdings in other state courts that had applied Family Court Act § 415 instead of CSSA.

  • City of New York v. Wing, 93 N.Y.2d 430 (1999): Retroactive Application of Social Services Law § 153-i

    City of New York v. Wing, 93 N.Y.2d 430 (1999)

    Social Services Law § 153-i can be applied retroactively to allow the State to recoup from New York City the full amount of federal disallowances for foster care expenses, including interest, when the final federal agency decision or settlement occurred after July 1, 1995, regardless of when the underlying mismanagement occurred.

    Summary

    This case concerns a dispute between New York State and New York City over who should bear the cost of federal recoupment of foster care aid due to mismanagement by the City. The central issue is the retroactive application of Social Services Law § 153-i, which allows the state to recoup federal disallowances from the city. The Court of Appeals held that the amended statute applied retroactively because the final settlement between the State and the federal agency occurred after July 1, 1995, the date to which the amendment retroactively pertained. The Court also found the State had authority to recoup the interest charges associated with the disallowance from the City.

    Facts

    From 1983 to 1985, New York City received federal funds for foster care expenses under Title IV-E of the Social Security Act. In 1988, a federal audit found that the City did not comply with federal eligibility requirements in numerous cases. As a result, the federal government sought to recoup approximately $92 million from the State. The State appealed the disallowance. In April 1995, HHS issued a negative grant award and recouped $31.2 million. A final settlement between HHS and DSS was reached in December 1996, with DSS paying HHS an additional $42.8 million. DSS then notified the City it would recoup the entire $74 million.

    Procedural History

    The City sued the State in a CPLR Article 78 proceeding, seeking to annul the recoupment efforts. Supreme Court granted relief to the City, rejecting retroactive application of Social Services Law § 153-i. The Appellate Division modified the judgment, agreeing that the State was responsible for half the disallowance but concluding that the State could recoup half the interest. Both the State and the City appealed to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether Social Services Law § 153-i may be applied retroactively to authorize the State to recoup federal foster care expenditures from the City.

    2. Whether the State may recover from the City the associated interest charges assessed by the Federal Government.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the 1999 amendment to Social Services Law § 153-i (8) applies retroactively irrespective of whether the actions underlying the disallowance occurred prior to July 1, 1995, if the final settlement occurred after that date.

    2. Yes, because Social Services Law § 153-i authorizes the State to recoup any disallowance based on a final agency decision or settlement, which includes the interest component.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court found that the 1999 amendment to Social Services Law § 153-i (8) clearly states that the law applies retroactively. The crucial factor is when the final settlement between the State and the federal agency occurred. The Court determined that the final settlement occurred in December 1996, after July 1, 1995. Before that point, the disagreement over disallowance between DSS and HHS was still subject to review and dispute. The Court cited DAB’s acknowledgment that the administrative decision on the 72 uncontested sample cases was not yet final as of August 2, 1995. Therefore, the City is accountable for the entire amount recouped from the State by HHS.

    Regarding the interest charges, the Court noted that Social Services Law § 153-i (8) declares that the “block grant apportionment shall reflect the state share of sanctions or disallowances taken against the district pursuant to this chapter or federal law.” The Court reasoned that federal regulations, such as 45 CFR 30.13 (a) (1), stipulate that interest accrues on debts from the date the party has notice of the debt and is treated as part of the disallowance under federal law. Therefore, the State has the authority to recoup the interest amount from the City.

    The Court rejected any other contentions, stating they did not alter the outcome of the litigation. They concluded that the State is entitled to recoup from the City the entire amount of the Federal disallowance, including its interest component.

  • Matter of Claudio v. Dowling, 83 N.Y.2d 593 (1994): Foster Parents’ Right to Fair Hearings for Reimbursement Disputes

    Matter of Claudio v. Dowling, 83 N.Y.2d 593 (1994)

    Foster parents have standing to request a fair hearing from the state regarding foster care maintenance payments, even after the children are no longer in their care, because they are considered recipients of benefits or services under both federal and state law.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether foster parents can request a fair hearing from the State when the City denies or fails to act on their request for foster care maintenance payments, especially when the children are no longer residing with them. The Court of Appeals held that foster parents do have such standing. Federal and state laws provide foster parents the right to a fair hearing to challenge the adequacy of foster care reimbursements, even after the children have left their care. Denying this right would be inconsistent with the purpose of attracting qualified foster parents and ensuring proper care for children.

