New York Law Review

Tag: Foreign Divorce Decree

  • Kleila v. Kleila, 50 N.Y.2d 277 (1980): Enforceability of Separation Agreements After Foreign Divorce

    Kleila v. Kleila, 50 N.Y.2d 277 (1980)

    A separation agreement retains its contractual force even after being incorporated into a foreign divorce decree, but electing to sue on the agreement precludes an award of counsel fees under Domestic Relations Law §238 if the decree, as modified, no longer mandates the same level of support.

    Summary

    This case addresses the enforceability of separation agreements after a foreign divorce and the availability of counsel fees in actions based on such agreements. The New York Court of Appeals held that while a separation agreement remains valid and enforceable even when incorporated into a foreign divorce decree, a party who chooses to sue on the separation agreement, rather than the modified divorce decree, is not entitled to counsel fees under Domestic Relations Law § 238 if the modified decree no longer provides the same level of support. The Court affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision regarding the Statute of Limitations and the husband’s defenses, but modified the judgment to deny counsel fees to the wife.

    Facts

    The husband and wife entered into a separation agreement. Subsequently, they obtained a bilateral foreign divorce decree that incorporated the separation agreement. Later, a Family Court order modified the support provisions of the divorce decree. The wife then commenced an action seeking arrears based on the original separation agreement, arguing that the husband had failed to meet his obligations. The husband raised defenses including the Statute of Limitations, the invalidity of the separation agreement due to his emotional state and lack of counsel during its execution, and laches.

    Procedural History

    The trial court ruled in favor of the wife. The Appellate Division affirmed, rejecting the husband’s Statute of Limitations defense and holding that the separation agreement was enforceable, but it modified the judgment concerning other issues. The case was then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether a party to a separation agreement may collaterally attack its validity after it has been incorporated into a valid, bilateral foreign decree of divorce.
    2. Whether the husband’s affirmative defense of laches had merit.
    3. Whether the wife was entitled to counsel fees under Domestic Relations Law § 238 when she elected to sue on the separation agreement, rather than the modified divorce decree.

    Holding

    1. No, because a party to a separation agreement may not attack the validity of the agreement collaterally after it has been incorporated in a valid, bilateral foreign decree of divorce.
    2. No, because the husband failed to show that he was prejudiced by the wife’s alleged undue delay in asserting her right to arrears.
    3. No, because the divorce decree, as modified, no longer requires the level of support provided for by the separation agreement; by electing to proceed under the separation agreement, the wife chose a litigation path to which Domestic Relations Law § 238 was not applicable.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals agreed with the Appellate Division’s rejection of the Statute of Limitations defense based on the reasoning in the lower court’s opinion. The Court emphasized that a separation agreement cannot be collaterally attacked after being incorporated into a valid foreign divorce decree, citing Greschler v. Greschler, 51 NY2d 368, 376-377. Therefore, the husband’s defense concerning his emotional state and lack of counsel at the time of the agreement’s execution was deemed inadmissible.

    The Court dismissed the laches defense because the husband failed to demonstrate prejudice resulting from the wife’s delay in asserting her rights, referencing Sorrentino v. Mierzwa, 25 NY2d 59.

    Regarding counsel fees, the Court distinguished the case from Fabrikant v. Fabrikant, 19 NY2d 154. Unlike Fabrikant, the divorce decree in this case, as modified by the Family Court order, no longer mandated the same level of support as the original separation agreement. The Court reasoned that while the wife had the right to sue on the separation agreement, by doing so, she opted for a legal avenue where Domestic Relations Law § 238, which provides for counsel fees, did not apply. The court stated, “while the wife was not bound by the support provision of the decree and so was privileged to proceed under the separation agreement, by electing to do so she chose a litigation path to which the provision for counsel fees in section 238 of the Domestic Relations Law was not applicable.”

  • Greschler v. Greschler, 51 N.Y.2d 36 (1980): Enforceability of Foreign Divorce Decrees Incorporating Support Waivers

    Greschler v. Greschler, 51 N.Y.2d 36 (1980)

    New York courts will generally recognize foreign divorce decrees, including separation agreements incorporated therein, unless procurement of the judgment involved fraud or recognition would violate a strong public policy of New York, assessed by prevailing community standards.

    Summary

    Helen Greschler sought to invalidate a Dominican Republic divorce decree and the incorporated separation agreement, arguing the agreement, which waived her right to support, violated New York public policy. The court held that because Helen failed to sufficiently plead fraud in procuring the power of attorney for the divorce, she could not attack the separation agreement’s validity. The court reasoned that New York generally recognizes foreign judgments unless they are obtained by fraud or violate a strong public policy. Furthermore, the court noted that New York’s public policy regarding spousal support had evolved, now allowing waivers of support if the spouse is not likely to become a public charge, aligning with the terms of the separation agreement.

    Facts

    Helen and David Greschler married in 1955 and entered into a separation agreement in 1975, where Helen waived alimony. The agreement stipulated that if either party obtained a divorce, the separation agreement would be incorporated into the decree but would otherwise survive. Helen signed a power of attorney authorizing her appearance in a Dominican Republic divorce action, also directing the court to approve and incorporate the separation agreement. David obtained a divorce in the Dominican Republic based on incompatibility of temperaments, with the decree incorporating the separation agreement.

