New York Law Review

Tag: Foreseeable Harm

  • Dalton v. U.E.S.S. Leasing Corp., 749 N.E.2d 192 (2001): Landlord’s Duty to Protect Tenants from Foreseeable Criminal Acts

    Dalton v. U.E.S.S. Leasing Corp., 749 N.E.2d 192 (2001)

    Landlords have a common-law duty to take minimal precautions to protect tenants from foreseeable harm, including foreseeable criminal conduct by third persons, when past experience alerts them to the likelihood of such conduct.

    Summary

    The plaintiff, a tenant in a large apartment complex, was sexually assaulted in her apartment after opening the door without verifying the visitor’s identity. She sued the landlord and security company, alleging negligent security. The New York Court of Appeals held that the landlord had a duty to take minimal precautions to protect tenants from foreseeable criminal acts and that a factual question existed as to whether the landlord’s negligence in failing to exclude the assailant, a known troublemaker, was the proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injuries. The court also found the tenant’s act of opening the door without looking was not an independent intervening cause as a matter of law.

    Facts

    Plaintiff resided in an apartment in the Lefrak City complex. Her boyfriend called to say he would be upstairs shortly. The doorbell rang, and Plaintiff, assuming it was her boyfriend, opened the door without looking through the peephole or asking who was there. A third party, Lawrence Toole, forced his way into the apartment and sexually assaulted her at knifepoint. Toole had relatives residing in the complex and had a history of criminal activity on the premises, including robbery and attempted rape. The landlord had an arrest photo of Toole.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment, dismissing the complaint. The Appellate Division reversed, finding a question of fact as to the landlord’s negligence. The Appellate Division certified the question of whether it properly reversed the Supreme Court’s order to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the landlord had a duty to take minimal precautions to protect tenants from foreseeable criminal acts.

    2. Whether questions of fact remain as to whether the landlord negligently failed to exclude Toole and whether this negligence proximately caused the Plaintiff’s injuries.

    3. Whether the Plaintiff’s act of opening her apartment door without looking through the peephole was an independent intervening act that absolved the landlord of responsibility.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because landlords have a common-law duty to take minimal precautions to protect tenants from foreseeable harm, including foreseeable criminal conduct by a third person.

    2. Yes, because questions of fact remain as to whether the landlord negligently failed to exclude Toole, given his history of criminal activity on the premises, and whether this negligence proximately caused the plaintiff’s injuries.

    3. No, because, on the facts of this case, the Plaintiff’s actions were not an independent intervening act that, as a matter of law, absolved the landlord of responsibility.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that landlords have a common-law duty to protect tenants from foreseeable harm, including criminal conduct. This duty arises when the landlord is aware of past criminal activity that makes future criminal conduct foreseeable. The court cited Jacqueline S. v City of New York, 81 NY2d 288, 293-294 and Burgos v Aqueduct Realty Corp., 92 NY2d 544, 548. The court emphasized that “[w]hether knowledge of criminal activities occurring at various points within a unified housing complex * * * can be sufficient to make injury to a person in one of the buildings foreseeable, must depend on the location, nature and extent of those previous criminal activities and their similarity, proximity or other relationship to the crime in question” (Jacqueline S. v City of New York, 81 NY2d, at 295). The court found that Toole’s history of criminal activity in the complex raised a question of fact as to the landlord’s negligence in failing to exclude him. The court also determined that the Plaintiff’s action of opening the door without looking was not an independent intervening cause that absolved the landlord of liability. The court noted that more discovery was needed to determine how foreseeable a risk Toole posed and what measures the landlords had in place to deal with him.

  • Mirand v. City of New York, 84 N.Y.2d 44 (1994): School’s Duty to Supervise Students and Foreseeable Harm

    84 N.Y.2d 44 (1994)

    Schools have a duty to adequately supervise students and are liable for foreseeable injuries proximately related to the absence of adequate supervision, especially when the school has specific knowledge of potential danger to a student.

    Summary

    Two student sisters, Virna and Vivia Mirand, were attacked at their high school after Virna reported a threat from another student, Donna Webster, to a teacher and found the security office unattended. Vivia was stabbed trying to defend her sister. The New York Court of Appeals held that the school district could be liable for negligent supervision because it had notice of a specific threat against Virna but failed to take adequate steps to protect her, and because school security was absent from key locations at dismissal time, when the attack occurred. The Court affirmed the Appellate Division’s reinstatement of the jury verdict in favor of the sisters.