    Facts

    Several foster parents (Claudio, Vera, and Velez) cared for children with special needs placed in their homes by the New York City Department of Social Services (City DSS). Despite requests for higher reimbursement rates for special needs children, they either received the standard rate or experienced delays and denials. In all cases, the requests for fair hearings occurred *after* the children had been returned to their biological parents. Claudio requested a fair hearing after caring for three children; Vera requested one after caring for two children; and Velez requested one after caring for five children, some with significant medical needs.

    Procedural History

    Separate fair hearings were conducted, and the Commissioner of State DSS denied jurisdiction, stating that since the children no longer resided with the foster parents when the fair hearing was requested, the agency lacked jurisdiction. Claudio’s Article 78 proceeding was granted to the extent of remanding the matter for an administrative hearing. Vera and Velez’s class action for declaratory judgment was dismissed. The Appellate Division reversed in Claudio and affirmed in Vera, concluding that former foster parents lacked standing. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether foster parents have standing to request a fair hearing from the State regarding the adequacy of foster care maintenance payments, even if the children no longer reside with them at the time the hearing is requested.

    Holding

    Yes, because both federal and state law grant foster parents the right to a fair hearing to challenge the adequacy of foster care reimbursements, and this right is not extinguished simply because the children are no longer in their care.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court based its reasoning on both federal and state law. Federal law (42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(12)) grants “any individual” whose claim for benefits is denied the right to a fair hearing. The court interpreted this to include foster parents seeking review of underpayments. Citing Timmy S. v. Stumbo, 916 F.2d 312, 315 (6th Cir. 1990), the court stated the benefits include foster care maintenance payments. Because state plans provide “services” to foster parents (42 U.S.C. § 675(1)(B)), foster parents fall under the “any individual” category. The court also pointed to federal regulations providing a hearing to any “recipient who is aggrieved by any agency action” (45 CFR 205.10(a)(5); 1356.20(a); 1355.30(p)(2)). The court reasoned that since payments are reimbursements, foster parents could logically be considered recipients.
    On the state level, New York provides applicants or recipients of “assistance, benefits or services” (18 NYCRR 358-3.1(b)) the right to a fair hearing. Since payments for foster care services are made *to* foster parents, they can be considered recipients. The court emphasized the irrationality of requiring a child to be in the foster home when the hearing is requested, noting that disputes over reimbursement arise *after* services have been rendered. The court quoted a Local Commissioner’s Memo: “foster care rates are an important ingredient in enabling social services districts to place children in the least restrictive setting appropriate to the needs of the child and to attract a sufficient number of qualified foster parents to serve as placement resources for such children.” To deny standing would contradict this purpose. The court concluded by clarifying that the state can prescribe procedural matters relating to administering such hearings.

  • Matter of Shaina B., 87 N.Y.2d 733 (1996): Applicability of Foster Care Review to Children in Custody of Minor Parents

    Matter of Shaina B., 87 N.Y.2d 733 (1996)

    Social Services Law § 392, mandating judicial review of foster care status, does not apply to children who reside with their minor parents in foster care and remain in their parents’ legal custody.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether Social Services Law § 392 requires judicial review of children in foster care who are also in the legal custody of their minor parents who are themselves in foster care. The New York Court of Appeals held that such review is not required. The court reasoned that the purpose of § 392 is to ensure permanency planning for children in foster care and to prevent them from languishing in temporary placements. When a child resides with their parent who retains legal custody, the goal of permanency is inherently satisfied. The court also noted alternative mechanisms exist to address concerns about the child’s well-being.

    Facts

    Shaina B. and Stephanie C. were born to minor parents who were in foster care. At the time, New York regulations required the minor parents to surrender custody of their children to the Commissioner of Social Services for the children to be eligible for foster care benefits. In 1993, the regulations changed, allowing the Commissioner to provide foster care payments for both the minor parent and the child, even if the child remained in the legal custody of the parent. Consequently, custody of Shaina B. and Stephanie C. was returned to their minor parents. The children continued to reside with their parents in the same foster care setting.

