New York Law Review

Tag: Forcible Touching

  • People v. Hatton, 25 N.Y.3d 366 (2015): Facial Sufficiency of Information for Forcible Touching

    25 N.Y.3d 366 (2015)

    An accusatory instrument charging forcible touching must contain non-hearsay allegations that, if true, establish reasonable cause to believe the defendant committed the offense, including the element of lack of legitimate purpose.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether an accusatory instrument charging forcible touching was facially sufficient. The Court held that the instrument, which alleged the defendant smacked the complainant’s buttocks, sufficiently established the elements of the crime, including the lack of a legitimate purpose. The Court reasoned that, given the context and the intimate nature of the act, the instrument provided enough factual allegations from which to infer that the defendant acted without a legitimate purpose, thus satisfying the facial sufficiency requirements. The Court reversed the Appellate Term’s decision, which had dismissed the information.

    Facts

    Frankie Hatton was charged with multiple counts of forcible touching, sexual abuse, and harassment. The charges stemmed from incidents where he allegedly smacked the buttocks of several women. The accusatory instruments included factual allegations, witness statements, and the defendant’s own statement. Hatton pleaded guilty to one count of forcible touching. The Appellate Term reversed the conviction, finding the accusatory instrument facially insufficient. The People appealed to the Court of Appeals.

    Procedural History

    Hatton was originally arraigned on multiple accusatory instruments. He pleaded guilty to one count, but the Appellate Term reversed the conviction, dismissing the accusatory instrument. The People appealed. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the defendant implicitly waived his right to be prosecuted by information.

    2. Whether the accusatory instrument contained sufficient factual allegations to establish all the elements of forcible touching, specifically the lack of legitimate purpose.

    Holding

    1. No, because the record did not support a finding of implied waiver.

    2. Yes, because the factual allegations, when read fairly, supported an inference of no legitimate purpose.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court first addressed whether Hatton waived his right to be prosecuted by information. It found that a statement by Hatton’s counsel did not constitute a waiver because the counsel explicitly preserved Hatton’s right to prosecution by information. The Court then addressed the facial sufficiency of the accusatory instrument. The Court stated the instrument must establish reasonable cause and contain non-hearsay allegations which, if true, establish every element of the offense. The Court determined that the allegations that Hatton smacked the complainant’s buttocks, causing her to become alarmed and annoyed, sufficiently established the actus reus and the lack of consent elements. The Court emphasized that, intent may be inferred 'from the act itself,' and that the lack of a legitimate purpose may be reasonably inferred from the act of smacking someone’s buttocks, given the intimate nature of the act and the complainant’s reaction.

    The Court also rejected the argument that the instrument was deficient because it did not negate all possible defenses. The Court clarified that the People need only allege facts that, if true, establish the elements of the offense, and they are not required to anticipate and negate every potential defense. The dissent argued the allegations were too sparse to create any inferences establishing the “no legitimate purpose” element.

    Practical Implications

    Prosecutors drafting accusatory instruments for forcible touching cases must ensure that the factual allegations provide a sufficient basis for inferring all elements of the crime, including the lack of a legitimate purpose. While the Hatton decision does not create a per se rule, it suggests that alleging conduct on its face lacking a legitimate purpose (e.g. in a public setting without a prior relationship) is sufficient to establish the element. Prosecutors should carefully consider the context of the alleged conduct. The case also confirms that the People are not required to negate all possible defenses in the accusatory instrument. This case highlights the importance of detailed factual pleadings in criminal complaints and informs how similar cases should be analyzed, reinforcing the court’s case-by-case approach, focusing on the facts alleged within the instrument.

  • People v. Guarnan, 22 N.Y.3d 678 (2014): Defining “Forcible Touching” in New York Law

    People v. Guarnan, 22 N.Y.3d 678 (2014)

    In New York, “forcibly touches” under Penal Law § 130.52 encompasses any intentional bodily contact involving the application of some level of pressure to the victim’s sexual or intimate parts, when done with the requisite criminal intent.

    Summary

    Defendant was arrested for rubbing his exposed penis against another man’s buttocks in a subway station. He was charged with forcible touching, among other offenses. Defendant argued that the information was jurisdictionally defective because “rubbing” does not constitute the requisite “forcible touching” under Penal Law § 130.52. The Court of Appeals held that the act of rubbing, when accompanied by the intent to degrade or abuse, or for the purpose of gratifying the actor’s sexual desire, and involving the application of some pressure, does constitute forcible touching. The court affirmed the Appellate Term’s order upholding the conviction.

    Facts

    A police officer observed Luis Guarnan rubbing his exposed penis against another man’s buttocks in a subway station. The victim confirmed he did not consent to the contact. The accusatory instrument stated that Guarnan intentionally and for no legitimate purpose, forcibly touched the sexual and other intimate parts of the victim for the purpose of degrading and abusing him, and for the purpose of gratifying Guarnan’s sexual desire. The victim swore to his lack of consent in a supporting deposition.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was charged with third-degree sexual abuse, forcible touching, and public lewdness. The defendant moved to suppress identification evidence and statements, which was denied. He pleaded guilty to forcible touching. The Appellate Term affirmed the judgment, finding the information sufficient. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the factual allegation that the defendant “rubbed” his groin and exposed penis against the victim’s buttocks establishes the kind or level of force required by Penal Law § 130.52 to constitute forcible touching.