    Facts

    Virna Mirand, a student at Harry S. Truman High School, had an altercation with fellow student Donna Webster, who threatened to kill her. Virna reported the threat to a teacher after finding the security office closed. Later, while waiting for her sister Vivia, Webster and her companions attacked Virna on the school veranda. Vivia was injured when she intervened to protect her sister; she was stabbed in the wrist by Webster’s brother. No security personnel were present during the attack.

    Procedural History

    The Mirand sisters sued the Board of Education for negligent supervision. A jury found in favor of the plaintiffs. The Supreme Court set aside the verdict and dismissed the complaint. The Appellate Division reversed, reinstating the jury verdict. The Board of Education appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the Board of Education negligently failed to provide adequate supervision, leading to the plaintiffs’ injuries.

    Holding

    Yes, because the school had notice of a specific threat and failed to take reasonable steps to protect the student, and because the absence of security personnel at a critical time and location was a proximate cause of the injuries.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals stated that schools have a duty to adequately supervise students, acting in loco parentis. To establish a breach of this duty when injuries are caused by fellow students, it must be shown that school authorities had sufficiently specific knowledge or notice of the dangerous conduct which caused the injury and that the injury was foreseeable. The Court highlighted the fact that the school, through a teacher, was made aware of Webster’s death threat to Virna. The Court also noted the absence of security personnel at dismissal time, despite the school’s own security plan requiring their presence. The court emphasized, “The violent acts which caused plaintiffs’ injuries were sparked by a prior altercation and death threat of which defendant, through one of its teachers, was expressly made aware; yet no action was taken to prevent escalation of the incident…” The Court found that the jury reasonably concluded that the Board was on notice of imminent danger and did not take reasonable steps to protect Virna. It further stated, “On the issue of proximate cause, we conclude that a rational jury could find that the complete absence of security or supervisory personnel at a time and place when vigilance was absolutely essential constituted the proximate cause of plaintiffs’ injuries.” The court concluded that the jury’s verdict was supported by sufficient evidence and should be upheld.

  • документооборот v. Board of Education, Union Free School Dist. No. 3, Town of Brookhaven, 12 N.Y.2d 799 (1962): Municipality’s Duty to Prevent Foreseeable Harm in Public Spaces

    dokumentоборот v. Board of Education, Union Free School Dist. No. 3, Town of Brookhaven, 12 N.Y.2d 799 (1962)

    A municipality is liable for injuries resulting from criminal activities in its parks or playgrounds if it is aware of such activities and fails to take appropriate preventative measures.

    Summary

    This case concerns the liability of a school board for injuries sustained by a child due to the negligent discharge of fireworks on school property. The New York Court of Appeals held that the school board was liable because it had prior notice of the dangerous activity (fireworks being set off in the schoolyard) and failed to take reasonable preventative measures. This ruling affirms the principle that municipalities have a duty to maintain their public spaces in a reasonably safe condition and to prevent foreseeable harm, especially to children.

    Facts

    The seven-and-a-half-year-old plaintiff was injured when a firecracker exploded in the schoolyard of Union Free School District No. 3. The Board of Education was aware that children had been using the schoolyard as a playground for years. The board had received multiple notifications about firecrackers being set off in the schoolyard. Community members had requested that the missing gates of a high metal fence separating the schoolyard from the sidewalk be reconstructed to prevent access after hours, however the board failed to act.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the plaintiff.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a municipality is liable for injuries sustained in a public space when it had prior notice of dangerous activity occurring there and failed to take reasonable steps to prevent the injury.

    Holding

    Yes, because a municipality aware of criminal activities like the discharge of fireworks in its parks or playgrounds is liable for resulting injuries if it fails to take appropriate preventative measures.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court relied on the precedent set in Caldwell v. Village of Island Park, which established that a municipality has a duty to maintain its park and playground facilities in a reasonably safe condition. The court emphasized that this duty extends to preventing foreseeable harm. In this case, the Board of Education had constructive, if not actual, notice of the dangerous activity. “The decisive principle is that a municipality aware that its park or playground is being used by visitors as a site for criminal activities, such as the unlawful discharge of fireworks, will be liable for resulting injuries if it fails to take appropriate preventative measures.” The court stated that the invitation to use the schoolyard as a playground could be implied from the board’s knowledge and failure to take any action to exclude children. The court explicitly rejected the argument that the lack of express invitation or supervision absolved the board of its responsibility. The failure to repair the fence, despite requests, further underscored the board’s negligence. The court reasoned, that importing that the present case involves a new or major step in imposing liability would weaken well-established doctrine sustaining liability, especially to children, for injuries due to hazards in public or publicly-maintained places.