    Procedural History

    The Commissioner of Social Services moved to withdraw petitions filed under Social Services Law § 392 for review of Shaina B. and Stephanie C.’s foster care status, arguing the reviews were no longer necessary since the children were back in the legal custody of their parents. The Law Guardian opposed the motion. The Family Court granted the Commissioner’s motion. The Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether Social Services Law § 392, requiring judicial review of foster care status, applies to children who reside with their minor parents in foster care and remain in their parents’ legal custody?

    Holding

    No, because Social Services Law § 392 is designed to address situations where a child is not living in the care and custody of a biological or adoptive parent, and the goal of permanency is already satisfied when a child is in the custody of their parent.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals determined that the purpose of Social Services Law § 392 is to ensure that children in foster care are moved into permanent home situations, either through adoption or return to their biological families. The Court emphasized that the statute’s design focuses on situations where the child is not living in the care and custody of a biological or adoptive parent. The statute mandates notice to “the child’s parent or guardian who transferred the care and custody of such child…to an authorized agency.” Further, the statute directs the reviewing court to consider the services offered to “re-unite the family.”

    The Court reasoned that if § 392 applied, the only possible outcome of a review proceeding would be to continue the foster care placement, rendering the entire proceeding a “futile exercise.” The court stated that the legislature could not have intended this outcome. It further explained that the statute was enacted to reform the foster care system by guaranteeing judicial oversight, ensuring that no child would “fall between the cracks.” In this case, where the children are living with their biological parents who have legal custody, the goal of permanency is satisfied, rendering judicial review under § 392 unnecessary.

    The court rejected policy arguments about the lack of judicial supervision for this “new class” of at-risk children, noting that § 392 is not aimed broadly at ensuring supervision of all aspects of foster care placements, but rather at making agencies accountable for moving children into permanent homes. Finally, the court observed that regulations treat the children and their minor parents as a family unit for financial support, case planning, and preventive services. Concerns about neglect or abuse can be addressed through other legal mechanisms, such as Article 10 of the Family Court Act. The court concluded that “there exist adequate alternative methods of addressing the concern raised by the Law Guardian that children will now be ‘lost’ in foster care.”

  • In re Michael B., 80 N.Y.2d 372 (1992): Determining a Child’s Best Interests in Foster Care

    In re Michael B., 80 N.Y.2d 299 (1992)

    In foster care cases, the “best interest of the child” standard requires a nuanced inquiry that prioritizes the biological parent’s fitness and the potential harm to the child upon removal from foster care, while also considering the agency’s efforts to reunite the family, and only permits an award of custody to foster parents after termination of parental rights.

    Summary

    This case addresses the complex issue of custody disputes between a biological father and foster parents in the context of New York’s foster care system. The Court of Appeals clarifies the meaning of “best interest of the child” under Social Services Law § 392 (6). The Court holds that while bonding with foster parents is a factor, the fitness of the biological parent and the potential trauma of removal from foster care are primary considerations. The court also specifies that Social Services Law § 392(6) does not permit an award of custody to foster parents, absent termination of parental rights. The case was remitted for a new hearing due to changed circumstances regarding the father’s fitness.

    Facts

    Michael B. was born in 1985 with a positive toxicology for cocaine and voluntarily placed in foster care by his unmarried mother. At three months old, he was placed with Maggie W.L., a foster parent, where he remained for over five years. The agency initially assured Mrs. L. this was a preadoptive placement. The appellant was later identified as Michael’s father. The agency sought to terminate the rights of both biological parents based on neglect. The father initially consented to a finding of permanent neglect but later withdrew his plea. He then entered a drug rehabilitation program and began visiting Michael. An agreement was reached where judgment was suspended for 12 months contingent upon the father meeting specific conditions, but ambiguity surrounded who had responsibility for initiating drug tests. The lower court was satisfied that the father showed substantial compliance with the condition of the suspended judgement.

    Procedural History

    The Family Court initially directed Michael’s discharge to his father, finding it lacked jurisdiction to rehear the custody issue based on the child’s best interest. The Appellate Division reversed and remitted, holding that dismissal of a permanent neglect petition doesn’t divest the Family Court of its jurisdiction until a “best interests” custody disposition is made. On remittal, the Family Court again ordered Michael’s release to his father. The Appellate Division again reversed, awarding custody to the foster parents and remitting solely for determination of the father’s visitation rights. The father appealed to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the “best interest of the child” standard in Social Services Law § 392 (6) in the context of foster care requires only a limited inquiry into the biological parent’s fitness and potential harm to the child upon removal from foster care, or a broader inquiry comparing the suitability of the biological parent versus the foster parents.