    Procedural History

    Helen sued in New York to set aside the separation agreement and request alimony, arguing it violated New York public policy and was procured by fraud. The initial complaint was dismissed with leave to replead to challenge the divorce decree itself. Helen amended the complaint to include a challenge to the Dominican Republic divorce decree, alleging fraud in procuring the power of attorney. The Supreme Court denied David’s motion to dismiss. The Appellate Division reversed, granting the motion and dismissing the complaint, finding the fraud claim insufficiently detailed and holding the relevant General Obligations Law section unconstitutional. Helen appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the plaintiff’s cause of action for fraud was pleaded with sufficient particularity to withstand the defendant’s motion to dismiss.
    2. Whether, absent a successful challenge to the jurisdiction of the Dominican Republic court, the plaintiff can attack the validity of the separation agreement incorporated into the foreign decree based on an alleged violation of New York public policy.
    3. Whether enforcing the Dominican Republic divorce decree, which incorporates a separation agreement waiving spousal support, would violate New York’s public policy.

    Holding

    1. No, because the plaintiff’s allegations were conclusory and failed to meet the statutory requirement that fraud be pleaded “in detail.”

    2. No, because failing to successfully challenge the jurisdiction of the Dominican Republic court on the ground that her power of attorney was obtained by fraud, plaintiff was precluded from assailing the validity of the separation agreement.

    3. No, because New York’s current public policy, reflected in the amended General Obligations Law, allows either spouse to waive their right to support as long as they are not likely to become a public charge.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court agreed with the Appellate Division that the fraud claim was insufficiently detailed, failing to meet the requirements of CPLR 3016(b). The court emphasized that under conflict of laws principles, without a successful challenge to the Dominican Republic court’s jurisdiction (based on fraud in obtaining the power of attorney), Helen was precluded from attacking the separation agreement’s validity on public policy grounds. The court stated that New York generally extends comity to foreign judgments, equivalent to the full faith and credit given to judgments of sister states, absent fraud in procurement or violation of strong public policy. The court quoted Loucks v Standard Oil Co., 224 NY 99, 111, stating that for a court to refuse recognition to a lawful foreign judgment, it must violate “some fundamental principle of justice, some prevalent conception of good morals, some deep-rooted tradition of the common weal.” The court further reasoned that public policy should reflect “the prevailing attitudes of the community” (Ehrlich-Bober & Co. v University of Houston, 49 NY2d 574, 580). Examining New York’s public policy, the court highlighted the amendment to General Obligations Law § 5-311, which now permits either spouse to waive support if they are not likely to become a public charge. This evolution indicated that Helen’s waiver did not violate New York’s prevailing policy. The court concluded that without overturning the divorce decree, Helen could not collaterally attack the separation agreement, and because the fraud claim was dismissed, the argument regarding General Obligations Law § 5-311 was academic.

  • Gleason v. Gleason, 26 N.Y.2d 127 (1970): Comity and Collateral Attack on Foreign Divorce Decrees Based on Fraud

    Gleason v. Gleason, 26 N.Y.2d 127 (1970)

    A New York court’s ability to entertain a collateral attack on a foreign divorce decree based on fraud depends on whether such an attack would be permitted in the rendering jurisdiction, considered under principles of comity.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether a New York court can hear a collateral attack on a Dominican Republic divorce decree and separation agreement based on the husband’s alleged fraud. The wife claimed the husband failed to disclose ongoing negotiations to sell his family business, which would have significantly impacted her decision to sign the agreement. The Court of Appeals held that the initial determination must be whether Dominican Republic courts would allow a similar collateral attack. If so, New York courts, under principles of comity, should also consider the merits of the fraud claim. If not, the New York court should then consider whether exceptional circumstances warrant allowing the attack despite Dominican law.

    Facts

    The wife and husband, married for 20 years, separated and began negotiating a separation agreement and divorce in 1971. On March 20, 1972, they signed a separation agreement, and the wife authorized an appearance on her behalf in a Dominican Republic divorce proceeding. Four days later, the husband obtained a divorce decree in the Dominican Republic. Less than three weeks after the divorce, the wife learned the husband’s family business had been sold for $28.5 million. Less than three months after the divorce, the wife sued to set aside the divorce decree and separation agreement, alleging fraud.

    Procedural History

    The wife sued to set aside the Dominican Republic divorce decree and the separation agreement. Special Term concluded the husband committed fraud but dismissed the action, holding that the divorce decree could not be collaterally attacked in New York. The Appellate Division affirmed, disagreeing with the finding of fraud. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the grant of summary judgment and remitted the case for trial.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a New York court may entertain a collateral attack for fraud on a divorce decree rendered in the Dominican Republic.