    Holding

    Yes, because, when done with the relevant mens rea, any bodily contact involving the application of some level of pressure to the victim’s sexual or intimate parts qualifies as a forcible touch within the meaning of Penal Law § 130.52.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that the factual allegations in a misdemeanor complaint must provide “reasonable cause” to believe the defendant committed the charged offense. An information must set forth “nonhearsay allegations which, if true, establish every element of the offense charged and the defendant’s commission thereof.” The Court stated that the examples in the statute, “squeezing, grabbing or pinching,” signal a low threshold for the forcible component of the crime. The Court found that the legislature intended a broad construction of “forcibly touches”, noting the crime was enacted as part of the Sexual Assault Reform Act of 2000, in response to public sexual attacks. The court rejected the argument that forcibly touching should be limited to contact that compresses and is painful or physically discomforting.

    The court stated that to be guilty of third-degree sexual abuse, the actor must subject another person to sexual contact without the latter’s consent, for the purpose of gratifying sexual desire of either party. Because third-degree sexual abuse criminalizes nonconsensual sexual touching for purposes of either party’s sexual gratification, the People are not required to plead or prove whether the touching is for the actor’s or the recipient’s sexual gratification.

    The People argued that “force” is commonly defined as “strength or energy exerted or brought to bear.” “Rub” means to move along the surface of a body with pressure, or to subject to the action of something moving especially back and forth with pressure and friction. “Since the use of ‘pressure’ or ‘friction’ obviously brings strength or energy to bear, the act of ‘rubbing’ qualifies as a forcible touch.”

    The court agreed with the People and concluded that “forcibly touches” is not restricted in the way defendant advocates, and the allegation in the information met the test.

    The legislative history of the crime of forcible touching indicates the legislature meant for “forcibly touches” to cover contact beyond only that which compresses and is painful or physically discomforting.

  • People v. Casey, 95 N.Y.2d 539 (2000): Specificity of Timeframe in Accusatory Instruments

    People v. Casey, 95 N.Y.2d 539 (2000)

    An accusatory instrument must provide sufficient information about the charge and underlying conduct to allow the defendant to prepare a defense, and the reasonableness of the timeframe alleged is determined on an ad hoc basis considering all relevant circumstances.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether an accusatory instrument that delineated a seven-month period for an alleged criminal act provided sufficient notice to the defendant. The court held that, based on the circumstances, the prosecution failed to demonstrate that such a broad timeframe was necessary. The court emphasized that while an exact date and time are not required, the timeframe must reasonably protect the defendant’s right to be informed of the accusation to prepare a defense.

    Facts

    The defendant, a funeral director and scoutmaster, was charged with forcible touching based on his relationship with a boy in his troop. The complainant lived with the defendant’s family for several months. More than a year later, the complainant reported to the police that the defendant had inappropriately touched him numerous times. The information filed with the court alleged that the incidents occurred “from December 2002 through June 2003” at the defendant’s home. The complainant’s supporting deposition detailed specific instances of alleged forcible touching, including an incident on a camping trip and instances of “play fighting” where the defendant would pinch his penis over his clothes.

    Procedural History

    The defendant moved to dismiss the information, arguing that the expansive timeframe made it impossible to prepare a defense. He alternatively sought a bill of particulars specifying the precise dates, times, and locations of the alleged offenses. The City Court denied the motion to dismiss. After a jury trial, the defendant was convicted of forcible touching. The defendant’s motion to set aside the verdict was denied, and he was sentenced to imprisonment. The County Court affirmed the conviction. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and stayed the execution of the sentence.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the accusatory instrument, delineating a seven-month time period for the alleged forcible touching, provided the defendant with sufficient notice of the charge to adequately prepare a defense.

    Holding

    No, because the People failed to demonstrate that they were unable to provide a more precise timeframe for the alleged act, considering the complainant’s age and intelligence, and the lack of explanation for the broad timeframe.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized that the primary purpose of an accusatory instrument is to provide sufficient information about the charge to allow the defendant to prepare a defense and to protect against double jeopardy. While an exact date and time are not required, the timeframe must reasonably serve the function of informing the defendant of the accusation. The court reiterated the “determination of whether sufficient specificity to adequately prepare a defense has been provided to a defendant by the [accusatory instrument] and the bill of particulars must be made on an ad hoc basis by considering all relevant circumstances” (quoting People v. Morris, 61 NY2d at 295). The Court considered factors such as the age and intelligence of the victim, the surrounding circumstances, and the nature of the offense. The court noted that because the complainant was reasonably intelligent and provided exact dates for incidents that occurred years prior, the People failed to justify the broad timeframe. As the Court stated in People v. Morris, “Reasonableness and fairness demand that the [accusatory instrument] state the date and time of the offense to the best of the People’s knowledge, after a reasonably thorough investigation has been undertaken to ascertain such information” (61 NY2d at 296). Thus, the Court held the defendant’s motion to dismiss the information should have been granted.