    2. Whether Social Services Law § 392 (6) permits an award of legal custody to foster parents.

    Holding

    1. No, because the “best interest of the child” inquiry must begin by weighing past and continued foster care against discharge to the biological parent, considering the parent’s fitness, the agency’s efforts to reunite the family, and the child’s emotional well-being, but it does not allow the balancing of one against the other.

    2. No, because Social Services Law § 392 (6) does not envision foster parents as “other suitable persons” to whom legal custody can be awarded; this interpretation exacerbates the child’s legal limbo status by preventing establishment of permanent parental relationships.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that New York’s foster care scheme prioritizes the biological family unless the parent is unfit. Encouraging voluntary placements without fear of losing parental rights is a key component. The Court distinguished Matter of Bennett v Jeffreys because that case involved a private placement, not a statutory foster care arrangement. The Court emphasized that using the foster care period to create emotional ties that then justify comparing the biological parent to the foster parent undermines the purpose of voluntary foster care. The Court found that the statute encourages providing children with stable permanent homes as early as possible and extended foster care is not in the child’s best interest. Parental rights may be terminated only upon clear and convincing proof of abandonment, mental illness, permanent neglect, or abuse.

    The Court found that Family Court Act § 631 directs disposition to be made based solely on the best interest of the child, and there shall be no presumption that such interests will be promoted by any particular disposition, in contrast to Social Services Law § 392(6). The legislative history of Social Services Law § 392(5-a) clearly advises Family Court of certain considerations before making an order of disposition; and, that these factors establish a clear policy of exploring all available means of reuniting the child with his family before the Court decides to continue his foster care or to direct a permanent adoptive placement.

    The Court rejected a pure “best interests” hearing where biological and foster parents are on equal footing. The Court found that emotional well-being may encompass bonding to someone other than the biological parent, but absent termination of parental rights, the nonparent cannot adopt the child.

    Regarding the award of custody to the foster parents, the Court stated Social Services Law § 392 (6) (b) contemplates removal of the child from foster care by return to “the parent, guardian or relative, or direct[] that the child be placed in the custody of a relative or other suitable person or persons.” The revision added as a permissible disposition the placement of children with relatives or other suitable persons, but it does not envision including foster parents as “other suitable persons.” The Court found if foster parents are implicitly included in paragraph (b), it addresses different interests.

    Because new allegations arose during the appeal, specifically neglect of other children in his custody and substance abuse, the Court remitted the matter to Family Court for an expedited hearing to determine the father’s current fitness. The Court stated, “changed circumstances may have particular significance in child custody matters”. The Court directed that the hearing be conducted before a different judge. Pending the hearing, Michael was to remain with his current foster parents, but legal custody returned to the foster care agency.

  • Davis v. St. Joseph’s Children’s Services, 64 N.Y.2d 796 (1984): Statute of Limitations and Foster Care

    Davis v. St. Joseph’s Children’s Services, 64 N.Y.2d 796 (1984)

    The statutory tolling provisions for infancy under the CPLR do not extend beyond the age of 18 for individuals in foster care absent a specific legislative intent to do so.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether the statute of limitations for tort claims is tolled for individuals who were in foster care beyond the age of 18. The plaintiff, who had been in foster care, attempted to amend her complaint to include tort causes of action, arguing that the statute of limitations was tolled due to infancy and insanity. The Court of Appeals held that neither the infancy nor the insanity tolling provisions applied. The Court found no legislative intent to extend the infancy toll beyond age 18 for those in foster care, and foster care alone did not constitute an “overall inability to function in society” sufficient to invoke the insanity toll.

    Facts

    The plaintiff, Davis, was in the care of St. Joseph’s Children’s Services. She later brought a lawsuit and sought to amend the complaint to add tort claims. The specifics of the underlying tortious acts are not detailed in the Court of Appeals memorandum decision, but the central issue revolved around the timeliness of these claims.

