New York Law Review

Tag: Forged Instruments

  • People v. Martinez, 83 N.Y.2d 781 (1994): Permissible Jury Access to Exhibit Lists Correlated to Indictment Counts

    People v. Martinez, 83 N.Y.2d 781 (1994)

    A trial court may provide a deliberating jury with a list of exhibits correlated to specific counts of an indictment, in response to a jury request, without the defendant’s consent, provided the list contains no statutory references or legal instructions, and the instruments were specifically identified in the indictment.

    Summary

    Martinez was convicted of defrauding church members. During deliberations, the jury requested a list of specific items related to certain counts of the indictment. Over the defendant’s objection, the trial court provided a table listing each count number, corresponding exhibit number, and a brief description of the exhibit. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that providing the exhibit list was permissible because it was devoid of statutory references, answered the jury’s specific request, and the instruments were specifically identified in the indictment and the court’s initial charge. The Court emphasized that this did not present the dangers associated with submitting prohibited jury documents like statutes or excerpts from the jury charge.

    Facts

    Defendant and his wife were charged with defrauding ministers and members of Pentecostal churches by posing as officers of a “detective chaplains” organization. They offered memberships, badges resembling police shields, fake IDs, and bogus diplomas for a fee. The indictment included 31 counts, with 29 specifically identifying forged instruments (e.g., “a gold shield bearing the seal of the City of New York in blue and the number 0102”). These instruments were introduced as exhibits at trial.

    Procedural History

    The trial court convicted Martinez on 30 counts. The Appellate Division modified the sentence but otherwise affirmed the conviction. Martinez appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in providing the jury with a list of exhibits correlated to the indictment counts without his consent. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a trial court is required to obtain a defendant’s consent before providing a deliberating jury with a list of exhibits correlated to specific counts of the indictment, when the jury requests such a list?

    Holding

    No, because the list provided was devoid of any statutory references, simply answered the jury’s request, and the instruments were specifically identified in the indictment.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals distinguished this case from prior holdings that prohibited providing juries with written material containing statutory elements or terms of the charged offenses without the defendant’s consent. The Court reasoned that the “Table” in question here was “devoid of any statutory references and simply answered the jury’s request.” The court cited People v. Moore, where it held that the text of two counts of the indictment was properly given to the deliberating jury over defendant’s objection, reasoning that the submission was justified on the basis of the court’s statutory obligation to comply with a jury request. Here, each instrument was specifically identified in the indictment, and for most of the counts exhibit numbers were included in the court’s charge. The court noted, “Even without the disputed list, the jury could have linked the counts to the exhibits by asking the trial court for the text of counts 2 through 30 of the indictment and either readbacks of the court’s charge on each of these counts or separate requests for each exhibit count-by-count. There is no meaningful distinction between those laborious procedures and what actually took place here.” The Court also emphasized that unlike statutes, which pose a risk of misapplication, there was no danger that providing the jurors with this exhibit list would encourage them to take “on the role of Judges of the law as well as Judges of the facts” (People v Moore, 71 NY2d at 688). The Court cautioned that trial courts should exercise “extreme care” when submitting materials to a deliberating jury over a defendant’s objection, but found no prejudice to the defendant under these specific circumstances.

  • People v. Kreel, 42 N.Y.2d 90 (1977): Admissibility of Evidence Seized After Consent

    People v. Kreel, 42 N.Y.2d 90 (1977)

    Evidence obtained as a result of a search and seizure is admissible if the defendant consented to the surrender of the property in question, and even if the seizure was illegal, its admission is harmless if there is other overwhelming evidence.

    Summary

    Defendant was convicted of criminal possession of a forged instrument. The police, investigating forged checks passed in a blue Volkswagen, traced the car to the defendant’s wife. They found the car at their residence and informed the wife they would seize it. While preparing to impound the car, they found a matchbook from a Binghamton restaurant inside. The defendant and his attorney later consented to surrender the car. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that the defendant consented to the surrender of the vehicle, negating any claim regarding subsequent photographs of the vehicle. The court further held that even if the matchbook seizure was illegal, its admission was harmless given the other evidence linking the car to the crime scene.

    Facts

    On July 19, 1972, a man driving a blue Volkswagen convertible with a white top and a dent in the right rear panel attempted to pass forged checks at two banks in Binghamton. Tellers described the man and the car. A parking lot attendant recorded two license plate numbers from the car: one which was reported stolen and another registered to the defendant’s wife, who resided in Westchester County. On July 21, 1972, State Police arrived at the defendant’s residence and found the car in the garage. The defendant was not home. The police informed the defendant’s wife that they would seize the vehicle and, while removing the contents to impound the car, found a matchbook from a Binghamton restaurant. The defendant and his attorney subsequently told the police they could surrender the car on Monday morning. The police seized the car on Monday, arresting the defendant and taking photographs of the license plates and the dent.

    Procedural History

    The defendant moved to suppress the vehicle and the matchbook, but the motion was denied. He was convicted of two counts of criminal possession of a forged instrument (Penal Law, § 170.25) following a jury trial. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, and the case was appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the evidence obtained from the vehicle should have been suppressed because the search and seizure were illegal.

    2. Whether the admission of the matchbook into evidence was reversible error, even if its seizure was illegal.

    Holding

    1. No, because the defendant consented to surrender the vehicle on Monday morning, negating any claim regarding subsequent photographs of the vehicle.

    2. No, because even assuming the seizure of the matchbook was illegal, its admission was harmless in view of the other evidence placing the vehicle at the scene of the crimes.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that the defendant’s consent to surrender the vehicle on Monday morning waived any objection to the photographs taken of the vehicle at that time. The court did not need to decide if the defendant had standing to challenge the initial search. Regarding the matchbook, the court acknowledged the defendant’s argument that its seizure may have been illegal. However, the court found that even if the seizure was unlawful, admitting the matchbook into evidence was harmless error. The court emphasized the existence of other substantial evidence linking the vehicle to the crimes, including the eyewitness testimony and the license plate information. The court determined that the matchbook was merely cumulative evidence and its admission did not prejudice the defendant, and would not warrant reversal of the conviction. The court stated, “Even assuming, as the defendant urges, that the seizure was illegal, admission of the matchbook would unquestionably be harmless in view of all the other evidence placing the vehicle at the scene of the crimes.”