    Holding

    No, not without first determining whether the divorce decree and separation agreement may be collaterally attacked in the courts of the Dominican Republic for the alleged fraud, because New York courts normally accord comity to foreign judgments, giving them the same recognition as judgments from sister states, but the extent of that recognition depends on the law of the rendering jurisdiction.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that New York courts typically grant comity to foreign judgments, giving them the same effect as judgments from sister states under the Full Faith and Credit Clause. However, this principle is not absolute. The initial step is to determine whether the Dominican Republic would allow a collateral attack on the divorce decree and separation agreement based on the alleged fraud. If the Dominican Republic permits such an attack, New York courts should also consider the merits of the fraud claim. As the court stated, “where collateral attack on the ground of fraud would be permitted in the courts of the foreign State in which the judgment had been rendered, our courts will entertain a similar challenge.”

    If the Dominican Republic bars collateral attacks, the New York court should then consider whether there are sufficient circumstances to warrant allowing a collateral attack despite Dominican law. The court noted that “if proof with respect to the laws of the Dominican Republic demonstrates that collateral attack would be barred in the courts of that Country or that there were doubts as to whether it would be permitted, the trial court in this case should nonetheless then consider, under principles of comity, whether there are here sufficient circumstances to warrant allowing collateral attack notwithstanding that such an attack would not be permitted in the courts of the Dominican Republic.” The court emphasized the need to determine whether the husband’s conduct vitiated the separation agreement and power of attorney before granting any summary judgment.

  • Drogheo v. Drogheo, 22 N.Y.2d 182 (1968): Establishing Family Court Jurisdiction over Foreign Divorce Decrees

    Drogheo v. Drogheo, 22 N.Y.2d 182 (1968)

    The New York State Legislature has the constitutional authority to confer jurisdiction upon the Family Court to enforce and modify alimony and support provisions of foreign divorce decrees, as this constitutes a new class of action or proceeding within the meaning of Article VI, Section 7, of the New York Constitution.

    Summary

    Evelyn Drogheo sought to enforce the support provisions of a Mexican divorce decree against her former husband, Joseph Drogheo, in New York Family Court. The Family Court granted her petition, but the Appellate Division reversed, finding that the Family Court lacked jurisdiction to enforce or modify foreign divorce decrees. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division, holding that the legislature had the authority to grant such jurisdiction to the Family Court because enforcing or modifying foreign divorce decrees constituted a new class of action, not previously recognized at common law.

    Facts

    Evelyn and Joseph Drogheo entered into a separation agreement in October 1964, which was incorporated into their subsequent Mexican divorce decree. The agreement stipulated that Joseph would pay Evelyn $23 per week for support.
    By May 25, 1966, Joseph was $376 in arrears on these payments.
    Evelyn petitioned the Family Court to enforce the support provision of the Mexican decree, pursuant to Section 466(c) of the Family Court Act.

    Procedural History

    The Family Court denied Joseph’s motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction and his cross-application for downward modification of the support provision; the Family Court granted Evelyn’s petition, determining Joseph to be $445 in arrears and ordering him to pay $23 weekly plus $5 weekly on the arrears (June 16, 1966).
    Another Family Court order fixed total arrears at $652 and required Joseph to post a $250 cash bond or serve 30 days in the workhouse; payments were to be held by the Support Bureau pending appeal (August 29, 1966).
    The Appellate Division reversed the Family Court’s orders, dismissing Evelyn’s application (date not specified).
    The New York Court of Appeals granted Evelyn leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the right to commence a proceeding to enforce or modify the provisions of a foreign divorce decree in New York courts constitutes a new class of action or proceeding within the meaning of Article VI, Section 7, of the New York Constitution, thereby allowing the Legislature to confer jurisdiction to the Family Court.

    Holding

    Yes, because at common law, New York courts had no jurisdiction over matrimonial matters, and the power of the Supreme Court over such matters is derived solely from statutory grants of authority. The enforcement and modification of foreign decrees, irrespective of the grounds for the divorce, constitutes a new class of action.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the legislature has the power to create new classes of actions and proceedings, concurrent with the Supreme Court, where the Supreme Court, absent statutory authorization, would lack jurisdiction.
    The Court noted that at common law, New York courts lacked jurisdiction over matrimonial matters, with the Supreme Court’s power in such matters derived solely from statute. Before the enactment of Section 466, New York courts could not enforce or modify foreign matrimonial decrees unless the grounds for the decree were recognized in New York.
    The Court emphasized that Section 466(c) empowered the Family Court to enforce and modify foreign decrees regardless of the grounds upon which they were granted.
    Because the right to commence such proceedings was not recognized at common law, it could be considered a new class of proceeding, allowing the Legislature to grant jurisdiction to the Family Court.
    The court quoted Thrasher v. United States Liab. Ins. Co., 19 N.Y.2d 159, 166 (1967): “Once the Legislature create[s’] the [new] cause of action, jurisdiction to entertain it automatically vest[s] in the Supreme Court by virtue of article VI of the Constitution.” This means that even if Section 466 did not explicitly grant concurrent jurisdiction to the Supreme Court, such jurisdiction would arise automatically.
    Furthermore, the Court stated that judicial policy requires construing legislative enactments to preserve their constitutionality and continuing vitality. Therefore, Section 466 should be interpreted to provide the Supreme Court with concurrent jurisdiction.