    Procedural History

    The plaintiff sought to amend her complaint to include tort causes of action. The lower court denied the motion to amend. The Appellate Division affirmed the denial. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the three-year statute of limitations for the tort causes of action was tolled by the continuous treatment doctrine.
    2. Whether the tolling provisions for infancy under CPLR 208 extend beyond the age of 18 for a person in foster care.
    3. Whether foster care, without more, constitutes “an over-all inability to function in society” sufficient to invoke the toll for “insanity” under CPLR 208.

    Holding

    1. The Court did not address the issue of continuous treatment because the argument was not made in the lower courts.
    2. No, because nothing in Social Services Law § 371 (19) and § 383 (2) suggests a legislative intent to extend the infancy toll of CPLR 208 beyond 18 for a person in foster care.
    3. No, because foster care, without more, does not demonstrate “an over-all inability to function in society” sufficient to invoke the toll for “insanity” contained in CPLR 208.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s decision, primarily focusing on the statute of limitations issue. As to the cross motion to amend the complaint, the court cited the reasons stated by the Appellate Division and also referenced Video Corp. v Flatto Assoc., 58 NY2d 1026, 1028.
    Regarding the tort causes of action, the Court declined to address the continuous treatment doctrine argument because it was not raised in the lower courts. The Court then addressed the infancy and insanity tolling provisions of CPLR 203 and 208. It stated that infancy is defined by CPLR 105 (j) as not having attained the age of eighteen years. It emphasized that Social Services Law § 371 (19) and § 383 (2) do not indicate a legislative intent to extend the infancy toll beyond 18 for those in foster care. The court noted that the definitions in Social Services Law § 371 pertain only to that specific article or special acts relating to children.
    Furthermore, the Court held that foster care, by itself, is not sufficient to invoke the toll for insanity under CPLR 208. To qualify for the insanity toll, the plaintiff must demonstrate “an over-all inability to function in society” (McCarthy v Volkswagen of Am., 55 NY2d 543, 548; accord, Eisenbach v Metropolitan Transp. Auth., 62 NY2d 973). The Court found no evidence that the plaintiff’s foster care experience resulted in such a profound inability.

  • Sinhogar v. Parry, 53 N.Y.2d 426 (1981): Due Process Requirements for Out-of-State Foster Care Placement

    Sinhogar v. Parry, 53 N.Y.2d 426 (1981)

    The procedures available to children and their parents for judicial review of out-of-state placements of emotionally disturbed and mentally retarded children satisfy both federal and state constitutional due process requirements.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether the procedures for placing emotionally disturbed and mentally retarded children in out-of-state foster care meet constitutional due process requirements. Several children, through guardians, sued New York City and State officials, arguing that out-of-state placements violated their rights. The Court of Appeals held that existing review procedures, including administrative review and Article 78 proceedings, are constitutionally sufficient. The court emphasized that the case did not concern the initial removal of children from their natural families, but rather subsequent transfers from in-state to out-of-state foster care. The court declined to make sweeping pronouncements on the substantive rights of the children, reserving those issues for trial.

    Facts

    Carlos Sinhogar and Jeannette Morgan, emotionally disturbed teenagers in the custody of the New York City Department of Social Services, were placed in institutions in Virginia and Florida, respectively. John Evans, a retarded teenager living with his parents, was offered out-of-state placement due to the unavailability of in-state options that his parents could afford. The plaintiffs argued that these out-of-state placements infringed on their constitutional rights, particularly the right to an ongoing family relationship and the right to state-created benefits such as adequate care.

    Procedural History

    The plaintiffs filed a class action lawsuit seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as damages. The Supreme Court granted partial summary judgment, directing the defendants to propose a review procedure for challenging out-of-state placements. The Appellate Division modified this decision, declaring out-of-state placements pursuant to the Interstate Compact on Placement of Children (ICPC) constitutional and dismissing the complaint against one defendant in his individual capacity. The case then went to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the procedures available to children and their parents for review of out-of-state placements of emotionally disturbed and mentally retarded children meet constitutional due process requirements.
    2. Whether parents are constitutionally entitled to prior notice of every prospective out-of-state placement.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the available review procedures, including administrative review and Article 78 proceedings, provide sufficient due process.
    2. No, because neither Congress nor the Department of Health and Human Services has regarded prior notice or formal review procedures as fundamental due process rights.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals measured the available review procedures against the constitutional standards prescribed by the Supreme Court of the United States. Referencing Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, the court noted that the Supreme Court had previously determined New York’s statutory system for regulating foster care placements to be constitutionally sufficient. The court emphasized that the placements in question were not the initial removals from the natural family setting, but subsequent transfers. Regarding prior notice, the court found no categorical constitutional right to such notice for out-of-state placements. The court highlighted that administrative review is available to “[a]ny person aggrieved by such decision” (Social Services Law, § 400, subd. 2), and that fair hearing determinations can be judicially scrutinized in a CPLR Article 78 proceeding. While acknowledging that more streamlined review procedures might be desirable, the court concluded that the existing procedures meet minimum constitutional mandates. The court stated, “The issue is whether the Constitutions mandate the provision of review procedures which are not now available and which would be beyond impairment or diminution by either administrative or legislative action. We conclude…that they do not.”

  • Group House of Port Washington, Inc. v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 45 N.Y.2d 266 (1978): Defining ‘Family’ in Zoning for Group Homes

    Group House of Port Washington, Inc. v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 45 N.Y.2d 266 (1978)

    A municipality cannot apply zoning ordinances defining ‘family’ so stringently as to exclude a small group home for foster children that functions as the functional equivalent of a natural family.

    Summary

    Group House sought a building permit to operate a foster home for children in an area zoned for single-family residences. The town denied the permit, arguing it wasn’t a ‘family’ under the ordinance. The New York Court of Appeals held that the group home, operating as a functional family unit, could not be excluded. The court converted the Article 78 proceeding to a declaratory judgment action. The court reasoned that excluding a group home that functions as a natural family serves no valid public purpose, but emphasized that the ruling was limited to homes functioning as family units. The dissent argued the group home was not a stable family unit and extending the definition of ‘family’ was an overreach.

    Facts

    Group House, a non-profit, bought a house in Port Washington, NY, in an area zoned for one-family residences. The town’s zoning ordinance defined ‘family’ as related persons living as a single housekeeping unit, with limited boarders. Group House planned to use the house as a state-authorized group home for foster children. The Building Commissioner denied their building permit application, stating the group home was not a permitted use.

    Procedural History

    The Board of Zoning Appeals upheld the Building Commissioner’s denial. Group House then initiated an Article 78 proceeding to overturn the Board’s decision. The Supreme Court ruled in favor of Group House. The Appellate Division affirmed the judgment, but on different grounds, asserting a municipality could not use zoning to exclude a state-approved group home. The Court of Appeals affirmed, but on the narrow grounds that the group home was indistinguishable from a natural family.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the Town of North Hempstead may apply its zoning ordinance definition of ‘family’ to exclude a small group home for foster children that functions as a functional equivalent of a natural family?

    Holding

    Yes, because the group home in this case operated as the functional equivalent of a natural family and to exclude it would serve no valid public purpose.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals focused on the factual similarities between the proposed group home and a traditional family. It noted that the group home would consist of two surrogate parents and seven children, creating a stable home environment. The children would be drawn from the local community, attend local schools, and not impose an additional burden on the community.

    The court distinguished this situation from boarding houses or transient residences, emphasizing the intent to create a permanent family structure. It stated that excluding such a group home would not further the family and youth values that single-family zoning is intended to protect.

    The court stated that while the power to zone is broad, it is not unlimited, and may not be used for arbitrary exclusionary efforts. Citing Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, the court acknowledged the legitimacy of zoning for single-family residences. However, it emphasized that arbitrary restrictions under the guise of protecting family values are impermissible. The court reasoned that because the group home was the functional equivalent of a natural family, excluding it would serve no valid purpose. The court also warned that the holding was limited to homes functioning as family units, and might not apply to facilities for delinquents or the mentally disturbed.

    Chief Judge Breitel dissented, arguing that the group home did not meet the standard for ‘family’ established in City of White Plains v. Ferraioli because it was not a stable, single-family unit. He also argued that the alternating houseparents and the transient nature of the children undermined the purpose of single-family zoning. The dissent emphasized the importance of analyzing subtle distinctions on a case-by-case basis to determine if a group home truly emulates a family.